In both Iraq and Tunisia a highly inclusive electoral system was used in legislative transitional elections, that was expected to facilitate the representation of all communal groups in the elected assembly. In Egypt, however, whilst the electoral system included a proportional tier of seats, the non-proportional tier was expected to distort the accurate representation of communal groups in the parliament. Table 7.4 shows that in Iraq and Tunisia there was high de jure inclusion, whilst in Egypt there was none. Each indicator is discussed in detail below.
Table 7.4 De jure inclusion at implementation stage of elections Indicator 1
Focus on inclusive electoral system design
Indicator 2
Proportional formula with av. district magnitude ³3 and legal electoral threshold £ 3%
Index (0-2)
Egypt 0 0 0 None
Iraq 1 1 2 High
Tunisia 1 1 2 High
In Egypt there was no explicit focus from the SCAF on inclusion in the choice of electoral system. The SCAF themselves preferred the electoral system used under the previous regime (Hassan 2013; International Crisis Group 2012) that was not expected to produce an inclusive outcome (Reynolds 2011; Tavana 2012, 6). On the contrary, political observers (and apparently SCAF actors as well) (International Crisis Group 2012, 4, 17; Reynolds 2015) anticipated that the previously-used electoral system would disproportionately benefit actors from the ancien regime (Faris 2012, 149; Masoud 2014, 130). Following public pressure, the SCAF did increase the proportion of seats elected in a PR-
list tier, however, inclusion was not an explicit rationale for the choice of electoral system design (International Crisis Group 2012).
In Iraq, the UNEAD team responsible for electoral system design emphasised inclusion as a key reason for the choice of a proportional electoral system (Hooker 2005; Perelli 2004), stating that ‘the electoral process must seek to gain the greatest inclusiveness and transparency as possible – offering the widest opportunity for Iraqis to participate as voters and candidates’ and that ‘the PR system [chosen] is most effective in gaining inclusive representation for a range of groups’ (United Nations 2004a).In effect, then, inclusion was a clear criterion for the choice of electoral system.
In Tunisia, inclusion was emphasised as a basis for the choice of a PR-list electoral system in multi-member districts. As recorded by Alfred Stepan (2012a, 93) based on an interview with Ben Achour, chairman of the body responsible for electoral system design, ‘The Commission agreed that the electoral system would be one of pure proportional representation. This decision was correctly understood to have crucial antimajoritarian, democracy-facilitating, and coalition-encouraging implications’. Political analysts similarly suggest that inclusion was an explicit focus in Tunisia. As Reynolds (2015) puts it, ‘I think the designers went for a system that they felt would maximise inclusion… they thought that inclusion was the first priority of the electoral system as a part of the broader new framework of the state’.
The second indicator of de jure inclusion, use of a proportional electoral formula, was not present in Egypt, but was observed in Iraq and Tunisia. Key features of electoral system design in each country are shown in Table 7.5. Egypt used a mixed-member-majoritarian system (Hassan 2013); whilst this included a tier of seats elected using a proportional electoral formula, the disproportionality of the majoritarian tier was not compensated for, so this type of system was expected to distort the translation of votes into seats and over-represent large parties, and is not considered proportional.
Iraq, on the other hand, used a single-tier, proportional, closed-list system. Tunisia also used a proportional electoral formula, with a closed PR-list system in multi-member districts. In Iraq, the election was conducted in one nation-wide district, so district magnitude was the entirety of seats elected to the assembly, that is, 275 seats (Coalition Provisional Authority 2004b). In Tunisia, the average district magnitude was between six and seven seats.
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018
Neither Iraq (United Nations 2004a) nor Tunisia (Carey 2013) imposed a legal electoral threshold which the parties were required to meet to secure representation.
