Approaches to the Left-Right Cleavage in Turkey

Scholarly approaches to defining left and right in Turkey tend to be influenced by the explanatory frameworks favored by the researcher in question. In more general political analyses of different party systems, four main cleavages have been identified as helping to distinguish different political approaches—namely, matters of center and periphery, state and church, functional and materialism vs. post-materialism (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967:47; Klingemann et al. 1994:6). In the study of Turkey, the first three have been seen as especially significantin the formation of the center-left and center-right.

Regarding the functional cleavage, İlkay Sunar sees the emergence of a left-right separation as a result of the disruption of a coalition between the bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy (Sunar, 1974). As Özbudun notes, in those years, it is difficult to point to the existence of an influential bourgeoisie, given their high degree of dependency on the state (2011(2):30). To Keyder, because the Ottoman social structure lacked extensive landownership and a settled aristocracy, in many ways it cannot be defined as feudal, making it hard to categorize the Ottoman Empire and the early Republic within a post-feudal class framework. Bureaucracy was a different class juxtaposed with the bourgeoisie in the Republican Era during which political power developed a capitalist investment tenet, and in Keyder’s view, the Turkish proletariat remained a passive actor, largely forced to observe rather than influence the changes occurring around it (Keyder, 1987). Even so, especially in the late 1960s and across the 1970s, the left and right began to represent the socioeconomic stratification in the society (Özbudun, 1976;

Ayata and Ayata, 2012; Cizre, 1992). In the 1980s, ANAP’s neo-liberal policies also echoed a broader world trend in terms of a socioeconomic reading of the left-right

cleavage (Öniş, 2004; Cizre and Yeldan, 2005; Aydın, 2005). Analyzing the contemporary context, Ali Çarkoğlu asserts that: “The left and the right as reflected in the determinants of self-placements along the L-R scale have no tangible socioeconomic basis such as economic deprivation but have instead bases in ethnic and sectarian differences” (Çarkoğlu, 2007:267). It is essential to note here that, in studying Turkey, party allocations might differ from the self-placements of individuals.

Thus, in terms of a functional understanding of left and right, according to many scholars, Turkish politics is an exceptional case, meaning that it is difficult to classify left-right connotations in Turkey so as to perfectly line up with economics. In that vein, the periphery cleavage is more helpful in elucidating the definitions of center-right and center-left parties. Şerif Mardin proposed the center-periphery cleavage to explain the Turkish case, a definition that favors the distinction of those who hold power and those subjected to that power without giving priority to economic patterns. In relation to the 1960s, especially for the DP (in its opposition to the CHP) and the AP (in its opposition to the state), Mardin’s thesis helps to explain the center-right understanding in Turkey and its rhetoric of the nation’s will. The leftist intellectual Mehmet Ali Aybar also formulated a similar duality, that of the bureaucracy vs. the masses, as a source of left-right cleavage (1998). Yet the center-periphery cleavage has its critics (e.g. Wuthrich, 2013). Avner Levi (1991) questions its explanatory power for the Turkish case, pointing to the structural presumption of the cleavage and to the fact that neither the center nor the periphery is composed of static bodies. On the contrary, they are dynamic and multifaceted since they are subject to internal conflicts (Levi in Heper and Landau, 1991; Heper, 1980; Özbudun, 2013). Nevertheless, many scholars

continue to defend the explanatory power of such a distinction between a center that holds power and is largely unconcerned with the interests of the periphery. In a statistical study, Çarkoğlu and Avcı state that: “Continuing along a multidimensional explanatory framework, we argued that Mardin’s center–periphery construct still maintains the overall salient characteristics of Turkish politics that shape and reshape the modern-day party system’s constellations of electoral preferences” (2011:27). Ersin Kalaycıoglu’s analysis of the data gathered in the 1990 Turkish Values Survey also reveals “the continued importance of the conflict between the values of the centre versus the values of the periphery,” which largely comes down to religiosity (1990:24). In a recent study, Özbudun also notes the continuing explanatory power of the center-periphery cleavage, with the center-periphery divided along religious-conservative and ethnic-cultural-geographic lines and the center maintaining its secularist and nationalist outlook (2013). In addition to the center-periphery cleavage, the emphasis of Özbudun and Kalaycıoğlu on the secular vs. conservative cleavage is in some respects reminiscent of the left-right cleavage in the context of the French Revolution.²⁰

Apart from party politics, ethnic and sectarian identity and religiosity also play a role in determining right-left alignments though the nature of these different modes of identification is quite volatile when it comes to voting patterns among the Turkish citizenry (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005:138; Sayarı and Esmer, 2002; Hale and Özbudun, 2010).

