Access Control

The imposition of security posts for the screening of passengers and their baggage at airports constitutes, of itself, a type of access control. Efficient screening points act both as filters for arms and explosives and as valves for the prevention of passenger regression from security-sensitive zones. In this way they can become important mechanisms for establishing a vital and reliable landside/airside boundary in terminals and are literally in the “front line" of security activities. In addition to formal screening points, however, it is necessary to deploy other means of access control at airports. The purpose of this is simply to provide a ring of uninterrupted protection for sensitive areas - most notably the airside region where aircraft are situated.

It is pointless to impose labour-intensive, expensive, high security screening barriers within passenger terminals if no reasonable degree of protection is accorded to servicing bases, cargo, courier and mail terminals, vehicle entry points and other sectors within easy reach of vulnerable targets. On several occasions, offenders have demonstrated the ease with which they can find points of entry into airports for placing persons, weapons and explosive devices on board aircraft. The experiences of the TWA hijacking of June 1985, in which arms were smuggled onto the aircraft via servicing crews, and the Pan Am attempted seizure of September 1986 in Karachi, Pakistan. where terrorists gained entry to their target after posing as security guards in an apparently official vehicle, both demonstrate the need to maintain vigilance throughout a ir p o r t s ’ access points at all times. Of course, busy airports require complex series of corridors, carriageways, doors and gates to be included in airport designs, linking the outside world to sensitive areas and facilitating the work of the thousands of employees with access to the airside. This does not i mp l y , however, that any lowering of security levels should be tolerated. Instead, as E C A C ’s security manual describes;

"Boundaries should be established between landside and airside

**For a very useful analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of passenger profiling techniques see L. Zoucker and M . Bachrach in Lewis and Kaplan (1990), p p. 165 - 175.

areas. Passages through such boundaries should be protected by guarded gates and/or locked or guarded doors which should be inspected at irregular intervals."**

Only when airports are regarded as centres of vulnerability which require constantly high standards of security by those who manage and operate them can they acquire their true status - akin to that of military establi shment s or prisons. The practical problem for authorities is that airports are, by definition, public places, involving a much higher turnover of transitory persons and vehicles than forces bases or penitentiaries. H e n c e , it is necessary for a certain ease of public access to permissible areas of airports to c o ­ exist with a policy of rigorous access control wherever required. Defining the limitations of public access can be difficult at some high security venues, as will be demonstrated below. Common to all airports, however, is a need for high quality perimeter control me a s u r e s .

4,4,3.1. Perimeter Control

Although it should be evident to airport managers that peripheral access control is of equal importance to any other form of boundary protection, it is not uncommon to hear reports from those within the industry of badly maintained or non-existent fencing at the edge of some airports, particularly those with perimeters several miles long. Gaps in fencing or inadequately erected systems allow would-be intruders to pass undetected and unimpeded from landside to airside, literally, in one easy step. It should be a key priority of airport designers to include in their plans - particularly for major sites adequate perimeter protection, perhaps even of the kind so often found at military establishments. Anything less than this fails to take account of the importance of aviation protection.**

Fencing should be constructed of strong and dense material, such as close chain link, to prevent easy destruction. In order that it can be monitored at night with infrared night-sights, the chain link should be coated with durable white PVC - an innovation introduced by Dorey into at least one high security airport, allowing Immediate determination of infiltration locations at night.*? Adequate vertical coverage of the fence, both above and below ground level should be accompanied by the employment of copious quantities of coiled razor wire or barbed wire, as a visible indication of security protection, and by the use of robust concrete post foundations to prevent fencing being uprooted.

In addition to these structural considerations, excellent reinforcement can be achieved by incorporating a second barrier of fencing within the first, a monitoring carriageway for vehicular

**ECAC (1988), paragraph 2.2.1.

**For an interesting description of poor airport perimeter protection and its consequences see Clutterbuck (1987), p . 76.

*?F.C. Dorey, Untitled conference paper presented at "Scotsec ’87" conference, Renfrew, U K , 11 November 1987.

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security patrols separating the two. These features would not only act as a first class deterrent to anyone anticipating a quick entry, but would provide a second physical barrier to breach, should the first be crossed. The incorporation of warning signs, sirens and flood lighting also enhances security and increases deterrent qualities.

