The binary codes as the source o f different interpretations o f economic agendas

It is impossible to identify the whole gamut of views in Korean studies of

economics under the colonial situation, merely from the two positions

above.1 Be that as it may, it still remains possible to grasp the basic

1) For a summary of the research activities of Korean historians between

1987 and 1989 regarding the colonial period, see YOON Kyung-Ro (1991);

for a proposal of a new paradigm for economic history in Korean studies,

see AHN, Byung-Jik (1997); for the debate on the implications of Japan's

capital export and colonial Korea's industrialization, see KIM Nak-Nyun

intellectual disagreements between many Korean scholars, as well as

overseas scholars in Korean studies. Different interpretations compete with

each other, utilizing conflicting empirical evidence and theoretical

frameworks. This situation could be understood as the consequence of

different research directions: 'Whereas research with the conventional

perspective took the grand theme of identifying indigenous Korean capital

as a whole and utilized the data on companies or on factories for this

purpose, recent research intends to investigate one or two cases of Korean

capital' (JOO Ik Jong, 1991: 33). Or, like the revisionist critique and its

counter-critique, this situation may have been fashioned by both a 'magic

(of the exploitation theory) beyond economic common senses' and a 'magic

of economics' that ignores the actual colonial historicity (CHUNG

Tae-Heon, 1997).

At this point, I will look at KIMURA Mitsuhiko, a Japanese economist,

whose research questioning and conclusions would provoke critical reactions

from those working under the broad umbrella of exploitation theory

(Kimura, 1989, 1993, 1995). Even though it is acknowledged that the

contributions o f each article should be understood under the parameters of

the intellectual discourse in Japanese studies, in which research on colonial

Korea occupies an important place for the evaluation of the economic

policies of Japanese imperialism2, and it should be necessarily reminded

(1993); for nationalism, socialism and the combination of both in the

labour movements, see KIM Kyung-Il (1991); for female workers'

conditions and their labour movements, see LEE Hyo-Jae (1976) and

CHUNG Chin Sung (1988).

2) His critique of economic imperialism in terms of its insignificant

contribution to Japan's domestic economy is a good example. See, Kimura

that his research does not fully and officially represent all Japanese

scholars in colonial-Korean studies, his manner of introducing and codifying

statistical data and drawing conclusions from them, is in no way

subsumable under the critique o f economics as magic. He illustrates that,

compared to colonial Taiwan, the financial inflow into the colonial account

for Korea - the accounts for the colonial central and local government -

from the accounts for Japan Proper - the general accounts and the special

accounts other than the accounts for the colony - is higher than the

outflow from the colonial account (Kimura, 1989). The statistical data from

which Kimura produced his moderate analysis seem to be rather differently

understood by the advocates of exploitation theory in Korea. 'I came across

statistics ( ^ # ^ * 1 3 . ) that predominantly suggested that colonial rule

contributed to the development o f colonial Korea, in that the money inflow

into Korea from Japan was 4,322,000,000 yens higher than the money

outflow from Korea to Japan' (CHUNG Tae-Heon, 1997). Additionally,

Chung argues that it is absurd to compare inflow and outflow of money

under territorial separation, and that it is necessary to take account of its

different usages - in terms of Korea and Koreans compared with the

maintenance cost of colonial rule including salaries and expenses for

Japanese bureaucrats and managers.

Kimura's other article (1993), "Standards Of Living In Colonial Korea -

Did The Masses Become Worse O ff Or Better Off Under Japanese Rule?"

seems to be more provocative. He argues that Korean masses' living

(1995) and Myers and Peattie (1984). Additionally, for a brief introduction

to the implications of the Korean experience of colonial development for

Japanese studies, see HIDEK1 Takijawa (1983) and MIYAZIMA Hiroshi

(1993).