In ‘The Nature of the Left-Right Ideological Self-placement in the Turkish Context’

Çarkoğlu’s statistical study (2007) focuses on three categories of Turkish society,

20 As Mardin saw it, the center periphery cleavage was not only a null spatial metaphor. Rather, it involved a certain degree of the conflicts of value systems, such that the secular vs. conservative/religious became a dynamic variable of the center-periphery cleavage.

center, right and left, and emphasizes the significance of religion as a catalyst of left and right identity. To Çarkoğlu, more tolerant, progressive and democratic individuals identify with the left, while happier, more authoritarian and less democratic individuals define themselves as rightists in Turkey. Employing a leftist perspective, Tanıl Bora also identifies nationalism, Islamism and conservatism as three phases of the Turkish right, which represent, respectively, the solid phase, liquid phase and gaseous phase that all might juxtapose to each other (Bora, 1999). In light of this categorization, Bora comes up with that the leitmotiv of the Turkish center-right is to a large extent conservatism, which enables the center-right to adopt and adapt other ideas with ease. Furthermore, Bora postulates that the volatility within the farright and the center-right in Turkey might be explained by the intersections and co-transformations of these three characteristics of right ideology. Nevertheless, the transactions between the center-left and center-right and even between the center-left and far-right are not considered by Bora the fact of which led him tocategorize both under the umbrella of “right”; however, this dissertation asserts that it is very necessary to divide the center-right from the far-rights due to the sui generis of the center-right from its counterparts. On the other hand, what Bora initially looks at are the ideological debates and intellectual representatives of the right-wing ideology without paying much attention to political parties. Bora also looks at the issue from a leftist point of view that in some ways leads to negative value judgments of the author towards the issue.

Beşir Ayvazoğlu, from a rightist point of view, explains what being rightist correspond to in Turkey as the representation and expression of divergent affiliations of “the real mass” (1991:32). For him, consisting of the great majority of the population, “the real

mass” is the one that was ousted from the power realm as well as the one that is perceived to be obliged to pay taxes without intervening in the active political discussions (1991:32-2). Looking at the intellectual literature rather than party politics, Ayvazoğlu concentrates on two main lines of the right in Turkey which are Islamist/conservative and nationalist, which occasionally overlap with each other.

Furthermore, what Ayvazoğlu disdains is implicitly the center-right with its partially democratic, occasionally statist and brutally opponent character vis-a-vis the reactionists that holds the political and economic power (1991:32). Despite accepting the center-right position as one of the components of center-right-wing ideology in Turkey, he does not deal with the center-right in particular. Similarly, Süleyman Seyfi Öğün concerns himself with conservatism²¹ and nationalism as two main pillars of right-wing ideology through focusing more on the sociological aspects without considering the center-right ideology and politics separately. Ali Yaşar Sarıbay also renders the religio-Islamic dynamics within the right-wing ideology, but he still does not distinguish center-right either. Therefore, the prevailing understudied status of the center-right in Turkey is extant in the right-wing intellectuals’ studies too.

As one of the rarest studies that completely focuses on the center-right in Turkey, Nuray Mert, in “Merkez Sağın Kısa Tarihi” (A Brief History of the Center Right in Turkey), asserts that being at the center, for a political party, connotes being legitimate (2007:7).

She furthermore reveals the dual function of the center right in Turkey: Its goals are to represent ‘the nation’s will’ and to get the approval of the masses on behalf of the Republican regime. In other words, Mert reveals that the center-right parties have been

21 For example, Süleyman Seyfi Öğün. 1998. “Türk Muhafazakârlığının Açık İkilemleri Üzerine”, Doğu Batı Dergisi 3(3): 75-77.

capable enough to attract the people without threatening the regime. One of the main differences of Mert’s study from this dissertation is Mert’s tendency to compare the center-right mentality with the Islamic and nationalist far-right approaches per se without paying attention to the division and integration lines of the center-right and the center-left. Furthermore, identifying the strategies of the center-right towards the

“economic development” as a means for the modernization of the center-right as well as the representation of the masses’ values is without any doubt justifiable. However, reducing the center-right political strategies to these two concepts may lead to an incomplete understanding of the center-right in Turkey, so that is why this dissertation introduces three main parameters, which also occasionally overlap with these two.

