BPI showed as evidence that as early as 1948, he was diagnosed with schizophrenia but SC stated it was insufficient.
According to the scientific studies mentioned, a person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his property. By merely alleging the existence of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show substantial proof that at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his mental faculties.
Thus, the lower courts correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at the time he gave consent to the donation. He was only declared incompetent or incapable to give consent to contracts in Dec. 22, 1953 by the RTC of Pangasinan.
DOCTRINE: Incompetency must be evidenced with substantial proof
Mercado v. Espiritu [37 Phil 215, 1917]
TOPIC: Restrictions on civil personality (minority) PONENTE: Torres, J.
AUTHOR: Padrones, Mark NOTES: (if applicable)
FACTS: (chronological order)
The Mercado siblings alleged that as the sole heirs to a 48 hectare tract of land which belonged to their mother, Espiritu’s sister.
According to the Mercado siblings, Espiritu cajoles, induced, and fraudulently succeeded in getting them to sell their land for a sum of P400 as opposed to its original value. They demand the annulment of the sale; return the land to them, and the
remuneration of the thing benefited by Espiritu.
ISSUE(S): WON the contract is valid.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO:
Such sale was still valid since it was executed by minors, who have passed the ages of puberty and adolescence, and near the adult age, and that the minors pretended that they had already reached their minority. These minors cannot be permitted afterwards to excuse themselves from compliance with the obligation assumed by them or seek their annulment.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
Carson, J., concurring:
“If he who is a minor (1) deceitfully says or sets forth in an instrument that he is over twenty-five years of age, and this
assertion is believed by another person who takes him to be of about that age, (2) in an action at law he should be deemed to be of the age he asserted, and should not (3) afterwards be released from liability on the plea that he was not of said age when he assumed the obligation. The reason for this is that the law helps the deceived and not the deceivers.”
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ATIZADO v PEOPLE [633 SCRA 06, 2010]
TOPIC: Restrictions on capacity to act – a. Minority:
Criminal liability
PONENTE: Bersamin, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN NOTES: (if applicable)
FACTS: (chronological order)
Atizado and Monreal (minor) were convicted of murder for killing Rogelio Llona. The deceased and his common law wife Mirandilla were attending a barangay fiesta when the incident happened.
CA affirmed the conviction and the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE(S): WON Monreal should also serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua
HELD: No. Decision affirmed but penalty for Monreal was modified to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as the minimum period, to 14 years, 8 months, and one day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum period.
RATIO:
Monreal was proven to be a minor, when they committed the crime, based on affidavits, police blotter, and court minutes even when his birth certificate was not presented to the trial.
Pursuant to Art. 68 (2) of the RPC: when the offender is over 15 and under 18 years of age, the penalty next lower than the prescribed law is imposed.
Monreal has been detained for over 16 years and has already served his sentence. Therefore, he should be immediately released.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Sec. 7 Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006: Minors shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be 18 years old or older.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
US v. Vaquilar [March 31, 1914]
TOPIC: Insanity re: criminal liability as a restriction on the capacity to act
PONENTE: Trent, J.
AUTHOR: RAYOS DEL SOL, Angelo S.
NOTES: (if applicable)
FACTS:
Evaristo Vaquilar was convicted of parricide for killing his wife and his daughter.
His appeal was based on testimony by several witnesses who claimed that he was insane during and before the commission of the crimes:
o Before the act, he had pains in his stomach and head
o His eyes were big and red; he would not have killed his wife and kids if he were not crazy o He looked like a madman; cut everyone at random regardless of who it was
o He looked sad; crazy because he cut his sister o And more!
Health officer did not notice whether defendant was suffering from mental derangement or not.
ISSUE(S): WON Vaquilar is insane, therefore, not guilty of parricide.
HELD: Not insane. Judgments affirmed.
RATIO:
Insanity is different from extreme passion or the failure to use reason or good judgment because of anger.
“Crazy” is not synonymous with “insane”.