standards rose between the early colonial period and 1940, as instantiated

in a growing literacy rate, survival rates, and average stature, variables, he

argues, that were more directly related to living conditions than other

variables, like farm income per household, agricultural real wages, and per

capita calorie intake from staple foods, which declined throughout that

period. Although, there was no direct criticism of this argument, it is not

difficult to find quite opposite and alternative stories through which the

historiography of pre-colonial Korean projects and colonial realities are

understood. To start with, the educational reforms toward establishing what

is called the modem school started in the 1880s (SHIN Yong Ha, 1974)

and the national education system had been prepared by the Chosun state

(LEE Hye Young, 1996). Besides, registration in primary schools in the

early colonial period, was significantly and deliberately rejected by Koreans'

strong antagonism to the colonization process, while many students and

parents preferred traditional institutions and voluntary organizations by

educated Koreans (Tsurumi, 1984). Additionally, an irony arises from his

analysis of the trends in stature. According to his collection o f data, 'the

stature of the Korean masses at least did not decrease during the colonial period' (Kimura, 1993: 647) (italics added). Even though this argument

seems to intend to indirectly refute the critical comment that living

conditions during the colonial period became worse, he also accepts that

there was a fall in average income and deterioration in diet, the latter

perhaps suggestive of a propensity of the Korean masses' to fashion their

own solutions for survival.

Although it is necessary to utilize detailed statistical data in order to

extend knowledge, I cannot fully accept the revisionist arguments either.

This implies neither that exploitation theory and nationalistic views are

more correct, nor that revisionist critics are misguided in their data

analysis. It is simply because the conceptual assumptions of many

revisionists are not detached from their own normative foundation, and this

despite their strong critique of the advocates of exploitation theory for their

non-objective attitudes in employing emotionally or politically motivated

usages of language that are irrelevant for grasping historical realities. In

fact, the normative foundation of the revisionists is not derived from the

magic of economics, but comes from the strong idea of an economic

modernization that must be qualitatively different from the traditional

economic structure, a difference which is a priori constructed upon the vocabulary of economics. In other words, underdeveloped legislation o f

property right in late Chosun is understood in the revisionist account as a

dead-lock of the feudal economy. At the same time, an economic project,

for them, becomes qualified as factual evidence only when it produces a

certain level of economic influence. This must be the reason why they do

not accept any emerging economic phenomena and the change of taxation

policies in the late 1890s as the pivotal point of rupture. Thus, only the

cadastral survey can fulfill their criteria for conceptual rupture, from the

traditional feudal economy to a modem capitalist one. The normative

foundation for them is the modem economic system itself in general and

modem landownership in particular.

MIYAZIMA Hiroshi (1993)'s conceptualization of modem landownership

and its adoption, as the basis for interpreting the modem Korean

experience, for both him and his revisionist colleagues, displays a

dangerous aspect in developing the idea of the modem in economic

thoughts.

"1. the Modem landow nership system (■5‘CH Jn.—] ) is that which guarantees the logic of the commodity economy controlling modern society to pervade landownership... It is necessary to deconstruct the (pre-modem) relationship between political rule and landownership in order to establish the characteristics of modem landownership system... 2. This [land-document system

(*1*| *)]£.) intends to construct a nationwide, public map detailing the owners of all land, incorporating statistics, locations and so forth, under the principle o f one-land for one-owner established by the modem landownership system... 3. The land-registration system

(5L*|'§-7| *)].£) aims to guarantee the secure and rapid facilitation of landownership in the future as well as to establish a modem landownership system does... 4. the Modem land taxation system

(0cH 3-j ^|-<-||^l]S.) is designed to reflect the modem landownership system. In other words, the land tax under a modem land taxation system is collected in monetary form, under the assumption of the dominance of the commodity economy, as well as the profit-orientation of private landowners." (pp.11-13)

