PNG: The State

The colonisation and occupation of PNG has been well documented by many writers (Gash, Hookey, Lacey & Whittaker, 1975; Joyce, 1971; Legge, 1956). The island of New Guinea was colonised by different empires at different times in its colonial past. The Dutch initially laid claim to the western part of the island in 1660, as Dutch New Guinea, and the Germans took possession of the north-eastern quarter in 1884 and named it German New Guinea.

Figure 3.1. Map of New Guinea in the colonial era Source: CartoGIS, the Australian National University.

The south-east quarter of the island of New Guinea, known as the Territory of Papua, became a British protectorate in 1884 and it was formally annexed as British New Guinea in 1888. It was devolved to Australian jurisdiction (exercised jointly by Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria) in 1902 as British interest in the island waned. From 1902 to 1905, the newly formed Government of the Commonwealth of Australia relieved the three states of joint control and assumed responsibility until 1906, when the Commonwealth took over full control

of the territory and changed its name to Papua. In 1949, the two territories of Territory of Papua and Trust Territory of New Guinea (formerly German New Guinea) were amalgamated to form the Australian-administered Territory of Papua and New Guinea, under the terms of the United Nations Trusteeship Agreement of 1946 (Griffin, 1974; Legge, 1956). The combined territories were given self-governing authority on 1 December 1973 and Australia granted them full independence under the name of Papua New Guinea on 16 September 1975.

Figure 3.2. Map of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea Source: CartoGIS, the Australian National University.

Figure 3.3. Political map of Papua New Guinea Source: CartoGIS, the Australian National University.

Prior to colonisation, people were organised into many thousands of independent political groupings, with some created by individual ‘big men’ and others led by powerful chiefs (Berndt & Lawrence, 1971; Sahlins, 1963; Strathern, 1971). Village societies were, and still are to a large extent, self-contained communal authorities that coexisted in alternating patterns of war and peace with their neighbours. The traditional political organisation did not exist beyond the level of a tribal community. In 1884, the concept of state, which identified with democratic and constitutional political institutions, was imposed on the traditional PNG societies with disregard for their cultures, structures and boundaries. The imposition of the colonial state superimposed an overarching institutional framework that was foreign to the local communities. The introduced state did not transform the indigenous culture; it gradually developed with traditional Melanesian forms of government to produce syncretic political modes that exhibit elements of both Western and indigenous forms (Allen & Hasnain, 2010; Ketan, 2000; May, 1982, 2004; McLeod, 2008; Morgan, 2005). Many people found it difficult to distinguish between the state and their respective traditional styles. Political elites have often combined traditional and modern values and organisational forms of government to suit their own development (May, 1997, pp. 24–25). But in setting the ‘rules of the game’ (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006; Leftwich, 2010) and applying them, political elites often undermine the power of the political institutions. They often used the ‘Melanesian way’ (Jacobsen, 1995; Narokobi, 1980), to justify the use of traditional values in governance. The term ‘Melanesian way’ is vaguely defined, but it has connotations of kastom (custom) and wantok (Lawson, 2013; Lindstrom, 2008) and its use provides ‘a capacity for compromise’ (May, 2004, p. 47) in politics and governance.

Culture plays an influential role in PNG’s social, political and economic life. PNG’s political history has been shaped by its traditional culture of competition and reciprocity. Terms like ‘big man’ and wantok are used to describe the patronage and informal networks that are often more influential than formal institutions and rules (Scott, 2005, p. 51). The cultural

obligation to reciprocate under the wantok system creates tension between the pressure for the institutionalisation that would consolidate and strengthen the power and position of formal institutions and the pressure for the maintenance of a personalised basis of politics, which is largely played by ‘big men’ who derive their power and authority from their closest supporters. This power, regarded as ‘personal power’ (Sahlins, 1963, p. 289), is often more influential than legal and rational authority.

