Active and Selective Engagement (1981–2002)

On 9 November 1981, the foreign policy white paper was tabled in parliament (May, 1986a, p. 105). It was the first review of PNG’s foreign policy since its independence. The foreign policy white paper recommended that PNG should adopt a basic approach to its foreign policy. This involved a three-pronged diplomatic strategy, which emphasised consolidation and extension of existing relations, independent and constructive cooperation with neighbouring countries and further diversification and development of relations with other countries (Bogari, 2010; Foreign Affairs Review, 1982a; Wolfers & Dihm, 2009). Based on the basic approach, it was suggested that PNG adopt an active and selective engagement foreign policy. This policy involved: identifying issues, opportunities and problems that are central to PNG’s national

interests; selecting those issues and actors, including governments, international organisations, multinational corporations and others, who can support the country’s national interests; analysing the relative advantages and disadvantages and taking the appropriate action or inaction; and engaging actively with the issues and selected actors to secure and enhance the country’s national interests (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1980, pp. 6–7). Active and selective engagement focused on consolidating existing relations. It was concurrently open to exploring new opportunities and other arrangements with prospects for further socio-economic and security benefits.

In articulating the concept of active and selective engagement, the authors placed PNG’s relations with Australia, Indonesia and the Solomon Islands in a framework of wider common interests to be promoted in an independent, constructive and neighbourly cooperation. These three countries share a common border with PNG. The white paper acknowledged their importance and simultaneously urged that the conduct of relations between each country should differ because of the differences between the three countries themselves, as well as the differences in the ways in which PNG’s relations with their governments have previously developed (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1980, pp. 39–41). The overall objective was to conduct independent and constructive neighbourly cooperation with the governments of each country, appropriately and by different means.

Policymakers in PNG perceived in the white paper that its relations with Australia have ‘become relatively, but not absolutely, less important to Papua New Guinea’ (Foreign Affairs Review, 1982d, p. 39). The relative but modest decline in the importance of relations with Australia occurred because PNG diversified almost every aspect of its foreign relations—not only the formal aspects of diplomacy, but also the economic and other aspects. PNG diversified its trading partners towards Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, including Japan and Germany. Japan became an important export destination, although Australia retained its status as the

major origin of PNG’s imports. These developments led to the diversification of PNG’s relations with Australia, the main exceptions of which including, by mutual agreement, aid and development support (Foreign Affairs Review, 1982d). PNG still depended on Australia for aid, trade, investments in merchandise and mining sectors and for trained public servants. The foreign policy white paper did not stress much the security aspect of PNG–Australia relations. As discussed earlier, Australia avoided entering into any binding defence commitments with PNG and, moreover, it was perceived that Australia would come to PNG’s assistance, should there be an external aggressor (Laki & May, 2009, pp. 261–262; May, 1993, p. 35). However, the white paper raised security issues vis-a-vis PNG–Indonesia relations.

The white paper stressed the importance of PNG–Indonesia relations (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1980, pp. 42–48). Cooperation between PNG and Indonesia in the fields of education, defence, police and cultural exchanges based on mutual understanding and trust has been captured under a Technical Cooperation Agreement between the two countries, which was signed on 5 June 1979 (and expired in 1984). One of the more arresting of these premises in the white paper related to security. It was asserted that ‘no foreign government threatens military aggression towards Papua New Guinea now or in the readily foreseeable future’ (Foreign Affairs Review, 1982a, p. 46). This clause underscored the unlikeliness of a military conflict with Indonesia. It was further asserted that ‘there is no foreign armed force on whose assistance we can rely’ and, even more pointedly, ‘no foreign government has offered to guarantee the independence and security of Papua New Guinea. Nor, despite expressions of concern by senior Australian officials, is one likely to do so’ (Foreign Affairs Review, 1982b, pp. 46–47). This assertion was a direct response to the residual Australian defence commitment along the PNG–Indonesia border and the Vanuatu experience that questioned Australia’s military assistance to PNG.

PNG appreciated the asymmetries of power in its relations with Indonesia and it acknowledged that the PNGDF’s capacity to defend against an armed attack was comparatively modest (Foreign Affairs Review, 1982a, p. 46). This acknowledgement led the PNG Government to an accommodative posture, which was described as ‘increasing commitment to co-operation’ (Foreign Affairs Review, 1982a, p. 41) and ‘consistent with both countries’ national interest’ (Foreign Affairs Review, 1982a, p. 43). The guidelines for this policy proposal were slightly defensive. Regarding the threats from Indonesia, the white paper stated that ‘there is no evidence to suggest that a substantial or influential body of opinion in Indonesia has aggressive intentions towards Papua New Guinea’ (Foreign Affairs Review, 1982a, p. 41). The events and conditions in Irian Jaya (specifically referring to the oppression of the Melanesian people living in West Papua) were matters of Indonesia’s internal affairs, but they pointed out that domestic critics of policy ‘have failed to distinguish between ethnic sentiment and national interest’ (Foreign Affairs Review, 1982a, p. 42). The overtures of friendship demonstrated PNG’s intention to resolve the border problems and its intention to mend the broken link to the wider ASEAN community.

The foreign policy white paper not only emphasised PNG’s economic and security interests, but it also stressed the importance of international cooperation in addressing issues that had a substantial capacity to affect PNG’s wider and shared interests. The issues included arms control, human rights, refugees, racism and national self-determination (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1980, pp. 108–116). The white paper was tabled in parliament on 21 November 1981 and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Noel Levi, delivered an interim statement that detailed the changing emphasis of PNG’s foreign policy. In support of the white paper, Mr Levi said:

Relations have, in fact, developed in a rather selective way— sometimes because the Papua New Guinea government has wanted

them to do so, but often because the government of other countries or other circumstances have caused them to do so. We recognise that national interests—ours as well as those of other countries—and not friendship, have often been the reasons (Foreign Affairs Review, 1980, p. 10).

The main argument put forward was the differences in how relations with various countries have developed. The supporting statement introduced PNG’s active and selective engagement foreign policy. It denotes picking one’s friends more carefully. This policy stance reflected PNG’s intention to rebalance its reliance on the postcolonial relationship with Canberra and replace it with one that formed a part of wider regional and global foreign policy. The conviction that drove the policy was that PNG’s foreign policy should promote self- defined real interest (Weatherbee, 1982, p. 335). Active and selective engagement laid the foundations for the diversification of socio-economic, military and aid relations in many ways. It demonstrated PNG’s ambitions to replace its Australian relations with ones with the rest of the world.