To illustrate the circumstances within which NSAGs have developed in Burma, this chapter briefly examines the modern historical context of the conflicts and the NSAGs involved in them. In particular, attention is given to the social and political basis of the ethnic conflicts and their evolving political economy. The counter-state governance roles of ethnic NSAGs, recent ceasefires since 2012, and the nation-wide ceasefire process since 2013, are then outlined.
The colonial era
Following the first and second Anglo-Burmese wars in 1824-26 and 1852 respectively, the British removed and exiled the last King of Burma
following the third Anglo-Burmese war in 1885.299 Burma was then administered as a province of British India up to 1937, but it was not all administered in the same manner.300 The British occupied and directly administered “Ministerial Burma” or “Burma Proper,”301 which developed as a major rice producing and exporting region in the British Empire, as well as a source of minerals and oil. In the highland “Frontier Areas,”302 the British “largely left intact the traditional political structures of the peripheral regions."303 This was for “reasons of economy and simplicity of
administration.”304 Nonetheless, the era of British colonial rule reified the already existing divide between lowland Burmans and the upland ethnic groups via the systems of administration. This was further deepened by the recruitment of soldiers from ethnic minorities, especially Karen, Chin and Kachin, for the British colonial army that was used to suppress
299 Thant Myint-U, The River of Lost Footsteps: Histories of Burma (New York, NY:
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006), 3-30.
300 Robert Taylor, "British Policy towards Myanmar and the Creation of the 'Burma Problem'," in Myanmar: State, Society and Ethnicity, ed. N. Ganesan and Kyaw Yin Hlaing (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), 78-82.
301 Rachel Safman, "Minorities and State-building in Mainland Southeast Asia," in
Myanmar: State, Society and Ethnicity, ed. N. Ganesan and Kyaw Yin Hlaing (Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), 53.
302 Taylor, "British Policy towards Myanmar and the Creation of the 'Burma Problem'," 75.
303 Alan Smith, "Burma/Myanmar: The Struggle for Democracy and Ethnic Rights," in Multiculturalism in Asia, ed. Will Kymlicka and Baohang He (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005), 264.
304 Taylor, "British Policy towards Myanmar and the Creation of the 'Burma Problem'," 75.
110
Burman revolts.305 Missionaries also found ready converts among the animist frontier peoples compared to the resistance they faced from the Buddhist Burmans.306 As Mikael Gravers has described it “a double exclusion took place as a result of this policy of difference: the Christian from the Buddhist and the ethnic minorities from the majority.”307
Alongside separate administration of the periphery regions, and administrative, religious and military differentiation from the Burman centre, some of the frontier ethnic groups, especially the Karen and the Kachin, were also involved in supporting the British against the Japanese invasion of Burma of 1941-45 during the Second World War. Whereas, initially, some Burmans supported the Japanese invasion as a means to end British colonial rule. This ethnic minority/Burman divide would have marked consequences for Burma’s independence after World War Two.
The events of the Japanese invasion and its aftermath, are significant in that they “created political opportunities for the military and transformed the resistance movement itself into a legitimating factor for those aspiring to lead the post-independence state.”308 This helped to establish the central role played by the Burma Army (the Tatmadaw) in Burma’s future politics.
Independence and the outbreak of insurgencies
Within a year of independence in 1948, a Communist Party of Burma (CPB) insurgency as well as several ethnic rebellions had started. These included Karenni and Mon309 uprisings, an Islamic insurgency in northern Arakan,310 and ultimately, a Karen rebellion that broke out in January of
305 See, for example, Gravers, "Ethnicity Against State -State Against Ethnic Diversity?,"
17; Smith, "Burma/Myanmar: The Struggle for Democracy and Ethnic Rights.", 265;
Taylor, "British Policy towards Myanmar and the Creation of the 'Burma Problem'.",75.
306 See, for example, Lian H. Sakhong, "Christianity and Chin Identity," in Exploring Ethnic Diversity in Burma, ed. Mikael Gravers (Copenhagen, Denmark: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2007); Mikael Gravers, "Conversion and Identity: Religion and Fomation of Karen Ethnic Identity," in Exploring Ethnic Diversity in Burma, ed. Mikael Gravers
(Copenhagen, Denmark: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2007).
307 Gravers, "Ethnicity Against State -State Against Ethnic Diversity?," 14.
308 Tin Maung Maung Than, "Dreams and Nightmares: State Building and Ethnic Conflict in Myanmar (Burma)," in Ethnic Conflicts in Southeast Asia, ed. Kusuma Snitwongse and W. Scott Thompson (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), 72.
