ETH Zurich also supports in particular the commercial exploitation of research findings by its graduates and staff and the related creation of spin-off companies. The technology transfer office ETH transfer supports ETH Zurich members in this process and ensures that the research freedom and the scientific independence of ETH Zurich members is maintained and that potential conflicts of interest are disclosed. In this respect, an understanding by all ETH Zurich staff members of their responsibility for their own actions is the best prerequisite for working together in a constructive and ethically correct manner (see also Weisungen betreffend Meldungen von Angehörigen der ETH Zürich zu rechtlich und ethisch unkorrektem Verhalten 2 (Instructions on Reports by ETH Zurich Members of Illegal and Unethical Behaviour)).
Second, prudential aspects in the distribution of funding must take into account. Islamic business unit which conducts accelerated growth of market share asset would try to increase the allocation of funding. To chase big asset growth would make relevant Islamic bank to improve the distribution of funding, distribution of funding who lacks prudential aspects would cause the increase of financing problems. Third, comparison of the value of assets between Islamic business unit and conventional parent bank is a related matter, so it cannot compare to Islamic business unit and a sharia subsidiary of a large conventional bank with the relatively small conventional bank. Fourth, asset share value does not have any direct connection with the net profit from relevant Islamic bank. If we look at the data, it is seen that Bank of CIMB Niaga whose asset share values is 3.73% able to earn current year profit for IDR 104 billion, where this amount of gain is similar with the net profit of Bank of DKI for IDR 104 billion, but it has shared asset for 9.29%. Therefore, factors of the current year profit for the last several years can include as one of the spin-off requirements compared to the asset share value Islamic Business Unit with its conventional parent bank.
Subsequently, our findings support the general argument that the characteristics of information provided by mass media influence investor choices about spin-off firms. In this perspective, we evidence that mass media information is important not only for its novelty, but also for its effects on investor sentiment. As one could expect, media sentiment, measured as semantic content of the news, influences the investors’ preferences and therefore returns around the spin-off deals date. In particular a positive (negative) media sentiment in news spread before spin-off deals is associated with positive (negative) short term returns.
Commercialisation of intellectual property (IP), particularly patent becomes an important agenda in most universities. Patents that were licensed to established companies in return for royalties recognised as a traditional mode to commercialise university IPs. As government funding are getting harder to obtain, and demand from the stake holders to see universities play more important role in local economic development, universities are prompts to look at spin-off formations as an alternative route for technology commercialisation. This paper is trying to look into the process of decision making in commercialisation of university patents through spin-off formation. A single case of one university in Scotland is adopted in this study. Six patents from university portfolio’s patents were selected, which were licensed to spin-off companies. Companies that licensed know-how or IPs other than patents were excluded. The inventors of these 6 patents were interviewed in depth using semi-structured questionnaires, which were recorded and later transcribed. The data were then analysed using a case basis and cross-case analysis aided with Nvivo software.
spin-off, such as BNI Shariah, BRI Shariah, BJB Shariah, BSB and Victoria Shariah. The research is done by Wilcoxon Match Pairs test that saw the performance between before and after the spin-off decision on Islamic banking units. The variables of Is- lamic banks performance are asset, financ- ing, third party funds, net earnings, CAR, NPF, FDR, ROA and ROE. The result shown that only asset, financing and third party funds that shown a difference be- tween before and after spin-off policies on that five banks. Otherwise for other va- riables such as CAR, FDR, ROA and ROE shown that there were no difference on CAR, FDR, ROA and ROE in Islamic banks. This result might be due to the spin- off is new practiced in the Islamic banking industry, so the testing period was short on this research.
Stamboel (2012) found that three things are most often encountered during the spin-off process that is: First, spin-off plan and brief information of spin-off plan; Second, employee movement; and Third, incompatibility between regulation of Ministry of Justice and regulation of Bank Indonesia. In this study, it can also be concluded that the business environment in Indonesia has been more than ready to conduct spin-off transactions since the support of the State is still sufficient. This condition should be balanced with a single set of laws and regulations conducive to the implementation of the process, Achieve legal certainty for all parties involved in spin-off transactions.
