An academic discourse on regionalisation

Beyond the deterministic link it establishes between security and regional projects, an important part of this IR literature can be considered as a normative securitising discourse on regionalisation by presenting it as a necessity for the survival – or at least the stability – of the region, its states and the population. Many of these accounts draw on the vocabulary and concepts of the Regional Security Complexes literature, which became mainstream to describe regional security dynamics in terms of security interdependence and securitisation.

As already described, the literature on West Africa emphasises the catastrophic conditions of the region torn by civil wars and recurrent coup d’états, and further destabilised by transnational threats. Many predictive scenarios for the future of the region sound rather pessimistic, pointing to the risk of implosion and potential ‘back to the future’ scenarios which implies that the (de)colonisation period might only be an interlude instead of a permanent point of transformation from a pre-modern period to a modern one (Buzan and Waever 2003, 220-221).65 _{The danger would be the} collapse of the Westphalian experiment in Africa or, in any case, that the inherent weakness of these states hinders their development into full-fledged modern states (Keller 1997, 300-302; Buzan and Waever 2003, 221; Soderbaum 2004, 426).Hence, whether arguing for pessimistic or optimistic scenarios most scholars describe West Africa as an essentially dangerous and unstable region. Interestingly, the influence of

65 _{Buzan and Waever refer themselves to classical analyses of the African state such as the ones} written by Daniel Bach (1995) and Jean-François Bayart (1999).

the 1994 essay of journalist Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy,66 _{on this} literature is noticeable through the intertextual links existing between this nodal text and more recent analyses of West Africa. Kaplan describes West Africa as an anarchical region in a permanent state of war posing a threat for the world and international security, as well as a mirror for what ‘the political character of our planet is likely to be in the twenty-first century (Kaplan 1994, 1). Sometimes implicitly taken as a reference by scholars (Jackson 2013, 118; Kaplan 2006, 81-82), he is also directly cited – still today – by political scientists who specialise on the region (Francis 2006, 13; Arthur 2010, 3). Francis presents the region as a ‘violent and ‘bad neighbourhood’ with ‘weak and collapsed states’ and references Kaplan’s essay (2009, 89). All these accounts of West Africa echo Kaplan’s (1994, 2) argument that:

‘West Africa is becoming the symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental, and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real “strategic” danger. Disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation- states and international borders, and the empowerment of privates armies, security firms, and international drug cartels are now most tellingly demonstrated through a West African prism.’

A consensual solution is drawn from this representation of the region’s security environment, which consists in the development of common action at the regional level. In West Africa, ECOWAS should contribute to the peace and stability of the region through policies and actions based on the security and development nexus. This security and development nexus is conceptualised by scholars as essential and inextricable, and as the only way to deal with this anarchic security environment and save the region from collapse.67 _{Hence, most of the works already cited in this chapter}

66 _{In 2000 Kaplan published a book with the same title including this essay among others.}

67 _{The security and development nexus and its connection to regional integration is part of an} international community discourse produced by many international actors such as the EU and the UN.

elaborate a narrative linking regionalisation, security and development as the remedy to this ‘bad neighbourhood’. Jaye (2008, 152) argues that the organisation became concerned with peace and regional security because they are necessary for the socio- economic development of the member states.’ Bah (2005, 78) emphasises in the same way that ‘ECOWAS realised the symbiotic relationship between economic development and security, as well as the interdependence of the elements of security relationships in the region.’ Regionalisation is often presented as the only rational solution for the region: ‘Helping long-troubled regions such as West Africa requires nothing less than embracing a new development paradigm. Instead of trying to fix a plethora of dysfunctional governments one by one, efforts might be concentrated to build up a strong regional organization’ (Kaplan 2006, 82). Francis (2006, 7) goes even further by asserting ‘the imperative to engage with the link between peace, security and development (henceforth the “nexus”)’; stressing that the ‘inextricable link between economic regionalism and security integration highlights the fact that it is impossible to achieve the economic growth and development objectives of integration in an environment of wars, armed conflicts and perpetual political instability.’

In the South American case the link established between regionalisation and security insists less on survival but is still described as a necessity for the stability and prosperity of the region. Indeed, while not being depicted as anarchic and inherently dangerous as for West Africa, South America is also presented as being destabilised by transnational threats and organised criminality. Even more, certain areas where states’ borders meet in the Amazonian region and at the Triple border are described as areas controlled by criminal groups, which are potential safe havens for terrorists Its influence in West Africa will be further explored in this chapter as well as in the following empirical chapters.

(Pion-Berlin 2005, 216; Flemes 2006, 164). Flemes and Radseck (2012, 156) present South American frontiers as ‘hot spots’ because ‘traditional and new threats tend to overlap and mutually intensify one another in these often poorly patrolled spaces.’ The example of the Triple Border is recurrent to illustrate a ‘lawless area’ with poor state control, illicit activities such as arms and drug trade, money laundering, fake goods, and Muslim communities financing terrorist activities; similarly, the frontiers between Ecuador, Venezuela and Brazil are supposed to have the highest murder rates in the region68 _{(Flemes and Radseck 2012, 160). Trinkunas (2013, 84) argues} that ‘Organized crime, narcotics, smuggling, gangs, and other violent nonstate actors are the main threat to security, and in some cases, give rise to the talk about failed states.’ The risks stemming from this security environment are presented in the IR literature as multidimensional and interconnected: they could destabilise democracy through corruption, worsen relationships between governments because of frontiers issues, and foster a re-empowerment of the military through their increased involvement in public security issues in South American states. This environment also has an impact on economic development and prosperity, which could potentially weaken democracy. These interconnected risks could overlap, trigger or reinforce domestic political crises that could compromise the political stability of the sub- region as a whole (Flemes and Radseck 2012, 156). An underlying narrative linking security, democracy and economic prosperity as interdependent with the potential to trigger a vicious or virtuous circle is thus recurrent in the IR literature on South America.