It is not unnatural for a murderer to strike promiscuously when he is caught in the act.
His conduct in jail showed reflection and remorse.
“Those who have not lost control of their reason by mental unsoundness are bound to control their tempers and restrain their passions, and are liable to the law if they do not.”
The presumption is that the person is sane. The burden of proof when alleging insanity as a defense falls upon the defense who alleges it. It requires positive evidence that criminal intent was not present because of the insanity, and that the offense was a direct result of that insanity; enough to overcome the presumption of sanity.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Insanity, as a defense, must be shown by the defense, through positive evidence, to have been the cause of the offense.
Insanity is not the same as an inability to control one’s temper or a lack of judgment.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S): N/A
Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC [G.R. No. 193237, 2012]
TOPIC: Restrictions on Civil Capacity (Restrictions on capacity to act – Civil interdiction)
PONENTE: Carpio, J.
AUTHOR: Villaseñor, Pamela NOTES:
FACTS:
Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte in the May 2010 elections. Jalosjos was running for his third term.
Cardino filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to deny due course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jalosjos. It was alleged that Jalosjos made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy when he declared under oath that he was eligible for the Office of Mayor. Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos had already been convicted by final judgment for robbery and sentenced to prisión mayor by the RTC Cebu and have not served his sentence.
Jalosjos admitted his conviction but stated that he had already been granted probation. Cardino countered that the RTC revoked Jalosjos’ probation. Jalosjos refuted Cardino and stated that the RTC issued an Order declaring that Jalosjos had duly complied with the order of probation.
Jalosjos further stated that during the 2004 elections the COMELEC denied a petition for disqualification filed against him on the same grounds.
COMELEC First Division ruled in favor of Cardino and found that Jalosjos’ certificate of compliance of probation was fraudulently issued; thus, Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence. Therefore, he is not eligible to run.
ISSUE: Did COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it disqualified Jalosjos to run as Mayor?
HELD: No.
RATIO:
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a false statement in a certificate of candidacy that a candidate is eligible to run for public office is a false material representation is a ground for disqualification. Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was void from the start since he was not eligible to run for any public office at the time he filed his certificate
absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification, both would constitute ineligibilities to be elected or hold public office.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Revised Penal Code
Art. 31. Effect of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification. — The penalties of perpetual or temporal special disqualification for public office, profession or calling shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected;
2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually or during the term of the sentence according to the extent of such disqualification.
Art. 34. Civil interdiction. — Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.
Art. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal; Their accessory penalties. — The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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Reyes v COMELEC
TOPIC: Alienage (1987 Constitution, ART IV Sec 1-5) PONENTE: Perez, J
AUTHOR: Magsino, Patricia Marie C.
Note: Art IV, Sec 1-5 is about citizenship
FACTS: (chronological order)
Oct. 31, 2012 – Joseph Socorro Tan filed before COMELEC an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Ceriticate of Candicacy of petitioner – Regina Ongsiako Reyes on the ground that it contained material
misrepresentations
Among which were that she stated (1) she was not a permanent resident of another country when in fact, she is a permanent resident or an immigrant of the USA and (2) that she is a Filipino citizen, but in fact she is an American citizen
March 27, 2013 – cancelled the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner
April 8, 2013 – Reyes filed for Motion for Reconsideration stating that she was a Filipino citizen
May 14, 2013 – COMELEC denied her motion
May 18, 2013 – Reyes was declared the winner of the 2013 election
June 5, 2013 – COMELEC issued a Certificate of Finality declaring their Resolution (May 14 decision) final and executory, on the same day Reyes took her oath of office
Reyes has yet to assume office at the time because her term officially starts at noon of June 30, 2013
Reyes assails through a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction resolution of the COMELEC ordering the cancellation of Reyes
ISSUE(S):
WON Reyes is a Filipino citizen HELD:
NO. Reyes is not a Fililpino citizen.
Petition is dismissed and May 14 decision is upheld.