309 Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, 106-09.
310 Thant Myint-U, The River of Lost Footsteps: Histories of Burma, 259.
111
1949.311 Karen hopes for an independent state had been dashed with the creation of the unitary Burmese state and inter-ethnic tensions and
escalating violence saw Karen units in the army and Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO) militias rally around the Karen National Union (KNU) which had formed in 1947.312
At this time, the KNU also helped develop other ethnic NSAGs waging insurgencies in Mon and Karenni areas and, in the wake of the Second World War, there were many armed and trained former soldiers who now joined the insurgencies.313 A number of leaders, and future leaders, of the developing ethnic NSAGs had previous military training and experience in the recent war. The KNPP’s original leader, Saw Maw Reh, was a veteran of the British Army as were the original brigade commanders of the KNU after 1948 and the later KNU leaders Bo Mya and Tamla Baw, while future KIA leader Zau Seng had trained as an intelligence officer with US forces in Kachin.314
Military rule and insurgencies 1962-2010
Following the 1962 military takeover led by General Ne Win, communist and ethnic insurgencies increased in number and intensity.315 New ethnic insurgent organisations such as the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), New Mon State Party (NMSP) and Shan State Army (SSA)
proliferated. A significant consequence of the failed economic policies of Ne Win’s Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) during the 1960s and 1970s was that ethnic NSAGs that operated on the borderlands of the Burmese state were able to exploit the extensive cross-border shadow economy. Taxation of cross-border trade routes with Thailand helped finance ethnic NSAGs who controlled the border crossings, while the
311 Tin Maung Maung Than, "Dreams and Nightmares: State Building and Ethnic Conflict in Myanmar (Burma)," 75.
312 Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, 110-12.
313 Lintner, Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 1948, 10-22; Smith, State of Strife: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Burma, 15.
314 See for short biographies of the leaders and important members of Burma NSAGs up to the 1990s, Lintner, Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 1948, 496-526.
315 David Steinberg, Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press, 2010), 66-67.
112
opium trade out of Shan state was controlled by various pro and anti-government NSAGs.316
Student-led pro-democracy protests in response to Burma’s dire economic situation and demonetization of its currency in 1988 led to Ne Win’s
resignation, and another military-led takeover by a group of generals; the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC).317 The military then supressed protests in major cities with considerable loss of life and thousands of students consequently fled to ethnic NSAG-held areas on Burma’s borders. Some of those students then formed the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF) to fight alongside ethnic NSAGs against the SLORC.
SLORC Intelligence Chief, General Khin Nyunt, quickly seized an
opportunity when the CPB collapsed in 1989 to negotiate ceasefires with the CPB’s successor ethnic NSAGs in north and northeast Burma.318 These groups were permitted to retain their arms and administer their respective areas as virtual mini-states.319 These ceasefires allowed the Tatmadaw to then concentrate its forces against remaining resistance ethnic NSAGs, especially the KNU, KNPP, and NMSP, along the Thai border.320 Later ceasefire agreements were negotiated with other major NSAGs in the mid-1990s including the KIO in northern Burma in 1994,321 and the NMSP in southeast Burma in 1995.322 These later ceasefire arrangements gave less autonomy to the KIO and NMSP compared to the
316 Brown, "Burma: The political economy of violence." See, also, South, Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict, 39; Bertil Lintner, Outrage: Burma's Struggle for Democracy (London, UK: White Lotus, 1990).
317 Many observers believe Ne Win was the real architect of the “coup by consent” as many of the SLORC leaders were close to him. In June 1989, Aung San Suu Kyi publicly named him as the force behind the 1988 coup, Aung San Suu Kyi, Freedom from Fear and other Writings (London, UK: Penguin, 1991), 273,309.
318 Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, 374-83. These groups included the United Wa State Army (UWSA) in Wa territory, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (NMDAA) in Kokang, and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) in Mongla.
319 Kathryn Theobald and Hui Hui Ooi, "The Wa State, Burma," National Strategy Forum Review 20, no. 3 (2011): 1.
320 Ashley South, Mon Nationalism and Civil War in Burma: The Golden Sheldrake (London, UK: RoutleldgeCurzon, 2003), 166-68; Lintner, Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 1948. 413-414.
