Estas son las principales leyes de naturaleza referentes al culto de Dios, es decir, las leyes que la razón dicta a todos los hombres, además de la uniformidad de culto público, porque las acciones realizadas por individuos esperanza de lograrla, y cuando no pueda conseguirla, entonces, puede buscar y usar todas las ventajas y ayudas de la guerra. ” 2. “ Que un hombre debe estar deseoso, cuando los otros lo están también, y a fin de conseguir la paz y la defensa personal hasta donde le parezca necesario, de no hacer uso de su derecho a todo, y de contentarse con tanta libertad en su relación con los otros hombres, como la que él permitirá a los otros en su trato con él .” ThomasHobbes, Leviatán. La materia, forma y poder de un Estado eclesiástico y civil, op. cit., 110 – 111. 3. “ De esa ley de naturaleza que nos obliga a transferir a otro esos derechos que, de ser retenidos, impiden la paz de la humanidad, se deriva una tercera le, que es ésta: que los hombres deben cumplir los convenios que han hecho. Sin esta ley, los convenios se hacen en vano y sólo son palabras vacías, y como de ese modo permanece el derecho de todos los hombres a todas las cosas, nos encontramos aún en un estado de guerra. Y en esta ley de naturaleza consiste la fuente y el origen de la Justicia. Ibíd. 121 ”. 4. “ Lo mismo que la Justicia depende de un pacto o convenio que ha tenido lugar previamente, así también la gratitud que depende de una gracia que se ha concedido con anterioridad, es decir, un don gratuito otorgado antes. Y esta es la cuarta ley de la naturaleza: que un hombre que recibe gratuitamente un beneficio de otro, debe hacer lo posible para que quien le ha otorgado esa gracia no tenga motivo razonable para arrepentirse de su buena voluntad. Ibíd. 127 ”. Así mismo con la complacencia, el perdón, la magnitud del futuro, contra la contumelia (injuria), contra el orgullo, contra la arrogancia, la equidad, el uso igual de cosas comunes, el sorteo, la primogenitura, y primera posesión, los mediadores, la sumisión al arbitraje, ningún hombre es juez de sí mismo, imposibilidad de ser juez por imparcialidad, sobre los testigos. Ibíd. 127 - 131 . Estas son las leyes de naturaleza que mandan buscar la paz como medio de conservación para los hombres en multitud, leyes sólo concernientes a la doctrina de la sociedad civil, pero también como forma obediente de alabanza a Dios.
We must not overlook that the foole’s foolishness is also to be attributed to his explicitness. That the foole is so foolish as to explicitly justify his view, however, is taken by some in the literature to be a straw-man and that Hobbes’s actual antagonist is (or, rather, should be) the ‘silent’ foole who says only in his heart that there is no such thing as justice. Moreover, these same commentators contend that Hobbes’s reply misses the point, in part, because he does not adequately address the problem of the ‘silent’ foole who believes that an absolute curb on self- interest is contrary to reason. See, e.g. David Gauthier, “Three Against Justice: The Foole, the Sensible Knave, and the Lydian Shepherd,” 17; F.C. Hood, The Divine Politics of ThomasHobbes, 110; Olli Loukola, “Combining Mortality and Rationality: Hobbes on contracts and covenants,” 82; and Alan Zaitchik, “Hobbes’s Reply to the Fool: The Problem of Consent and Obligation,” 246-247. In response to this allegation, see Kinch Hoekstra, “Hobbes and the Foole.” Hoekstra argues, I think convincingly, against the traditional interpretation: we should not view the ‘silent’ foole as Hobbes’s antagonist but, rather and only, the ‘explicit’ foole. For a brief explication of Hoekstra’s argument, see infra note 126 below.
ThomasHobbes’ ideas were so controversial in his day, in large part because he moved the locus of debate around politics away from the natural law tradition. From the ancients through to the early modern period, natural law transcended the classical and Christian eras by providing a picture of political life as one reflective of the order in nature understood as both the reality around us and a divine reality. Sophocles gives a picture of a natural law that sits outside of what we might think of as the immediate natural world in his play Antigone. Antigone’s resistance to King Creon’s order to leave her brother unburied reflects the idea that there is a law that sits above human made codes. Similarly, in the Judeo- Christian scriptures, the prophets insist that the kings of Ancient Israel obey the laws of God. In the story of King David, the prophet Nathan forces David to realize the error of his ways on more than one occasion, perhaps most famously in the scene in which the king sends one of his generals to the front line in order to take his wife for himself. Nathan asks ‘Why have you despised the word of the Lord to do what is evil in his sight?’ (2 Samuel 12: 9). This prophetic role reminds even the anointed king of his duty to God.
