Terrorism has become a part of the global landscape and there is a world-wide call for security specialists to combat it. As a student of Bachelor of Arts (Security, Terrorism and Counter-terrorism) you will gain a multi-faceted understanding of terrorism and global security. You will be given an educational foundation in diplomacy, international security, IT training and counterterrorism studies and develop an informed understanding of terrorism and security that is highly valued in the international community.
40. The GTD has considerable limitations that should be kept in mind when interpreting the data. One noteworthy limitation is that the GTD does not include information on state terrorism. Thus, an act of state terrorism that may be considered ‘Olympic related’ is not covered in the GTD: the bombing of Korean Airlines flight KAL 858 in November 1987, which caused 115 fatalities. This attack reportedly involved state terrorism from North Korea and impacted upon security planning for the 1988 Seoul Olympics. See: Fussey, ‘Terrorist Threats to the Olympics, 1972–2016’. For a more general discussion of the database’s limitations see: Ramón Spaaij, Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism: Global Patterns, Motivations and Prevention (New York: Springer, 2012); LaFree, ‘The Global Terrorism Database’.
On 21 September 2015, Section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA 2015) came into force in England and Wales. The legislation imposes a duty on specified authorities, including colleges and universities, to have “due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism”. The provision is the latest in a series of measures introduced as part of the UK Government’s overall counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, which seeks to “stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism”. The Prevent duty has been met with significant opposition from within the Higher Education (HE) sector. At its 2015 Congress, the lecturers’ trade union, the University and College Union (UCU), passed a motion which condemned the Prevent duty as posing a serious threat to academic freedom. UCU has raised concerns that the Government’s broad definitions of ‘terrorism’ and ‘extremism’ will have the effect of stifling campus activism and freedom of speech. Concerns have also been raised by the National Union of Students (NUS) that in focusing disproportionately on Islamic- inspired ‘terrorism’ and ‘extremism’, the Prevent duty is inherently discriminatory towards Muslim students, and will sever the relationship of trust and confidence between staff and students, legitimise Islamophobia and lead to the normalisation of racist views. This article will consider the extent to which the Prevent duty undermines academic freedom in UK Higher Education. Drawing on the author’s own experience teaching counter terrorism law, the article will discuss the implications of the duty for HE teaching practice.
However, as this chapter has suggested, the deck is stacked against openness. At formal and informal levels, information remains largely in the control of the state. Within Muslim communities the mainstream media faces great challenges in building trust, with those challenges arguably substantially a product of the media’s own making. Journalists — even very experienced journalists with good contacts — find it very difficult to get reliable information and, importantly, to test the information they are given by the authorities. Even if imperfect, the courts are absolutely crucial avenues for obtaining information of great public interest. In terrorism and security matters, where information will be closely guarded by the state, the ability to adequately report court cases is essential if scrutiny of government is to be effective, if the threat of terrorism is to be understood, and if the public is to have confidence in the way that such threats are addressed. Things could and should be improved, but the main struggle at present is to ensure that open justice is not trumped by an all- encompassing—whether necessary or not—national security priority. In the words of a journalist interviewee, ‘ national security is an easy umbrella to put up to deflect what you think is going to be troublesome rain ’ . 100
Following the London bombings, U.K has implemented several legislative changes that grants security agencies exceptional measures. Particularly, the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act, introduced in 2012, is prominent in this regard: Faced with individuals that the state is unable to prove are affiliated with terrorist activities, the state may still invoke measures for a two-year duration on the individual – which may include electronic tagging, required regular reporting to the police, barred from travelling abroad, and being prohibited from specific locations (Lister, 2015:5-6). As Home Secretary Theresa May stated in a parliamentary debate concerning the TPIMs: “They provide some of the strongest restrictions available in the democratic world and some of the strongest possible protections that our courts will allow. (Parliament Publications, 2014: Column 229). Yet, in contrast to what the paper may have expected, there have been no distinct securitizing speech act moves in the U.K following the terrorist attack of 2005. This supports the arguments made by Huysman and Neal in that the decision-making speech act is reduced in importance regarding securitization, and the
Education, the Department for Innovation, Universities, and Skills, and the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) - for documents produced between January 2001 and December 2011 using the query: ‘citizenship OR security OR terrorism OR radicalisation/radicalization’. These texts were then augmented by using links from the iCoCo website (iCoCo 2011). However, we further narrowed down our selection to those documents most relevant to the aims of our research. Relevance was ascertained by the prominence of key terms in the title and by a preliminary reading of electronic documents for the frequency and salience of the search terms. For example, the 2005 document New Localism – Citizen Engagement, Neighbourhoods And Public Services: Evidence from Local Government (DGLC) appeared paradigmatic of the CCC discourse due to the emphasis upon citizenship and localism displayed in the title; while the three iterations of the CONTEST (Home Office 2006, 2009a, 2011a) and Prevent (Home Office. 2003, 2009b, 2009c, 2011b) documents emerged as prototypical PVE documents due to the frequency of the search terms ‘security’, ‘terrorism’ within the text itself, and their prominence on the websites of multiple government agencies. By contrast, documents in the series Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities (DLGC, 2009) were discarded not only because as they were demographic surveys and not policy documents per se, but also because the series followed a rather repetitious formula which would have distorted our statistical analysis. The final corpus comprised 148 documents, amounting to around 2.8 million words.