Modern security fencing systems need not be passive forms of protection. By using electronic perimeter control systems, taut wire fencing can be monitored by staff and/or computer from a central command and control location. The placement of electro-mechanical intrusion detector sensors along a fence can provide a warning in the event of attempts to cut, spread or scale it, allowing swift response from staff informed of the precise location of the breach. Additionally, CCTV cameras can be set to start recording any form of activity in locations which should be deserted, such as the ‘‘no m a n ’s land" sector between fencing layers. False alarms could, in theory, be caused by animal or climatic interference, although sensitivity can be altered with ease to filter out virtually all but genuine breach attempts.

It need hardly be remarked that security fencing systems such as those described in the foregoing paragraphs can cost a very great deal to install, monitor and patrol, at least when compared with the simplest types of fencing. It must be for airport authorities to determine which of their sites require the more complex forms of boundary, although it should be clear that any prominent airport covering a large geographical area can be at risk from the dangers of unnoticed penetration.

4.4.3.2. Entry Point Security

At points of high vulnerability, such as entrances to airside regions, it is necessary to utilise security points which complement perimeter boundary controls and passenger screening points, so maintaining a unified protective shield around sensitive areas. As an absolute minimum form of deterrence, all such points of entry should be protected, by being locked fast when not in use and otherwise manned by security guards who can monitor the flow of persons, vehicles and other objects, and carry out occasional security spot checks.

A major difficulty in securing all entry points is encountered at the largest international airports which feature a multitude of landside/airside crossing points. Even after unnecessary access points have been closed or blocked in the interests of security, there must still be a large number of vulnerable areas left to secure, such as servicing entry points, cargo cross-over sectors and aircraft crew entrances. In these and similar circumstances, it is vital to ensure that only those persons entitled to gain access can do so.

Such simple apparatus as unidirectional ful1-height turnstiles can ensure the existence of a one way system, making it difficult for an unauthorised person to make a brief visit to the airside. When combined with an electronic card reader or personal identification number decoder, security is increased slightly because of the need for users to possess a personalised pass or code number. Absolute security cannot be guaranteed using such systems because nothing prevents an unauthorised intruder from coercing a card or number

holder into giving over the unique, but not user-specific, pass or number. The use of photographs on passes does little to improve security when used alone, as reports of bored security personnel failing to verify the validity of the tiny images are legion. One successful security evader told the current writer that he gained access to a very sensitive British passenger aircraft by showing his charge card (without a photograph) to a guard.**

A variety of technologically advanced, automated access control systems have been developed to enhance basic access control feat ures.*’ For example, the West German firm Gallenschutz lietallbau GmbH has combined into its turnstile systems mechanisms for automatically verifying entrants' identities and for ensuring that only one person per security pass can enter or exit a secure zone. "Anti-passback" protection can be incorporated to prevent one pass being used to permit two consecutive movements in the same direction through one access poi n t . ’ * It is also possible to differentiate between high and low security passes by making it possible only for holders of certain passes to gain access to the most secure zones and by using an alarm method to alert security personnel of any attempt to gain unauthorised a c c e s s . W h e n linked to a computer database, accurate records can be kept of in dividuals’ movements around an a i r p o r t .

For the most sensitive areas of airports, enclosed cylindrical doors can be used. To enter the system a form of identification must be presented. If accepted by the system, the pass will open the first door, permitting entry to the cylinder, then close, momentarily trapping the person. At this point, confirmatory checks can be made to determine that the pass holder is entitled to transfer into the secure zone. This can be done in the form of a personal code number, a weight sensor (which also guards against more than one person being in the cylinder) or a finger-print reader or similar device, to isolate a unique characteristic of the person being checked. Once the system is satisfied that the person is entitled to enter the zone, the second, forward door is activated, allowing the transfer to be c o m p l e t e d .

For computer controlled access systems to be of use in the largest airports, it will be vital to maximise the speed with which a computerised system can identify a person from the pass signal being presented. In particular, weight confirmation can take several seconds. Gallenschutz has remarked that his f i r m ’s devices allow a bidirectional throughput rate of between twenty and twenty-five

* * Informal interview with British intelligence consultant, Geneva, Switzerland, February 1987,

*’For an excellent assessment of modern access control systems, see

Airports Internationai, _{January 1990, pp. 22 - 27.}

’*T. Gallenschutz, "Access Security within Terminal Buildings,"

Airport Technology International _{(1988), p. 243.}

’ iJ.R. Norville, "Airports - Protecting the Airside," Airport

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persons per minute - a rate which would be more impressive but for the inefficiency of the card reader employed.’?

