Attributed influence assessment 149

As the analysis of the preference attainment has shown, the success rate of the pro-migrant groups towards the Parliament and the Council remained limited. Not even the remarkable congruence of the guidelines of the UNHCR and the recommendations of the pro-migrant groups regarding the extension of the LTR Directive helped augmenting the influence of the groups. In addition to the preference attainment analysis, this subsection assesses the attributed influence of the pro-migrant groups. To do so, the interest representatives of AI Europe, ECRE, CCME, Caritas Europa, and JRS were asked to describe their satisfaction with the outcome of the extension of the LTR Directive. Moreover, this section reflects on the views of relevant EU decision-makers concerning the influence of the pro-migrant groups.

On the influence of the pro-migrant groups, it was a representative of AI Europe who gave the most pessimistic answer. According to the advocacy officer that was responsible for lobbying at the extension of the LTR Directive, despite the fact that AI Europe is a large member-based and renowned organisation, its ability to actually exert influence on policy outcomes was very low. All she was willing to confirm is ‘if we weren't here, things would look much worse’. Thus, she regards it as the responsibility of AI Europe to limit damage. In some meetings with representatives of the member states, as she explained however, her argumentation on the extension of the LTR Directive was well received (Interview 28).

With regards to the influence of CCOEMA, a representative of JRS also remained rather modest. He said, ‘I think it is presumptuous to believe that NGOs set the agenda in asylum and migration matters’. Nevertheless, he explains that pro-migrant groups can exert influence on policy-makers by means of informing them of on the ground issues (Interview 14). His colleague who works with Caritas Europa, in addition, alluded to the sheer impossibility of convincing every single person involved in the decision-making process of the beliefs of CCOEMA. As an example, he refers to the Parliament and the difficulty of finding majorities in intra-parliamentary voting. In general, both interest representatives believe that more

influence can be exerted when approaching national policy-makers, as they seem to be the driving forces (Interviews 1 and 14). An official of CCME, on the one hand, was very satisfied with the inclusion of refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection in the scope of the LTR Directive. On the other hand, she anticipates problems during the transfer of the new provisions into national law. Especially in countries that differentiate in more categories than refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, as at the time of the interview was the case in Germany and Austria, this could lead to situations where not all beneficiaries of international protection are covered by the directive (Interview 18).

A former member of ECRE staff also presented herself as very content with the extension of the scope of the directive to beneficiaries of international protection. About the actual influence of ECRE, however, she voiced restrained remarks.

We have always been advocating for ‘please, please Commission please come with a proposal to include refugees also in the LTR Directive’. [But] [i]t is very difficult to pinpoint results. [...] I wouldn't dare to say that the Commission proposed it because ECRE lobbied for the inclusion of refugees in the LTR Directive but it was kind of a momentum created (Interview 49).

But in general she always felt taken seriously in the meetings with the policy-makers. ‘They were very willing to listen to comments, to criticism, to other ideas as long as they are constructive and as long as they can use them in their work’. What seems to have undermined the overall influence of ECRE, though, is ‘that the power still lies with the Council usually and at the same time they [the member states] are least easy to lobby’. Therefore, she is certain that there a numerous things that ECRE would have liked to see differently but, nevertheless, ‘overall ECRE can be very happy with the results’ (Interview 49).

On the part of the policy-makers, one Commission official acknowledged that ‘NGOs can definitely influence me [her] as a policy-maker’. But that does not mean that what the Commission has taken on board is eventually reflected in the directive adopted by the Parliament and the Council. According to her, that has mostly to do with the different cultures of interest representation in the member states. ‘In Finland, in Sweden they even have scheduled monthly meeting with NGOs. [...] So it’s part of the agenda of the ministry, whereas in other member states they never meet them’. Another problem that the interviewee saw in terms of the LTR Directive is that there was only one major amendment proposed by the Commission – the extension of the scope of the directive to beneficiaries of international

protection. In her opinion, this modification is not enough to reflect on the influence of pro- migrant groups (Interview 12).

With a view to the Parliament, the opinions of the interviewed MEPs on the influence of the pro-migrant groups remained rather discreet too. While one of the interviewees did not question the influence on the part of NGOs, he also explained that it is impossible to exert influence on all MEPs due to the comprehensive internal decision-making process.

NGOs might introduce some new ideas. They might try to influence in one way or another a rapporteur to their philosophy and what they would like to see in the report. But this is only one small part of the whole process. Because during a debate you hear all pros and cons of an argument and you end up with a consensus, which usually is not the ideal proposal […]. You have to find that proposal which will satisfy everybody to some extent to make them vote for it (Interview 9).

