Weak Relations with the Opposition

Dahl distinguishes democratization from the polyarchy in terms of the development of a public opposition. Whereas the former demands responsiveness to citizens’ preferences, the latter requires a more inclusive system (1971:1-2). In the light of this distinction, we can suggest that the DP could not permit the development of public opposition by liberal means. In fact, not only the DP and center-right representatives, but also the Turkish political elites in general could not develop a tolerant attitude towards oppositional forces (Kalaycıoğlu, 1988:54; Mardin, 1965:375-13, Frey, 1975:45-19; Özbudun, 2000:74). Nevertheless, as the parties that based their identity on advocating for his authority within a majoritarian framework. This perception also structured the DP’s relationship to its opposition.

66 Lijphart employs Rae’s term “manufactured majorities” in explaining majoritarian democracies: “This system tends to produce highly disproportional results…‘manufactured majorities’ that are artificially created by the electoral system out of mere pluralities of the vote” (Lijphart, 1999:15; Rae 1967:74).

democracy, the center-right parties’ intolerant attitude towards the opposition can be evaluated as a shortcoming for the establishment of a substantive and inclusive democracy.

In that regard, the DP did not begin with harsh attitudes towards the opposition. In the 1950 election and the beginning of their period of rule, the DP promised to refrain from questioning and investigating the actions and policies of the single-party period (avoiding Devr-i Sabık). It seemed that the DP intended to establish a tolerant and peaceful understanding while in office with a fresh start instead of dealing with previous issues. This promise was quite important for the consolidation of democracy in the country since previous CHP governments, as founders of the state, at times engaged in arbitrary acts. A period of revenge might have brought further problems and chaos to the country. By the same token, after the DP Program was read in Parliament, the CHP demanded time to evaluate the program, which was a demand the DP accepted. This was an important reconciliation step if we consider that when the party program of the Peker government was being read after the 1946 elections, Menderes criticized the new government for having neither shared the program before the vote nor provided time for consideration after the program was declared (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 14.08.1946 p.60). Regarding the attitudes of the opposition party, Menderes justified the right to speak for the opposition declaring that his government welcomed criticism as a requirement of a democratic system (Bayar, 1969:154; Menderes and Akyol, 2011:19).

However, such diplomatic attitudes towards the opposition did not represent the general stance of the DP in the following years.⁶⁷

During ten years of DP rule, President Bayar and the opposition leader İnönü met once (Aydemir, 1976:263). And just as they met infrequently in person, they also rarely saw eye to eye in terms of ideas. In particular after the autumn of 1952, government relations with the opposition weakened. On 5 October 1952, in his İzmir speech İnönü argued that CHP’s political security was threatened. The DP interpreted this statement as a serious provocation, prompting CHP to accuse the government of fostering chaos.

İnönü said “I am warning that I am seeing a threat” (Burçak, 1998:122-3)⁶⁸. The transfer of some CHP assets to the state treasury and the closure of Public Houses (Halk Evleri) were two significant sources of the increasing tension resulting in major crises

between DP and CHP.

Eroğul perceives the revocation of the privilege of immunity of Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın (CHP’s Kars deputy) due to an article Yalçın published in Ulus on 18 April 1952 as the first signal of the DP’s tendency towards shifting to a “tyranny of the majority”

(2003:124). The DP’s attitude towards the Secretary General of the CHP Kasım Gülek

67 One should also note that government-opposition party relations did not gradually worsen. It is possible to talk about at least four terms of reciprocal tolerance and peace in these relations (Burçak, 1998; Toker, 1991a; 1991b). To Menderes and Akyol, the number of these periods was roughly seven (Menderes and Akyol, 2011:81-2). During these terms, the opposition party members also met with Menderes. Menderes also spoke about the unity of the government and the opposition party’s stance as being beyond the common values of the two parties. On 18 January 1953, for instance, Menderes declared that “the CHP was a party molded by the soul of national unity and it is necessary to accept that what dominated the CHP is patriotism” (Burçak 1998:131). To Belen on the other hand, in the course of the intra-party crisis, the DP fostered such periods of peace with the opposition party as a political strategy in order to deal quietly with internal problems (Belen 1960:53-2).