Obviously, there are some disadvantages, too. One of them is the high risk of conflict of interests between the Spin – off and the mother company. Many of such conflicts result in an abrupt bonds breaking between both institutions, which is not profitable for any of them. However, in almost every Spin – off a moment arrives, when breaking the bonds with the mother company seems very tempting for its further development and commercialisation of the new technology. The problem is that the main enterprise hardly ever can be satisfied with cost repayment only. This is the moment, when in most cases negotiations start.
Le imprese spin-off nascono grazie all’entusiasmo dei fondatori e ad una forte spin- ta nel voler fare qualcosa di nuovo. Nonostante ciò, il discorso speculativo è spesso estraneo alla logica sottesa alla nascita di queste imprese: questo è un altro dei motivi principali per cui non è ben vista l’idea di un venture capitalist. Le imprese lamentano il fatto che i venture capi- talist non sono informati sulle attività e sulle fi- nalità dell’impresa e, soprattutto, non sono inte- ressati a quello che fanno: l’obiettivo è unica- mente quello di investire nell’impresa e realizza- re un buon utile nel giro di pochi anni. Sono molto aggressivi commercialmente e poco fina- lizzati alla qualità. Viceversa, l’obiettivo princi- pale dell’impresa spin-off è quello di far rilevare la differenza e la singolarità del prodotto, dedi- cando la maggior parte degli sforzi alla R&S. Il rischio che l’impresa vuole evitare è quello di avere all’interno persone che guardano solo il bilancio e i flussi di cassa, senza alcuna sensibi- lità circa il prodotto in commercio. L’impresa spin-off preferisce non avere padroni esterni e poter rispondere solo a sé stessa. Piuttosto che affidarsi ad un venture capitalist, l’impresa spin- off preferisce cercare alleanze commerciali rea- lizzando partnership con aziende che operano nello stesso settore e hanno la medesima sensi- bilità e attenzione all’attività in corso. Inoltre, se c’è l’idea di un prodotto non brevettabile e che richiede grossi investimenti, è più probabile che interessi ad una società che produce un prodotto simile che non ad un venture capitalist.
The role of academic spin-off has been recognized as fundamental element for eco- nomic development in the literature (Di Gregorio and Shane 2003, Fini et al. 2017). However, the question about how the academic community ’ s academic entrepreneurial potential can be stimulated is still unanswered (Fini et al. 2017; Fini, Obschonka et al. 2012; Fini, Grimaldi and Sobrero 2009). To understand impact on young academicians, AEI has got a lot of attraction in many entrepreneurship researchers (Fini et al., 2017; Goethner et al. 2012; Huyghe and Knockaert 2015; Mosey et al. 2012). According to Goethner et al. (2012), basing their study on the TPB, verified the ability of some eco- nomic variables to analyze AEI. However, in an academic context the main constructs of EI is the attitude, PBC and SN, whereas economic variables indirectly influence on attitude and PBC (Fini et al., 2017). Several studies indicates that university culture and climate shape AEI (Huyghe and Knockaert 2015). It has been observed by many a scholars that the commitment of university to an entrepreneurial mission leads towards the more chances of EI of its academicians.
• Exclusive licence policy: One policy that influences the rate of spin-off activity of universities is exclusive licencing. Permitting exclusive licences encourages spin-off activity for several reasons. Shane (2004:69) argues that entrepreneurs are unwilling to start new companies and bear the risks of developing new technology, while investors are unwilling to finance them because they need assurance that they will have exclusive rights to that technology once it has been developed. The non- exclusive licencing allows possible competitors to gain access to the technology that makes it even harder for the spin-offs to have appropriate returns on the developed technology. Non-exclusive licencing discourages the ability to create university spin- offs because it reduces the amount of capital that is invested in the development of the companies.
The Virginia Consortium Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology seeks approval as a spin-off degree program to begin in Fall 2013 based on the institutional, faculty, and community resources currently committed to the Psy.D. in Clinical Psychology, www.sci.odu.edu/vcpcp. The Ph.D. program in Clinical Psychology will be administered by the Virginia Consortium in Clinical Psychology, which is sponsored jointly by Eastern Virginia Medical School (EVMS), Norfolk State University (NSU), and Old Dominion University (ODU), all located in Norfolk, VA. The Interinstitutional agreement among the three institutions is Appendix A. The program has an administrative office and staff, located in the Virginia Beach Higher Education Center. The program is directed by the Director of Clinical Training (DCT), the Associate Directors of Training (A-DCT) and four additional faculty members who comprise the program’s Advisory Panel (AP). Each institution has two representatives on the AP.
