Conclusion 56

To assess the influence of pro-migrant groups on the EU asylum and migration policy, the resource dependence theory, developed in the 1970s to describe the interrelation between organisations and their environment, has been modified. This theory appears to be more suitable for the assessment of political influence than theories of European integration because it starts from the premise that both governmental and non-governmental actors can shape EU policy. Furthermore, the theoretical framework allows consideration of resource interdependencies and the decision-making procedure under which policy proposals are negotiated that both form crucial factors in the exertion of influence on policy outcomes.

Starting with the works of Aldrich, Pfeffer, and Salancik, the original idea of resource interdependence between organisations and their environment has been introduced. Secondly, previous adaptations of the theory to the political system of the EU have been reflected upon. In this context, Bouwen’s assumption about the dependence of the EU institutions on expert knowledge and information about European or domestic encompassing interests has been

presented. For the purpose of this research, thirdly, the resource interdependence of the EU institutions and the pro-migrant groups has been concretised. On the part of the EU institutions, expert knowledge, support, and legitimacy have been identified as resource dependences, whereas pro-migrant groups appear to be primarily dependent on access to the policy-makers. These resource dependence structures determine the conditions for political participation. As a fourth step, this theoretical framework goes beyond the original concept of the resource dependence theory. In linking the resource dependencies to the decision-making procedures under which the different case studies were adopted, assumptions about the expected influence of the pro-migrant groups on the four directives have been made. In the following paragraphs, the assumptions about the resource dependence structures between the EU institutions and the pro-migrant groups are recapitulated, as they form the basis of the subsequent empirical analysis.

For the identification of the resource dependencies of each EU institution involved in the shaping of the EU asylum and migration policy, the responsibility of the institutions, their internal decision-making structures, and deficits are summarised. As the Commission is responsible for the drafting of new legislation but at the same time faces a high workload and a comparably low number of employees, it is heavily dependent on external expert knowledge. Furthermore, as a non-directly elected body, the Commission also requires legitimacy from stakeholders to justify its policy proposals. Finally, the Commission is only one of three legislators and, therefore, relies on external allies that support its objectives in the negotiations with the Parliament and the Council. The Parliament, just like the Commission, is dependent on the provision with external expert knowledge to overcome its personnel deficit and to guarantee that policy drafts are scrutinised thoroughly. It also requires supporting allies to ensure that its recommendations are not watered down too much in the course of the inter-institutional negotiations. Even though the Parliament is the only directly elected EU institution, it, nevertheless, requires further legitimacy from outside because its own legitimacy is challenged through the inexistence of European parties, European election campaigns, and a European demos. The Council, on the contrary, is less dependent on interest groups, although it lacks sufficient personnel to generate the required expert knowledge and although it has to defend its position to the other institutions. Rather than relying on pro- migrant groups, the Council can refer to tried and tested information providers such as national experts or ministries. To persuade other policy-makers of its position, the Council is reported to lobby these actors directly and not by means of non-governmental allies. Thus, the

Commission and the Parliament appear to be more reliant on, and consequently more open towards, interest groups than the Council is.

On the part of the pro-migrant groups, it has been elaborated that the resource that they are dependent on the most is access to the EU institutions. To access the EU policy-makers, they need to meet the requirements of the EU institutions by providing them with expert knowledge, support, and legitimacy. But only groups that feature appropriate working structures are able to supply those resources. For instance, interest groups need sufficient funding in order to employ enough staff and run a liaison office in Brussels. This again is necessary to build up contacts to the EU officials and to follow the policy-making process closely. Moreover, a group needs to be able to collect timely on the ground information and to flexibly formulate positions to the negotiations at EU and national level. The provision of the EU institutions with support, in turn, can only be guaranteed if the claims of the pro-migrant groups are in line with the position of the EU institution that is to be supported and if the groups have access to those policy-makers that need to be convinced of this position. Finally, in order to provide the EU institutions with legitimacy, pro-migrant groups need to legitimise their advocacy work at EU level; for instance, by demonstrating that they have adequate participation structures, a sound basis of argumentation, or sufficient representativeness.

From the resource dependence structures of the EU institutions, their responsiveness towards the claims of the pro-migrant groups has been inferred. Following the assumption that a greater dependence on pro-migrant groups results in a greater responsiveness towards the claims of the groups, the Commission and the Parliament are predicted to be more responsive towards the recommendations tabled by the interest groups than the Council. This would make the Commission and the Parliament the ideal lobbying subjects of the pro-migrant groups. However, the influence of the pro-migrant groups on the 2003 LTR Directive and the 2004 Qualification Directive is presumed to have been marginal because the Parliament did not have the right to co-decide with the Council upon the scope and the content of the two directives. On the outcome of the extension of the LTR Directive and the recast Qualification Directive, on the contrary, the influence of the pro-migrant groups is believed to have been higher because in those two policy-shaping processes the Commission and the Parliament had sufficient legislative authority to negotiate with the Council on an equal footing.

Summing up, this chapter provides assumptions about the influence of pro-migrant groups on EU asylum and migration legislation. Those assumptions are based on the resource

dependence structures between the EU institutions and the pro-migrant groups, which, in turn, have been inferred from the responsibilities, organisation, and objectives of the said actors. Their validity will be tested empirically in the following four case studies. By means of preference attainment analyses as well as attributed influence assessments, the influence of pro-migrant groups on the 2003 and 2011 LTR Directives and the 2004 and 2011 Qualification Directives is examined from different angles. To find out about the external and internal factors that have affected the influence of the groups, EU officials from the different institutions and interest representatives are asked to assess their dependence on expert knowledge, support, and legitimacy as well as their ability to provide said resources. Finally, a cross-case study comparison will allow to test whether the level of influence on the four directives actually varies as a consequence of the different decision-making procedures under which the directives were adopted.