Another MEP listed the current political climate and the way immigration to Europe is being portrayed in the media as further factors that limited the influence of pro-migrant groups on the extension of the LTR Directive (Interview 10). Finally, while the assistant to the rapporteur of the LTR Directive acknowledged that some of the concerns raised by NGOs were finally reflected in the position of the EPP that mainly guided the opinion of the Parliament, another MEP appeared to regret the final outcome of the directive. She presented herself furious about the outcome saying ‘it’s not to my liking and most NGOs also plea for a more liberal way of dealing with migration and asylum. So they didn't get what they want and neither did I’ (Interviews 2 and 25). From the interviews with MEPs from different political groups it became clear that the Socialists and Democrats, the Greens, the Liberals, and the European United Left/Nordic Green Left, even though they had preferred a more liberal interpretation of the Geneva Convention, were not able to establish their opinion in the internal positioning process.

Despite the noncommittal assessment of Commission officials and MEPs with regards to the influence of pro-migrant groups, members of the Council General Secretariat staff and officials working with the Permanent Representations did not dispute their influence on the Commission and the Parliament. They based their assessment on the wide resemblance of the positions of these institutions and the contributions of the pro-migrant groups (Interviews 19, 20, 36). The impact of pro-migrant groups on the Commission and the Parliament, however, needs to be regarded in the light of the recommendations tabled by the UNHCR, as one JHA Counsellor emphasised (Interview 22). Moreover, the majority of the interviewed JHA Counsellors denied that pro-migrant groups could exert influence on the decisions of the

Permanent Representations. As reason for that they argued that Permanent Representations are bound by instructions from the governments that, rather than being responsive to pro- migrant groups, are committed to the workability and feasibility of new instruments. (Interview 3, 21, 22, 31, 35, 36, 38). Finally, a Finnish representative acknowledged that countries such as Finland that already granted beneficiaries of international protection long- term residence permits are potential cooperation partners for pro-migrant groups that lobbied for the extension of these standards to all EU member states. Given this initial condition, however, there was nothing at stake for the Finnish government on this matter and, thus, Finland did not get much engaged in the negotiations (Interview 7). Hence, sometimes even those countries that support the requests of pro-migrant groups are not responsive to them because they prefer to limit their involvement in debates to issues that are of national priority.

The self-assessment of the influence of the pro-migrant groups on the LTR Directive portrays the results of the preference attainment to the extent that the interest representatives expressed their contentment with the extension of the scope of the directive to beneficiaries of international protection. Beyond that, however, only few recommendations tabled by the groups are reflected in the directive. Even though some of the interest representatives emphasised that they had lobbied on the extension of the LTR Directive long before the Commission drafted its new proposal, they distanced themselves from taking the credit for it. The policy-makers that were involved in the negotiations on the directive, while acknowledging that pro-migrant groups can in principle exert influence on the Commission and the Parliament, also doubted that the groups’ impact on the LTR Directive was significant. As such, the analyses of the preference attainment and the attributed influence have produced similar results; namely, that the overall influence of the pro-migrant groups on the content of the final LTR Directive remained limited.

7. 3 Which factors affected the influence of pro-migrant groups?

7.3.1 Empirical assessment of the ability of the pro-migrant groups to provide expert knowledge

For the analysis of the ability of the pro-migrant groups to provide expert knowledge, their funding and personnel, organisational structures, and expertise are analysed. In order to not exclusively focus on the supply side, it is then investigated to what extent the different EU institutions were actually dependent on the further expert knowledge from the interest groups. To do so, interviews with EU officials on the dependence on expert knowledge are evaluated.

Funding and personnel are expected to strongly affect the ability of pro-migrant groups to provide expert knowledge. Based on this assumption, ECRE appears to be well equipped for the provision with expertise. In 2010, its annual budget amounted to € 1,853,305 and its personnel capacity in Brussels added up to 19 members of staff (Commission 2012g; ECRE 2012a). The capacities of AI Europe were similar. It had an annual budget of €1,431,692 in 2010 and employed 19 persons at the liaison office in Brussels (AI Europe 2012e; Commission 2012h). For CCOEMA the figures are assumed based on the average budget available for advocacy and the personnel capacity of its members. Thus, the funding of CCOEMA is not expected to have exceeded €220,000 in 2010 and its advocacy work should not have been supported by more than six staff members (Caritas 2012; CCME 2012; Commission 2012i; 2012a; JRS 2012b: 27; 2012a).

Furthermore, the organisational structure of a group is assumed to be crucial for the overall ability to provide expert knowledge. In this context, it is expected that the division of labour between the liaison office in Brussels and the member organisations in the member states facilitate the provision with readymade expertise. All analysed pro-migrant groups were in principle able to divide labour because they maintain offices in Brussels and in the member states. As CCOEMA was mainly represented by the liaison offices of its leading members CCME, Caritas Europa, and JRS, the ad hoc group could divide labour between the Secretariats in Brussels. Moreover, responsibility and work was divided between those Secretariats, which monitored the negotiations on the extension of the LTR Directive, and the national member organisations that collected on the ground information (Interview 14 and 18). AI Europe (2012a) also states on its website that its Secretariat in Brussels closely cooperates with its member sections for the provision with background studies and analyses on national migration practices. The Secretariat in Brussels, in turn, informs the national sections about the state of the art in the negotiations. Nevertheless, in one interview it was revealed that the limited number of staff at the Brussels office also affects the ability of AI Europe to distribute information among the different EU policy-makers timely and flexibly (Interview 28). For the extension of the LTR Directive, a former employee of ECRE reported that the liaison office formulated the respective recommendations. During that positioning process, she informed the member organisations about the lobbying objectives of ECRE and the implication that the extension of the LTR Directive would have at national level. However, due to the highly technical nature of the dossier and the lack of familiarity with

these issues on the part of the member organisations, the interviewee stressed having received hardly any input from them (Interview 49).