The literature on friendship broadly agrees that in the ancient world friendship was ‘the major principle in terms of which political theory and practice [were] described, explained and analysed’(Hutter 1978, 2; see also von Heyking and Avramenko 2008, 1; Gadamer 1999), and finds ThomasHobbes – the seventeenth century theorist of discord and disagreement (Abizadeh 2011) – largely responsible for the modern marginalisation of friendship in political science and political philosophy (Dallmayr 2000, 105; King, 2000, 13; Pangle 2003, 3; Schwarzenbach 2009, 4; Yack 1993, 110). Lorraine Pangle captures the dominant view when she writes that ‘the devaluation of friendship is the result of a decisive new turn in philosophy […] Ever since Hobbes, modern moral philosophy, even when it has not followed his teaching about the state of nature, has conceived of men’s most important claims upon one another to lie outside the realm of friendship’ (Pangle 2003, 3).
00001t tif Consent and the basis of political obligation with reference made to Thomas Hobbes and John Locke Calliope Christina Samoulla Farsides Submitted for the degree of Ph D London School of Econ[.]
Every year thousands upon thousands of tourists visit Hobbesbury, the global village founded in honour of the seventeenth century English philosopher ThomasHobbes. Like any self- respecting destination, Hobbesbury operates an open-top tour bus whose itinerary includes all the unmissable sights: Strauss Strasse, Oakeshott Way, Watkins Institute of Science, Martinich Observatory, Skinner Tower, Springborg Cathedral, Pateman Women’s Institute, Gauthier & Hampton Contract Companies, MacPherson Old Market, Dietz’ Citizens Advice Bureau, Tuck Foreign Office, Lloyd Moral Institute, Sorell Urgent Care Centre, Gert Ministry of Peace, Hoekstra’s Athenaeum, and the Bibliotheca Malcolmiana. The aim of this essay is to recommend an additional stop on the tour, at a new building in the heart of the village, opposite Bobbio’s Notary Practice: Larry May’s Chancery Court. It is a sober and minimalist construction, I will argue, with a wealth of inconspicuous windows that offer novel views on the town’s most secret gardens.
Since security is the main reason individuals establish the state in the first place, they cannot possibly be expected to allow anyone, much less the sovereign, to do anything that could put their own lives and security at risk. For Hobbes, ‘no man is supposed bound by covenant, not to resist violence; and consequently it cannot be intended, that he gave any right to another to lay violent hands upon his person.’ 17 But, if the right to punish inevitably involves the sovereign’s right to ‘lay violent hands’ upon anyone who breaks the law, how could any of the subjects of the commonwealth possibly authorise it? There is an obvious tension between these two aspects of Hobbes’s theory; remarkably, this is a tension of which Hobbes himself was keenly aware. He highlights its existence right after the definition of punishment in Leviathan, when he states that ‘there is a question to be answered, of much importance; which is, by what door the right, or authority of punishing in any case, came in.’ 18
Flathman thus finds in Hobbes resources for a strong individualism. Hobbes, he concludes, feared democratic governance because it in this form of political life that there is the most threat to individualism and liberty. While the monarch may be flawed and thus construct a flawed political order, an active and animated demos will encourage the ‘vain- glorious’ who will seek to appear before all others as most important and hence try to outdo each other with activity. 8 For Hobbes, and Flathman, this tendency in democratic life is to be feared more than the possibility of a single unconstrained sovereign, whose political reach is limited. Rather than turn toward a democratic structure that feeds the competitive spirit in public life, Flathman highlights those elements of Hobbes in which education is central. Civic education is where forms of character building can take place that might lead to the attributes identified as creating more possibilities for peace (Flathman 2002: 154; see also Slomp 2000: 173). 9
A lth o u g h In L e v ia th a n g lo r y Is d e fin e d In some re s p e c t le ss p re c is e ly tha n In E lem ents o f Law, f o r o u r purposes I t Is In te r e s tin g to note t h a t In L e v ia th a n Hobbes adds a q u a lif ic a t io n on th e meaning o f g lo ry t h a t was m is s in g In h is p re v io u s works. In sec I I I . 2.7 I t was n o tic e d t h a t whereas In c u r r e n t language I t makes sense to speak o f g lo rio u s dea ths and to c o n s id e r death as a p o s s ib le ro u te to g lo ry , the co m b in a tio n o f g lo r y and death Is a lo g ic a l I m p o s s ib ility In Hobbes's te r m in o lo g ic a l w o rld . In f a c t as g lo r y Is th e p le a s u re o f s u p e rio r power and dom inion, I t fo llo w s t h a t no Hobbes Ian man can experience tr u e g lo r y (as opposed t o v a in g lo r y based on fa n c ie s ) u n le s s he Is a liv e . L ik e power, p le a s u re In g lo r y va nishe s a t one's death. In L e v ia th a n Hobbes s p e lls o u t t h i s p o in t, d is tin g u is h in g c le a r ly the d e s ire o f honour, g lo ry , and power on th e one hand and th e d e s ire o f fame a f t e r dea th and d e s ire o f p ra is e on th e o th e r. The form e r d e s ire s , he arg ue s In th e c h a p te r on th e manners o f men, lead people to c o m p e titio n , s e d itio n and war. D e sire o f fame a f t e r death and d e s ire o f p ra is e . In ste a d , d r iv e people to obey to th e common power and to a v o id c o n f lic t :
