CHAPTER 2. THE CASE OF THE MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT
2.3. Arroyo and the global war on terror (2001-2005)
2.3.1. Timeline of events
Date Event Description Actor(s)
March 2001
Kuala Lumpur agreement Resumption GRP-MILF peace talks Malaysia, GRP, MILF
March 2001
Second organic act for the ARMM
Organic act adopted, MNLF protests that it is not faithful to FPA
GRP
April 2001 Storming of presidential palace
Presidential palace Malacanang is stormed by Estrada supporters, Arroyo calls on the army to intervene
GRP, population
April 2001 Coup for MNLF leadership, Misuari ousted
Council of 15 created, Misuari is deposed
Parouk Hussin, Hatimil Hassan, Mulsimin Sema April 2001 Misuari creates own
organization (look up name)
Misuari creates his own organization with loyalists on Sulu,
MNLF, GRP
May 2001 Hostage taking Dos Palmas, Palawan
ASG takes hostages, in an attempt to free the hostages, 22 soldiers and 5 hostages are killed
ASG, GRP, International community May 2001 National legislative and local
elections
Result elections, Communists win seats in Congress
Congress, population May 2001 Communist numbers swell
again
From 4500 members in 1995, the movement reaches 10 000 members again
CPP, NPA, KM
June 2001 Coordinative and Integrative System for Internal Security
Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security drafted the National Internal Security Plan
60 June 2001 Tripoli agreement on Peace GRP and MILF agree to center peace
talks on three domains: ancestral domain, security and rehabilitation.
GRP, MILF
August 2001
Implementing guidelines security aspect Tripoli Agreement
Installment Local Monitoring Teams (LMT’s), call for International Monitoring Team (IMT)
GRP, MILF
August 2001
Bangsamoro Development Agency - Solidarity Fund
Joint initiative MILF and MNLF to develop the Bangsamoro area
MILF, MNLF
September 2001
Terrorist attacks Al-Qaeda Deadly attacks against the World Trade Center in New York and other targets. In response: ‘global war on terror’
Al-Qaeda, USA
November 2001
ARMM elections Parouk Hussin elected new ARMM governor, Misuari supporters boycott elections
Council of 15, population
November 2001
Pro-Misuari forces revolt On Sulu and in Zamboanga City, Misuari loyalists revolt but are defeated by AFP. Misuari flees to Sabah but is arrested.
MNLF, GRP, Malaysia
December 2001
MNLF Plea with United Nations, submittal of draft declaration of independence
Misuari, out of frustration with the GRP unilateral implementation of the ARMM, seeks aid with the UN.
MNLF-Misuari, UN
January 2002
Misuari repatriated to the Philippines and detained
Upon his return, Misuari is arrested for rebellion.
MNLF, GRP
January 2002
Start of US-Philippine offensive against ASG on Basilan
Balikatan operation. Pursuing terrorists on Basilan Island until June 2002
GRP, USA
May 2002 Implementing guidelines rehabilitation aspect Tripoli Agreement
Work together to help civilians in conflict areas. Recognition by GRP of the MILF-run Bangsamoro
Development Agency
GRP, MILF
May 2002 Creation AHJAG Creation of the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group, creating a coordination body
61 to coordinate actions against
criminals
May 2002 Joint Coordination Council The MILF and MNLF agree to coordinate their efforts towards a unified Bangsamoro homeland
MILF, MNLF Executive Council
February 2003
Buliok offensive AFP launches an unexpected large- scale attack on the MILF Islamic Center Headquarters
GRP
March, April 2003
Davao- airport, wharf bombings
The Davao airport bombing killed 21, the Davao wharf bombing claimed 17 lives MILF, JI suspected March 2003 Bombing power transmission towers
Power transmission towers are bombed, causing one major power collapse.