PNG was still a ‘collection of stateless societies’ (Wainwright & White, 2004, p. 22) at their independence in 1975, comprised of hundreds of semi-autonomous tribal and linguistic groups. It has more than 7000 different cultural groups and approximately 852 different languages, which makes it one of the most culturally diverse countries in the world. By ethnolinguistic standards, it is the most fragmented society in the modern era (Reilly, 2008, pp. 12–13). The cultural diversity posed significant problems for national unity and has been a great concern for the early government. The threat to national unity was exacerbated by the separatist movements that were proliferating in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Some of these movements were established from a background of cult activity, others were established to oppose particular government policies and few pressed for more regional autonomy. Many leaders in the separatist movements were ambivalent about national unity (Denoon, 2005, p. 86; May, 2004, pp. 48–106). Since the 1970s, political elites and the local intellectuals have undertaken efforts to produce images and ideals of nationhood in the hope of consolidating national unity (Ballard, 1981; Foster, 1995; Griffin, 1974; May, 2004). The newly established government of Sir Michael Somare pushed for national unity through its ‘political education’ programs to infuse the idea of unity in the minds of people (Ballard, 1981, p. 64; May, 2004, pp. 118–121). The effectiveness of this program, however, was difficult to assess. Despite a variety of attempts to cultivate or invoke a sense of shared national culture and identity, the highly localised loyalties to wantok and ethnolinguistic groups prevailed. The weak sense of

nationhood complicated the process of state building and made it difficult to articulate the national interest.

At their independence, the new state faced an enormous task of creating a sense of shared nationhood. Sentiments of nationalism were limited to a few people (Ballard, 1981, p. 10). The weak sense of nationalism made it difficult to cohere a strong or unitary national state, which complicated the prospects for pursuing strategic foreign policies. It suggested that foreign policy was not driven by nationalistic tendencies as seen in many parts of the developing world, particularly Africa (Duara, 2003; Hodgkin, 1956; Pardesi, 1976). In PNG, nationalism was generated by an elite group who were educated in the Western education system and who were introduced during the colonial period. They were able to mobilise the support for nationalist movements that led to independence. The path to independence lacked what Geertz (1973) described as the ‘consciousness of massive, univocal, irresistible movement, the stirring to action of an entire people, that the attack upon colonialism almost everywhere induced’ (Geertz, 1975, p. 236). Simply put, independence was not triggered by united and mass movements against colonialism. Pokawin (1982, p. 57) argued that:

Independence for PNG on 16 September 1975 was not a result of national consensus. The majority of Papua New Guineans were either not concerned, against, or not committed. It was the doing of a small group of people led by the Pangu Party and its sympathisers in the House of Assembly. Many people were not sure of what independence would bring for them and the country.

The Western-educated elites that experienced the brunt of the colonial policies engineered the self-determination process in PNG. They optimistically borrowed Western ideas and ideals and presented them as ‘national goals’ in the preamble of the PNG constitution (Kari, 2005). These goals were said to have captured the ‘common interest’ of society, which

subsequently formed the overarching ideological interests that drove domestic and foreign policy.

PNG exhibits many signs of a weak state, including the limited capacity of the public sector to deliver services, the weak law enforcement capacity and a poorly developed sense of national identity. Its political institutions seem to be growing increasingly vulnerable to undemocratic pressures that range from long adjustments of parliaments to increasingly trouble-prone national elections (May, 2003c, pp. 154–155). The country’s development is challenged by dysfunctional service delivery mechanisms, deteriorating infrastructure, poorly functioning systems of government, law and order challenges and corruption. The state’s weakness in providing adequate government services is, in part, a function of economic decline that could be corrected through sustained growth. However, periods of high economic growth have not been associated with good governance (Chand, 2002; Levantis & Gupta, 1999; Mawuli, 1997). Clans increasingly play the role of interests groups (Reilly, 2004, p. 51). The effect of small ethnic groups acting to secure their own interests undermines the broader interests of society. During his survey of policymaking in 1981, Ballard wrote that ‘state penetration of society was limited’ in most new states (Ballard, 1981, p. 3). More than four decades after their independence, this is still true of many parts of PNG. State institutions and agencies are left vulnerable to manipulation by ‘big men’ and other personal and local interests.