Though it offers some critical points, Mert’s study is largely a descriptive political history with a prevailing negative judgment of the center-right. Basing her choice of research methods on the premise that Political Science jargon could not evaluate the center-right issue adequately, she utilizes chronological explanations more (e.g. Mert 2007, Chapter 1). What I offer instead in this dissertation is a Political Science perspective that facilitates a comprehension of the center-right in Turkey with the help of its conceptual and analytical framework.

Ümit Cizre is also interested in center-right politics, especially the post-DP period, yet she does not compare the concept to center-left and far-right ideologies. Cizre contributes to the study of the center-right by adding such terms as pragmatism, spontaneity, conjunctural policy making and ambiguity. She critically reconsiders the characteristics of the center-right and its various relationships to the state. Nevertheless, without engaging in comparison, she sometimes attributes as particular to the

center-right aspects of Turkish politics that are far more general and widespread. For instance, she argues that one of the main characteristics of the Turkish center-right is leader dependency, but this is likely true for other ideologies as well. On the other hand, she makes her operationalization on the basis of parties rather than mentality or ideology, which is different than this dissertation²².

Analyzing the fragmentation of the center-right, Tanju Tosun argues that in the post-1980 coup period, Turkish politics became an apolitical arena under the economy-oriented influence of neo-liberalism (1999). Although they represented distinct sociological and ideological coalitions in the 1970s, center-right parties later began to seek legitimacy in the eyes of the state instead of society, which raised questions of reliability. Without internalizing conservatism, nationalism and liberalism, the center-right commonly utilized these ideologies on the popular level, and to Tosun, those ideals were then obtained by their real possessors (1999). Tosun’s study is useful in its analysis of the failure of classical right parties as well as its theorization of what center-right indicates in the Turkish context.

Another scholar who builds his study on the basis of political parties is Tanel Demirel.

Tanel Demirel’s two books on the Justice Party and the Democratic Party are significant sources for evaluating these two parties’ politics and discourses with special reference to the center-right in Turkey. His works offer an integration of a broad scope of methods.

Yet Demirel’s account ends in 1980, and does not deal with the Motherland Party and its key role in center-right politics in Turkey.

22 As stated above, the main objective in this dissertation is to investigate and to formulate what center-right mentality is in Turkey, and the political parties are just a unit of analysis.

Any picture of the literature review on the Turkish center-right would be incomplete without a reference to İdris Küçükömer. According to Küçükömer, who likens the left-right distinction to a progressivist vs. elitist and traditionalist vs. revolutionist cleavage, the Turkish right corresponds to the left and the Turkish left corresponds to the right when being compared to standard international conceptions of left and right (Küçükömer, 1994). If we are to look for a correlation between socioeconomic background and ideological positioning, research measuring political behavior reveals that, in general, the base of the left is comprised of relatively wealthier and more educated people whereas the social base of the right is comprised of poorer and less-educated people, which may to some extent support Küçükömer’s diametrical opposition of left and right in Turkey (e.g. Çarkoğlu and Avcı, 2002; Rienner, Esmer and Sayarı, 2002; Esmer, 2002:100-102; Tosun, 1999; Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2007;

Çaha, 2009; Hale and Özbudun, 2010).

Despite these debates and the sometimes contradictory divisions of left and right, we should not conclude that the terms left and right are entirely antagonistic and contrary to more global understandings of these terms; to do so would risk introducing a reductionist way of using these terms to analyze Turkey. What is crucially revealed across these discussions is the blurred and bizarre utilization of right and left in the Turkish context, which requires further operationalization of these terms to make them more analytically powerful. In order to simplify this operation, in what follows I shall suggest utilizing three main perspectives that may distinguish center-right politics and discourse in Turkey: democracy, state and secularism.

CHAPTER III