In an effort to market the battery to consumers, is a must to get a model that fits the commercialization of the above cases. Based on previous research derived conclusion that is a spin-off best way for the start-up company in Sebelas Maret University . The spin-off is a company that exploits a university or research intellectual property that is characterized by the maturity of a technology. An academic spin-off is an enterprise of which the business activity is founded on a technological development or innovative concept developed at the university. The economic scale of this company must be small. In each of these regions and more specifically around each of the local research organizations, we analyzed which financial resources were available for (potential) spin offs and in which stage of the spin-off process these resources were used. In the invention phase, we find without exception, that research grants to the research organizations (universities, public research laboratories and embedded corporate laboratories) play a very important role.
In addition to external team members, another way to mitigate the perceived lack of experience and commercialization skills of a founding team is if the academic entrepreneur behind the spin- off is a professor. If the academic in the leadership position in the spinoff is a professor, their status is more likely to demonstrate greater proficiency in the aforementioned areas due to the longer period of time the professor has spent in academia during which he or she will have had more time to gain industry exposure through prior research efforts, board appointments, consultancy work and informal interactions (Peterson & Philpot, 2009; Francis, Hasan & Wu, 2015; Meyer-Krahmer & Schmoch, 1998; Bruneel, D’Este & Salter, 2010). Professors will have more opportunities to engage in such industry interactions due to a higher demand for their services than those of lower-ranked academics due to the fact that they are recognized as leading subject matter experts. In addition, since professors are able to build strong social capital and networks on the industry side, thereby increasing the likelihood that they are able to attract additional team members who possess industry competences and experiences to their founding team (Mosey & Wright, 2007).
dei collaboratori che siano di livello qualificato. Questi collaboratori si possono formare con il dottorato e poi si può continuare ad utilizzarli o a rapportarsi, anche dopo il dottorato, con delle borse post doc e con degli altri modi opportuni [di collaborazione]. Uno di questi [modi], almeno per parte della mia attività, era quello di rendere possibile l’applicazione dei modelli e delle teorie che ho sviluppato con la mia ricerca e quindi questo si poteva fare attraverso persone che si impegnassero in un progetto industriale, che però avesse un profilo scientifico diverso dal normale, quindi è stato quasi naturale cercare di costruire delle ditte (...). All’università, [sono presenti] due realtà: una parte di professori ordinari, in genere arrivati qualche mese o qualche anno prima, che è in grado di aver ricercatori che lavorano per loro o anche professori associati che lavorano per loro, e in questo caso costituiscono in qualche modo un gruppo di ricerca (...). [Per] altre [persone], invece come me, questo non è stato possibile, forse anche perché gli altri son più bravi, non so che cosa ... non voglio dar giudizi però osservo questa situazione. Allora io per far fronte a questa situazione, per avere delle persone che possano lavorare per me, nel momento in cui anche l’ambiente intorno ti domanda di avere delle risposte applicative sul territorio, ho pensato che l’unica via per non ingannarle fosse quella di cercare di costruire attorno alle loro figure anche un qualche tipo di professionalità, questo per esempio attraverso Snow Tech (...) [un altro esempio è] Idro-Tek nata prima che l’università di Ω permettesse degli spin-off e poi naturalmente molti studi professionali di miei studenti con i quali attualmente collaboro (...). Comunque [questo] è un problema che in questi tempi si pone perché viste anche i recenti decreti legislativi è difficile pensare che si vada in direzione dell’espansione del personale direttamente incardinato sull’università e quindi ci si deve porre il problema di come si deve fare la ricerca quando questa richiede la collaborazione di più persone”.