Table 7.5 Egypt, Iraq, and Tunisia: electoral system design for first transitional elections
Egypt Iraq Tunisia
Assembly title The People’s Assembly Transitional National
Assembly Tunisian Constituent Assembly Date of election 28 Nov 2011 –
11 Jan 2012 30 Jan 2005 23 Oct 2011
No. of seats 508 275 217
Electoral formula Mixed-Member-Parallel 332 seats: PR-list
166 seats: Two-round-system 10 seats: SCAF appointed
Proportional PR-list
Proportional PR-list
District magnitude Proportional tier: 4-12
Majoritarian tier: 2 275 Domestic: 4-10 Out-of-county: 1-5 Average: 6-7 Legal electoral
threshold
0.5% for proportional tier None None
Ballot structure Categorical
Closed-list / non-preferential
Categorical Closed-list
Categorical Closed-list PR list formula Hare quota - largest remainder Hare quota - largest
remainder Hare quota - largest remainder No. of districts PR list tier: 46
2RS tier: 83 1 27 in Tunisia 6 out-of-country Quotas / reserved
seats 10 seats appointed by SCAF 1 woman on each party list 8 seats for minority groups 25% for women
Zipped lists (m/f/m/f)
Sources: information on electoral system design taken from electoral commission websites where available (www.elections.eg; Iraq: www.ihec.iq; Tunisia: www.isie.tn) and from IPU Parline database on parliamentary electoral systems, available at: archive.ipu.org/parline/parlinesearch.asp
Whilst both Iraq and Tunisia chose electoral systems that were expected to facilitate the accurate representation of all communal groups in the elected assembly, the countries varied in terms of how accurately the distribution of seats amongst candidates reflected the population proportion of each group in the broader populace. In Iraq, despite a highly inclusive electoral system, Sunni-Arabs were under-represented in the legislative assembly. In Tunisia, on the other hand, Islamist and non-Islamist groups were accurately represented in the constituent legislative assembly. In Egypt, the electoral outcome in terms of the
distribution of seats amongst Islamist and non-Islamist candidates did not accurately reflect the proportion of these groups in the population. Islamists were over-represented, whilst non-Islamists were under-represented. Table 7.6 shows that both indicators of de facto inclusion were observed in Tunisia, whilst neither one was present in Egypt or in Iraq. All indicators are discussed in detail below.
Table 7.6 De facto inclusion in electoral outcome Indicator 1
Seat-share of key communal groups proportional to population-share
Indicator 2
Absence of supermajority win for one key communal group
Index (0-2)
Egypt 0 0 0 None
Iraq 0 0 0 None
Tunisia 1 1 2 High
The first indicator of de facto inclusion, the accurate representation of key communal groups in the distribution of seats in the elected assembly, was not observed in Egypt or Iraq. Table 7.7 shows the percent of over- and under-representation of the key communal groups in each country. This is the difference (expressed as a percentage) between the share of seats in the elected assembly won by political parties aligned with a particular communal group, and that communal group’s proportion of the population.3 In Egypt, Islamists were over-
represented by 33 percent in the seat-share won by Islamist-aligned political actors in the elected assembly, whilst non-Islamists were under-represented by 50 percent. The mean of over- and under-representation of communal groups in Egypt was 42 percent and is assessed as a lack of de facto inclusion.4
In Iraq, the Shia-Arab population was over-represented by 10 percent in the elected assembly, and the Kurdish communal group by 56 percent, whilst Sunni-Arabs were under- represented by 35 percent in the proportion of seats won by Sunni-Arab-aligned parties. The mean of over- and under-representation was, therefore, 34 percent,5 which constitutes a lack
of de facto inclusion. In Tunisia, by contrast, there was a low discrepancy between the population proportion of each key communal group and their seat share in the elected
3 See Appendix B for details of the assessment of each party’s alignment with a communal group and the
distribution of seats in the elected assembly in each country.
4 The lack of accurate representation of key communal groups was also confirmed by political observers, see for
example The Carter Center (2012b); International Crisis Group (2012); Masoud (2014); and Tavana (2012).
5 The lack of accurate representation of Sunni-Arabs in Iraq was confirmed by political analysts and election
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018
assembly. Islamists were over-represented by 11 percent, and non-Islamists were under- represented by the same proportion, constituting a mean discrepancy from accurate representation of 11 percent.6
Table 7.7 Representation of communal groups in elected assembly Communal group Population
proportion (%) Seat proportion (%) Discrepancy (%) Egypt Islamist 54 72 Over-represented: 33
Non-Islamist 46 23 Under-represented: 50
Mean over- and under-representation of communal groups (%) 42
Iraq Shia-Arab 61 67 Over-represented: 10 Kurds 18 28 Over-represented: 56 Sunni-Arab 17 6 Under-represented: 35
Mean over- and under-representation of communal groups (%) 34
Tunisia Islamist 37 41 Over-represented 11 Non-Islamist 63 56 Under-represented: 11
Mean over- and under-representation of communal groups (%) 11
Source: See Appendix B for sources and detailed description of allocation of political parties per communal group
The second indicator of de facto inclusion is the absence of one communal group wining a supermajority of seats (above 66 percent) in the elected assembly. In Egypt and Iraq, as shown in Table 7.7, one key communal group did win a super-majority of seats. In Egypt, Islamist-aligned political representatives won 72 percent of seats in the elected assembly. In Iraq, parties aligned with the Shia-Arab communal group won 67 percent of the seats. Conversely, in Tunisia, no communal group won a supermajority of seats. Islamist-aligned parties won 41 percent of seats, whilst non-Islamist-aligned parties won 56 percent. Therefore, no one group won a supermajority of seats. And indeed, in Tunisia, a coalition government was formed with the largest Islamist party, Ennahda, and two other non-Islamist parties (Al Jazeera 2011a).