A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the

owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

(Municipality of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corp., 292 SCRA 678, July 20, 1998 [Panganiban])

258. May the Sangguniang Panlalawigan validly disapprove a resolution or ordinance of a municipality calling for the expropriation of private property to be made site of a Farmers Center and Other Government Sports Facilities on the ground that said “expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available lots of the municipality for the establishment of a government center”?

Held: Under the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan is granted the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or Mayor to issue. As held in Velazco v. Blas (G.R. No. L-30456, July 30, 1982, 115 SCRA 540, 544-545), “The only ground

upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is ‘beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same.’ A strictly legal question is before the provincial board in

its consideration of a municipal resolution, ordinance, or order. The

provincial board’s disapproval of any resolution, ordinance, or order must be premised specifically upon the fact that such resolution, ordinance, or order is outside the scope of the legal powers conferred by law. If a provincial board passes these limits, it usurps the legislative functions of the municipal council or president. Such has

been the consistent course of executive authority.” (Moday v. CA, 268 SCRA 586, Feb. 20, 1997)

259. Under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, “[T]he term of office of elective local officials x x x shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.” How is this term limit for elective local officials to be interpreted?

Held: The term limit for elective local officials must be taken

to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in

the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an

individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been ELECTED to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

(Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC and Capco, Jr., G.R. No. 133495, Sept. 3, 1998, 295 SCRA 157, En Banc [Mendoza])

Case No. 1. Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes mayor by reason of the death of the incumbent. Six months before the next election, he resigns and is twice elected thereafter. Can he run again for mayor in the next election?

Answer: Yes, because although he has already first served as

mayor by succession and subsequently resigned from office before the full term expired, he has not actually served three full terms in all for the purpose of applying the term limit. Under Art. X, Sec. 8, voluntary renunciation of the office is not considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term only if the term is one “for which he was elected.” Since A is only completing

the service of the term for which the deceased and not he was elected, A cannot be considered to have completed one term. His resignation constitutes an interruption of the full term.

Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected Mayor and, during his first term, he is twice suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after that, can he run for one more term in the next election?

Answer: Yes, because he has served only two full terms

successively.

In both cases, the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because the two conditions for the application of the disqualification provisions have not concurred, namely, that the local official concerned has been elected three consecutive times and that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In the first case, even if the local official is considered to have served three full terms notwithstanding his resignation before the end of the first term, the fact remains that he has not been elected three times. In the second case, the local official has been elected three consecutive times, but

he has not fully served three consecutive terms .

Case No. 3. The case of vice-mayor C who becomes mayor by succession involves a total failure of the two conditions to concur for the purpose of applying Art. X, Sec. 8. Suppose he is twice elected after that term, is he qualified to run again in the next election?

Answer: Yes, because he was not elected to the office of mayor

in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor. (Borja,

Jr. v. COMELEC and Capco, Jr., G.R. No. 133495, Sept. 3, 1998, 295 SCRA

157, En Banc [Mendoza])

260. What are the policies embodied in the constitutional provision barring elective local officials, with the exception of barangay officials, from serving more than three consecutive terms?

Held: To prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not

the only policy embodied in the constitutional provision in question (barring elective local officials, with the exception of barangay officials, from serving more than three consecutive terms). The other policy is that of enhancing the freedom of choice of the people. To consider, therefore, only stay in office regardless of how the official concerned came to that office – whether by election or by succession by operation of law – would be to disregard one of the purposes of the constitutional provision in question. (Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC and Capco,

Jr., G.R. No. 133495, Sept. 3, 1998, 295 SCRA 157, En Banc [Mendoza]) 261. Lonzanida was previously elected and served two consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 1995 mayoral elections. In the May 1995 elections he again ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the rights and duties of mayor until March 1998 when he was ordered to vacate the post by reason of the COMELEC decision on the election protest against him which declared his opponent Juan Alvez the duly elected mayor. Alvez served the remaining portion of the 1995- 1998 mayoral term. Is Lonzanida still qualified to run for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 1998 local elections?

Held: The two requisites for the application of the three term

rule were absent. First, Lonzanida cannot be considered as having been

duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, he did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that

Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. It has been repeatedly held by the SC that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest. Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as

presumptive winner, which presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.

Second, Lonzanida cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to

1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. His opponents’ contention that Lonzanida should be deemed to have served one full term from May 1995-1998 because he served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the second requisite for the application

of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three

consecutive terms. The second sentence of the constitutional provision

under scrutiny states, “Voluntary renunciation of office for any length

of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of

service for the full term for which he was elected.” The clear intent

of the framers of the Constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. Lonzanida vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary

severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

In sum, Lonzanida was not the duly elected mayor and that he did

not hold office for the full term; hence, his assumption of office from

May 1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three term limit. (Lonzanida v. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602,

July 28, 1999, En Banc [Gonzaga-Reyes])

262. May the President validly withhold a portion of the internal revenue allotments of Local Government Units legally due them by administrative fiat?

Held: The Constitution vests the President with the power of supervision, not control, over local government units (LGUs). Such

power enables him to see to it that LGUs and their officials execute their tasks in accordance with law. While he may issue advisories and

seek their cooperation in solving economic difficulties, he cannot prevent them from performing their tasks and using available resources to achieve their goals. He may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the law. Thus, the withholding of a portion of internal revenue allotments legally due them cannot be directed by administrative fiat.