MILF suspected
March, 2003
Arrest warrants against MILF leadership
After the Davao airport bombing and several other bombings, the GRP puts out arrest warrants against the MILF leaders, branding the organization as criminal/terrorist instead of a legitimate political organization
GRP
June 2003 MILF rejects terrorism Hashim Salamat makes a statement that the MILF rejects terrorism
MILF
July 2003 Hashim dies Hashim Salamat dies and is succeeded by Al Haj Murad Ibrahim
MILF
July 2003 Ceasefire A general ceasefire between the GRP and MILF is agreed to in Kuala Lumpur
GRP, MILF
February 2004
Superferry 14 bombing A ferry on its way from Manila to Cagayan de Oro is bombed, killing 116 ASG, RSM, JI February 2004 Inclusion CPP/NPA/NDF in US foreign terrorist
Due to listing the CPP/NPA/NDF as an FTO, the peace process with the
USA,
62 organizations list communist movement broke down
March 2004
Malaysian advance team arrives
A group of Malaysian observers for the IMT arrives
Malaysia
October 2004
Formation IMT Malaysia, Brunei and Libya formed the International Monitoring Team, which was tasked with overseeing the ceasefire
Malaysia, Brunei, Libya, OIC
February 2005
Hostilities Sulu MNLF and AFP clash on Sulu because of continuing human rights violations by AFP troops
MNLF, GRP
February 2005
Valentine Day’s bombings Three bombs explode in different cities (Manila, General Santos and Davao City), killing 8 and wounding 150
ASG, RSM, JI
May 2005 MILF Mindanao people consultation
Four million people give MILF mandate to negotiate a deal with the GRP
MILF, population
July 2005 Negotiations on ancestral domain start
Negotiations on the third track of the Tripoli Agreement, ancestral domain, start.
GRP, MILF
2.3.2. Context
International
Until January 2001, the peace process was an affair of domestic actors, such as the GRP, MILF and some NGOs (Notre Dame University, Maguindanaon Professionals and Employees Association). When Arroyo entered office, she took a multilateral approach, involving the OIC and Malaysia straight away. Whereas in the period after the FPA in 1996, the conflict between the GRP and MILF was mostly viewed as an internal matter, to be resolved within the boundaries of the Constitution, the all-out war changed this (Quilala, 2007). The OIC, Malaysia, Libya and Brunei Darussalam started to feel they should facilitate peace. The devastating effects of the war, with almost one million people being internally displaced (OPAPP, 2016), were clear for all to see. This activated these parties
63 to take a more facilitative role. The OIC for example, at the 27th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM), expressed its concern for the military hostilities and urged the GRP and MILF to seek for peace (Quilala, 2007). However, the OIC could not do more because the OIC did not recognize the MILF as the legitimate representative of the Moro people. Instead, Malaysia stepped in as a mediator (Quilala, 2007). The GRP objected to such a role, as Malaysia was seen as biased towards the Moros, but its third-party role was nevertheless accepted. The GRP accepted all demands made by the MILF, being
1) Withdrawal from MILF camps,
2) Involvement of the OIC or OIC members in the peace process,
3) Negotiations should be held on foreign neutral soil, and
4) The GRP should honor all previous agreements signed with the MILF (Quilala, 2007).
Parties rather choose a partial-insider mediator, than an impartial-outsider (section 1.3.4.4). This was also true for the GRP. The only insiders that are at close distance are Malaysia and Indonesia. With Indonesia too closely linked to the MNLF-GRP peace process, Malaysia was the logical choice. Soon after this, the parties agreed to resume the peace process in Kuala Lumpur. Libya also played a facilitative role and was more acceptable for the GRP because it did not play a prominent role in financing the conflict anymore (Abuza, 2003). Building upon the sign of trust created in Kuala Lumpur, the parties agreed on the specific tracks for the peace process in Tripoli: security, rehabilitation and ancestral domain (Quilala, 2007). These tracks will be discussed more extensively under the state and group sections.
Just after the Tripoli agreement was made in the summer of 2001, the international context changed tremendously. The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 on the United States was an event that changed the world everywhere and this was also true for the Philippines. The Philippines were probably one the areas in the world where the effects of 9/11 were felt most profoundly. With a history of terrorist attacks in a conflict which could easily be perceived as divided along religious lines, it would become an important theatre for the war on terror. As the Americans launched their attacks on Afghanistan, the situation in Mindanao was also watched closely. With hostage takings and bombings still numerous, the region drew the attention of the US. It was thought that some of the planning and training for 9/11 was done in the Philippines and that Mindanao was a ‘safe haven’ for terrorists (more under group). President Bush increased pressure on states. The National Security Strategy (2002) called for: “And America will hold the white house Washington to account nations that are compromised by terror, including those who harbor terrorists— because the allies of terror
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are the enemies of civilization. The United States and countries cooperating with us must not allow the terrorists to develop new home bases. Together, we will seek to deny them sanctuary at every turn“. This was solidified by strong United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions such as S/RES/1373 and S/RES/1377. Due to strong bilateral ties and the presence of jihadi networks on its soil, the Philippines was quickly drawn into the global war on terror (Quilala, 2007; Cruz de Castro, 2010; Buendia, 2004).