Of course, the practical difficulties involved in curbing unauthorised access to vulnerable airport locations must be noted when assessing the theoretical benefits of control systems. Furthermore, the large number of firms with commercial reasons for entering airports or for making consignment deliveries must also be considered. Catering, maintenance, hygiene, cargo and other services all involve the transfer of goods and persons from the landside to the airside. One aspect of this problem which must be considered by airport managers is the particular inadequacy of trusting that airside staff at an airport are sufficiently reliable and honest as to require no on-site security inspections or monitoring. In any low paid, high turnover work role, including many servicing jobs, it should be remembered that bribery, blackmail and terrorist infiltration can each result in workers being tempted, forced or else choosing to carry firearms, explosives and related objects on board aircraft being serviced on the airside. In 1989, GOnter Eser. Secretary General of lATA, alluded to the scope of this problem for the biggest international airports when he noted that Frankfurt Main licenses approximately 30,000 workers with airside passes, while London Heathrow and Gatwick each issues about 50,000 airside ID c a rds ,’*

The great difficulties involved in vetting large numbers of workers were highlighted in the months after the Lockerbie bombing, when several journalists in separate incidents gained access to vulnerable airside zones simply by taking up cleaners posts which offered immediate entry to wide-bodied jets.’ * No check was made of their falsified application details and no landside probation period was imposed on them. As a response to this inadequacy, the British Secretary of State for Transport, Paul Channon, imposed certain regulations on servicing firms, requiring the verification of ap p l i c a n t s ’ particulars, the taking u p of references and a six month

probation period before work on the airside could be allowed. More notably, in early April 1989, he ordered the introduction, within a year, of reliable access control systems at a total of nineteen British a i r p o r t s . T h e s e systems would be computerised to facilitate the automatic reading of staff passes for entry to restricted zones, with passes being issued sparingly. In addition, it was announced that restricted areas would be patrolled and aircraft would be searched prior to flights and then protected from unauthorised

’^Gallenschutz (1988), p. 243.

’*rhe International Herald Tribune, _{Monday 15 May 1989, p. 2.}

’*G. Norris, "Security Concerns Across the Atlantic," Interavia Aerospace Review _{7 (1989),} p. 693.

’^Aberdeen, Belfast Harbour (Sydenham), Belfast International (Al d e r g r o v e ) . Birmingham, Bristol, Cardiff/Wales. East Midlands, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Leeds-Bradford, Londonderry (Eglinton), London (Heathrow), London (Gatwick), Luton, Manchester, Newcastle, Norwich, Prestwick and Stansted.

acce ss. ’* Most importantly, the new regulation made clear that entry to restricted areas by any authorised staff would be subject to a standard of search equal to that imposed on passe nge rs, ”

In the United States, regulation of computerised access control measures was made by an FAA final rule of 8 February 1989,’ * which applied to all airports used by aircraft with more than 60 seat s.” This was imposed in spite of doubts concerning calculations of expense, the estimated provision requirements of terminals and the state of advancement of the technology involved.” * In particular, Tom Browne of the Airport O p e r a t o r s ’ Council International fAOCIl voiced the following concern:

"There are a lot more doors and access points on airports than the FAA have estimated. T h e y ’ve calculated between 10 and 130 at any given airport - we have recently conducted a survey which found this figure to be between 30 and 5 0 0 . " ” *

Another major difficulty which must be addressed in relation to access control concerns the need for standardisation of systems from one airport to another. In the absence of such coordination, multiple passes would be required by crew travelling from site to site,, presenting the possibility of passes being lost or stolen and of the inefficient systems causing congestion problems for staff.**?

In situations in which tens of thousands of personnel have access to an a i r p o r t ’s sensitive areas, the best form of offence prevention mechanism will be to screen as many staff as possible (ideally all) as they pass from the landside onto the ramp and to monitor their work. If one hundred per cent screening is unfeasible, reliable access control systems should be set in place to permit entry only to legitimate workers with valid passes, who should be made subject to the possibility of random security searching at access control points and at their work places by roving security teams.