Adopting an ‘interdependent’ analysis

The above section has served to trace a theoretical path that encourages us ‘to give up thinking in terms of single, isolated substances and to start thinking in terms of relationships and functions’ (Elias, 1991: 19 [italics removed]). Consequently, instead of simply examining how the ‘other’ can play an important part in delineating the specificities of a national group (Colley, 2005), Malcolm (2012) argues that ‘to fully understand such relationships one must examine the dynamic interdependence, rather than simply the co-existence, of the respective parties’ (2012: 167 [italics added]). Here, powerful and less-powerful nation-states are drawn together through processes of dynamic interdependence, in which both internal and external processes can encumber the nation (Van Benthem van den Bergh, 1992: 15). Indeed, it is these processes that serve to shape group identity (De Swaan, 1995; Mennell, 1990;

Kaspersen and Gabriel, 2008).

With regards to processes of identification, however, Elias (1978) argues that in order ‘to perceive oneself as a person of whom one says “I” involves perceiving other people as “he”, “she”, “we”, “you” or “they” (1978: 125). This relationship between the individual ‘I’ (I-identity) and the collective ‘we’ (we-identity) offers one approach to transcending traditional individual/society debates (Quilley and Loyal, 2004). Elias (1978) noted that such a dichotomy:

[lead] people to believe that their actual ‘selves’ somehow exist ‘inside’ them;

and that an invisible barrier separates their ‘inside’ from everything ‘outside’ – the so-called ‘outside world’ … this mode of self-perception and this image of mankind … lend[s] staying power and conviction to the ideas of ‘society’

existing beyond individuals or ‘individuals’ existing beyond society (1978: 119) Indeed, these concerns work alongside Elias’s critique of the homo clausus (closed people) image of society (Elias, 1978; Elias, 1991; 2008b).³ Elias (1994) elaborates:

The conception of the individual as homo clausus, a little world in himself who

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

relationship between their own “civilization” and the supposedly “barbaric” cultures of subjected peoples’ (Van Krieken, 1999: 302 [italics added]).

3 Furthermore, O’Connor and Goodwin (2012) elaborate that Elias persistently saw the homo clauses perspective of society as dominating sociology and leading ‘sociologists [to] continually … view the individual as something existing outside of society and society as existing beyond individuals’ (2012:

483).

ultimately exists quite independently of the great world outside, determines the image of man [sic] in general. Every other human being is likewise seen as a homo clausus; his core, his being, his true self appears likewise as something divided within him by an invisible wall from everything outside, including every other human being [sic] (Elias, 1994: 204 cited in Van Krieken, 1998: 13) Accordingly, theoretical models, such as symbolic interactionism, ‘fail to move beyond … [a] homo clausus model of human beings as possessing some basic identity prior to their interaction with others’ (Van Krieken, 1998: 65). Moreover, such perspectives fail to account for those unplanned actions that are neither planned nor controlled by social actors (Elias, 1978). Here it is evident that the ‘unplanned consequences of planned human action arise from their repercussion within a web woven by the actions of many people’ (Elias, 1978: 146). As a result:

without an adequate understanding of the essential interdependence of human beings within a wide network of relationships, even theories of interaction would posit a pre-social individual who only became social when they engaged in social interaction (Van Krieken, 1998: 65 [italics in original])

Appropriately, in counteraction to the homo clausus perception, Elias proposed his concept of homines aperti (open people) (Elias, 1978; 1991; 2008b). This allowed one to understand that ‘the concept “individual” refers to interdependent people in the singular, and the concept “society” to interdependent people in the plural’ (Elias, 1978: 125). This prevents the unnecessary separation of both the individual from society and vice versa and encourages one to consider the dynamic interdependencies that are forged between individuals within society as well as between societies (Elias, 1991; 2008b; Mennell and Goudsblom, 1998; O’Connor and Goodwin, 2012; Van Krieken, 1998).

