Concubinage and Bigamy does not constitute the same crime, so no double jeopardy!
Judgment is REVERSED!
Schneckenburger is ACQUITTED!
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
Bugayong v. Ginez
No. L-10033. December 28, 1956
TOPIC: Defense against legal separation, Condonation FC56(1)
PONENTE: Felix, J.
AUTHOR: Ocampo, Miguel
FACTS:
Petitioner Benjamin Bugayong was a serviceman in the U.S. Navy who married respondent Leonila Ginez on Aug. 27, 1949 at Pangasinan, while on leave. After celebrating the marriage, they lived w/ Benjamin’s sisters in Pangasinan and had an agreement that when Benjamin already leaves for duty, Leonila is to stay w/ his sisters. But they eventually moved so Sampaloc, Manila.
But on July, 1951, Leonila left the home of Benjamin’s sisters and lived w/ her mother in Pangasinan. Later on moved to Dagupan for her to study there.
On same date, July, 1951, Benjamin was already receiving letters from Leonila’s sister, Valeriana Polangco, and other anonymous writers, alleging that Leonila is committing acts of infidelity, and kissed a certain Eliong.
So Bejmain sought advice from the Navy Chaplain about legal separation. Also, on Aug., 1952, he went to Pangasinan to look for Leonila and found her. He persuaded Leonila to go to Pedro’s house (Benjamin’s cousin) where they slept there for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife. And later on slept in Benjamin’s house for another night as husband and wife.
After sleeping 1 night in Benjamin’s house, he asked Leonila about this adulterous acts but instead of Leonila answering, she just left, w/c prompted Benjamin to build a belief that such adulterous acts are true. Despite such belief, he tried to find her but failed to do so. He instead went to Ilocos Norte “to soothe his wounded feelings”.
Later on, he filed w/ the CFI of Pangasinan this petition for legal separation on the ground of sexual infidelity by Leonila and presented 6 witnesses to support his claim.
Leonila, as defense, states, that assuming arguendo that such acts of infidelity are true, Benjamin already condoned to it.
CFI ruled in favor of Leonila and dismissed the case based on condonation. CA passed it to SC because the issue was a question of law.
ISSUE:
WON Benjamin condoned the alleged acts of infidelity of Leonila. YES.
HELD:
SC noted;
a. That when he went back to Pangasinan in Aug. 1952 to find out the truth of the alleged infidelity, he had slept w/ his wife for 2 nights and 1 days but failed to do so because Leonila left when Benjamin confronted her about it;
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b. That after running away, he tried to find her; and
c. That, also, in the hearing while the case was still in the CA, that was when he admitted that he had slept w/ Leonila.
SC agrees w/ the CFI that the conduct of Benjamin despite his belief that Leonila was unfaithful, deprives him, as alleged the offended spouse, of any action for legal separation against the offending wife.
SC cites American jurisprudence as support to their conclusions because it is said that one voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties is sufficient to constitute condonation, and where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation:
a. In Land v. Martin and Day v. Day, a divorce suit will not be granted for adultery where the parties continue to live together after it was known;
b. In Rogers v. Rogers, sexual intercourse after knowledge of adultery constitutes condonation; and c. In Toulson v. Toulson, citing Phinizy v. Phinizy, merely sleeping together for a single night.
ONG v ONG
[G.R. No. 153206. October 23, 2006]
TOPIC: Defenses in actions for legal separation - recrimination
PONENTE: Austria-Martinez, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN NOTES: (if applicable)
Recrimination – the accuser is as guilty as the accused.
FACTS: (chronological order)
1996: Lucita filed a petition for legal separation against her husband, William. She alleged that William is a wife-beater and had inflicted physical violence against her for the last 20 years of their marriage.
That in 1995, after a violent quarrel with William, she had to leave the conjugal house and stay with her parents.
This incident prompted her to file the petition.
Her sister and the doctor that treated her injuries after the violent quarrel attested to her allegations.
William denied everything but did not present evidence to support his counterclaim.
RTC granted the petition and CA affirmed in toto.
William filed for certiorari, raising recrimination as a defense - that the petition should be denied since they both have grounds to file for legal separation (Art. 56 (4)).
That his ground is that Lucita abandoned him.
ISSUE(S): WON there is recrimination when Lucita abandoned William.
HELD: There is none. SC affirmed CA and RTC in toto.
RATIO:
Abandonment as a ground for legal separation under Art. 55 (10) should be without a justifiable cause.