68This attitude of the opposition parties continues today. Turkish center-right and far-right parties are usually criticized by the opposition parties as damaging the regime under the name of a “threat”. Even in the 2009 elections, a headline in the pro-CHP daily Cumhuriyet asked “Are you aware of the threat?”

harking back to CHP-DP relations.

was also problematic. He was arrested in Zonguldak, and while being transferred to Istanbul he was subjected to harsh treatment by the police (Aydemir, 1976:155; Toker, 1991b:138). Even İnönü’s visits and meetings were sometimes impeded, and he was subjected to physical and psychological violence at times as in the case of the Kayseri and Uşak incidents (Zürcher, 2004:349; Öymen, 2013:335-6; Eroğul, 2003:238-2;

Aydemir, 1976:155,263; Burçak, 1998:508,518). The DP’s intolerance of the opposition occasionally extended to taking severe precautions to limit the self-expression of the opposition. Long ignoring the proposals of the opposition party deputies and refusing to discuss them in the Assembly (Burçak, 1998:626-4)⁶⁹, limiting CHP’s open-air meetings (Eroğul, 2003:194-2; Öymen, 2013:337-2) and prohibiting, just before the military intervention, the political activities of the opposition outside of the Assembly on 18 April 1960 (Zürcher, 2004:349) were among the more remarkable instances of DP’s intolerance.

This behavior of the DP towards the opposition was not limited to the CHP. Before coming to power, the party supported CHP’s efforts to close the Turkish Socialist Worker and Peasant Party and all periodicals and newspapers close to this party (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 16.12.1946). Nor did this position change during the DP’s rule. On

27 January 1954 The Nation Party (Millet Partisi) was closed in a single night as though it was “an ordinary association” without a second thought on the pretext of its purported opposition to Atatürk and his reforms (Eroğul, 2003:129). The secret procedure carried out in this case was also criticized by the opposition (Burçak, 1998:136). The Turkish Peasant Party and The Republican Nation Party declared before the 1954 elections that

69This issue was discussed in the National Assembly on 15 February 1960. For further details see TBMM Tutanak Dergisi.

they would not join the elections because of the undemocratic stance of the DP government (Burçak, 1998: 228). Not surprisingly, seeing this protest as inconsequential, the DP made no effort to reach a consensus with these parties.

Osman Bölükbaşı, a former DP deputy and chairman of the Republican Nation Party defeated the DP in the 1954 elections in Kırşehir, though this victory was suppressed by the DP by changing the province’s status to town despite the many serious critiques against this action by much of the CHP (See TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 30.06.1954 p.357-4 ).⁷⁰ Just before the 1957 elections, Kırşehir became a province again, but Osman Bölükbaşı was arrested as well as his privilege of immunity revoked in the pre-election process (Eroğul, 2003:198; Öymen, 2013:72-2). Similarly, İnönü’s election region, Malatya, was also divided into two, and Adıyaman became a new province after the 1954 elections.

Although this undemocratic stance of the DP towards the opposition was sometimes criticized within the DP, the party leadership supported by a strong president usually justified the necessity of these decisions in a demagogic manner. The DP leadership wanted to control and make decisions with as much independence as possible, which would also prevent lenience to intra-party opposition. In that regard, trying to restrict all political activities of the previous DP members who went against their party, ousting dissident members from the party, and forcing all ministers to resign in 1955 despite remaining the prime minister and delaying the party congress due to intra-party problems are among the antidemocratic methods used by the DP leadership against

70 Interestingly, in the village headman (muhtar) elections following this incident, the DP won 74 out of 76 villages in Kırşehir (Burçak 1998:231).

intra-party opposition ⁷¹ (Toker, 1991b:115; Burçak, 1998:430-7, Aydemir, 1976:268,311; Karaosmanoğlu, 1968:226). An absence of a delegation of authority and a dearth of trust for party members, which can be seen reflected in a lack of consultation and discussion within the party, were embedded DP practices.⁷² The DP elite were thus eager to exclude all forms of opposition including intra-party opposition, CHP opposition, other opposition parties and opposition from the press.