321 Lintner, Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 1948, 405-06.
322 South, "Ceasefires and Civil Society: The Case of the Mon," 165.
113
earlier ceasefires with post-CPB groups, and despite some limited development activity, long-term political settlements remained off the table. Three significant groups, the KNU, KNPP and Shan State Army-South (SSA-S) remained outside of these agreements until another round of ceasefires in 2011-2012.323
The USDP Government (2011- 2015)
In 2010, a national election was held by the SPDC controlled government which was boycotted by the main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD). Consequently, the military-backed but nominally civilian Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) came to power with former General Thein Sein as President. The period of 2011-2015 saw the government establish ceasefires with most of the remaining NSAGs,324 the release from house arrest of the NLD leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and her subsequent success along with many other NLD candidates in by-elections in April 2012.325 This contributed to a relaxation of economic sanctions from western states,326 and the start of an apparent foreign investment boom.327 However, active armed conflict resumed in Kachin state in June 2011 between the Tatmadaw and the KIA, (who previously had a ceasefire with the government since 1994).328 Sporadic conflict has also continued, or reignited, with some other NSAGs.329
323 See, for example, Naw Noreen, "Karenni rebels reach out to locals over peace talks,"
Democratic Voice of Burma April 18, 2012. Burma News International, "KNU and Burma Government Delegations Kick-off Ceasefire Talks," Burma News International April 5, 2012; Phanida, "SSA-S Accepts Burmese Government's Offer to Start Peace Talks,"
Mizzima News, 6 October 2011.
324 The SSA-S agreed a ceasefire in December 2011, the KNU in January 2012, and the KNPP in March 2012. Burma News International, Deciphering Myanmar's Peace
Process: A Reference Guide, 2014.
325 Al Jazeera, "Myanmar's Suu Kyi 'wins landmark election'," 2 April 2012; Rachel Harvey, "What now for Burma after Election Landslide?," BBC News April 4, 2012.
326 BBC News, "Burma Sanctions: Obama lifts Restrictions on US firms,"
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-18798162; Agence France Press, "West must lift Myanmar Sanctions ‘without delay’: Think-tank," BurmanetNews, 11 April 2012.
327 Lucy Hooker, "Could Burma be the next emerging market miracle?," BBC News, 17 June 2012.
328 Ba Kaung, "Burmese Army mounts multi-front offensive against KIA " The Irrawaddy, 11 October 2011. Edward Wong, "Myanmar: Offensive Against Kachin Army goes on,"
New York Times, 25 January 2012.
329 In particular, in Shan state with the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N) despite it having a ceasefire with the government, with the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) since 2011, and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in the Kokang special region bordering China, since February 2015. There have also been sporadic
114
The situation of Burma until very recently was one of limited democratic reforms that facilitated the lifting of many western sanctions and
encouraged foreign investment. On the other side of these developments was the continuance of political, ethnic, and economic grievances, and the military’s retention of its overall hold on power. An election, contested this time by the NLD, resulted in a comprehensive victory for the NLD in November 2015. However, the 2008 military-drafted constitution remains central to politics in Burma up to the present. It enshrines the role of the military in government, preserving 25 percent of the seats for serving members of the armed forces in both the People’s Assembly (Pyithu Hluttaw) and the Upper House (Amothya Hluttaw). The constitution requires a 75 percent majority to make changes to it, thereby effectively giving the military power of veto over any such changes.330
Nationwide ceasefire negotiations
Following the establishment of individual ceasefires with most NSAGs in 2012, the government and the NSAGs started working towards a
nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA). To this end, the government, with assistance from the EU, created the Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC) in 2012. Members of the MPC acted as a technical team for chief
government ceasefire negotiator, Aung Min. Most of the major ethnic NSAGs formed a renewed coalition in 2011, the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC)331 which negotiated the NCA from 2013 onwards through its nationwide ceasefire coordination team (NCCT). In October 2015, eight NSAGs, including the KNU, SSA-S, ABSDF and DKBA, signed the NCA with the government, while the remaining NSAGs, including the
outbreaks of fighting in Karen state, mostly between government forces, or government aligned Border Guard Forces (BGF), and splinter factions of the DKBA.
330 Steinberg, Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know (Second Edition), 143-45.
The constitution also contains a specific article, 59 (f), preventing those with spouses or children who are foreign nationals from running for the office of President. This effectively prevents Aung San Suu Kyi, who was married to a UK national and whose children are UK nationals, from being able to run for the office of President. An attempt to have this changed in the 2008 Constitution in order to allow her to stand in the 2015 election was, predictably, prevented by the 25 percent military voting bloc in June 2015. Kyaw Phyo Tha, "Parliament Votes Against Constitution Reform, Reserves Military Veto," The Irrawaddy June 25, 2015.