Lucita left the conjugal dwelling because of William’s repeated physical violence and grossly abusive misconduct against Lucita.
These allegations were proven in trial from testimonies and evidence presented by Lucita. William did not attempt to disprove the allegations and only presented a general denial of the accusations.
Therefore, Lucita’s abandonment was justified. William has no ground for legal separation against Lucita.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Abandonment with justifiable cause is not a ground for legal separation.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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MATUTE v. MACADAEG [99 Phil. 340. May 30, 1956]
TOPIC: On the custody of children PONENTE: Concepcion, J.
AUTHOR: Villaseñor, Pamela NOTES:
FACTS:
Armando Medel brought an action for legal separation against Rosario Matute, upon the ground of adultery committed with his brother, Ernesto Medel. The decision found Rosario guilty of the charge against her, decreeing said legal separation, and awarding to Armando the custody of their four (4) minor children.
Armando went to the US, leaving the children in the City of Davao under the care of his sister Pilar Medel, in whose house Rosario subsequently lived in order to be with her offspring. Armando returned to the Philippines late in 1954.
With his permission, Rosario brought the children to Manila to attend the funeral of her father. Armando alleges that he only consented on the condition that she would return the children to him within two (2) weeks. However, Rosario did not do so.
Rosario filed a motion for praying for the awarding the custody of her children and Armando be obligated to support the children in their studies and give them a monthly allowance. It was alleged that three of the children did not want to live with their father because he is already living with a woman other than their mother.
Armando opposed this motion and countered with a petition to declare and punish Rosario for contempt of court, because of her failure and alleged refusal to restore the custody of their children to him.
CFI Manila, presided over by respondent judge, issued an order absolving Rosario from the charge of contempt of court as she secured Armando's consent before bringing the children to Manila. On the other hand, the Court denied her motion for the custody of the children and ordering her to deliver them to Armando within twenty-four hours from notice.
Rosario instituted this action of certiorari and prohibition on Armando and respondent judge.
ISSUE(S): Can Rosario obtain custody of her children?
HELD: No. Petition is dismissed.
RATIO:
She merely obtained his permission to bring them to Manila, for the purpose of attending the funeral of their maternal grandfather. She obtained and has the physical possession of the minors in a precarious manner. He may, therefore, demand their return at any time, and she is bound to comply immediately with such demand.
Again, it is conceded that children over ten (10) years of age, whose parents are divorced or living separately, may choose which parent they prefer to live with, unless the parent chosen is unfit to take charge of their care by reason of
“moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity or poverty” (Rule 100, section 6, Rules of Court).
The fact remains that she is without means of livelihood and, according to her own admission, she lives on the charity of
them under her care.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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Laperal v. Republic
G.R. No. L-18008 October 30, 1962 TOPIC: Effects of decree of legal separation on the use of surname, NCC372
PONENTE: Barrera, J.
AUTHOR: Ocampo, Miguel
TAKE NOTE: This is only legal separation, not annulment or divorce
FACTS:
Petitioner Elisea Laperal filed this petition for change of name or resume using of maiden name w/ the CFI of Baguio. She alleged the facts below as support of her petition:
a. Her maiden name was Laperal;
b. She married Enrique Santamaria on March 24, 1939 and used Enrique’s surname during marriage;
c. On Jan. 18, 1958, her marriage to Enrique Santamaria was given a decree of legal separation;
d. After the legal separation case, she ceased to live w/ Enrique for many years now.
This was opposed by the Baguio city attorney and her petition was denied.
But upon her motion, the CFI, treating the petition as change of name, granted it because she stated in such motion that it would confuse in her finances and eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.
Hence, the State appeals to CA.
ISSUE:
WON Elisea can resume back using her maiden name. NO.
HELD:
SC cites NCC372 and notes that the language in such article is mandatory. Hence, her petition for change of name cannot given due course. This is so because her married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the marriage tie.
With regard to her granted motion, these were not the alleged causes upon which the petition was based. Hence, obviously no evidence to this effect had been adduced.
Secondly, the conjugal partnership of Elisea and Enrique had already been dissolved by the decree of legal separation in 1958. Consequently, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.
CFI decision reversed and set aside, Elisea’s petition dismissed.
MACADANGDANG v CA
[No. L-38287. October 23, 1981]
TOPIC: Legal separation - effects of death of one of the parties
PONENTE: Makasiar, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN NOTES: (if applicable)
FACTS: (chronological order)
Antonio married Filomena in 1946. Their lives went from rags to riches, but their fortune took a toll on their relationship. Both accused each other of having extramarital affairs.