National
When Arroyo entered the presidential office, the economy of the Philippines was recovering, in spite of a still relatively low growth of just over 2 % (Philippine National Statistical Coordination Board). This was mainly due to the influx of remittances from the USA and other parts of the world. Another development was that due to increasing global competition, a trend of business outsourcing had developed. Both back-office business processes, such as accounting, financial services and human resources, and front-office processes, such as customer related services, were more and more outsourced to low wage countries. A country like the Philippines, with a highly competitive labor force, could profit from this development. During this phase, the growth of the world economy continued and the Philippines grew steadily, although a little slower than its South East Asian neighbors, steadily16.
Despite economic growth, the country was worried by continuing violence from two sides. First, the communist movement had gained back its momentum during the Asian Crisis and was becoming a real threat again. After the US had branded the CPP/NPA as a terrorist organization, its leader Joseph Maria Sison called for all-out resistance. Arroyo readily accepted the FTO listing of the CPP/NPA and declared war on the communists. This phase is characterized by continuous conflict between the GRP and the CPP/NPA. Because of its presence on the Island of Luzon, and its possession of heavy arms, the communists were seen as an existential threat. This is part of geopolitics, influenced by ideas of containment to certain geographical areas, is important for the GRP military strategy. Contrary to the Moro rebellion on Mindanao, the communists were harder to contain (ICG, 2008b); (Woon, 2014)). The GRP only managed to attain a ceasefire and peace agreement with the RPM-P (in 2005), and therefore had to fight the large majority of the communist movement.
Second, the amount and severity of terrorist attacks was increasing. The Superferry bombing (2004) and the Valentine Days’s Bombings (2005) were especially bloody (ICG, 2005). Hostage takings such as Dos Palmas in Palawan and the kidnapping of Indonesian and Malaysian nationals to Jolo
65 Island received much attention. The bombings reached their peak in this phase, with serious disruptions of city life in Mindanao and the Manila metropole. It forced the GRP to launch an offensive campaign, with help of the US, against the ASG and Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM) (ICG, 2008). RSM was a smaller organization which operated in Manila. According to one its captured members, its main task was to keep the AFP busy in Manila (ICG, 2008a). For these reasons, the inclusion of the MILF on the list of terrorist groups was a matter of constant debate (see state).
Finally, there was an important development in the MNLF. The MNLF had gotten divided because of the unilateral implementation of the ARMM by an organic act in March 2001. Misuari rejected the organic act but his authority was waning. In April 2001 the breakaway faction under the leadership of the Council of 15 was created. When Misuari supporters violently rebelled against the plebiscites and subsequent elections for the newly created ARMM, Misuari had to flee Malaysia. There he was arrested and later extradited to the Philippines. He was sentenced to prison time for rebellion against the state. Consequently, the MNLF was split in two, a more moderate faction under the leadership of the Council of 15, and a somewhat more radical faction of remaining Misuari loyalists.
Figure 3: Per Capita Poverty Threshold and Poverty Incidence among Families 2006, 2009, and 2012. NCR: National Capital Region (Manila). ARMM: Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
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Local
On a local level, three developments are important. First, underdevelopment and poverty continued. In some areas 30-40 % of the population lives under the poverty line (see figure 4). The contrast between the ARMM and Manila is 40,5 % vs 2,9 % (National Statistical Coordination Board). For groups like ASG, this provided an excellent area of operations. By distributing food and money, it gained popular support, at least passively, among parts of the population (Ressa, 2003). Efforts by the GRP, US and MILF run Bangsamoro Development Agency only helped to soften the blows of conflict. They did not structurally improve the situation and address this grievance (Santos, 2005).
Second, grievances were worsened by the large number of internally displaced persons. When refugees return to their lands, they might find it either in ruins or appropriated by someone else. Because of the honor codes like maratabat17, the disownment of land meant a serious offence which should be settled. Consequently, inter-clan conflicts (rido) remained an issue that kept dividing the Moros (Torres, 2007).
