carlos huneeus madge
Universidad de Chile.
recepción: 04/10/2017 • aceptación: 27/03/2018
RESUMEN: El artículo analiza la participación de los partidos en los cuatro go- biernos de la Concertación en Chile (1990-2010), un tema conocido en la Ciencia Política como partygovernment. Esta participación estuvo influida por los rasgos institucionales del presidencialismo, con la centralidad decisoria del Presidente, por los cambios programáticos y organizativos llevado a cabo por partidos del conglomerado durante la dictadura, en el contexto más amplio de las lecciones extraídas por la caída de la democracia en 1973, y por decisiones estratégicas de los gobiernos. Estas tuvieron amplias repercusiones en la agenda del gobierno, no solo porque impusieron la primacía de la política económica sobre la agenda pública y no consideró la naturaleza política de la gestión del gobierno sino, también, porque se les descuidó en esas tres dimensiones, que explica su debilitamiento electoral, organizativo y en sus capacidades para participar en el gobierno. El artículo entre- ga elementos conceptuales y empíricos para el análisis de un tema hasta ahora no considerado por los estudios del presidencialismo en América Latina.
The Rate of Survival can therefore be considered as a prerequisite for carrying out successfully a political strategy. Obviously Minority Governments are lower ranking in this respect, and where there is a stable majority in parliament or a Single Partygovernment survival is often higher than average (examples are Australia, Greece, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain and the UK). However, the relationship is not overtly strong (Pearson’s r between Type of Government and Survival Rate= -.42**) meaning that it helps to have a Single Partygovernment or a Minimal Winning coalition (a score of 2 on Type of Government in Table 1), but cannot be considered as a sufficient condition in terms of achieving its policy goals. However, if we look at the Turnover Rate of governments a different story can be told: although many governments are formally terminated if and when an election is called this does not by definition imply that the partisan composition of the new government is altogether different from the previous one. More often than not the same government continues or it is only partially overhauled. For example, the Tories in Great Britain ‘ruled’ for 18 years on an end (only switching PM’s in 1990) and the same observation can be made for Germany (Kohl was Bundeskanzler, presiding over the same coalition, for 16 years) and Spain. Also in other countries with more complex coalitions this low turnover rate can be observed. However, in these cases often one (of the smaller) parties is exchanged for another (e.g. in Belgium, Finland, Italy before 1994, Ireland, the Netherlands, and – of course – Switzerland). Hence, the life and times of partygovernment depends on electoral results (office seeking capacity of parties), on the one hand, and on the ability of parties to remain incumbent (policy seeking coalescence), on the other hand. Both elements appear to influence the steering capacities of partygovernment over time:
While for many the return of single partygovernment was a shock, the Conser- vative majority was only 12. The last time the Conservatives had won an election was in 1992 when John Major secured 42.2% of the vote and a 21 seat majority. This was soon whittled down by by-election defeats while Major’s government suf- fered the corrosive effects of ratification of the Maastricht Treaty as the European issue ate away at the party and contributed to its landslide defeat at the 1997 general election. It is easy to deploy this historical analogy and predict toil and trouble ahead for David Cameron as this Parliament too, or at least its beginning, is likely to be dominated by a referendum on Britain’s EU membership. Yet the context is now very different; not least because Labour is considerably weaker than it was in 1992 with the decimation of its support in what were once its Scottish heartlands and a mountain to climb in England if it too were to aspire to form a single partygovernment.
These findings are important for understanding the role of partygovernment in parliamentary systems in the process of representation. In empirical terms, we show that the general public can influence policy change to a comparable degree in three political systems that have rather different patterns of partygovernment embedded in different institutions. In theoretical terms, our results help explain why coalition governments might not be less responsive to the wishes of the public. The normative implications of these results are significant as well. First, we show that even if political parties have weakened their links with society (Katz and Mair 1995), when in government they still follow to some extent general public opinion, and not only the wishes of their members and supporters. Second, we find evidence that party opposition cannot always override strong public support for policy change, which is good news for democratic representation.