RATIO:
Tan submitted to Bureau of Immigration evidence showing that Reyes is a holder of a US passport, and that her status is that of a balikbayan. For Reyes to reacquire her citizenship, she must take an oath of allegiance, and make a personal sworn
renunciation of her American citizenship (RA 9225). Reyes did none of these requirements, and as it stands she remains to be
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
Olaguer v. Parugganan
[ G.R. NO. 158907, February 12, 2007 ] TOPIC: NCC38
PONENTE: Chico-Nazario, J.
AUTHOR: Ocampo, Miguel
FACTS:
Petitioner was the owner of 60k shares of stocks of Businessday Corporation with a total par value of Php600k and was against the Marcos dictatorship.
While anticipating to be arrested because of the Marcos dictatorship, petitioner then made an oral agreement with Raul Locsin, Enrique Joaquin and Hector Hilofena, that they would support petitoner’s family with his salary. And also made an SPA appointing them 3 as his attorney-in-fact for selling or transferring the petitioner’s shares with Businessday for the purpose of concealing that he was a stockholder of Businessday, in the event of a military crackdown against the Marcos’.
The parties acknowledged the SPA before respondent Emilio Purugganan, Jr., who was then the Corporate Secretary of Businessday, and at the same time, a notary public for Quezon City.
In Dec. 24 1979, petitioner was arrested by the Marcos military and detained for committing arson. During the
petitioner's detention, Locsin ordered Purugganan to cancel petitioner's shares in the books of the corporation and to transfer them to respondent Locsin's name.
When petitioner was finally released from detention in 1986, he discovered that he was no longer registered as stockholder of Businessday. He also learned that Purugganan, had already recorded the transfer of shares in favor of Locsin, while petitioner was detained. When petitioner demanded that respondents restore to him full ownership of his shares of stock, they refused to do so.
On 29 July 1986, petitioner filed this petition against Purugganan and Locsin to declare the sale of the shares of stock as illegal, to restore to the petitioner full ownership of the shares.
RTC ruled in favor of respondents stating that the sale was valid and petitioner intended to sell the shares to anyone including Locsin.
CA affirmed stating that granting that there was no perfected contract of sale, petitioner ratified the sale to Locsin by his receipt of the purchase price (The 600k), and his failure to raise any protest over the said sale.
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ISSUE:
WON the sale is valid HELD: YES.
In petitioner’s allegations, he stated that the authority of the afore-named agents to sell the shares of stock was limited to the following conditions:
1. In the event of the petitioner's “absence” and “incapacity”; and
2. For the limited purpose of applying the proceeds of the sale to the satisfaction of petitioner's subsisting obligations with the companies adverted to in the SPA.
He wanted to apply a strict definition of “absence” and “incapacity” wherein "a person disappears from his domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, without leaving an agent to administer his property," pursuant to NCC381 and NCC38:
a. ART 381. When a person disappears from his domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, and without leaving an agent to administer his property, the judge, at the instance of an interested party, a relative, or a friend, may appoint a person to represent him in all that may be necessary.
b. ART. 38 Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person, from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements.
If we apply NCC381 and NCC38, it would negate the effect of the SPA by creating absurd, if not impossible, legal situations.
Petitioner did not give evidence that he was in debt with Businessday at the time he had executed the SPA. Nor could he have considered incurring any debts since he admitted that, at the time of its execution, he was concerned about his possible arrest, death and disappearance.
Petitioner alleges that the purported sale between himself and Locsin of the disputed shares is void since it contravenes Article 1491 of the Civil Code, which provides that:
a. ART. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another: x x x x
2. Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been entrusted to them, unless the consent of the principal has been given; x x x.
However, NCC1491 is not absolute due to CA’s ruling.
Umale v. ASB Realty Corporation [G.R. 181126, June 15, 2011]
TOPIC: Restrictions on capacity to act (Insolvency and Trusteeship
PONENTE: Del Castillo, J.
