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The first part of the research structure examined the history of the Red Cross to elicit the organisations unique characterisation of security, and its relation to the issue of protection of human-lives. This also assisted in critically examining the apparent hereditary relationship between the Red Cross and human security, as inferred by Krause (2014:77). The theoretical framework of the human security paradigm was then examined. A broad overview of the human security theoretical framework was necessary first as it assisted in understanding areas where human security and Red Cross interests might either diverge or converge either programmatically (for example through resilience or R2P), or the way operational security interests were conceptualised.

Subsequently the theoretical overview then provided a narrower focus upon the militaristic and health-related aspects of human security, so as to identified concepts within the discourse which might be especially topical to Red Cross considerations. The research structure then reviewed ten case-studies of security incidents that were experienced by NZRC delegates. By ordering these case-studies in terms of required (albeit) operational definitions, it was possible to understand what could be expected as a ‘typical’ characteristic of the Red Cross experience. Identified gaps and limitations were then discussed in terms of what a human security discourse might be able to contribute to security understanding and potentially operational practise. Figure 6.1 in Chapter Six provides a diagrammatic illustration on how the various components (the characteristics of the Red Cross, the concepts of human security, and the operational definitions of security) supported each of the research questions.

In many of the situations that NZRC delegates experienced in the case studies, there were security variables that could be linked to human security understandings. Most notably, this exposure including being in the proximity to military actors whom a human security framework can cast as legitimate humanitarian actors or at least the enabler of aspect of human security (Regehr and Whelan, 2004:6), whether it was a ‘formalised’ military or ‘informal militia’. However, the distinction between these two groups providing a notable dynamic when applying the assumption that the ‘formal’ status of any military actor nessecarily correleted with personal safety for the NZRC delegates. In one of the case studies, particularly the example from Chechnya, the Special Russian Forces who some accuse of carrying out the killings of ICRC could be considered a formalised unit in some ways. As could the soldiers that were using weapons outside the hotel in the case study from CAR.

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As covered in Chapter Three however, the exposure to the military (regardless of whether it they are ‘formal’ or ‘informal’) is a historical and contemporary characteristic of working for the Red Cross in many ways. The research questions were mindful of the uniqueness of the Red Cross, and were designed to elicit findings that could account for the exceptional level exposure and normalisation to insecurity that its faces in the field, as presented below.

Findings in response to the First Research Question:

How is the human security discourse represented in the way that the Red Cross considers operational security within its humanitarian operations and development programmes?

The historical influence of Red Cross to the human security framework, and the representation of the human security discourse within contemporary Red Cross operational security, cannot be taken for granted.

Many of the ideas that form the foundational roots of human security are neither the invention of the Red Cross (particularly the ICRC) and the Geneva Conventions, nor the product of nineteenth-century European thinking alone. This argument was covered in Chapter Three, as supported by the literature from Hampson (2002:17), Blair (2006:274) and the ICRC (2009a:5). The apparent representation of the human security discourse within the Red Cross must take into account that organisation and operational security is often less malleable, more definitive and prescriptive, and institutionalised (Owen, 2014:331).

The human security discourse is represented in the peculiar Red Cross characterisation of security and protection at a strategic and programmatic level, as well as the particular way that Red Cross considers personal security at the operational level.

The role of protection and rights within the Red Cross is perhaps more restrictive within the Red Cross due to its particular fundamental principles (neutrality, impartiality and independence) and the limitation that this places on the organisation for advocating or political negotiation. The Red Cross does however share the human security understanding of the role of protection and security for the maintenance of capacity for such things as health services (Batniji et al., 2009:1141), and for the reduction

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vulnerability (Ogata & Cells, 2003:273). There are challenges for the Red Cross to attain full personal security for its delegates due to the inherent insecurity of the conflicts or complex emergencies that it is sometimes required to operate within. As raised when introducing the NZRC case studies in Chapter Five, and discussed in Chapter Six, the ‘seven pillars of security’ assist with mitigating these risks (IFRC, 2007:18).