Third, the war on terror was also felt locally. Due to bombings and hostage takings and retaliatory violent counter-terrorism operations, animosity between Muslims and Christians grew. Discrimination of Muslims by the Christian majority worsened. This was also caused by negative framing by the media. Chen Yuan Woon (2014) studied the role of framing by the Philippine media of the Mindanao conflict. More specifically, he has focused upon the way audiences shape, re-make or re-produce these frames. In the case of Mindanao, Woon’s analysis of the most widely read newspaper, the Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI), gave a clear idea of how the PDI reported on Mindanao. Mindanao was displayed as another world, full of lawless conflict and chaos. Fortunately, this was contained to the island by government military action. Reports focused heavily on the violence in Mindanao, often accompanied by images of dead bodies signifying the severe brutality of the conflict. The religious divide was emphasized, strongly framing the conflict as a religious conflict or ‘clash of civilizations’. The Christians were depicted as good and peace-loving, while the Muslims were evil and antagonistic. The concept of security is portrayed one-sidedly, writing of the AFP and PNP as ‘providers’ and the Mindanao people as ‘receivers’. Local practices for conflict resolution are completely overlooked. Woon concludes that despite the power of people to process the reports in different ways and making an individual assessment, the mainstream Philippine media have exacerbated the conflict (Chen Yuan Woon, 2014).
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2.3.3. State
In the political sphere, Arroyo faced unrest from the beginning. Besides upcoming legislative and local elections in May, she was confronted with rebellion among angry Estrada-supporters. The impeachment and corruption charges were by Estrada-supporters seen as a coup d’état under false pretenses. In May, Arroyo had to call for a state of rebellion to suppress the storming of the presidential residence Malacanang (May 1, 2001). Shortly after this, elections were held for Congress and the lower level governance bodies, such as municipal and city councils, mayors and vice-mayors or barangay (neighborhood council) members. Possibly due to the violent overreaction of Estrada supporters, Arroyo’s people power coalition performed well in the election, winning 8 out of 12 senators and a large majority in the House of Representatives. This meant that she had gained a strong mandate to conduct further peace negotiations with the MILF and other groups. In June that year, the GRP and MILF moved forward with the peace process by outlining the major tracks for peace in the Tripoli Agreement: security, rehabilitation and ancestral domain (Quilala, 2007). For security, in order to create trust and monitor troops on the ground effectively, it was deemed necessary to create independent monitoring teams, composed of foreign nationals. As for rehabilitation, the parties agreed that the MILF-run Bangsamoro Development Agency will lead these efforts in MILF controlled areas (Quilala, 2007). For the MILF, this was a big step forwards, as it would get more legitimacy and standing (Taya, 2007). On ancestral domain, the parties merely acknowledged the need to identify such a geographical area (Quilala, 2007).
At the same time, the Arroyo administration had to deal with an exhausted AFP and PNP after the all-out war and the growing support for insurgency movements in Mindanao. Arroyo ordered the creation of a Coordinative and Integrative System of Internal Security. A National Internal Security Plan (NISP) was drafted, which called for a holistic approach. The strategy enabled the entire government machinery to make concerted and coordinated efforts to eliminate roots causes and take out insurgents effectively. Arroyo called for a military, diplomatic, cultural and economic path (Ressa, 2003). Within this framework, the AFP formulated its own policy of ‘focus and contain’. It stressed that limited resources should be used on focus points for maximum impact (Cruz de Castro, 2010). One might link the Buliok offensive to this policy, where the AFP tried to force a breakthrough into one major MILF stronghold. The strategy further specified a tactics for counter- insurgency, drawing from successful operations against the Communists from 1989-1995. An approach of Clear-Hold-Consolidate-Develop was implemented along three phases:
- Military defeat of armed rebels and the dismantling of critical institutions/structures support them
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- Strengthening of territorial gains to create momentum and keep the initiative
- Create the conditions for other government agencies to operate safely (Cruz de Castro, 2010)
In order to implement such a strategy, the GRP could use external help. After 9/11, Arroyo quickly pledged her allegiance to the war on terror. For the Americans, the Philippines and Southeast Asia was an important region to fight international terrorists. After Arroyo granted US forces access to Philippine air space in late 2001, help was on its way (Cruz de Castro, 2010). Short on all kinds of material, the US supplied helicopters, weapons, aircraft and training. Also, it supplied 600 men of Special Forces for operations on Basilan against ASG (Cruz de Castro, 2010). Operation Balikatan, which lasted from January till July 2002, was a clear signal to all insurgency/terrorist groups of the determination of the GRP/US coalition. It was also well-timed because terrorist groups had regrouped after the all-out war. Whereas 2001 was relatively peaceful compared to the previous year of destructive war, 2002 was characterized by a steady rise of bomb attacks (ICG, 2004).