Of particular concern for Green (2007) is that Rove attempted to bring about this realignment of U.S. politics without what Paul Allen Beck has labeled a “societal trauma” (Beck 1997). Given the peace and prosperity of the late 1990s, any potential for realignment lacked “an obvious trigger” and so Rove proposed to “use the levers of government to create” the necessary conditions “through a series of far-reaching policies.” One issue that defined Bush’s initial run for the presidency was his promise to deliver substantial tax cuts, a promise that had broad appeal among the different components of the GOP coalition and a promise the president would keep (Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001). But in addition, Bush proposed an ambitious agenda that included education reform, a restructuring of Medicare, the partial privatization of Social Security, government sponsorship of faith based initiatives, and new immigration laws. Rove believed that these poli- cies could be formulated to mobilize and ensure the political loyalty of con- servatives while simultaneously appealing to select Democratic and Inde- pendent voters (conservative and religious Blacks, women concerned about education, Catholics who voted on cultural issues, Hispanics, and the elderly) (Green 2007, para. 9-13; Lemann 2003, para. 42-43).
The changes in housing policymaking are important for two reasons. First, they reveal that a political party in power – one with a solid social programme and a growing economy – is capable of reducing inequality and poverty by promoting consistent social gains, which includes access to better quality social services and decent housing. Second, while social gains can be observed, those changes did not result in a wider sharing of wealth and power. The Workers’ Party promoted in a decade a combination of poverty reduction and economic growth policies. However, the party was unable to maintain a sustainable growth – in part due to the global uncertainty of the markets – and it was unable to hold on to its electoral support base. As a consequence, the housing sector has also been affected, first by the strong intervention of the private sector in the process of decision-making, and, second, by the several economic and political crises that have affected Brazil since Rousseff’s impeachment in May 2016.
tems, majoritarian, mixed and proportional. Each observation corresponds to a particular legislature in a particular country in the 1960-98 panel. The statistics in the table are computed from pooling together these observations. Most ob- servations are either classified as majoritarian or proportional. Comparing these two more extreme electoral systems, we immediately find large diﬀerences in line with all the predictions of the theory. Majoritarian electoral systems have a less fragmented party system, a smaller incidence of coalition governments, a larger in- cidence of single partygovernment, and smaller government spending, compared to proportional systems. The few mixed electoral systems display outcomes in between the polar types. Interestingly, 63% of the observations from majoritarian countries exhibit single-partygovernment, whereas the incidence for proportional countries is only 17%. Taking our model literary, the residual presence of coalition governments under majoritarian elections might reflect either the multiplicity of equilibria or heterogeneity of districts in a subset of countries. Note also that the standard deviation of the type of government is large within each class of electoral rules, suggesting that there may also be independent shocks to coalition formation, a feature not present in our model (see further below).
tems, majoritarian, mixed and proportional. Each observation corresponds to a particular legislature in a particular country in the 1960-98 panel. The statistics in the table are computed from pooling together these observations. Most ob- servations are either classified as majoritarian or proportional. Comparing these two more extreme electoral systems, we immediately find large diﬀerences in line with all the predictions of the theory. Majoritarian electoral systems have a less fragmented party system, a smaller incidence of coalition governments, a larger in- cidence of single partygovernment, and smaller government spending, compared to proportional systems. The few mixed electoral systems display outcomes in between the polar types. Interestingly, 63% of the observations from majoritarian countries exhibit single-partygovernment, whereas the incidence for proportional countries is only 17%. Taking our model literary, the residual presence of coalition governments under majoritarian elections might reflect either the multiplicity of equilibria or heterogeneity of districts in a subset of countries. Note also that the standard deviation of the type of government is large within each class of electoral rules, suggesting that there may also be independent shocks to coalition formation, a feature not present in our model (see futher below).
