SAN PEDRO v. CA (G.R. No. 106496. December 18, 1996)
Petitioners-heirs contend that the lower court had no jurisdiction as an intestate/probate court to resolve the question of title over the subject property. Public respondent argues that when the Republic questioned the existence of the estate of San Pedro, the lower court became duty-bound to rule on the genuineness and validity of the title which purportedly covers the said estate.
A probate court's jurisdiction is not limited to the determination of who the heirs are and what shares are due them as regards the decedent's estate. Neither is it confirmed to the issue of the validity of wills. We held in Maniñgat v. Castillo (75 Phil. 532) that the main function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the estates of deceased persons either summarily or through the process of administration. This function necessarily includes the examination of the properties of the deceased so as to rule on whether or not the inventory of the estate properly included them for purposes of distribution. Thus in Trinidad v. CA (202 SCRA 106) we held that questions of title to any property apparently still belonging to the estate of the deceased may be passed upon in probate with the consent of all parties, without prejudice to third persons.
Questions of title pertaining to the determination prima facie of whether certain properties ought
to be included or excluded from inventory and accounting may be resolved by the probate court.
(Garcia v. Garcia, 67 Phil. 353) REYES v. CA (October 1997)
As a general rule, probate courts are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. Thus the court merely inquires on its due execution, whether or not it complies with the formalities prescribed by law, and the testamentary capacity of the testator. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficacy of the will's provisions. However, where the parties agree that the intrinsic validity be first determined, the probate court may do so. The rule on probate is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will.
In the probate proceeding here, the only issues were whether the testator had animus testandi; whether vices of consent attended the execution of the will; and whether formalities of the will had been complied with. Thus, the lower court was not asked to rule upon the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the will's provisions. As a result, the declaration of the testator that X was his wife did not have to be scrutinized during probate. The propriety of the institution of X as one of the devisees/legatees already involved the will's intrinsic validity which did not have to be inquired into by the probate court.
The probate court erroneously invoked Nepomuceno v. CA (139 SCRA 206), where the testator himself acknowledged his illicit relationship with the devisee. Thus the very tenor of the will invalidated the legacy as the testator admitted he was disposing of the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage. To remand the case would only be a waste of time and money since the illegality or defect was already patent. But here, the testator merely stated in his will that he was bequeathing some of his properties to his wife X. There was never an open admission of any illicit relationship, unlike in Nepomuceno.
REYES v. REYES (G.R. No. 139587. November 22, 2000.)
The jurisdiction of the probate court merely relates to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and the probate of wills of deceased persons, and the appointment and removal of administrators, executors, guardians and trustees. The question of ownership is as a rule, an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate proceeding, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.
The probate court exercises but limited jurisdiction, thus it has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the probate court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced.
LLORENTE v. CA (G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000 )
Article 17 of the CC provides: the forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
The clear intent of testator X to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on “family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity.”
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from X are issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated. As a guide, however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent’s national law.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS (1058-1060) CIR v. CA (G.R. No. 123206. March 22, 2000.)
Administration expenses, as an allowable deduction from the gross estate of the decedent for purposes of arriving at the value of the net estate, have been construed by the federal and state courts of the United States to include all expenses “essential to the collection of the assets, payment of debts or the distribution of the property to the persons entitled to it.
Expenditures incurred for the individual benefit of the heirs, devisees or legatees are not deductible.
ALIPIO v. CA (G.R. No. 134100. September 29, 2000.)
After the death of either of the spouses, no complaint for the collection of indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal partnership can be brought against the surviving spouse.
Instead, the claim must be made in the proceedings for the liquidation and settlement of the conjugal property. The reason for this is that upon the death of one spouse, the powers of administration of the surviving spouse ceases and is passed to the administrator appointed by the court having jurisdiction over the settlement of estate proceedings. Indeed, the surviving spouse is not even a de facto administrator such that conveyances made by him of any property belonging to the partnership prior to the liquidation of the mass of conjugal partnership property is void.
PARTITION (1078-1105)
SALVATIERRA v. CA (G.R. No. 107797. August 26, 1996)
The law is clear that where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before partition, owned in common by such heirs. Hence, the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion that may be allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-ownership.
MAGLUCOT_AW v. MAGLUCOT (G.R. No. 132518. March 28, 2000.)
In this jurisdiction, an action for partition is comprised of two phases: first, an order for partition which determines whether a co-ownership in fact exists, and whether partition is proper; and, second, a decision confirming the sketch or subdivision submitted by the parties or the commissioners appointed by the court, as the case may be.
The first phase of the partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntarily agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, upon the other hand, with
an adjudgement that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, the parties may make partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon.
The second phase commences when it appears that “the parties are unable to agree upon the partition” directed by the court. In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.
The present rule on the question of finality and appealability of a decision or order decreeing partition is that it is final and appealable.
Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who took possession of the portion allotted to them, are estopped to question title to portion allotted to another party. A person cannot claim both under and against the same instrument. Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity will in proper cases, where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder.
AVELINO v. CA (G.R. No. 115181 March 31, 2000)
Petitioner submits that no partition of the estate is possible in the instant case as no determination has yet been made of the character and extent of the decedent’s estate. A complete inventory of the estate may be done during the partition proceedings, especially since the estate has no debts. Hence the CA committed no reversible error in converting petitioner’s action for letters of administration into an action for judicial partition. Where the more expeditious remedy of partition is available to the heirs, then the heirs or the majority of them may not be compelled to submit to administration proceedings.
SPOUSES ZARAGOZA v. CA (G.R. No. 106401. September 29, 2000)
Was the partition done during the lifetime of X valid? It is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be done for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced. Article 1080 of the CC is clear on this. The legitime of compulsory heirs is determined after collation, as provide for in Article 1061.
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
Unfortunately, collation cannot be done in this case where the original petition for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the other compulsory heirs. The petition must be dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable parties are present for the rightful determination of their respective legitime and if the legitimes were prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos.
PROPERTY