They separated in 1965. Filomena moved to Cebu.
1971: Filomena was able to confirm Antonio’s illicit affairs. She then filed for legal separation and a motion for appointment of administrator of the conjugal partnership.
January 1973: CFI granted the petition finding Antonio guilty of concubinage; ordering the dissolution and
liquidation of the conjugal properties. But there was no division yet since the list of the conjugal properties to be divided is not yet complete.
Antonio did not appeal, making the decision final and executory.
October 1973: Filomena filed another motion for appointment of administrator and submission of complete list of conjugal assets by Antonio.
Antonio filed for a motion for reconsideration. Denied.
He submitted a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction to the Court of Appeals;
praying to set aside the October 1973 decision and prohibiting the lower court to treat the January 1973 decision as final and executory, and enforcing the same.
CA ruled that the January 1973 decision has been final and executory and that the October 1973 decision is valid, and that Antonio has no valid cause to impugn the decision.
Antonio appealed. But while the case was pending in SC, Antonio died.
ISSUE(S): WON Antonio’s death renders the case moot and academic How to resolve the division of properties?
HELD: No. But the petition was dismissed (not denied, I guess because they still rendered a resolution on the division of the conjugal property) for lack of merit. Although, SC affirmed that January 1973 decision is final and executory. (Hence, the lack of merit.)
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RATIO:
Legal problems do not cease simply because one of the parties dies. SC “felt bound” to resolve on how to divide the conjugal properties.
The rules on dissolution and liquidation under NCC (this was 1981) would be applied effective January 1973, when the decree of legal separation became final.
Then, the properties that may be allocated to Antonio as a result of the liquidation of the conjugal assets, shall be distributed in accordance with the laws of intestate succession.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Death of one of the spouses does not render the petition for legal separation moot and academic with regard to the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal properties.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
Ilusorio v. Bildner [May 12, 2000]
TOPIC: Obligation to live with the other spouse PONENTE: Pardo, J.
AUTHOR: RAYOS DEL SOL, Angelo S.
NOTES: the case consists of two consolidated petitions:
a) Wife Ilusorio v. Daughters (incl. Bildner), John and Jane Doe b) Husband Ilusorio, Daughters (incl. Bildner) v. CA and Wife Ilusorio - might be interesting to note that Erlinda’s application for habeas corpus included a prayer to enforce consortium
FACTS:
Erlinda Kalaw and Atty. Potenciano Ilusorio (Atty. P) (Chairman and Pres. Of Baguio Country Club) were married and lived together for 30 years, after which they separated in fact for undisclosed reasons. Erlinda lived in Antipolo, while Atty. P lived in different, high-end places.
They had six children, incl. Erlinda Bildner (Bildner) and Sylvia Ilusorio-Yap.
Once, after arriving from the US, Atty. P lived with Erlinda for 5 mos. In Antipolo. Sylvia and Bildner alleged that, during this time, Erlinda gave Atty. P an overdose of Zoloft, which caused deterioration in his health. Erlinda then filed a petition for guardianship over Atty. P due to his “deteriorated state”.
Later, after coming from a meeting in Baguio, Atty. P did not return to Antipolo but lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati. It was because of this that Erlinda filed a petition with the CA for habeas corpus to have custody of Atty. P, alleging that Bildner and Sylvia refused her demands to visit him, and prevented him from visiting her.
The CA rendered a two-part decision:
o That Bildner, Sylvia, the staff of Cleveland Condos, etc., allow Erlinda to visit Atty. P for “humanitarian
consideration”. (Hence, Atty. P and his daughters’ petition to nullify this, and enjoin enforcement of visitation) o Recalling the previous issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, and dismissing it entirely. (Hence, Erlinda’s petition
to reverse the CA’s dismissal of the application for the writ) ISSUE(S): (#2 may be subsumed under #1)
3. WON Erlinda may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel Atty. Potenciano to live with her.
4. WON Erlinda should be granted visitation rights.
HELD: No to both. Erlinda’s petition DISMISSED; Atty. Potenciano’s petition GRANTED.
RATIO:
1. No, she may not.
A writ of habeas corpus is only a remedy in cases of involuntary and illegal restraint that must be actual and effective, not nominal or moral. It extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled to that custody.
In this case, Atty. P was able to prove that he was capacitated and still mentally able, despite being 86 years old, meaning it was his full and free choice to live away from Erlinda. In addition, he never asked the condominium to
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