3 as its relation to liberal legal systems. 5 As the first modern political theorist to advance a model of society based on the liberty and equality of individuals and on the importance of a formal system of civil laws enacted and enforced by political authority for the security of socio-political relations, Hobbes’s work arguably laid down foundations that deeply influenced the long tradition of political theory that followed it, including liberal political theory. However, assessing the precise nature and value of such contribution has proven to be no easy task. The diversity of interpretations given to Hobbes’s work is notably remarkable; Hobbes has been considered anything from one of the founders of the liberal tradition to one of its greatest enemies, a staunch defender of absolutism and arbitrary rule. Hobbes’s relation to the liberal tradition, together with the range of interpretations regarding the precise value which its theory has with regards to it, suggests to me that his theory is particularly useful to examine the extent to and the manner in which both individual freedom and authoritarian government are connected to the conceptualisation of the modern state, and the contemporary challenges underpinning its penal system.
The strength of the philosophy of ThomasHobbes (1588-1679) and the philosophy of Pëtr Kropotkin (1842-1921) is the capability to conceive from the characteristics of nature a consequent Ethics and Politics. Hobbes deduce a state of nature, while Kropotkin employs an inductive-deductive method . Both Hobbes and Kropotkin develop their philosophical systems within two scientific revolutions: ThomasHobbes was fellow-philosopher and friend of Francis Bacon (1561-1626), the father of the modern scientific method, and was also influenced by Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) ; Kropotkin was strongly influenced by Charles Darwin (1809-1882), perhaps the most revolutionary scientist of the Nineteenth Century that, with the contribution of Alfred Russel Wallace (1823-1913), has introduced the scientific theory of evolution.
This paper set out by looking at how ThomasHobbes began his theory from the nature of man in the state of nature. It examines human predicament which is largely due to the egoistic nature and attitude disposed by all men. Hobbes believes in the state as a means to curb man’s excess freedom, to put a stop to the war of every person fighting against the other. The key point for Hobbes is that the authority of the state is justified; this is because the citizens have consented or agreed to accept the authority. In virtue of this agreement, citizens are therefore bound to obey. The concept of consent and consensus can therefore be seen as background upon which the justification of the legitimacy of the sovereign is based. Although, it has been observed that Hobbes theory reflects the situation of his time especially the strife in his society that tore apart the fabric of the society which he wanted to avert, yet, there is a relevance of his theory to the contemporary society. David Held asserted that in Hobbes opinion, while sovereignty must be self-perpetuating, undivided and ultimately absolute, it is estab- lished by the authority conferred by the people: The sovereign’s right of command and the subjects duty of ob- edience is the result of consent. Although, there are some things about Hobbes’ conception of state which today we would find useful, yet his position is in support of those who argue for the importance of government by consent and reject the claims of the “divine right of kings” and more generally, the authority of tradition (Held, 1984).
Dialogue…of the Common Laws in Writings on Common Law and Hereditary Right, ed. A. Cromartie and Q. Skinner (Oxford, 2005), especially pp. xlv-liii. The thought that Hobbes was driven to write for what were primarily defensive reasons was originally explored by Richard Tuck, who used that thought as the basis for his claim that Hobbes was writing in support of religious toleration. For Richard Tuck’s argument, see particularly the argument developed in ‘Hobbes and Locke on Toleration’ in M. Dietz, ed., ThomasHobbes and Political Theory (Kansas, 1990), pp. 153-71, and his comments in Philosophy and Government (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 335-345. Tuck’s thesis is one of the targets of Milton’s ‘Hobbes, heresy and Lord Arlington’. Other commentators have also been sceptical about Tuck’s broader claims that Hobbes was promoting religious toleration during this period, for a recent examples see Justin Champion’s remarks in ‘An Historical Narration Concerning Heresie: ThomasHobbes, Thomas Barlow and the Restoration debate over ‘heresy’ in D Loewenstein and J. Marshall, eds., Heresy, literature and politics in early modern English Culture (Cambridge, 2006), p. 247. For a recent piece in support of Tuck’s thesis see E. Curley, ‘Hobbes and the Cause of Religious Toleration’, in P. Springborg, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes’s Leviathan (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 309-336.