His definition of the modem landownership system and its related features,

seems unproblematic at first sight, appearing to coincide with the common

understanding of contemporary social scientists. While his conceptualization

is firmly based on the Japanese model, which has been developed since at

least the Meiji reform, it soon becomes apparent that his overall idea of

the modem economic system is taken from the European experience. In

other words, it is a logic of interpretation borrowed from the European

intellectual tradition, subsequently applied to Japan and further developed by

Japanese economists themselves. He himself notes the burgeoning

intellectual trend in Japanese studies o f recent times, which critically

reflects on the theoretical applicability o f Western experiences of land

reform for East Asia, searching for a similar historical development of

small-farm management in the region. In spite of rejecting dependence

theory and semi-peripheral development theory, and despite acknowledging

the need for reconsideration of the theory of the transition to capitalism

from feudalism, his insistence on a strong rupture between the modem

economy and its traditional counter-part remains rigid. Perhaps because the

Japanese experience of the modem landownership system is one that

fundamentally underlies the current Japanese economic status quo. The

embedded values behind the vocabulary of economics is inescapably bound

to the full economic history of modem Japan. Miyazima's assumption about

the modem, at a conceptual remove from the traditional, is in fact not so

easy to undermine, in that the interpretation of the modem itself for the

social sciences necessarily requires an identification of concrete historical

projects - for him, the modem landownership system - which are

qualitatively distinct as reference points. When his conceptualization is

extended to cover the Korean situation, however, Miyazima fails to

incorporate into his theory the issue of (a) subject(s) who decide(s) to

develop the 'modem landownership system'. Even though he could hope to

limit his role as an economist to one outside political judgement, it

becomes impossible to avoid this issue, which was never significantly dealt

with in the Japanese experience. It is not because it was unimportant, but

because it was superfluous to Japanese requirements. Insofar as Japan

became the subject of narrative for the cadastral survey and the legislation

of the 'modem land taxation system' in colonial Korea, rather than Korean

actors, Miyazima's perception o f the modem deserves contestation in

intellectual discourses. For the introduction of the modem landownership

system by Japan could be differently understood from both the Japanese

and Korean side. From a Japanese perspective, it could possibly represent

an extended opportunity, a benevolent gift from an earlier enlightened and

more qualified Japan to Korea. From a Korean view, it may represent a

lost opportunity for autonomously arriving at a modem economic system;

Japan's pillage of the Korean project. Could this not be a basis for the

widespread nationalistic sentiments in both intellectual worlds? Furthermore,

could it be one of the reasons why many Korean scholars display a

preference for investigating Korean projects in the pre-colonial period which

were incomplete at the time of the Japanese occupation?

Regrettably, the nationalist review in general and the exploitation theory in

particular do not have a fully differentiated idea of the modem compared

with the revisionist view, in spite of their excessive attention to the issue

of the subject of colonial modernization. Many scholars do not doubt the

values of the categories of 'we/they' and 'Korea/Japan', although critics of

exploitation theory and even some Marxists at least note that response from

Koreans was fragmented, according to their economic and social interests.

The exploitation theory does not doubt the negativeness of what Japan left

as a whole, while new and old revisionists in economic history question

this and political economists positively evaluate Japanese involvement for

colonial Korea. At the same time, whereas some recent research focuses

more on the influence of those economic policies - the 'shift from a feudal

economy to a capitalist economy' -, a majority of the research takes the

Japanese empire's violent occupation of Korea as its starting point, from

which the intentions underpinning economic policies are revealed - 'with

pistol and surveying instrument'. Some of this latter research dwelt on

economic transformation, in terms of the replacement of the agricultural

economy by industrialization from the late 1920s, under which perspective

Koreans were always regarded as victims of social discrimination. A s an

example, 'The rate of Koreans' unemployment was more than double that

of their Japanese counterparts' (HUH Soo Youl, 1993). However, the

economic policies, which should be understood as the long-term effects on

society of the colonial management of Korea, were barely evaluated fo r

new visions of the post-colonial Korean economy and economic actors. In

other words, while most evaluations of economic policies and their

consequences have been effected under the strong dichotomy between Korea

and Japan and an unbalanced distribution of economic benefit and loss, the

In document The historical formation of modernity in Korea : events, issues and actors (Page 138-146)