X x x

Section 4 of AO 372 cannot x x x be upheld . A basic feature of

local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in

the National internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution . The Local Government Code (Sec. 286[a]) specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned

within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and “shall not be

subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose.” As a rule, the term “shall” is a

word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning.” The provision is, therefore, imperative.

Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding, effective January 1, 1998, of 10 percent of the LGUs’ IRA “pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation” in the country. Such withholding clearly

contravenes the Constitution and the law. Although, temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback, which means “something held back or withheld.

Often temporarily.” Hence, the “temporary” nature of the retention by

the national government does not matter. Any retention is prohibited. In sum, while Section 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as an advisory effected in times of national crisis, Section 4 thereof has no color of validity at all. The latter provision effectively encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local governments. Concededly, the President was

well-intentioned in issuing his Order to withhold the LGUs’ IRA, but the rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out by legal methods. (Pimentel, Jr.

v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, 336 SCRA 201, July 19, 2000, En Banc

[Panganiban])

263. What is meant by fiscal autonomy of Local Governments? Does it rule out in any manner national government intervention by way of supervision in order to ensure that local programs are consistent with national goals?

Held: Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having administrative autonomy in the exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy means that local governments have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released by the national government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities. It extends to the preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turn have to work within the constraints thereof. They are not formulated at the national level and imposed on local governments, whether they are relevant to local needs and resources or not. Hence, the necessity of a balancing of

viewpoints and the harmonization of proposals from both local and national officials, who in any case are partners in the attainment of national goals.

Local fiscal autonomy does not, however, rule out any manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. Significantly, the President, by constitutional fiat,

is the head of the economic and planning agency of the government

(Section 9, Article XII of the Constitution), primarily responsible for

formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated and integrated social and economic policies, plans and programs (Section 3, Chapter 1,

Subtitle C, Title II, Book V, EO 292 [Administrative Code of 1987]) for

the entire country. However, under the Constitution, the formulation

and the implementation of such policies and programs are subject to “consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and local government units.” The President cannot do so unilaterally. (Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, 336 SCRA 201, July 19, 2000,

En Banc [Panganiban])

264. What are the requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters?

Held: x x x [T]he Local Government Code provides (Sec. 284. See

also Art. 379 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local

Government Code of 1991):

“x x x [I]n the event the national government incurs an

unmanaged public sector deficit, the President of the Philippines

is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of [the] Secretary

of Finance, Secretary of the Interior and Local Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the

presidents of the liga , to make the necessary adjustments in the

internal revenue allotment of local government units but in no

case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year x x x”

There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector

deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the

presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and

the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the corresponding

recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of

the third fiscal year preceding the current one. (Pimentel, Jr. v.

Aguirre, 336 SCRA 201, July 19, 2000, En Banc [Panganiban]) 265. Distinguish an ordinance from a mere resolution.

Held: A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An

ORDINANCE is a law, but a RESOLUTION is merely a declaration of the

sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An

ORDINANCE possesses a general and permanent character, but a RESOLUTION

is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently – a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a

resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the

Sanggunian members. (Municipality of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty

Corporation, 292 SCRA 678, July 20, 1998 [Panganiban])

266. On its first regular session, may the Sanggunian transact business other than the matter of adopting or updating its existing rules or procedure?

Held: We cannot infer the mandate of the (Local Government) Code

that no other business may be transacted on the first regular session except to take up the matter of adopting or updating rules. All that the law requires is that “on the first regular session x x x the

sanggunian concerned shall adopt or update its existing rules or

procedures.” There is nothing in the language thereof that restricts the matters to be taken up during the first regular session merely to the adoption or updating of the house rules. If it were the intent of Congress to limit the business of the local council to such matters, then it would have done so in clear and unequivocal terms. But as it is, there is no such intent.

Moreover, adopting or updating of house rules would necessarily entail work beyond the day of the first regular session. Does this mean that prior thereto, the local council’s hands were tied and could not act on any other matter? That would certainly be absurd for it would result in a hiatus and a paralysis in the local legislature’s work which could not have been intended by the law. (Malonzo v. Zamora, 311 SCRA 224, July 27, 1999, En Banc [Romero])

267. May an incumbent Vice-Governor, while concurrently the Acting Governor, continue to preside over the sessions of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP)? If no, who may preside in the meantime?

Held: Being the acting governor, the Vice-governor cannot continue to simultaneously exercise the duties of the latter office, since the nature of the duties of the Provincial Governor calls for a full-time occupant to discharge them. Such is not only consistent with

but also appears to be the clear rationale of the new (Local Government) Code wherein the policy of performing dual functions in both offices has already been abandoned. To repeat, the creation of a

temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor creates a corresponding vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor whenever the latter acts as Governor by virtue of such temporary vacancy. This event constitutes an “inability” on the part of the regular presiding officer (Vice- Governor) to preside during the SP sessions, which thus calls for the operation of the remedy set in Article 49(b) of the Local Government Code – concerning the election of a temporary presiding officer. The

continuity of the Acting Governor’s (Vice-Governor) powers as presiding officer of the SP is suspended so long as he is in such capacity. Under Section 49(b), “in the event of the inability of the regular

presiding officer to preside at the sanggunian session, the members present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a

temporary presiding officer.” (Gamboa, Jr. v. Aguirre, Jr., G.R.

In document POLITICAL LAW REVIEW SANDOVAL (Page 158-164)