It was mentioned that ‘Universities and academics don’t have the experience and the skills for running companies… We are within the university trying to provide that help. That is the way in which we go’ (UVC). Regarding hiring an experienced CEO, also known in literature as a surrogate entrepreneur (Mosey and Wright 2007). However, not all the USOs had access to this choice, ‘because of the maturity of the company did not have the resources to hire managers’ (USO). The other one was to connect with UVCs. These UVCs brought to the USO all the skills that academics did not have but were badly needed for running the company, ‘my main responsibility is working within the universities to identify IP that we feel has the potential to become a spin-off and really incubating and developing that IP to build the business case’ (UVC). Once the investment was made and the company was established in the market, they still sat on the board of the company to ensure that it was developed. Therefore, in this way, the USO keeps the contact with UVCs and UTTOs over time. By doing so, they ensure they are linked to the revenues of the company established, which will be invested back again in new emerging technologies at universities. Therefore, UVCs in England are key in sustaining university IP commercialisation.
14 However, after a six-year break, Eon installed Martin Campbell in the chair: another experienced British director but one who was able to orchestrate one of the most elaborate stunts in Bond history. The justly renowned opening scene of Goldeneye – during which Bond freefalls into the cockpit of a pilotless light aeroplane – did much to reinvigorate and modernize the series on its own. Moreover, a whole new generation was reached through a hugely successful Goldeneye video-game spin-off, making a significant contribution to perceptions that the Bond film was no longer stale and
The interviews were carried out following a narrative approach (Polkinghorne 1988). During each interview, the pre-founding team members were asked to describe the status of their spin-off project, and the main elements in which they had progressed over the months prior to the interview, as well as the role and contribution of their TTOs. Decentralized and centralized TTOs were requested to describe the evolution of each spin-off project, the activities they had performed and how their involvement helped each pre-founding team to proceed. This type of narrative interviewing, in which there is minimum interruption by the interviewer, was used to obtain a better understanding of the events and to avoid the influence of interviewers’ personal views and theoretical perspectives on the data collection. The interview transcripts and documentary evidence were read and reread as data were collected and emerging themes were refined as this process progressed. Patterns of observations were identified and an iterative process allowed us to match empirical data with theoretical explanations. To avoid confirmation biases, two of the authors were kept at a distance from the data collection process (Doz 1996). A total of 63 interviews involving 21 different people were conducted over four interview rounds.
The study was conducted through the case study of the University of Turin. In the case study analysis, it is not possible to control the context, but it is possible to analyze the main characteristics (Benbasat, Dexter, Drury, & Goldstein, 1984; Yin, 2017). The analysis was conducted through direct reporting of the data, analysis of procedures and models adopted by the University of Turin, and periodic semi-structured interviews to spin-off and research office employees between 2017 and 2018 to verify the possible approach to be adopted and the future strategic choices that the university could have undertaken. To ensure the validity of case studies, data were collected through the presence and direct observation and presence during the internal meetings aimed at analyzing the case study. Furthermore, the triangulation guarantees the results relative to the collected elements. The data are original, and the case study and the analyzed sample presents elements that cannot be modified (Silverman, 2013). The flanking of qualitative analysis around the case guarantees the veridicity of what is expressed and analyzed (Glasser, 1999). External validity is possible because of the characteristics related to the document. The generalization of research results in similar contexts is possible through the analysis of the elements (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). The analysis and the treatment were conducted taking into consideration also reliability as the scholars usually would need to do when talking about case studies. ―Reliability‖ refers to the absence of random error, enabling subsequent researchers to arrive at the same insights if they conducted the study along with the same steps again (Denzin & Lincoln, 2002). Transparency and the possibility of replicating research allow and guarantee this aspect. The narrative collected during the study and the methodological approach of analysis and the replication of the case study analysis (Leonard-Barton, 1990).
But this discussion ignores two important factors: the cost to borrow Palm shares, and the uncertainty of the spin-off. We describe in the Appendix our unique dataset (provided by a major broker) showing that Palm lending fees were above 25% between April 10 and May 9 and above 50% after May 9. Separately, Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford (2003) locate 84 cases with “negative stub” values. In 30 % of these cases prices did not converge for some reason, such as cancellation of the spin-off, repurchase of subsidiary shares by the parent, or a takeover. Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford conclude that “… significant risk [is] faced by an arbitrageur