Assumptions

a. Knowledge of Contracting

The reader has a rudimentary knowledge and understanding of contracting in a contingency environment.

b. Contingency Contracting

The United States government will continue to use contingency, also known as expeditionary contracting as the primary means to support emergency and combat support operations throughout the global area of operation for the foreseeable future.

c. Contingency Contracting Officers

During a declared contingency operation, either deployed to a hostile combat zone or humanitarian and disaster relief area, the term contingency contracting officers will only refer to commissioned officers and enlisted personnel of the Department of Defense.

d. Development of Contingency Contracting Guidance

Developed over what could be considered a long period of time, the contingency contracting guidance used today evolved out of a need to win the hearts and minds of the populations that we liberated. In a 2011 article, “No More “Mad Money”: Salvaging the Commander’s Emergency Response Program,” author Heidi Osterhout, Major, U.S. Air Force, exposes the origins of and all things CERP. Maj Osterhout paints a picture of success in the transitional stage of the war in Iraq, success, problems with management and transparency, and project sustainability. Efforts to battle cultures of fraud and corruption are drawn to similar conclusion in Iraq and Afghanistan. For all the work to police it, the success of CERP as seen from the eyes of the commanders using it only increased the magnitude of funding and failures.

I can write a book on misuse of CERP and how not to do that again as well as Afghan infrastructure funds. And again, I don’t criticize the Brigade Commanders because they were under tremendous pressure with all that money coming in that Congress pushed our way in term of budget

authority, to use it through CERP or AIF. The problem was we never had the oversight and what I mean by “oversight” is we never had the surveillance in place to do that because all of the CORs (contracting officer representatives) came out of the maneuver force and if I have a security-dependent environment. (Personal communication with SCO-A, October 2013)

Ryan D. Yamaki-Taylor, a Naval Postgraduate School student and special operations officer, is the first individual to attempt to tie COIN contracting, MAAWS-A and CERP together in an effort to discern what went wrong through his 2011 thesis entitled, Shoot, move, communicate, purchase: How United States special forces can

better employ money as a weapon system. Although not addressed in depth previously,

Yamaki-Taylor endeavors to analyze historical friction areas experienced by CORs, caused by contracting officer guidance and special operations task force (SOTF) employment at the task force level and below. The impact of the COMISAF guidance on COIN contracting in Afghanistan was identified as having a correlational impact on the performance effectiveness of United States Special Forces (USSF), as it relates to the commander’s MAAWS-A guidance. By employing a modified version of the Yoder three-tier model for optimal planning and execution for contingency contracting, the author suggests that many of the historical frictions can be reduced or eliminated.

e. Contingency Contracting Core Competencies

Developed by CMDR (retired) Cory Yoder, former naval supply officer, the Yoder three-tier model consists of basic contracting officer core competencies and functions of personnel. Used to assess the current operational contracting environment, it can assist with determining the appropriate level of contingency contracting support necessary. Based on the existing support capabilities, the senior contracting official can determine the appropriate contingency contracting officer necessary based on the combined, joint or operational command structure. Each level within the Yoder model provides the senior acquisition professional with a guide for assigning individuals with the appropriate level of contracting education and experience to meet the challenges of a combined, joint or operational command structure. For the purpose of facilitating contracting awards based on operational requirements, the command must to weigh the

pros and cons of contingency contracting at each level. At the first level or tier-one is the ordering officer, next at tier-two is the leveraging contracting office and at tier-three is the integrated planner/executor.

The ordering officer’s responsibility at Level I is to execute basic simplified acquisitions, in the form of orders, conduct and complete training in accordance with Defense Acquisition University (DAU) Contracting (CON) 234. The ordering officer is also Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) Certified CON Level I or II and should be a junior to mid-enlisted, junior officers or General Schedule (GS) civilian, 1102 in the grade of GS7–9. The benefit of the ordering officer (tier-one) is the acquisition capability of simple buys under the simplified acquisition threshold (SAT) amount with no need of integration with operational units. This can be seen as a disadvantage, as the ordering officer is not involved with the operational or logistical planning at the unit level and has no broad liaison function, which could be useful in the case of unforeseen and emerging requirements after execution.

At the second tier is the leveraging officer, who is a small economy specialist capable of leveraging local markets, helping to reduce material “push and pull” and educating and training individuals at the DAU CON 234 level. Leveraging officers are DAWIA CON Level II or III certified, should be a senior enlisted, possibly a junior to mid-grade officer or a GS civilian 1102 (GS11 or higher). The leveraging officer is better at planning localized operations, can facilitate integration and provides the commander with more operational capability. One drawback to the leveraging officer is that they do not function as a planned theater integrator and thus provide no liaising capacity to the attached command. In addition, although highly proficient at contracting, the leveraging officer may perform local operations to optimize logistical support, but at a detriment to theater operations.

The integrated planner/executor or tier-three is a senior officer (O6+) or senior 1102 civilian/GS-13 or higher. Conducting acquisition planning at the highest joint levels, the individual is integrated at the G/J4 and G/J5. Involved with the creation and execution of operational plans (OPLANs), this officer provides direction for the contingency contracting officer (CCO) strategy two levels down, and links all operations

to the strategic theater objective of the combatant command (COCOM). This individual is highly educated, having earned both military and civilian graduate degrees. Certified at DAWIA Level III in contracting, the individual also has high DAWIA certifications in multiple disciplines. The integrated planner/executor performs operational and theater analysis, integrates results into OPLAN, and is the conduit between the COCOM and OPLAN to all theater contracting operations. This individual coordinates theater objectives with best approach to contracted support and can achieve broader national security goals through effective distribution of national assets. There are no drawbacks to this tier system, as an integrated planner allows the combatant commander to focus on the operational and strategic mission. He or she orchestrates planning, communication, coordination, and exercises with nongovernmental organization (NGOs) and private voluntary organization (PVOs) in theater.

The author, Yamaki-Taylor, ultimately came to the conclusion that a change in rank at the position of the Leveraging Contracting Officer (tier-two), along with timely integration of this senior, more competent contracting professional, would help or reduce frictions in the USSF contingency contracting process. Still the question remains, why is contingency contracting so important to counterinsurgency, when a COIN contracting directive was issued by the COMISAF commander? We can begin to understand its importance by understanding the contracting guidance.