In the uncertain context of a political transition, choosing an electoral system for transitional elections is sharply contested and carries significance for the distribution of power amongst groups in the important institution-building period (Andrews and Jackman 2005; Luong 2002). In all of the four countries under examination, transitional elections proceeded constitution- making. In Egypt and Iraq representatives were elected to parliament who would appoint members to a constituent body. In Tunisia a constituent legislative assembly was elected tasked with constitution-making as well as legislative duties. In Libya, a constituent body was to be elected at a later date. The potential to influence constitution-making raised the stakes of first transitional elections in each country. In turn, this meant that negotiations to determine an electoral system for transitional elections was a disputed arena of inter- communal contest.
Electoral system design as a discrete and important institution-building event during a political transition has been acknowledged by scholars in recent decades (Andrew and Jackman 2005; Benoit 2004; Shvetsova 2003). An extensive literature exists on electoral reform in established political systems (Dunleavy and Margetts 1995; Rahat and Hazan 2011; Remmer 2008). However, such changes are usually moderate and infrequent (Boix 1999; Norris 1995), with a few notable exceptions. For example, electoral reform in Japan, New Zealand, and Italy in the 1990s was remarkable for two reasons. First, they constituted substantial electoral change in established western democracies; a rare event. Second, the changes were towards more proportional electoral systems that could be expected to disadvantage incumbents (Sakamoto 1999). During transition, where the legitimacy of previous structures of political power are called into question, there is often enthusiasm for a complete overhaul of a previously used electoral system (Benoit and Schiemann 2001).
Scholarly literature acknowledges the importance of decisions on electoral system design during political transition (Luong 2002). Substantial scholarly attention has been paid to electoral system choice as an outcome of actors’ preferences (Boix 1999). It is somewhat surprising, however, that little consideration has been given to the quality of this decision- making process in terms of the involvement of key groups, and whether such inclusion impacts support for elections amongst those groups. Literature on institution-building in other areas, notably scholarship on designing a new constitution, emphasises the importance
of inclusion of all groups in order to build support and enhance the perceived legitimacy of political institutions. I assert that the expectation that involvement of all groups will create political confidence, should apply equally to decision-making on electoral system design, as it does for other institution-building events.
In Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Tunisia an electoral system was negotiated within the first year of the political transition, and just months before the transitional legislative elections were held. In each country, whilst the political transition was not disconnected from the electoral context of the previous regime, there was a willingness—ranging from enthusiasm in Tunisia (Murphy 2013) to reluctant willingness in Egypt (International Crisis Group 2012)— to make a break with the past in terms of designing a new electoral system for transitional elections. The willingness to entertain new electoral options in each country is evidenced by the choice of a different electoral system to the one used under the previous regime. Table 5.1 shows that in Iraq and Libya no candidates were elected using a system employed under the previous regime. In Egypt and Tunisia a small proportion, one-third and one-fifth, respectively, used the same system as one used under the previous regime.
Table 5.1 Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Tunisia: previous and new electoral system Electoral system under
previous regime
New electoral system Seats elected using same system as previous regime (%) Egypt Majoritarian with two-
member districts Mixed-member-parallel: Two-thirds of seats using proportional-representation; One third of seats using majoritarian two- member districts
33
Iraq Single-non-transferable-vote Proportional-representation 0 Libya No national elections held Mixed-member-parallel: 120 seats using
Single-non-transferable-vote and single- member-district; 80 seats using proportional representation
0
Tunisia Mixed-member-parallel 80 percent of seats: bloc-vote 20 percent of seats: proportional-representation
Proportional-representation 20
Sources: Faris (2012) on Egypt; C. Tripp (2007) on Iraq; Alexander (2012) on Tunisia; and Kjaerum et al. (2013) on Libya
In each country the interim authority played an important role in determining the negotiations framework to decide on a new electoral system, exerting influence over the
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018
involvement of key communal groups in this institutional design moment (the role of the interim authority is returned to in the conclusion). In each country multiple actors had an interest in electoral system design and were eager to influence the outcome. Compared with the lack of toleration for political contestation under the previous regime, relative political and civil freedom during transition was evidenced by an unprecedented level of public debate and engagement with institutional design (Diamond 2005, chap. 5; Kjaerum et al. 2013; National Democratic Institute 2011; The Carter Center 2012b). Each interim authority stated an objective to facilitate a political system that would include all communal groups, with freely elected political leaders through competitive multi-party elections (Coalition Provisional Authority 2003; Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 2011; Temehu 2016; The President of the Tunisian Republic by Interim 2011). However, this sentiment did not extend equally in each country to the process of deciding on an electoral system for these elections.