Terrorism is a major problem of the world today. Terrorism has affected government policies, inflicted injuries on men and women and caused physical damages to both people and infrastructure across the world. Computer, networks, electronic and other resources are usually the prime targets of suchterrorist attacks. This paper highlights existing cyber threats, discover efficient techniques for handling them and spread the awareness of such discovered information. A detailed study of information from secondary sources which includes the rich content of the internet and physical libraries were used to reveal that terrorist groups take advantage of certain anonymity provided by the internet especially through the social media platforms to perpetrate their evil intentions. The revelation arms individuals, organizations and government agencies with the strategy to adequately prepare to address all their security deficiencies while on the internet and thereby enhances their, safety, productivity and overall preformance both in business, government and family life.
We begin with an overview of what terrorism is and isn‟t, then proceed to a survey of terrorism techniques and organizations throughout the contemporary world. In the later half of the course, we will tackle the national security aspects – or how governments (both the US and others, as well as international organizations) should respond to terror. Finally, throughout the course we will integrate discussions regarding the morality of war, terrorism and torture.
The Second Report includes the work of over five months of not only the Task Force membership, but also of more than one hundred faculty members and staff of the Texas Tech University, the TTU Health Sciences Center; professional organizations; private enterprises;, and representatives of local, state and federal governments. Much of this work was carried out through the efforts of five subcommittees: Oil Field and Critical Infrastructure Anti-Terrorism, Agro-Terrorism, Surveillance in Public Health, University-City Public Health Partnerships, and the Homeland Security Degree Programs and Institute Subcommittees, identified in Appendix 2.
Large-scale illicit drug trafficking is the single most critical security threat the situation in Central Asia poses for Russia today. The drug trafficking of the region should by no means be associated primarily or solely with armed opposition groups. Most professional criminal groups operate independently from them, and the drug business is generally apolitical in the sense that it as easily co-opts corrupted parts of the state apparatus as it cooperates with militant opposition groups. Still, the very close nexus between terrorism and crime in the region poses a threat that is twice as hard to confront.
terrorism, and homeland security in America and national security of African nations. I posit that all the issues belong appropriately within the spheres of criminological inquiry. Since criminology focuses on crimes, and whereas terrorism constitutes depraved heart murder designed to instill fear on the populace, and because homeland security purports to defend against the actions of terrorists, then, they all have unique associations and are inseparable. If the purpose of terrorists is to instill fear and intimidate citizens or their victims and bring about reactions from individuals, organizations, and governments, it must be inferred that 9/11 certainly achieved that goal. This assessment can only be understood if terrorism experts pay more attention to the ideology of terrorism, which, in my conclusion, is the only practical way to defeat terrorism. If terrorists assume that they possess no legitimate means to address their grievances, they must believe that they can only succeed by using violence, which will allow governments to retaliate and respond. For terrorists, the essential purpose of violence is to instill fear, either through bombings, kidnappings, beheadings of innocent people, or by propaganda (White 2006). Terrorists believe that they will achieve their ideological goals and demands by employing methods of successful threats. If this view has any semblance of reality, Germany and the United States, as discussed above, have responded to September 11, 2001, because of the al- Qaida threats.