Concerning parallel lobbying at EU and national level, the members of CCOEMA confirmed that while the Secretariats in Brussels focussed on the EU institutions, their member churches approached national policy-makers – in particular the officials of the member states that held the EU Presidency at that time (Interviews 1, 18, 46). A Representative of AI Europe (Interview 28) explained that the liaison office in Brussels developed guidelines for their national branches to facilitate their lobbying efforts. In so doing, the overall objectives of the group were integrated in the different lobbying strategies and adapted to the national context. ECRE, on the contrary, did not pursue a parallel lobbying strategy on the extension of the LTR Directive. The liaison office did not mobilise its national member organisation because, to the umbrella group, the directive was not of core interest. As a consequence, the Brussels office was not successful in raising the awareness of the member organisation to the implications the directive could have at national level (Interview 49).

With regards to the dependence of the Commission on expert knowledge, two officials (Interviews 6 and 12) that were responsible for the extension of the LTR Directive agreed that, above all, they consulted pro-migrant groups to get information about the transposition of the original directive to see what needed to be taken into consideration for the extension of the directive. They pointed out that it is difficult for the Commission to monitor the transposition of directives and pinpoint those member states that do not transpose a directive in the way that the Commission meant it to be transposed. The interviewees described themselves as open to complaints and suggestions. They tried to get information about the transposition of the LTR Directive from pro-migrant groups because they

[…] are our eyes at member states level. We don’t have any other means of monitoring what’s happening. We don’t go to a lot of nations to see what’s happening on the ground. We really base ourselves on what NGOs working on the ground tell us (Interview 12).

MEPs from different political groups confirmed the dependence of the Parliament on expert knowledge. They all admitted having consulted pro-migrant groups on the technical details and implications of the extension of the LTR Directive. As reasons for consulting them, the interviewees listed their excellent field studies and analyses. MEPs, according to the interviewees, could never conduct such extensive research on each dossier because of the Parliament’s limited personnel capacity and the high workload (Interviews 2, 9, 10, 25).

Stressing the problem of limited personnel, one of the assistants to the rapporteur complained ‘it is totally unfair; compared to the Council we are so outnumbered’. He further elaborated that the Parliament only conducts studies itself ‘every now and then’ and only on ‘particular issues’. Moreover, the information that MEPs get from the Commission as part of the impact assessment ‘is often quite narrow’. Therefore, ‘the Parliament definitely relies on the kind of work that NGOs do’. He particularly referred to ECRE as a group that he frequently consulted (Interview 25). Finally, another MEP saw the added value of NGOs in their extensive knowledge on migration issues. ‘When you have NGOs that specialise on a specific point, they are in the position to point out various aspects of the problem. This is good information for a MEP to help him make up his mind’ (Interview 9).

With a view to the Council, only a small minority of JHA Counsellors and one member of the Council General Secretariat staff acknowledged that pro-migrant groups could add useful information to what the Permanent Representations got from their national ministries when the extension of the LTR Directive was discussed. In particular, these interviewees referred to on the ground expertise and to judicial advice that was considered in the preparation of the file (Interviews 4, 7, 21, 38). The majority of the interviewees, however, questioned the dependence of the Council on expert knowledge. They were convinced that none of the information provided by NGOs could add to the expertise that they receive from their national ministries or the UNHCR (Interviews 3, 11, 19, 20, 22, 35, 36). Moreover, as some interviewees argued, information provided by NGOs is often in conflict with the general political orientation of national governments and thus with the instructions that they receive from the ministries (Interviews 20, 22, 36). Contrary to the independence of the Council on further expert knowledge, JHA Counsellors described the Commission and the Parliament as institutions that rely on further expert input because of their high workload and time constraints (Interviews 11, 22, 35).

The analysis of the ability to provide expert knowledge has revealed that despite limited financial and personnel resources, most of the pro-migrant groups applied an effective internal organisation that allowed them to share lobbying costs between the liaison offices in Brussels and the member organisations at national level. To the members of the best-endowed umbrella group, however, the extension of the LTR Directive does not seem to have been important enough. But even though the member organisations of ECRE did not contribute much to the advocacy work of the liaison office, it appears to have been capable of providing

expertise to the EU institutions. The analysis also demonstrated that the Commission and the Parliament were reliant on the provision with expert knowledge, whereas most of the JHA Counsellors referred to their national ministries and the UNHCR whenever they needed further information for their positioning on the proposal of the Commission. As such, the