The other point of view is exactly the opposite, the starting point being the party viewed as a crucial element of the representative process. Normative and empirical points reinforce each other in this respect as well. On the empirical plane a long tradition of studies on elections under the conditions of mass participation showed to what extent parties with a well-defined identity and a strong organization came to control the representative process. On the normative plane democracy became the predominant political value and it was interpreted as a process centred on competitive representation. Thus parties gained, both in theory and in practice, the status of crucial ‘transmission belts’ of the democratic will. The ‘normal’ expectation was therefore that parties should gain an upper hand on the government and use the government to implement the popular will. The dominance of party over government - partygovernment - far from being an ‘evil’ became a critical condition of true democracy (Ranney 1962). In such a perspective there was obviously little point in studying government per se, except to determine the conditions under which parties could control the instruments of governance. Thus, as it was noticed once (King 1975), for a long time little attention was paid to cabinets in political science studies. More recently, however, the rise of anti-party feelings and the signs of a decline of organised parties has shifted the attention again in the direction of governments.
Some think that it is not possible or wise to isolate local councils from party politics. Political education, such people contend, ought to start with local government elections. In fact the demands of state politics seem to support such a view very strongly. The success or otherwise of a gubernatorial candidate is determined by his successes or failure in local government areas. To win, a candidate will not only score simple majority votes throughout the state but the votes must be spatially distributed among the local government areas that make up the state. He has to score at least 25 percent of the votes cast in at least two thirds of the local government areas. Thus the local government area is the unit of political organization of the political parties, by implication, and party control of the councils is one of exercising this control and thus winning over that local government area.
1926 General Strike and the ‘Socialism in Our Time’ campaign which attempted to raise the pace of change to socialism, but which also succeeded in dividing regional bodies such as the Scottish ILP. 3 R. K. Middlemass, in his book The Clydesiders, concluded that disaffiliation was a ‘suicide during a fit of insanity’. 4 More recently, Gidon Cohen has suggested that there was reasoned debate in the move towards disaffiliation. 5 All three interpretations raise questions about the nature of the decision to disaffiliate. The first implies long –term decisions, the second a more immediate decision following the collapse of the second Labour government, whilst the third suggests that it was a hard fought and reasoned debate led to disaffiliation. Ironically, none of these are exclusive of each other, although they clearly vary in emphasis. The fact is that there had been tensions between the ILP and the Labour Party before the formation of the second Labour government, during the administration of the second Labour government, and afterwards. The second Labour government merely heightened the potential for conflict and division. But, as David Howell has reflected, there may be no clearly defined explanation based upon the Labour Party’s gradualism and the battle over Standing Orders, for neither issue would have gained a majority for disaffiliation. Indeed, as Howell writes, ‘The trajectory of the ILP in the decade after 1922 cannot be captured adequately in the narrative of socialist disenchantment with the compromises of gradualism.’ 6 Nevertheless, nuanced or not, the narrative of the second Labour government provided the context and the final reason for disaffiliation.
8 As this thesis focuses on new party entry into parliament, it is important to define what exactly is meant by the term in this research, because various authors in various studies on new political parties have used different definitions. In this thesis, a party is considered new if it manages to win one or more seats in parliament after an election, while not having been present in parliament during the parliamentary term before the election. However, this definition does not include new political parties created as the result of a merger between two established political parties, because that would make comparison unfair. Merger parties are much more likely to gain seats after election than ‘true’ completely new parties are, especially if they are based on the merger of two parties that were represented in parliament. Mergers tend to attract media attention, which increases the knowledge of the new party among the general public, which in turn increases the chance of winning votes. They also have an established member base, composed of the members of the two parties before the merger. Additionally, they profit from an existing organizational structure and a functioning party office, as well as likely having access to the funds and resources of their predecessors. Because of this, counting merger parties as new parties could potentially bias the results of the effect of public funding availability on new party entry, as merger parties are in a much more favorable position to gain parliamentary seats.
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Neal Devins, Rethinking Judicial Minimalism: Abortion Politics, Party Polarization, and the Consequences of Returning the Constitution to Elected Government, 69 Vanderbilt Law Review 935 (2019)
The results of the INCB Variable test support the research conducted by (Klasnja & Titiunik, 2017; Linden, 2004; Macdonald, 2014; Moral et al., 2015; Uppal, 2008) which showed that elections in industrial democracies are related to personal characteristics of potential candidates for head of government and incumbents rarely happen. But on the contrary, this test showed different results than what was done by Prasetyo, 2014; Kalulu, 2014; Masyitoh et al., 2010; Ferraz & Finan, 2008; 2010. In this study the measurement of proxy uses a dummy variable, so that this result is possibly different from previous studies because the measurement of the Incumbent Status variable uses the time of the regional head in occupying his position (Prasetyo, 2014) and the measurement of Incumbent Status variables against Corruption Indications uses the Index Perception of Corruption (Masyitoh et al., 2010).