Without a doubt, the lasting currency of the Old Testament myth of Leviathan and Behemoth is due, in large part, to its appearance in the state theory of ThomasHobbes. In Jewish eschatology, the two monsters are conceived of as radically antagonistic: Behemoth, a male, controls the land, while the female Leviathan rules over the sea. Both monsters, intending to establish a reign of terror, struggle for dominance. They are then slain by God or – according to differing versions of the myth – kill each other. All accounts agree, however, that the monsters’ deaths will bring about the Day of Justice. Their story was popularised through Hobbes’s treatises Leviathan or The Matter, Forme, and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil (1651), and Behemoth or The long Parliament (1682). In his 1651 magnum opus, Hobbes describes an oppressive political system with only remnants of individual rights; the less well-known Behemoth, dating from the time of the English Civil War, deals with a chaotic non-state marked by utter anarchy. The absolute rule of Leviathan, in which traces of the rule of law and vestiges of individual rights are preserved, is distinct from that of Behemoth, which is marked by lawlessness and disorder (cf. Perels 2000: 361). In older depictions, Behemoth often resembles an elephant, a hippopotamus or a water buffalo, while Leviathan is rendered as a serpent, a dragon or a crocodile (cf. Hirsch et al. 1904). Other scholars, thinking of the two imaginary creatures’ legendary size and power, have interpreted them as dinosaurs (cf. Lyons 2001: 1ff.). In Hobbes’s Leviathan, these iconic traditions have been transmuted to form the famous “mortal god” depicted in the frontispiece: a giant human form made up of innumerable minuscule bodies, wielding sword and crosier as symbols of worldly and spiritual power (cf. Bittner/Thon 2006: 37ff.; Brandt 1982: 203ff.; Bredekamp 2006; Kersting 1992: 28ff.). By way of the biblical quotation placed above the princely figure (“Non estpotestas Super Terram quae Compareturei. Iob.41.24.”), Hobbes refers explicitly to the Old Testament source of his Leviathan: the Book of Job, in which the power of the Leviathan is said to be unmatched by any other power on earth. Hobbes was writing at a time in which Jewish reception of the story of Job was on the wane due to rabbinic criticism, while Christendom, on the other hand, had discovered Job as a patron saint (cf. Oberhänsli-Widmer 2003).
Thomas Paine “Common Sense” & American Crisis - 40 - Compiled By: John Paul Tabakian so; and as I mean not to conceal the name of any true friend when there shall be occasion to mention him, neither will I that of an enemy, who ought to be known, let his rank, station or religion be what it may. Much pains have been taken by some to set your lordship's private character in an amiable light, but as it has chiefly been done by men who know nothing about you, and who are no ways remarkable for their attachment to us, we have no just authority for believing it. George the Third has imposed upon us by the same arts, but time, at length, has done him justice, and the same fate may probably attend your lordship. You avowed purpose here is to kill, conquer, plunder, pardon, and enslave: and the ravages of your army through the Jerseys have been marked with as much barbarism as if you had openly professed yourself the prince of ruffians; not even the appearance of humanity has been preserved either on the march or the retreat of your troops; no general order that I could ever learn, has ever been issued to prevent or even forbid your troops from robbery, wherever they came, and the only instance of justice, if it can be called such, which has distinguished you for impartiality, is, that you treated and plundered all alike; what could not be carried away has been destroyed, and mahogany furniture has been deliberately laid on fire for fuel, rather than the men should be fatigued with cutting wood. There was a time when the Whigs confided much in your supposed candor, and the Tories rested themselves in your favor; the experiments have now been made, and failed; in every town, nay, every cottage, in the Jerseys, where your arms have been, is a testimony against you. How you may rest under this sacrifice of character I know not; but this I know, that you sleep and rise with the daily curses of thousands upon you; perhaps the misery which the Tories have suffered by your proffered mercy may give them some claim to their country's pity, and be in the end the best favor you could show them.
The way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their own industrie, and by the fruites of the Earth, thye may nouristh themselves and live contentedly, is to confere all their power and streinght upon Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Will, by plurality of voices, unto one Will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one man, or Assembley of men, to bear their Person; and everyone to owne, and acknowledge himselfe to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their Person, shall Act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concerned the Common Peace and Saftie, and therein to submit their wills, everyone to his Will, and their Judgements, to his Judgement. This is more than Consent, or Concord, it is a really unity of them all, in one and the same Person, made covenant of every man to every man….” (Hobbes 1996: 120).