Table 5.2 shows the hypotheses examined in this chapter based on variation on the independent variables in institution-building in each country. In Tunisia both de jure and de facto inclusion were present, so hypothesis two is examined. Hypothesis three is examined in Iraq where de jure inclusion was observed without de facto in negotiations on electoral system design. In both Egypt and Libya there was de facto inclusion without de jure, enabling an investigation of hypothesis four. The final column in Table 5.2 shows the predicted relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable according to the hypothesis under examination.
Table 5.2 Hypotheses examined at the negotiations stage of electoral system design De jure inclusion (independent variable) De facto inclusion (independent variable) Country where independent variables are observed Expected observation of support (dependent variable) H1 - - not tested in this chapter -
H2 x x Tunisia y
H3 x - Iraq y
H4 - x Egypt, Libya y
De jure inclusion, de facto inclusion, and support for elections are operationalised according to the indices reviewed in Table 5.3. The first two indicators of de jure inclusion pertain to a public focus on inclusion in determining an electoral system. The next two indicators concern public consultations on the choice of electoral system, and approval of the electoral system by an inclusive body. The first two indicators of de facto inclusion examine
whether representatives of all communal groups were in fact consulted on electoral system design, and whether these consultations continued up until an electoral system was chosen. The final indicators of de facto inclusion measure whether there is demonstrated evidence that representatives of all communal groups had an opportunity to impact electoral system design, running along both an elite and a mass public dimension. Support for elections is distinguished by behavioural, attitudinal, and constitutional support. Behavioural support is measured as an absence of election-related violence. Attitudinal support for elections is measured according to individual-level perceptions of electoral legitimacy. Constitutional support is assessed according to the absence of an election boycott, and absence of low turnout (33 percent or below), overall or on behalf of one communal group.
Table 5.3 Operationalisation of variables De jure inclusion (IV)
Index 0-4 De facto inclusion (IV) Index 0-4 Support for elections (DV) Index 0-4
Inclusion of communal groups in design body
1. Public focus from transitional authority on inclusion in determining an electoral system (Yes=1, No=0)
2. Members of design body include all key communal groups
(Yes=1, No=0)
Inclusion of communal groups in consultations on / approval of institutional design
1. Official policy of public consultation on electoral system design (surveys, open forums, focus groups) (Yes=1, No=0)
2. Electoral system design approved by body inclusive of all communal groups (Yes=1, No=0)
Actual inclusion of all communal groups in consultation
1. Actual consultation with representatives of all key communal groups on electoral system design (Yes=1, No=0)
2. Demonstrated evidence consultation with all key communal groups continued up until electoral system design was determined (Yes=1, No=0)
All communal groups have an opportunity to impact the institutional design outcome
1. Demonstrated evidence that representatives from all key communal groups had opportunity to impact electoral system design (through official negotiations or unofficial channels such as political pressure) (Yes=1, No=0)
2. Demonstrated evidence mass public had opportunity to impact electoral system design (through official consultations or unofficial channels such as public protest) (Yes=1, No=0)
Behavioural
1. Absence of election-related violence (Yes=1, No=0)
Attitudinal
1. Perceptions of legitimacy: intention to vote in elections (<50 percent)
(Yes=1, No=0)
Constitutional
1. Absence of a boycott of elections by political actors associated with a key communal group
(Yes=1, No=0)
2. Absence of low turnout overall or on behalf of one communal group (£33 percent) (Yes=1, No=0)
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018
Data sources to measure the independent and dependent variables are shown in Table 5.4. De jure and de facto inclusion are measured using expert interviews, and independent reports from election monitoring bodies and other political analysis institutes. Behavioural support (the absence of electoral violence) is measured using reports from independent election monitoring bodies. Attitudinal support (perceived legitimacy) is measured using individual-level survey data in Egypt, Iraq, and Tunisia. In Libya, due to a dearth of public opinion survey data, this indicator is measured using a report from IFES on individual-level perceptions of legitimacy in post-election focus-groups (IFES 2013b). For constitutional support, the absence of an election boycott is measured using independent reports from election monitoring bodies and corroborated with interviews and news media, turnout is measured using data from IFES election guide country profiles, and independent reports or survey data to disaggregate per communal group.
Table 5.4 Data sources
De jure inclusion De facto inclusion Support for elections
Six expert interviews Ö Ö Ö
Communique from transitional authority Ö
Reports from independent election monitoring and
political analysis bodies Ö Ö Ö Public opinion surveys: Arab Democracy Barometer
Wave II and Wave III; World Values Survey Wave 4 Ö IFES election guide country profiles
www.electionguide.org/countries Ö Source: for more detail on data sources see Table 3.13