public officer for acts done PRIOR to his present term of office. It
does not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a Congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself.
It also serves as an example and warning to others .
A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo
(19 Phil. 208, 212), it is the injury to the public which State action
in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the complainant. After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding.
The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular place of confinement.
It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellant’s arrest was issued, he fled and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in the House of Representatives for him to attend the
sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose call he initially spurned which accused- appellant is invoking to justify his present motion. This can not be countenanced because, x x x aside from its being contrary to well- defined Constitutional restrains; it would be a mockery of the aims of the State’s penal system.
Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or medical reasons x x x.
He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City, when he was likewise allowed/permitted to leave the prison premises x x x.
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused- appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. X x x
The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate. He also claims that the concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his mandate and that he has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave jail.
We remain unpersuaded. X x x
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve
his full term in office. (People v. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689, Feb.
3, 2000, En Banc [Ynares-Santiago])
54. Discuss the objectives of Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, that "[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
Held: The objectives of Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution are:
1) To prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation;
2) To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no information, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and
3) To fairly apprise the people, through such publication of
legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of
have opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise if they shall so desire.
Section 26(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is sufficiently complied with where x x x the title is COMPREHENSIVE enough to embrace the general objective it seeks to achieve, and if all
the parts of the statute are RELATED and GERMANE to the subject matter
embodied in the title or so long as the same are NOT INCONSISTENT with
or foreign to the general subject and title. (Agripino A. De
Guzman, Jr., et al. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 129118, July 19, 2000, en Banc
[Purisima])
55. Section 44 of R.A. No. 8189 (The Voter's Registration Act of 1996) which provides for automatic transfer to a new station of any Election Officer who has already served for more than four years in a particular city or municipality was assailed for being violative of Section 26(1) of Article VI of the Constitution allegedly because it has an isolated and different subject from that of RA 8189 and that the same is not expressed in the title of the law. Should the challenge be sustained?
Held: Section 44 of RA 8189 is not isolated considering that it is related and germane to the subject matter stated in the title of the law. The title of RA 8189 is "The Voter's Registration Act of 1996"
with a subject matter enunciated in the explanatory note as "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS, ADOPTING A SYSTEM OF CONTINUING REGISTRATION, PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURES THEREOF AND AUTHORIZING THE APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS THEREFOR." Section 44, which
provides for the reassignment of election officers, is relevant to the subject matter of registration as it seeks to ensure the integrity of the registration process by providing guideline for the COMELEC to follow in the reassignment of election officers. It is not an alien provision but one which is related to the conduct and procedure of continuing registration of voters. In this regard, it bears stressing
that the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title
of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue, all the contents and the minute details therein.
(Agripino A. De Guzman, Jr., et al. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 129118, July 19, 2000, En Banc [Purisima])
56. Do courts have the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules?
Held: The cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of
expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into
allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the right of private individuals. In Osmena v. Pendatun (109 Phil. At 870-871), it was
held: “At any rate, courts have declared that ‘the rules adopted by
deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.’ And it has been said that ‘Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.’ Consequently, ‘mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate that action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.’”
It must be realized that each of the three departments of our government has its separate sphere which the others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working of our system of government,
more than mere comity, compels reluctance on the part of the courts to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. Courts must accordingly decline the invitation to exercise
their power. (Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268, Aug. 14, 1997 [Mendoza])
57. What is the Bicameral Conference Committee? Discuss the nature of its function and its jurisdiction.
Held: While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its
broader function is described thus:
A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited to resolving the precise differences between the two houses. Even where the conference committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill.
But occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its mandate. These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of conference committee. (Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, Nov. 11, 1993, En Banc [Cruz])
58. Discuss the Enrolled Bill Doctrine.
Held: Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. Bill
No. 7189 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. x x x To be sure, there is no claim either here or in the
decision in the EVAT cases (Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance) that the
enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption. In one case (Astorga
v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 [1974]) we “went behind” an enrolled bill and
consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate.
But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the certification of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims that the three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution had not been obtained, because “a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts.” x x x
This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the President contained provisions which had been “surreptitiously” inserted in the conference committee x x x. (Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance)
It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of a bill in violation of Art. VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution that, “upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed.” (Philippine Judges Ass’n v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, 710 [1993])
In other cases, this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise than as certified by the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well- established. It is cited with approval by text writers here and abroad. The enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations: