Therefore they could be reintroduced on 11 July. In the Government's timetable, a month was allowed for their second consideration in Parliament to the point where they were again rejected by the Senate, followed by a short campaign of three weeks, ending with a referendum a day or two before Scullin 7
Caucus, Minutes, 3 April 1930. 8
C.P.D., Vol.123, pp.2190-1. Argus, 29 April 1930.
left for Great Britain at thd end of August. A dispute arose whether this plan rested on a correct interpretation of Section 128, principally on whether the three months was to begin from the time when the Bill left the Representatives
(11 April) or from its rejection by the Senate (28 May): if it were the latter the referendum probably could not be held before October or November 1930.a"'L The Crown Law officers
supported the Government's interpretations. But because of the controversy Brennan consulted legal authorities, who advised that there was a serious doubt which could only be resolved by a High Court decision (after the proposals had
12
been approved at the referendum). Because of this doubt the Ministry (but not the Caucus) decided to postpone the
matter until 1931. Scullin announced the decision at the first 13
day of the A.L.P. Federal Conference on 26 May, and to 14
Caucus on 29 May. Despite endorsement of the three
proposals by the Federal Conference they were not revived by the Government. 10 Ibid. 11 Argus, 1, 3 May 1930. 12 S.M.H., 27 May 1930. 13
Australian Labor Party, Official Report..., May 1930, pp.16-17. 14
The Government faced many difficulties. The difference in the interpretation of Section 128 was one problem, though this was only acute if the Government was determined to hold the referendum before the end of
August. But there was a strong probability that, in any case, the proposals would be defeated at a referendum whenever it was held, given the poor record of success of
referenda,‘L'J especially as there was no doubt that the Opposition would campaign for a 'no' vote. And the humiliation of a defeat would have been accentuated by
conflicts within the Labor movement. Of the sixteen proposals presented in seven constitutional referenda between 1906 and
1928, Labor had been responsible for e i g h t . T h e s e had met with some resistance within the Labor movement, especially
17
in New South Wales. The two proposals of the Bruce-Page
15
A.H. Chisholm (Ed.), The Australian Encyclopaedia, Sydney, 1958, Vol.VII, pp.397-400.
16 Ibid. 17
H.V. Evatt, Australian Labour Leader..., Sydney, abridged edition 1954 (1st edn . 1940), pp.192-8, 223-5; V.G. Childe, How Labour Governs..., Melbourne, 1964 (1st edn .1923) ,
Government in 1926 had produced sharp divisions within 18
the movement which had severely shaken unity.'*’ The N.S.W. Branch of the Party had opposed the stand of the ‘ Federal leaders, and a 'split' was threatened. The A.W.U. had also been opposed. In 1930 the A.W.U. supported the
19
Scullin Government's constitutional proposals. But the State Branches of the Party showed few signs of enthusiasm, and the N.S.W. Branch seems to have been completely opposed. As in the past, resistance within the movement to enlarged Federal powers was often passive rather than active and public. A Wheat Marketing Bill was introduced in the Representatives on 8 April and rejected by the Senate on 4 July 1930. This was the first of six measures to assist
20
the wheat industry during 1930 and 1931. Only two were enacted. One of these (the Wheat Advances Act of December
1930) was rendered useless when the banks refused to co-operate. The second (the Wheat Bounty Act of October 1931) fixed a
bounty of 4% pence on all wheat marketed; it did not satisfy 18
For Labor attitudes to the 1926 proposals, see A.Wildausky, 'The 1926 Referendum', in Studies in Australian Politics, Sydney, 1958, pp.17-62.
19
Australian Worker, 1, 8, 15 January 1930. 20
For the Government's attempts to bring relief to the wheat farmers see E. Dunsdorff The Australian Wheat-Growing Industry 1788-1948, Melbourne, 1956, pp.267-83.
the Government or the producers.
Among the most important measures introduced by the Government in 1930 were two banking Bills. Like the constitutional Bills, these represented the Party's desire to make changes in the economic system, as distinct from the many measures necessary to administer and assist; but the banking Bills also came to nothing.
The Central Reserve Bank Bill was read for the 21
first time in the Representatives on 2 April and the 22
Commonwealth Bank Bill on 23 May. in introducing the second Bill Theodore explained that 1 it was not intended to go on with the Bill until the fate of the Central Reserve
23
Bank Bill is determined r. No more was heard of this second Bill in 1930.
The Reserve Bank Bill was not a radical measure. It proposed a reserve bank endowed with central banking powers as understood by orthodox banking opinion in the 1920 s . This meant that the central bank was to serve the private banks
,
21 C.P.D., Vol. 123, p.759. 22 Ibid., p.2119 . 23 Ibid.
not direct or control them. The Bill, says Giblin, was 'accepted by the Opposition [in the Representatives] as a genuine attempt to strengthen central banking in Australia
24
on moderate and even conservative lines'. In 1928 the Bruce-Page Government drafted a Bill to increase central banking powers; the measure was ready for submission in early 1929 but was shelved by the Government. Schedvin believes that the Scullin Government's Bill 'was probably
similar in principal to the 1928 Bill'.“^ The 1930 Bill
was drawn up in consultation with officials of the Commonwealth 26
Bank and amended by the Bank Board ; Giblin concludes that the Board was in favour of the Bill. Moreover, the
Government sought advice on the Bill from Sir Ernest Harvey 27
of the Bank of England; though it ignored the request of that Bank to defer the introduction of the Bill until after
28