331 Various combinations of NSAGs have formed alliances throughout the post-independence era. These have included the National Democratic Front (NDF) in the 1970s, and the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB) in the 1990s.
115
KIO, NMSP and KNPP, decided against it.332 The NCA and an as yet unreleased code of conduct address military issues like the demarcation of areas of control and troop movements, and include references to
humanitarian concerns including landmine use and recruitment.333 The political economy of ethnic conflicts
Most of the last fifty-three years since the 1962 coup in Burma have been dominated by military rule. Throughout this period, the military has played a central role in the state through decades of armed conflict with ethnic and communist rebels, and via military backed political parties such as the BSPP or USDP. The military has also been involved in economic and business interests at state, local and cross border levels.334 This has included Tatmadaw generals,335 local commanders, some ceasefire NSAGs336 (since 1990), foreign governments, private businesses, and even organised criminal interests.337 The period from 1962 to 1988 was also marked by an isolationist foreign policy and, since then, selective economic openness, such as with Thailand or China, focused on lucrative resource extraction deals with businesses from those states. With the recent moves towards democratic reform, many western governments and businesses, as well as Burma’s neighbours, are now keen to do business with resource rich Burma. This has caused further concerns in
332 The reason for those NSAGs not signing the NCA at that time was ostensibly because of the exclusion of the MNDAA, TNLA and AA from signing the NCA by the government as they did not have pre-existing bilateral ceasefire agreements. There have also been ongoing clashes in Kachin, Shan and Karen states between NSAGs and the Tatmadaw.
Burma’s largest NSAG, the UWSA, also remained outside of the NCA. The eight signatory NSAGs to the NCA were also suspended from membership of the UNFC, by the other non-signatory groups, effectively dividing the overall ethnic NSAG coalition.
333 The ‘ceasefire code of conduct’ that has been included as a part of various NCA drafts is discussed further in chapters eight and nine. The draft NCA text as signed by the NSAGs in October 2015 is included in the appendices to this thesis. See, in particular, chapters three and four.
334 "Myanmar’s army and the economy; The road up from Mandalay," The Economist, 20 April 2012.
335 Brian McCarten, "Myanmar Military in the Money," Asia Times, 28 February 2012.
336 Theobald and Ooi, "The Wa State, Burma."
337 For example, the case of drug lord Khun Sa, Lintner, Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 1948, 421.
116
affected ethnic states where many of the resources and development projects are, or will be, located.338
A consistent feature of the long period of military rule, whether under the BSPP or SLORC/SPDC, has been the regime’s reluctance towards long-term political solutions to the ethnic conflicts. Moreover, it has paid little attention to improving the welfare and development of the ethnic regions, whose resources have usually been extracted for the benefit of the central state, or external states and business interests. The wealth from such deals has often accrued with the military and their business associates.
The organisation and political economy of NSAGs
It is within this context that the larger and longer established NSAGs such as the KNU, KNPP, NMSP and KIA, besides armed conflict with the central state for political independence or autonomy, have attempted to provide some form of government and administration in the remaining areas they control or contest. They have developed, to varying extents, political, governance, and welfare structures (such as health and
education services).339 Over lengthy periods, the central state has often neglected, deliberately targeted, or actively withheld such support as part of counterinsurgency operations in ethnic areas. The gradual loss of control over resource rich areas and over taxation of border trade from the 1980s onwards has increasingly limited the extent of the ethnic NSAGs’
ability to fund the running of their proto-state administrations.340 At the same time, their ability to resist Tatmadaw offensives has decreased and it has consequently been civilian villagers who have borne the brunt of the Tatmadaw’s counterinsurgency campaigns originally provoked by the NSAGs.341
338 John Buchanan, Tom Kramer, and Kevin Woods, Developing Disparity: Regional Investment in Burma's Borderlands (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Transnational Institute, 2013).
339 Smith, State of Strife: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Burma, 12.
340 Bertil Lintner notes that even when fleeing students arrived in ethnic NSAG areas in 1988, those NSAGs were already struggling to maintain their administrations and supplies of food and weapons. Lintner, Outrage: Burma's Struggle for Democracy, 155.
341 South, Perhult, and Carstensen, "Asia Programme Paper: ASP PP 2010/04: Conflict and Survival: Self-protection in South-east Burma," 147-48.
117
Another influence on the political/military structure of the NSAGs was the development of military and political wings. This has been an
organisational structure passed down from the CPB that has persisted among many of the ethnic NSAGs up to the present day. This involves
“political and military wings reaching down to the village levels” that are
“political and military wings reaching down to the village levels” that are