Limitations

a. COMISAF COIN Contracting Guidance

Intent of the COMISAF COIN Contracting Guidance was to achieve the following:

 Afghan Mentorship Program has continued to be implemented.

 Potential intelligence gathering value of AMP exploited.

 Proof of concept has been codified and refined to meet changing economic conditions.

 Afghan first (886) local vendor goals have been achieved.

 Local economies near or around RCC are diverse and self-sustaining.

 AMP refined and more pliable, other small business programs developed

 COIN contracting program is centrally managed, increased C2.

 Limitations

 Command and Control—Standardization has limited programs ability to meet RCC immediate need.

 Information is located in the military theater of war.

 Classification/Restrictions prevent information sharing.

 Lessons learned are not passed on.

 Contracting officer experience level.

 Combatant Commander’s knowledge/understanding of program. b. COIN Guidance One Task at a Time

The first task was to understand the role of contracting in counterinsurgency operations. Not a difficult first step, as early customer education, expectation management and contract management training at the regional contracting centers were abundantly available. The challenge was time. With so many competing constraints, unit commanders and staff had very little time to receive the necessary contract management training.

The second challenge was to train and hire Afghans first, according to the Section 886 Policy, which is not a typical function of a combatant force. As units collocated and established bases of operation in localized population areas, they were able to know who they were buying from, purchasing Afghan products and building Afghan capacity. This was the third and perhaps most important challenge addressed to all commanders, contracting personnel, military personnel and civilians of NATO ISAF and USFOR-A. The COMISAF’s COIN contracting guidance was a set of tasks that challenged the acquisition process at every level. Aimed at contingency contracting professionals, trying to understand the fourth task, the role of contracting in counterinsurgency was a complex exercise of mental aerobics. Contractors had been hiring Afghans first while acquisition

professionals in the RCC focused purchasing on Afghan products. An organizational policy of decentralized execution was essential for CENTCOM contracting to build Afghan capacity, at all levels.

Heavily influenced by 886, achieving task five, knowing whom you are buying from was exceptionally difficult. Based on the volume of contracting requirements streaming out of the regional JARBs and JFUBs, the tide of rubber-stamped requirements posed a direct challenge to the exercise of responsible contracting practices. At any given time, a contracting officer with an RCC could be expected to have 30–40 pending contracting actions.

The sixth, seventh and eighth tasks of integration of contracting into intelligence, plans and operations, consulting with local leadership and developing intelligence from contracting actions might have been the straw that broke the contracting officers back. Integration of contracting into Intelligence is something that must be coordinated for and accomplished at the tactical and operational levels by brigade and task force commanders. Contracting authorities are not trained or staffed for such capabilities. Consulting and involving local leaders, to develop new partnerships, which also have an intelligence value and force multiplying capability, relative to security and stability is again a tactical and operational level function. It does provide ample opportunity to collect critical information for commander’s decisions. However, it is manpower intensive. Soldiers at the smallest unit level, the fire team, are capable of accomplishing this challenge.

The last three challenges, contracting professional must look beyond cost, schedule and performance, acting now and getting the message out were wishful thinking. To meet the COIN guidance, the COMISAF Commander challenged every leader to invest adequate personnel within each organization the task of oversight and contract requirement enforcement. It is an expected practice for commanders to accept risk in non-critical areas of management when faced with competing critical requirements. This is one area that most chose to sacrifice. The COMISAF commander issued the order for all of those involved in the acquisition process to act—make this a priority now, as many years and millions of dollars went unaccounted for. The last task

was to get the word out. The process of telling your success stories and finding individuals that will listen was a major challenge for all every involved. Successful contingency contracting is not a scorching topic in the information operations arena and the competing requirements that consume a contracting activities efforts and assets are rarely media worthy.

c. Personnel Strength

Finite number of acquisition professionals in the CENTCOM contracting AOR. d. Institutional Knowledge and Organizational Experience

The legacy of institutional knowledge was insufficient do aptly apply best practices, which were incomplete in the areas of expeditionary and contingency contracting experience within the organization. Factor in scant pre-deployment qualification standards, which were supposed to be mandatory, coupled with a joint operational contracting environment and you have the potential for oversight failure. In addition, by factoring in varying, service orientation tour lengths that inhibit contracting continuity, the chances for instituting acceptable operational competence within the organization is further diminished. The intent here is to provide an adequate picture of the institutional knowledge and operational experience expected to implement the COIN contracting guidance, as many other corrective actions as recommended by the many reports were just out of reach.

This thesis explores the Afghan Mentorship Program, consisting of five initiatives that effectively managed these deficiencies and achieved integration and implementation of the COMISAF COIN Contracting Guidance.