the Conference normally met trienially to consider proposals from the State Branches for inclusion in the Party's
programme. In theory and often in practice the Federal Conference was the supreme governing body in the Labor Party. Between Conferences a Federal Executive of twelve - two
delegates from each State Branch - met at least once a year
resolve the more urgent policy and disciplinary questions. Neither Conference or Executive employed full-time officers.
The obvious must be emphasised: equal Branch representation Conference equal to that of New South Wales; whatever the merits of the allocation it is understandable that it was the cause of dissatisfaction. (This does not imply that the Conference divided along State lines).
The chain of organisation - Caucus - Executive - Conference - was roughly duplicated in each of the six State Branches, although there were many minor variations in structure and nomenclature (most notably in Western Australia). The important difference was rank-and-file participation by the local (i.e. intra-state) branches and trade unions. The theory and constitution of Labor suggested that the wishes of the ordinary Party member in an affiliated trade union or a local branch (or possibly both) were made effective by transmission through the union or branch delegate to the State Conference and hence to the State parliamentary Caucus. Where the impulse concerned Federal affairs it went on from the State Conference or Executive to their Federal counterparts and then to the Federal Caucus. The latter was therefore a long distance from the Labor Party member in the States and there was always the possibility of requests losing their way before even
being considered by Federal Caucus.
As Labor placed a high value on rank-and-file participation the Federal Party was always susceptible to
(and Party member) in the States. And as this was combined with a deep-rooted and powerful instinct for State autonomy, there was a continual temptation in the States to leap across the chain of transmission and directly 'instruct' members of the F.P.L.P. to do the bidding of the State Branch. Such temptation was the greater and the 'instruction' likely to be more powerful because the State organisations were the power bases for Federal Caucus members. Organisations within the State Branches controlled a substantial part of Party finance, the election campaign machine and, more importantly, the process of pre-selection and endorsement for Labor Federal Parliamentary candidature.
Threaded through the A.L.P. was 'the time-serving and place-seeking, the graft and chicanery' which, Turner
32
says, are endemic in Labor movements. Nobler aspirations also prevailed and the only too evident cynicism, corruption, ambition and blind joy in factional intrigue are insufficient as an explanation for the struggles of 1930 and 1931. Several
forces were at work in the Party which continually pushed it toward destruction. One such force arose from the strains imposed by Federalism. Another was the reverence for 32
rank-and-file participation and control, and the
consequent concern to ensure that Labor politicians were responsive to the membership and could be disciplined for breaches of Party principle.
At the time of the 1916 conscription split in the A.L.P. there was much talk among trade union officials of the need to discipline Labor politicians and 're-instate' control over politicians by the industrial wing of the Labor movement. During 1930 and 1931 there was again much talk,
and some action, of the same kind. At both times there was j.ustification for the feeling that the Labor Party had failed its creator and mainstay, the trade unions. Yet while at times fierce in their denunciation of the Scullin
Government, the union critics played a very soft pedal on their own responsibility for Labor's political failures. In fact their own responsibility was considerable.
The Australian trade union movement was one of the strongest in the world. Its numerical strength rested on the protection offered through the Commonwealth and State arbitration systems. Although at the end of 1928 the unions had
on the part of a majority of members. Voting and attendance figures in union records of the late 1920's indicate that most unionists were indifferent to the day-to-day business and activities of their union (though not of course, to the economic fruit of that activity). One consequence of such indifference was that union officials tended to remain unshakeably fixed in their positions. These two things, together with most unionists apparent indifference to the part played in Labor politics by their union , meant that Labor's theory of democratic participation was too often in practice nothing but a sad farce. It was the case in 1930 and
1931 that economic hardship had an effect the reverse of what might have been expected: participation in union affairs very often diminished rather than increased. Union officials who spoke in Labor Party counsels as though they were the echoing voice of thousands were frequently the voice of only a handful. The handful may have had authority in arbitration legislation and like matters; its concerns, however, extended far beyond such narrow fields.
33
In 1928 there were 379 separate unions in
Australia. Of these, 107 operated in two or more States and 43 operated in all six States; the 107 interstate
34
unions contained 81% of all Australian unionists. Some few unions such as the A.W.U. were well integrated, with a strong and dominant Federal organisation. However, these few were the exception. In general, the interstate unions had relatively strong State Branches and a weak Federal organisation: there were a multitude of unions in this position; the A.R.U., W.W.F., the Ironworkers, Carters and Drivers and various building trades unions were typical of most. One consequence was that such unions were much more interested and influential in State Labor politics than they were in the Federal Labor Party. Conversely, those rare
unions such as the A.W.U. which were strongly organised federally were interested and influential in Federal Labor politics (though not, in the case of the A.W.U., to the
exclusion of influence on Labor in some States).