The representation of the human security discourse within Red Cross considerations of operational security must take into account variations between the components of the entire Red Cross ‘Movement’, and the three layers of security within which each component engages.

As introduced in Chapter Three, the Red Cross is made up of a number of components: the ICRC which is more aligned with a humanitarian paradigm, the IFRC secretariat which is more aligned with a development paradigm, and the RCNS in each country (Forsythe, 2005:20). Each of these have distinct nuances within the management of their operational security, although they do roughly correspond with similar layers of security awareness; individual (or incidental) level, operational (or personnel) level, and the strategic (or organisational) level (IFRC, 2007:14). The shared representation or prioritisation of interest in the human security discourse may differ accordingly, including what phase any Red Cross development programme or humanitarian operation is also in (O’Keefe and Rose, 2008:458).

Findings in response to the Second Research Question:

By analysing the experience of security by Red Cross humanitarian and development health-based aid workers, how can human security considerations further contribute to the operational policies of the Red Cross?

Prioritisation within the human security discourse on such issues as rights are not always practical, and there are political aspects to the human security framework that are not compatible with current Red Cross operational security.

The organisational characteristics of the Red Cross, which include the unique auxiliary status of its RCNS to respective governments, is partly predicated on a tacit agreement that it will remain neutral and independence on, or of, any political matters. As covered in Chapter Four, Oberleitner (2005a:188) highlights the way that human security can succinctly be used for the prioritisation of political agenda, particularly by governments

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and less neutral or less impartial NGOs. However, many of the principles and Dunantist philosophy of the Red Cross are also shared by other humanitarian and development organisations, so the deliberations upon the utility of the human security discourse are also relevant to them.

The promotion of human security strategies such as the ‘securitisation of development (or health)’ might be appealing to the Red Cross, but not in regards to how such securitisation measures can eventually impact of delegate personal security.

It is clear that such politicised and strategic securitisation would currently be considered at odds with the characterisation of the Red Cross as an impartial and neutral movement. There are, however, anecdotes that securitisation strategies may have occurred within some Red Cross humanitarian operations and development programmes already33. The

consideration or actual utilisation of ‘securitisation strategies’ by the Red Cross would required a significant level of caution, at least because of the potential negative implications that such strategies could have on matters of Red Cross delegate acceptance (IFRC, 2007:17), as covered in Chapter Six.

Human security considerations offer a mechanism by which the Red Cross can reconsider within its operational security a comprehensive range of context- specific threats, across its entire range of (ICRC) humanitarian operations and (IFRC) development programmes.

The UNDP’s (1994:22) idea of human security refocused the security discourse towards a people-centred approach that acknowledged “the legitimate concerns of ordinary

people who sought security in their daily lives”. As covered in Chapter Four, human

security also expanded an understanding that physical violence or attack is not the only threat to the individual, and physical safety cannot be the only priority of personal security priority. The source of threat to personal security can also be related to issues such as mental well-being (which required operation security to include psycho-social support measures). The multi-faceted view the sources of threat could even be more topical, such as the biological threats that NZRC delegates are exposed to as part of the current

33 Due to security reasons and to maintain the professional discretion of NZRC delegates, these sources

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IFRC Ebola response in Sierra Leone (which requires operational security to include Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) resources) (NZRC, 2014c).

As mentioned earlier in this section, and covered in Chapter Three, in the case of NZRC at least, the normalisation of its delegates to threats that might imminent due to the presence of military are largely mitigated through operational security measures that seek to normalising engagement with such factors. The relevance of military as legitimate actors in an inter-agency approach to humanitarian and development solutions is well-established in the human security and Development Studies literature. The relevance of the Red Cross to Development Studies and the development paradigm would appear to be less established.

Relevance of Red Cross to Development Paradigms and