This narrative is constantly connected to another concept, regional integration or regionalism, as was already shown in the previous section when discussing the

68 _{Marcella (2013, 72) adds that Latin America has the highest murder-rates in the world: with only 8%} of the world’s population, 42% of the murders in the world occur in Latin America. Colombia, Venezuela and Brazil count among the most dangerous countries.

objective factors of regionalisation. Regional integration is presented at the forum that enables states to connect these different dimensions and tackle these interdependent aspects and problems. Show (2003, 124) emphasises that in the new millennium ‘regional order and security have increasingly come to be defined in terms of collective defense of democracy and the promotion of liberal economic reform and regional integration.’ Flemes (2005, 218) highlights that one of the main characteristics of the political evolution of South America in the last two decades is the tight relation between democratisation, regional integration and security policy. Pion Berlin (2005, 220) argues that ‘Without being in a deterministic relation, the economic and security interactions mutually reinforce one another’; and Kalil Mathias, Cavaller Guzzi and Avelar Giannini (2008, 2) state that ‘integration [in

particular in the area of defense] and democracy are correlated and interdependent

phenomena, in this sense [the] more integration you have, [the] more democracy you get.’

The narrative also goes together with an observation of, or a general recommendation for, an expanded understanding of security in the region. For Show (2003, 123) the US and Latin America have a common agenda of security concerns that includes considerations of human rights, democracy, environment, government reform, social equality, free market environment: ‘By employing a broader definition of security and restructuring multilateral organizations to address these concerns, Latin American states hope to avoid such negative externalities [human rights abuses,

refugee flows, reduced trade, etc.] stemming from regional conflict’. Marcella (2013,

68-69) links this expanded concept to development and human security: ‘Security constitutes a multidimensional condition for the development and progress of their nations. (…). Security is indispensable.’ Indeed,

‘Crime can result from the interaction of a number of factors: availability of guns, international criminal drug-related violence, contraband, and money laundering, all in conjunction with the proliferation of criminal gangs and weak institutional capabilities (…). Poverty, social exclusion, the youth bulge and the prevalence of official corruption multiply the problem’ (Marcella 2013, 74).

The lesson to be drawn from the emergence of this ‘post-westphalian order’ is the necessity to reduce, if not eliminate, ‘the distinction between the domestic and international domains of sovereignty and requires a broadening of the concepts of public security and national defence (Marcella 2013, 69). Herz (2010, 605) also asserts this necessity:

‘The expanded concept of security allowed for a focus on the “new security threats” and risks emerging with the intensification of the globalization process. These threats transcend state borders (…). They require new forms of cooperation between states and sub-governmental and non-state actors. The interdependence between economic, social, political and environmental issues and the threat and use of violence has become clearer. In this context, it becomes acceptable for narcotics and small arms trafficking, intra-state violence and institutional state failure to be addressed as security threats in regional and international forums.’

Hence, this expanded concept of security put the emphasis on a multidimensional vision of security including military, economic, political, social and environmental issues. It also advises for a merging of public security and defence to deal with the multidimensional character of threats and reinforced regional cooperation. However, some authors also take a strong stance against it such as Pion Berlin (2005, 216).

Interestingly, this academic discourse has strong intertextual links with one of the two official ‘basic discourses’ in South America which is challenging the dominant discourse that hinders the regionalisation process, as we will see in the next chapter. By contrast, in West Africa, this academic discourse relates to the hegemonic discourse which promotes regionalisation.

To conclude, in both cases, regionalisation (whatever the form it takes in the literature) is represented as necessary for the region, whether for its mere survival (West Africa) or for its stability and prosperity (South America). The literature produces a general narrative linking security and development with regionalisation in West Africa; and a narrative linking an expanded concept of security with democracy, economic development and regionalisation in South America. It is important to understand this academic discourse as part of the process of regionalisation. It asserts regionalisation as inevitable, necessary and even natural to comprehensively address the problems faced by the states in the region. However, it is important to deconstruct this ‘naturalness’ attributed to regionalisation. Regionalisation is but one among other possible policies to address these issues to the extent that states have a range of available options such as strengthening and increasingly monitoring their borders, or cooperating bilaterally with their neighbouring states without engaging in a process of regionalisation. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), for instance, between the US, Canada and Mexico only involves a free trade agreement. The US has engaged in an almost unilateral reinforcement of controls and security at its borders with Mexico to deal with illegal immigration and transnational security issues such as drug trafficking. This is not to say that regionalisation is not an efficient or good solution to deal with the security environment of both regions, but only that it is not the only possible existing policy; particularly because it can also be seen as threatening for the sovereignty of the states. This normative securitising discourse on regionalisation is (re)produced by the IR literature but also by international community actors such as the UN and the EU, great powers and major donors such as the USA, France and the UK, as we will see when analysing the discourses of the ‘external’ actors. The aim is to understand how and to which extent this discourse

constitutes the regionalisation process: which actors carry this discourse and with what influence; how regional actors adapt, assimilate or react to it? The next part of this chapter further discusses this question.