34
Unions were organised on a regional, State and, after 1927, a national basis. Some unions with allied interests were members of councils of the kind later exemplified by the Metal Trades Federation; among such unions at the end of the 1920's were the iron, steel, brass and building trades. Such councils were insignificant politically ((and probably, industrially) during the late
1920's and early 1930's. Each State had a number of Labor Councils, the most important of which were those in the capital cities. Although not as institutions affiliated with the State Branches of the A.L.P. they contained most of the unions which were affiliated with the Party. Thus the principal Councils were bodies to be reckoned with in Labor politics; but, again, their influence was most evident and important at the State Labor Party level.
The unions as a whole expressed their demands through the Australasian Council of Trade Unions (A.C.T.U.). This organisation was established in May 1927 with the general objective of the socialisation of industry, by the methods of the establishment of one union for each industry (i.e., by the elimination of the craft union), 1the consolidation of the
Australasian Labour Movement with the object of unified control, administration and action1, and the central control
35
of industrial disputes. Each of the principal State Labor Councils acted as a branch and supplied two representatives to the A.C.T.U.Executive, which also contained four other officials; like the A.L.P. Federal Executive, the A.C.T.U. Executive had no permanent office or full-time officials. For a number of reasons the A.C.T.U. was not at all a significant influence on the
Scullin Government. Obviously, in 1930 the A.C.T.U. was still in its infancy, unused to its position, lacking real powers and much subject to interstate and inter-union jealousies. Less important was the fact that the unions in Western
Australia had remained outside the A.C.T.U. (There were only 30
61,498 unionists in W.A. in 1928). Much more important was the refusal of the A.W.U. to participate in the A.C.T.U. and the hostility that existed between the two in 1930 and 1931.
35
Ibid., p .572. 36
The A.W.U. was Australia's largest and one of its 37 oldest unions. In 1928 it claimed 160,000 members; the next largest was probably the A.R.U., with approximately
38
60,000 members. The A.W.U. was undoubtedly the richest of Australian unions, and one of the most efficient.
Perhaps because it seemed so monolithic, rich and powerful, the A.W.U. was the subject of much criticism from other unions, especially the more militant; even one prominent A.W.U. man acknowledged that the opinion of many was:
That the A.W.U. was becoming a bureaucracy, and that the rank and file had no say in the
framing of the rules and constitution of the
organisation. 39
As we have noted, the A.W.U. was one of the very few unions which were strongly organised federally. Its influence with
the Scullin Government was strong, much more so than the A.C.T.U., any Labor Council or any other trade union; often
its influence was greater than any combination of all three. In part this was because there was a large number of A.W.U.
37
A.W.U. Annual Convention, Official Report, 1928, p.3. 38
Railroad, 10 August 1929. 39
members in the Scullin Ministry and the Caucus of 1929- 1932. And in part it was because the A.W.U. was the
industrial mirror image of the Federal Labor Party; strongly federalist and moderate in aim and pragmatic in action.
Many of the weaknesses of the union movement were revealed in the three great industrial disputes of 1928- 1929. Some 60,000 unionists in the waterside, timber and coal industries were locked in a struggle with the employees, the Arbitration Court and the Commonwealth Government. In each case the unionists were defeated and the unions
involved were crippled in the difficult years which followed. The effect on even the militant unions was profound, for the three lost struggles indicated that direct action was now hopelessly ineffective against wage reductions and erosion of working conditions.
Federal politics in 1928 and 1929 was dominated by industrial affairs. Industrial disputes of great bitterness, a major amendment to the Commonwealth Arbitration Act (1928) , use of the new Transport Workers' Act and an abortive
Industrial Peace Conference contrived to heighten and define attitudes. Many in the Labor movement believed that a 'general
capitalist offensive' was underway, and that the Government was contriving with the employers to facilitate it. The Bruce-Page Government (1923-1929) was convinced that in their attitude to arbitration the unions were irresponsible, inconsistent and insincere.
The Bruce-Page Government announced in May 1929 that if the States would not transfer their industrial powers to the Commonwealth (and they refused to do so) the Commonwealth would relinquish its own industrial powers, except in the maritime industries. In September 1929 a Bill to give effect to this was introduced into the Federal Parliament. On 10 September the Government was defeated in the House of Representatives by one vote, on an amendment moved in
Committee by W.M. Hughes. An election, for the House of Representatives only, was held on 12 October and Labor won a sweeping victory.
Five of the nine Ministers standing for re-election were defeated, including the Prime Minister. Non-Labor membership of the Representatives fell from forty-four to twenty-nine (and Nationalist Party membership from twenty-nine to fourteen). Labor numbers rose from thirty-one to forty- seven* A by-election in December 1929 won a further seat
Labor Caucus numbered fifty-five.
A careful study of the defeat of the Nationalist Government and the subsequent election has made extremely doubtful the accepted interpretation, which was that the election defeat was due to the Government's blunder over
40
arbitration. As Carboch points out, there is no way of knowing why the three and a half million electors voted as they did. There is some indication - such as the fact that many Labor gains were made in rural and rural-urban seats - that arbitration was but one influence among many. Carboch notes a number of issues put forward by opinion leaders:
40
Dagmar Carboch, 'The Fall of the Bruce-Page Government', Studies in Australian Politics, Melbourne, 1958, pp. 119- 282.
