The way that the concepts found within the human security discourse overlay with the way that security is characterised by the Red Cross will now be examined. This will be
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done by first suggesting what some of the limitations of operational security within the Red Cross might be, through attempting to understand its organisational concepts of personal security against a human security framework.
At the strategic level, each component of the Red Cross ensures that they act according to their principles, and it is largely about protecting the image and the acceptance of the organisational in that locale. An example of this was provided in Chapter Three, when historically the NZRC Welfare Teams had to work and reside alongside personnel from the American military’s Camp Radcliffe during the Vietnam War. This cohabitation presented perception issues of NZRC health-professionals as not being impartial and aligned to American interests. Additionally, in Chapter Five, one of the case studies from Afghanistan included notable challenges of navigating issues of acceptance due to local perceptions of Red Cross staff being aligned with Western interests.
At the operational level, security management structures are largely about effective situational monitoring and coordination within the operational area. At the individual level, the delegate is required to ensure that they competently undertake their role in compliance with regulation, but also to report any security issues upwards. All layers in this security framework are mutually supportive and synergetic (IFRC, 2007:15). By first identifying gaps at the broadest level, i.e. the strategic level, the way that wider security concerns may ‘trickle-down’ to impact upon the personal security of the individual can then be examined.
Red Cross characteristics within a politicised humanitarian or development environment
Operational Security within the Red Cross is linked to its mandate to strategically adhere to its historical characteristics and fundamental principles, particularly as a way to retain access to vulnerable communities. Organisationally, Red Cross staff are forbidden from working in-country without governmental permission, or publically questioning political issues, even human-rights violations. The security incidence that took place in South Sudan (2014), as covered in Chapter Five, is an example of this. It was clear during that conflict that violations of HCiD were occurring, but the NZRC delegate along with the ICRC remained somewhat silent on the issue, as required for operational security. However at an organisational level, there was less public advocacy from ICRC (in spite of their leadership in the HCiD campaign) for the need to respect health-security, in comparison to more politically vocal organisations like MSF (MSF, 2014b:1).
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The application of Human Security concepts might assist with examining the genuine relevance of such a principled approach by the Red Cross to operational security with the ‘highly politicised’ contemporary humanitarian or development environment. This would require an attempt by the Red Cross to rebalance their characterisation as an impartial and neutral entity, with the (political) prioritisation of security needs through a human security analysis. The current stance of the ICRC is what Davies (2012:16) has described as the “borderless rhetoric of neutrality” (citing DeChaime, 2005), which was
undertaken to a greater degree with MSF in South Sudan.
Red Cross dependence on proactive and reactive operational security measures
This general modus operandi across the Red Cross has been a preventative approach to security, rather than one that has relied on explicit harder measures, like armed guards or escorts. The use of any form of armed security intervention has serious implications for the ‘humanitarian imperative’ of any organisation like the Red Cross. Unfortunately, other than through the Red Cross implementing its operational definitions of acceptance, (passive) protection and deterrence, if an environment gets too insecure, the Red Cross and its delegates withdraw from the location. An example of this was highlighted in the case studies from Chechnya (1996), Northern Caucasus (1999), Afghanistan (2012) and South Sudan (2014) covered in Chapter Five. (The issue of securing environments however is well outside the Red Cross mandate.)
In two of the case studies, Chechnya and Northern Caucasus, the serious level of threat to Red Cross staff that eventuated in multiple Red Cross fatalities and kidnappings, there were also significant significant impacts on local beneficiaries as well. There was an immediate withdrawal of critical development and humanitarian health-services to vulnerable communities. The case study from Afghanistan also lead to a significant withdrawal of Red Cross support. These along with security incidents, such as those typified by the South Sudan case study also have impacts back in New Zealand, when RCNS such as NZRC then have to review what support, if any, they will provide in such critical dangerous environments.
The comprehensive nature of human security conceptualisations of security infers that any single threat to human-lives, such as health security, may require a social, political or even a military solution that exists beyond the scope of any one organisation alone. Furthermore, Batniji et al. (2009:1141) argues that broader issues of insecurity within development or humanitarian spaces require greater inter-agency collaboration. The
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Red Cross may often be accused of being too independent in its strategic approach to operational security. As covered in Chapter Three, perceptions of neutrality and impartiality have been important characteristics for the Red Cross to work alongside military bodies and parties to a conflict. Independence remains critical to the Red Cross; both for the personal security of its staff to exist in complex security environments, and for the retention of access to those that need health-security.
The use of ‘securitisation of health (or development)’ as a Strategic Tool
The possibility that organisations, such as the ICRC, may also be involved in the ‘securitisation of health’ is another way that Red Cross operations might further be informed by a human security discourse. It is through the ‘securitisation of health’ that the attainment of otherwise ‘un-associated’ strategic goals could be linked through the provision of health services by the components of the Red Cross. As supported by Chen (2004:2), the idea of the ‘securitisation of development’ involves the integrating of Red Cross health programmes into wider agendas with the purpose of prioritising other economic, social or ‘political’ strategies.