Indeed, the process of distinguishing between the self (‘I’) and other (‘you’) has over the course of human history seen a closer alignment between that of the individual self (‘I’) and the national collective (‘we’) (Elias, 1991). That is, at the societal level, one of the most potent forms of collectivity that one can refer to is the individual nation (Maguire and Burrows, 2005). Elias (1991) elaborates:

Collectivities which generate a nationalist ethos are structured in such a way that the individuals who from them can experience them – more specifically their emotion-laden symbols – as representatives of themselves. The love for ones nation is never only a love for persons or groups of whom one says ‘you’;

it is always also the love of a collectivity to which one can refer as ‘we’ (1991:

151)

Accordingly, the ‘multi-layered qualities of habitus, and the intertwining of the individual and society, can be understood by thinking in terms of what Elias (1991) called the ‘we-I balance’’ (Maguire and Tuck, 2005: 111). Drawing upon the work of Sigmund Freud, Elias (1996) suggested that:

an individual does not only have an ego-image and an ego-ideal, but also a we-image and a we-ideal. It is a central aspect of the nationalization of individual ethos and sentiment, which can be observed empirically in nineteenth-and twentieth century industrial states-societies, that the image of these state-societies, represented, among others, by verbal symbols such as ‘nation’, form an integral part of the we-images and the we-ideals of most of the individuals who form with each other societies of this type. This, in short, is one of the many instances of correspondence between specific types of social structure and specific types of personality structure (1996: 152)

Conductive with Elias’s individual (psychogenesis) and social (sociogenesis) relational analysis of civilizing processes, the conflation of the individual’s I-identity with that of a national ‘we’ corresponds with a group of people who can be distinguished as belonging to the nation and those who are deemed to be outside of it, often refereed to in the same set of pronouns as ‘they’ (Elias, 1991).⁴ Mennell (2007) argues that:

The intellectual and emotional construction of a group’s image’ and ‘we-feelings’ always takes place in tandem with the construction of a ‘they-image’

about some other group or groups of people, and with the development of feelings about them. (2007: 40)

In fact, elsewhere, Wagner-Pacifici (2010) has noted that ‘Collective shifters like

“we” and “they” become particularly charged in historical transitions in which identities change or in which the identity differences are being highlighted or elided’

(2010: 1360).

Indeed, changes within the British state, most notably, post-war immigration, have resulted in attitudes towards a collective British ‘we’ taking on greater political and social significance. The perceived relationship between the collective national

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

4 Maguire (1995) adds: ‘Identification with the ‘we’ perspective of different groups is necessary so the researcher can understand something of the sense in which certain actions are ‘meaningful’. At the same time it is necessary to grasp that no matter how sincere, these interpretations can be misleading.

Comparison of different ‘we’ perspectives will help, but the employment of ‘they’ perspectives which show the interrelationships from a greater distance offers a more adequate view of how the intentions and actions of the various groups are interlocked’ (1995: 16)

‘we’ and the distinctly outsider ‘they’ has remained a contentious issue since the British Nationality Act of 1948.⁵ Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech provides a particular example of the political dynamics surrounding such a relationship and the

‘homogenous we’ that a common sense of identity can elicit. A summary of Powell’s description of Britain is provided by Parekh (2000):

Britain was a fundamentally individualist society and had always cherished the rights and liberties of the individual. This was more true of it than of any other society, and the roots of its individualism went as far back as the beginning of its history and were deeply embedded in the character of the British people … The British were a cohesive people, intensely aware of their ethnic identity, and bound by deep ties of kinship and loyalty to those of their kind at home and abroad. They had a strong sense of ‘the homogenous we’ and instinctively knew who was ‘one of them’ and who was an ‘outsider’ (2000: 9 [italics added]) Ironically, Powell’s portrayal of collective identity, common values and shared British character reflects a more general attitude within contemporary British identity politics (Parekh, 2000; see also Kramer, 2003; Milbank, 2011; Settle and Curtis, 2007; The Economist, 1999). A more recent speech by British Prime Minister, David Cameron, stated that:

What I’m about to say is drawn from the British experience, but I believe there are general lessons for us all. In the UK, some young men find it hard to identify with the traditional Islam practised at home by their parents whose customs can seem staid when transplanted to modern Western countries. But they also find it hard to identify with Britain too, because we have allowed the weakening of our collective identity (Cameron, 2011, PM’s speech made at the Munich Security Conference [italics added])

The idea of a shared collective identity (‘our collective identity’) is assumed through assumptions regarding a common British experience and the distinguishing of the

‘they’, those whom find it difficult to assimilate with such values (Condor et al., 2006). Former Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, shared similar assumptions, noting that:

While the United Kingdom has always been a country of different nations and thus of plural identities – a Welshman can be Welsh and British just as a Cornishman or woman is Cornish, English and British – and maybe Muslim, Pakistani or Afro Caribbean, Cornish, English and British – the issue is whether we retreat into more exclusive identities in 19^th century conceptions of blood,