The John Brown case and 'class justice'; the film tax' the New South Wales coal lock-out; the timber workers' strike; the Government's financial policy; the Public Service Bill; the question of mandates; the question of Party discipline and the
importance of Party platforms; the rights of the smaller States - and so on. 41
Little mention was made of the worsening
economic situation. Doubtless many in the Labor movement thought that Australia was about to experience a relatively minor economic downturn, of the order of that of the early
1920's. On this issue there was no sense of urgency 42 or alarm from Labor. Scullin's policy speech was typical. He acknowledged the economic decline and laid the blame on the Nationalist Government's mismanagement and extravagance; Labor would correct this by curtailing loans and restricting loan expenditure to 'reproductive works'. He promised to implement several traditional Labor policies, such as higher tariffs, unemployment insurance, banking reform and pool marketing of primary produce. The principle matter, however, 41
Ibid., p.269. 42
was arbitration. Scullin, and Labor generally, denounced the Bruce-Page policy and promised reforms which would remove the punitive aspects and broaden the conciliative functions of the arbitration system. In the context of the
industrial strife of 1928 and 1929 and the Bruce-Page attack, this promise appealed greatly to the trade unions and they were more than ordinarily active in the Labor campaign. The Labor movement apparently chose to ignore Labor's position in the Senate and the predictable
intransigence of the Opposition Senators. Although this problem was very rarely mentioned during the election
the more thoughtful members of the Party. Before leaving
economic position would not be righted in a day or a year* and that 'things will be worse before they are better'; he concluded that 'the duties lying ahead of the Labor Party were much too serious to permit any undue exuberance'.
Chapter Ii
Bruce resigned on 21 October and the Governor
General sent for Scullin and invited him to form a Government. As is customary, Scullin asked for time before giving a
definite reply, meaning that he would first consult the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party. This was of course a
formality and the business of the Caucus meeting of 22 October was the election of a Ministry and the nomination of other Parliamentary and Party officers.
Although, with fifty four members,^ the choice was a wide one, there were several constraints. The first was the
tradition that Cabinet should consist of at least one
representative from each State; thus Caucus had to choose three members from among the eight representing Queensland, Tasmania
and Western Australia. A second limitation, also traditional, was the necessity to have at least one Minister in the Senate, who would have to be chosen from among Labor's seven Senators. 1
A table setting out the changing strength of the F.P.L.P. will be found in Appendix I.
Deputy-Leader of the Party, though subject to re-election to their positions at the Caucus meeting, would automatically take two of the most senior Ministerial positions. At the other end of the scale were the fifteen members of the House of Representatives who had been elected for the first time a few weeks earlier, and who at the meeting of 22 October had not yet even been sworn in as members of Parliament. Their chances of climbing straight to Cabinet rank were slender indeed. The exception among them was J.A. Lyons, the former Premier and Treasurer of Tasmania who had been invited by Scullin to resign his seat in the State Parliament to contest
2
a seat at the 1929 Federal Election. (Lyons had refused a 3
similar invitation in 1928-) The invitation and his 4
experience made Lyons' election to Cabinet certain, the more 2
Dame Enid Lyons, So We Take Comfort, London, 1965, p.148; J.Guy, Deputy Leader of the A.L.P. in Tasmania and D.Riordan of
Queensland also resigned State Labor seats and were elected to the Federal Parliament in 1929.
3
Caucus, Minutes, 13 September 1928. 4
For a brief account of Lyons1 twenty years in Tasmanian politics see, P.R. Hart, 'J.A.Lyons, Tasmanian Labour Leader' Labour History, No.9, November 1965, pp.33-42.
so because he could also serve as the Tasmanian
representative in Cabinet. A few other Caucus members were much handicapped, even had they sought office, by old age or chronic ill-health.^
With these limitations and reservations there were approximately thirty members of Caucus who might allow their name to remain on the ballot paper with some hope that they might win a position in the Ministry. But even these thirty had chances which were far from equal. After being out of office for thirteen years the Party was likely to reward those who had given long service in the bad years, and it is not
therefore surprising that six of the thirteen Ministers had been members of Parliament at the time of the Fisher Labor Government of 1910-1913.^ A further influence defining eligibility for Ministerial rank was the moderate attitudes 5
For example, Dr. W. Maloney was 75 years of age; J. Mathews was 'an extremely sick m a n 1 (Australian Worker, 4 December
1929) who attended no more than ten Caucus meetings throughout the Government's term of office.
6
The six were Scullin, Brennan, Fenton, P.Moloney, Barnes and Anstey. A list of all Federal Labor members, 1929-1932, and their electorates, appears in Appendix II.
of the^members of the House of Representatives were members