AUTHOR: Padrones, Mark NOTES: (if applicable)
FACTS: (chronological order)
1996: Amethyst Pearl executed a Deed of Assignment in Liquidation of a parcel of land in favor of ASB Realty in consideration of Amethyst Pearl’s outstanding capital stock from ASB Realty making ASB Realty the owner of the parcel of land.
Sometime in 2003: ASB Realty commenced an action in the MTC for unlawful detainer against Umale. ASB Realty alleged that it entered into a lease contract with Umale for the period June 1, 1999-May 31, 2000. Their agreement was for Umale to conduct a pay-parking business on the property and pay a monthly rent of P60,720.00. Upon the contract's expiration on continued occupying the premises and paying rentals.
June 2003: ASB Realty served on Umale a Notice of Termination of Lease and Demand to Vacate and Pay. ASB Realty stated that it was terminating the lease effective midnight of June 30, 2003.Umale failed to comply with ASB Realty's demands and
continued in possession of the subject premises, even constructing commercial establishments thereon.
ISSUE(S): Can a corporate officer of ASB Realty (duly authorized by the Board of Directors) file suit to recover an unlawfully detained corporate property despite the fact that the corporation had already been placed under rehabilitation?
HELD: Yes RATIO:
- What petitioners argue is that the corporate officer of ASB Realty is incapacitated to file this suit to recover a corporate property because ASB Realty has a duly-appointed rehabilitation receiver. Allegedly, this rehabilitation receiver is the only one that can file the instant suit.
- Corporations, such as ASB Realty, are juridical entities that exist by operation of law. As a creature of law, the powers and attributes of a corporation are those set out, expressly or impliedly, in the law.
- Corporate Rehabilitation’s concept of preserving the corporation’s business as a going concern while it is undergoing rehabilitation is called debtor-in-possession or debtor-in-place.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Corporate rehabilitation is defined as “the restoration of the debtor to as position of successful operation and solvency, if it is shown that its continuance of operation is economically feasible and its creditors can recover by way of the present value of payments projected in the plan more if the corporation continues as a going concern than if it is immediately liquidated”
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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HEIRS of FAVIS v GONZALES [713 SCRA 569, 2010]
TOPIC: Restrictions on capacity to act – k. Physical incapacity/disease
PONENTE: Perez, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN NOTES: (if applicable)
“Dr. Favis and his sneaky, greedy 2nd wife.”
FACTS: (chronological order)
Dr. Favis was married to Capitolina and had children with her. After she died, he took in Juana as his common-law wife (they eventually got married). They had one child, Mariano, with whom they had four grandchildren.
In 1992, he was diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease, kidney trouble, hernia, etc.
In 1994, he allegedly executed a Deed of Donation transferring and conveying parts of his estate in favor of his grandchildren with Juana.
In 1995, Dr. Favis died.
Dr Favis’ children with Capitolina filed an action for annulment of the deed, claiming that it prejudiced their legitime.
RTC found that Dr. Favis, at the age of 92, plagued with illnesses, could not have had full control of his mental capacities to execute a valid Deed of Donation. It nullified the deed on the ground of vitiated consent.
CA dismissed the complaint solely because of Art. 151 FC: that it was not alleged that there was earnest efforts toward a compromise, and that it had failed.
ISSUE(S): WON the deed of donation is valid.
HELD: No. CA decision was set aside. RTC decision affirmed.
RATIO:
CA did not touch on the correctness of the findings of RTC. CA chose to confine its review to the procedural aspect.
RTC’s findings, therefore, stands unreversed.
RTC decision: “The fact that the deed of donation was only executed after Dra. Mercedes (his daughter from 1st marriage) left his father’s house necessarily indicates that they don’t want the same to be known by the first family, which is an
RTC decision: “The fact that the deed of donation was only executed after Dra. Mercedes (his daughter from 1st marriage) left his father’s house necessarily indicates that they don’t want the same to be known by the first family, which is an