Today, terrorism is the hottest and most controversial issue in the world, and every country is aware of the dangers of terrorism. National security policy has become a key issue because most countries in the world are facing threat of terrorism. That is why most countries have revised their national security and foreign policy and adopted a series of measures to protect their countries and nationals from terrorism. They not only follow strict airport entry and exit inspection systems, but also develop stricter visa rules and regulations. This policy is successful in the short term, but in the long run, success cannot be achieved in controlling and eliminating terrorism and its threats (Ali & Li, 2016). The Government of Pakistan made strong policy about terrorism how to get rid of this evil. After the attack on school going children Peshawar the Government introduced certain policies against terrorism which up to date are not fully implemented. The government should have strong Foreign policy and established good relations with neighboring countries so that it could control the terrorism activities in Pakistan. Moreover, it should also increase the security on its borders especially Afghanistan and India borders, because the main influx of terrorists takes from these borders into the country.
Of course there is a need to make organised events as accessible as possible and to ensure there is a welcoming atmosphere within event arenas. This guide is accordingly not intended to create a 'fortress mentality'. There is however a balance to be achieved. Those responsible for security are informed that there are robust protective security measures available to mitigate against the threat of terrorism, e.g. protection from flying glass and vehicle access controls into crowded areas, goods and service yards and underground car parks.
Focusing on the Middle East—and contributing to the assessment of Li—Gregory Gause (2005a) demonstrates that terrorism originates from causes more precise and nuanced than regime type. Evidence for democracy promotion in the Middle East as an American security rationale fails under close scrutiny, as “soft support” for terrorist organizations would most likely maintain even with the imposition of—or transition into—democracy. Gause (2005) argues further that public opinion in Middle Eastern countries favors a type of democracy more akin to principles and organizational charac- teristics consistent with Islamic principles, quite dissimilar to the secular political atmosphere and liberal-mindedness of the West. As elections in the Gaza Strip in 2006 demonstrate (Herzog, 2006), along with the strong showing of conserva- tive and hard-liner Islamists in the Iranian elections (Peterson, 2008) and also recent political arrangements in Lebanon (Salem, 2008), there is very little strategic incentive for the U.S. to uphold its current democracy initiative as a solution to international terrorism. As Gause (2005) points out, a more effective approach would consist of bolstering lib- eral, secular, and nationalist organizations and individuals within Islamic countries that could genuinely counterbalance the recent gains of religious-extremists in the broader Middle East. Only then could the United States bring about domes- tic political reforms within Islamic states that are more in line with its own policies and perspectives. 2
Since 9/11, anti-terrorism resolutions have perhaps been the principal manifestations of the Security Council’s newfound authority. Anti-terrorism is an issue which unites disparate member states as, by definition, all non-state actors threaten the legitimacy of nation states and their governments. The international fluidity of terrorist movements which disregard national borders is a further incentive for co-operation: one reason for Russia’s condoning the US-led invasion of Afghanistan was awareness that Afghan terrorism also posed a threat to Russian security by destabilising Chechnya.  A number of these anti-terrorism resolutions are markedly different to those traditionally passed by the Security Council and raise concerns that the Security Council is acting in its own intergovernmental interest, not merely to the potential detriment of
The threat posed by cyber terrorism has grabbed the attention of the mass media, the security community, and the information technology (IT) industry. Journalists, politicians, and experts in a variety of fields have popularized a scenario in which sophisticated cyber terrorists electronically break into computers that control dams or air traffic control systems, wreaking havoc and endangering not only millions of lives but national security itself. And yet, despite all the gloomy predictions of a cyber-generated doomsday, no single instance of real cyber terrorism has been recorded. Just how real is the threat that cyber terrorism poses?Because most critical infra-structure in Western societies is networked through computers, the potential threat from cyber terrorism is, to be sure, very alarming. Hackers, although not motivated by the same goals that inspire terrorists, have demonstrated that individuals can gain access to sensitive information and to the operation of crucial services. Terrorists, at least in theory, could thus follow the hackers’ lead and then, having broken into government and private computer systems, cripple or at least disable the military, financial, and service sectors of advanced economies. The growing dependence of our societies on information technology has created a new form of vulnerability, giving terrorists the chance to approach targets that would otherwise be utterly unassailable, such as national defence systems and air traffic control systems. The more technologically developed a country is, the more vulnerary- able it becomes to cyber attacks against its infrastructure. Concern about the potential danger posed by cyber terrorism is thus well founded. That does not mean, however, that all the fears that have been voiced in the media, in Congress, and in other public forums are rational and reasonable. Some fears are simply unjustified, while others are highly exaggerated. In addition, the distinction between the potential and the actual dam-age inflicted by cyber terrorists has too often been ignored, and the relatively benign activities of most hackers have been conflated with the sectors of pure cyber terrorism. This report examines the reality of the cyber terrorism threat, present and future. It begins by outlining why cyber terrorism