However, compare Weaver to the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in United States v. Warshak, holding that “a subscriber enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of emails ‘that are stored with, or sent or received through, a commercial ISP’” regardless of their age. 56 The court further held that “[t]he government may not compel a commercial ISP to turn over the contents of a subscriber’s emails without first obtaining a warrant based on probable cause.” 57 To the extent that the SCA says otherwise, the Sixth Circuit declared it is unconstitutional. 58 The court reasoned that email and other traditional forms of communication, like tangible mail, are so similar that it would “defy common sense to afford emails lesser Fourth Amendment protection,” comparing an ISP to a post office. 59
Taking an implicit approach to party nationalization, the laws have set three qualiﬁcation thresholds for parties: consisting of at least 10,000 members; having offices in at least 20 provinces; and having at least 35 founders, who represent a minimum of 20 provinces. Although these thresholds have not explicitly referred to the ethnic composition of political parties, they were indeed designed to encourage broad-based parties given the regional concentration of ethnic groups. Even so, these laws have failed to encourage cross-ethnic parties or coalitions. Afghan parties have remained fragmented, personalized, and ethnic-based. In fact, no cross-ethnic party has grown in Afghanistan. Although some cross-ethnic coalitions have emerged during elections, they have failed to institutionalize as stable and cohesive political forces. This paper shows that the failure of laws to encourage cross-ethnic parties and coalitions has been due to their command-and control nature (as compared to incentive-based) and the fact that the laws have failed to set a regulatory framework for the cross-ethnic coalitions that have emerged, particularly during the presidential elections.
When one moves from religious denomination to variables that mea- sure “religiosity” some important differences are evident among the activists of both parties. Republican activists were much more likely to be regular churchgoers than Democrats, with a majority of Republicans reporting that they attended a church service almost every week or more frequently. In contrast one in five Democratic activists reported that they never attended a church service. The “religiosity divide” is also evident in two other items. Activists were asked what role religion played in guiding their day-to-day lives, and whether they have had a “born-again” experience. While a bare majority of Democrats said that religion guided their daily life either a “great deal” or a “fair amount” almost two-thirds of Republicans said the same. Finally, Republicans were more likely than Democrats to claim to have had a “born again” experience. Thus, the documented importance of religiosity or religious traditionalism as a new cleavage in both national and southern politics (see, for example, Layman and Carmines 1997; Green et al. 1998) also appears to distinguish party activists in Florida, although it would be something of an exaggeration to suggest that the state now possesses a “religiously committed” Republican party and a “secular” Democratic Party.
appearance of media f igures as political leaders. Yesh Atid’s leader, the news anchor and media star Yair Lapid, exemplif ies this development. Lapid’s supporters seem attracted to his ‘catch-all strategy’ with ref erences to both lef t-wing and right-wing political concerns while claiming to be the most attractive centrist party. He advocates military service f or all citizens, ‘improvement’ of the education system, and ‘ref orming’ the electoral system. He has used his media popularity to criticise both the political system as well as Netanyahu’s socio-economic policies, which resonates particularly well among discontented middle class voters.
8. Period of Validity of Proposals: The price offers shall remain firm within the currency of contract and no escalation of price will be allowed. The quoted offer and/ or rate must be valid for a minimum period of 120 days from the date of opening of the tender. The tender inviting authority reserves the right for seeking extension of validity of offered rates from the successful Tenderer. Acceptance of such request during actual offer is however optional to the Tenderer. The price validity will remain unaltered irrespective of any reason including foreign exchange rate variation. Variation in statutory rate levied by Government will however be reflected for both reduction and escalation. A Bid valid for shorter period shall be rejected being non-responsive.