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

5 This allowed imperial British subjects from locations, such as, the West Indies, to work within Britain without a visa (Rush, 2011).

race and territory, or whether we are still able to celebrate a British identity which is bigger than the sum of its parts and a Union that is strong because of the values we share and because of the way these values are expressed through our history and our institutions (Brown, 2004, ‘British Identity’, British Council Annual Lecture, 7July cited in Condor et al., 2006: 127 [italics added]) The portrayal of shared values and common history within Cameron and Brown’s speeches can be identified as highlighting the collective embodiment of a national

‘we’ image, which is based upon a common history and shared experience (Elias, 1991). Moreover, Brown’s mention of the ‘plural identities’ comprising Britain seeks to point towards the multiple and various levels of identity within Britain.

Therefore, in order to examine these multiple and various levels of identity within Britain, it is important to expand analyses of the nation to include the interdependencies that constitute and encompass the nation-state.⁶ In fact, in much the same way that individuals recognise one another, Hegel (1967) argued that a ‘state is as little an actual individual without relations to other states as an individual is actually a person without rapport with other persons’ (1967: 331n). In this respect, Elias’s (1991) understanding of ‘we’ and ‘they’ identities can be used to further elaborate upon the interdependencies between, and, within, states as well as their effects upon the national-self image (Moore, 2010). This can be particularly beneficial for the study of multi-national forms of identification, such as British identity, as well as those nations formerly part of larger imperial figurations. Indeed, the work of Pocock (1975; 1992; see also Bourke, 2010) points to the mutual and reciprocal relations that both Elias (1978; 2012) and Goudsblom (1977) highlight in

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

6 The following example by Elias (1991) can help to further elaborate on the importance of this wider collective: ‘One does not understand a melody by considering each of its notes in isolation, unrelated to other notes … It is similar with a house. What we call its structure is not the structure of the individual stones but of the relations between the individual stones of which it is built; it is the complex of functions the stones have in relation to each other within the unity of the house … the structure of the house, cannot be explained by thinking about the shape of the individuals stones independently of their relations to each other; on the contrary, the shape of the stones can only be explained in terms of their function within the whole functional complex, the structure of the house. One must start by thinking about the structure of the whole in order to understand the form of the individual parts. These and many other phenomena have one thing in common, different as they may be in all other resects: to understand them it is necessary to give up thinking in terms of single, isolated substances and to start thinking in terms of relationships and functions. And our thinking is only fully equipped to understand our social experience once we have made this switch’ (1991: 18-19 [italics in original]). Consequently, while we cannot understand the house without the individual stone, similarly, one cannot understand national identity without considering the wider global complex (Elias, 2012; Goudsblom, 1977;

Maguire, 2011; Smith, 2010).

their ‘interdependent’ examinations.⁷ Here, Pocock (1975) directs attention towards relations within the UK but also its culture overseas, both interacting with one another in multiple and complex ways. Subsequently, Pocock (1982) states that British history:

cannot be written as the memory of a single state or nation or as the process by which one came into existence. It must be a plural history, tracing the processes by which a diversity of societies, nationalities and political structures came into being and situating in the history of each and in the history of their interactions the processes that have led them to whatever forms of association or unity exists in the present or have existed in the past (Pocock, 1982: 317, 320 cited in Kumar, 2003: 13)

To this extent, the formation of the British state was itself a process closely entwined with the development of an imperial web of interdependence (Mennell, 1990).

Consequently, by focusing upon the functional dynamics that structure collective groups, one is able to consider that how people and nations as well as multi-national organisations, such as, empires, both at an individual and a collective level, are interdependently related (Elias, 1978).

Despite this, however, examinations of the effects of globalisation processes and the intermingling of national economic, political and cultural structures, have often considered empire as a ‘pre-national category’ (Gerasimov et al., 2005: 35). Indeed, the realities of a post-national world have resulted in what Howe (2010) describes as a lack of ‘big ideas’ in the study of empire, and in comparison with other spheres of historical and social scientific research, a lack of ‘theory building’ (2010: 5).

Accordingly, it is here that the process sociological framework, and, in particular, its use of the ‘figuration’, can be used to provide an understanding of empire beyond the limited periods of the nation-centered analysis (Hutchings, 2006; Moore, 2010).