‘extraordinary and widespread fear’ the authors of the bill elevated crimes such as piracy, murder and arson to the rank of threats to national security. In turn this allows for emergency measures, beyond the run of politics, to be taken by the state and the security services to counter the threat. Therefore legislation that is framed as social security is actually concerned with national security. However evidence also suggests that the critics that have argued that the Act allows for the security services to ride roughshod over human rights and civil liberties in the Philippines are mistaken. Largely because the Act has never been used. Indeed the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime argues that ‘Many notorious attacks on civilians that by their nature or context suggest a purpose to intimidate a population or to coerce a Government have been successfully prosecuted without the need to use anti-terrorism laws or to prove a specific terrorist intent’. In support of this claim they cite successful prosecutions of those who have committed acts that have intimidated a population or coerced a government without the use of anti-terrorist
Following 9/11, the US has become the leading force against terrorism and military action in the Middle East, 37 which makes it the desired target of militants. 38 In October 2003, the US Transport Security Association (TSA) piloted a programme in three airports called Screening of Passengers by Observations Techniques (SPOT) carried out by Behaviour Detection Officers (BDO) for the purpose of counter-terrorism. 39 The US Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) report suggested that SPOT was carried out without any scientific basis, and questioned the programme’s reliability. 40 The TSA responded by identifying that no other programme of this nature had ever been scientifically assessed prior to implementation. 41 The GAO acknowledged the difficulties in measuring the success of such a programme, because profiling passengers is not based on science but on the judgements of individual security staffs, which can be at times unreliable and create inconsistencies. Despite these concerns, in 2007 the programme was up-scaled and rolled out to 42 airports employing 644 BDO officers. By 2012 the programme had increased staffing in excess of 2800 at 142 airports. 42 No terrorist has been caught at an airport as a result of the SPOT programme, despite 199 arrests for other crimes. 43 In 2013 the programme was reviewed as lacking a clear strategic plan to identify priorities and establish clear outcomes, when costs having increased to $878 million. 44 A report sent to the GAO recommended that future funding for the programme needed to be limited. 45 The training of officers for the programme, particularly
There are two real and serious threats from terrorists to any country's security. The first is from terrorist acts themselves, which could cause mass casualties, severe economic loss, and social dislocation local society. The second is from the possibility of inappropriate or disproportionate responses to the terrorist threat that can do more damage to the fabric of society than terrorists would be likely to do. So that. Terrorism forms big threats to the state security in two levels, nationally and internationally. As for the national level, the terrorism actions lead to insecure societies. People first demand is security in homes, work, transportations, food and all other aspects of daily live. The existence of terrorists among people produces horror between civilians. The security of state's economy is highly affected by unsafe environment for investments.
Effective counter terrorism cannot simply be a reactive response (Crelinsten, 2009, 235). It must also be proactive and preventative; one of the most important parts of prevention is changing the mentality of terrorist and convincing them to see the value in non-violent ways of achieving their goals (Crelinsten, 2009, 235-236). There is a belief by some that the United States is losing the ‘war against cyber-terrorism’ by solely focusing on preventing cyber-terrorist attacks. The reason is that the United States is failing to effectively prevent terrorist’s primary use of the internet for both communication and indoctrination (Lappin, 2011, 125). This is the equivalent of increasing homeland security efforts, but failing to pursue terrorists abroad in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Terrorism cannot truly be prevented, while terrorists are allowed to strategize and recruit. While there have been increased efforts to monitor terrorist website, it is still difficult to prevent these sites. The reason for this is, when one website is targeted and shutdown, the information and communications on that site simply reappear somewhere else on the internet in a few days (Lappin, 2011, 127).