Social constructivism claims “human interaction is shaped primarily by ideational factors, not simply material ones.”60 It emphasises the socially constructed nature of interests and identities. Constructivism views these as able to change over time, whereas realist IR theory tends to view state interests (usually power and security) as fixed and unchanging. Alexander Wendt outlined the ontological differences between realism and
constructivism by highlighting realism’s focus on rational individualism extrapolated to the behaviour of states, while arguing that identities and interests, which are taken as fixed by realists, are viewed as being in a constant process of change by constructivists.61 Topics considered by constructivist research have included the use and control of weapons, the role of humanitarianism, and the influence of identity politics. Margaret Finnemore and Katherine Sikkink contend that constructivist research into these topics has “demonstrated how social structures of different kinds reshape actors’ interests, self-understandings, and behaviour.”62 This has placed constructivism as the main theoretical approach applied to
understanding humanitarianism, humanitarian norms, and non-state actors involved with their promotion.63
International treaties and NGO campaigns to address issues including landmine use and child soldiers provide examples, often cited by
constructivists, of the influence of norms in IR. A coalition of NGOs, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), campaigned for the
60 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics," Annual Review of Political Science 4, no. 1 (2001): 393.
61 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
62 Finnemore and Sikkink, "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics," 471.
63 See, for example, Michael N. Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarianism Contested: Where Angels Fear to Tread (New York, NY: Routledge, 2011). Michael N.
Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press,, 2004); Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, "Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics," International Social Science Journal 51, no. 1 (1999).
31
1997 Ottawa treaty banning the use of antipersonnel landmines.64 A
similar campaign involving another coalition of NGOs, the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (CSCS), now Child Soldiers International (CSI), was also conducted internationally to promote norms to end the use of child soldiers. This contributed to the 2002 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (OPAC).65 The ICBL and CSCS promotion of norms leading to development of treaties prohibiting the use of landmines and child soldiers, in the case of states, is relevant for the parallel situation of the same issues and norms applied to NSAGs. Norms in constructivist theories of IR are understood to be accepted standards of behaviour adhered to by states or other actors in the international system. Peter J.
Katzenstein defines them as “collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity.”66
Norms and socialisation
The role of ideas, and the potential of some in the form of norms, to establish accepted standards of behaviour, raises the question of the processes by which they are accepted. Theorists within the constructivist tradition have pointed to the central role of socialisation in states accepting new norms.67 In considering the role of socialisation on the acceptance by states of norms within international institutions, Alastair Iain Johnston identified two central processes; persuasion and social influence.
Persuasion is when the actor changes their mind or opinion about an issue
64 R. Thakur and W. Maley, "The Ottawa Convention on Landmines: A Landmark Humanitarian Treaty in Arms Control?," Global Governance 5, no. 3 (1999); Kenneth Rutherford, "The Evolving Arms Control Agenda: Implications of the Role of NGOs in Banning Antipersonnel Landmines," World Politics 53, no. 1 (2000).
65 Child Soldiers International, "Our History,"
http://www.child-soldiers.org/our_history.php; Peter Singer, Children at war (Toronto, Canada: Random House, 2005), 140-43, & 213-20.
66 Peter J. Katzenstein, ed. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York, NY: Columbia University Press,1996), 5.
67 Finnemore and Sikkink present a model wherein norms at first emerge, then cascade (spread), and eventually are internalised (accepted by the recipient). They identify socialisation as a mechanism by which norms are spread, and habit and
institutionalisation by which they are internalised. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink,
"International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 898.
32
without any “overtly material or mental coercion.”68 Johnston lists three main ways an actor may be persuaded to adhere to a norm. These are through the actor being presented with new information and counter attitudinal arguments, through the actor being influenced by their relationship with those attempting to persuade them, and through the characteristics of the particular actor that is being persuaded.69 Social influence, on the other hand, according to Johnston, elicits “pro-norm behaviour through the distribution of social rewards and punishments.”70 Social rewards include status and positive self-worth, while shame, exclusion or cognitive dissonance through not conforming with group expectations are viewed as social punishments. However, with social influence there can be outward demonstration of compliance with a norm even if there is not internal acceptance. Reputation through improved status, in this instance, can gain improved trust from other actors leading them to engage on other issues with an entity that is demonstrating compliance with a norm. This instrumental interest in compliance with norms is a significant feature within the role of social influence in
socialisation with potential relevance to NSAGs and humanitarian norms.
Jeffrey Checkel, has also outlined the role of norm socialisation in international institutions. He summarises the work of scholars looking at socialisation in international institutions and identifies three stages of socialisation in the acceptance of norms. These are initial “strategic
calculation” which is incentive based; “role playing” where the actors follow or adapt to a role because it is appropriate without deeper reflection upon it; and finally, “normative suasion”, where actors “actively and reflectively internalize new understandings of appropriateness.”71 Significantly,
Checkel acknowledges a role for both social and material incentives within the initial strategic calculation phase. What starts out as instrumentally
68 Alastair Iain Johnston, "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,"
International Studies Quarterly 45, no. 4 (2001): 496.
69 Ibid., 496-99.
70 Ibid., 499.
71 Jeffrey T. Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework," International Organization 59, no. 4 (2005): 808-13.
33
based behaviour change, he points out, can lead to “sustained compliance that is strongly suggestive of internalization and preference change.”72 Johnston and Checkel both identify contexts within which socialisation of actors into new norms is more likely to occur. These ‘scope conditions’
include, in the case of persuasion (normative suasion for Checkel), when the environment is outside of the regular one for the actors being
persuaded; when the target actor does not hold strong pre-existing opposition to the norm being promoted; when the persuader is an
authoritative member of an in-group with the target actor, and; when there is sustained contact between them.73 For Checkel’s strategic calculation model, the actor’s calculation that rewards of compliance are greater than costs, and again, the importance of sustained contact are highlighted.74 Johnston sees status, and thereby the importance of the audience or institution – the group by whom the actor wishes to be seen as legitimate – as an important context for social influence, as well as the more
instrumental element of encouraging engagement from actors on other issues, as mentioned above.75
While the constructivist research agenda has focused mostly on states, some writers have considered the influence of international norms and socialisation applied to NSAGs. In relation to NSAG involvement in post-conflict settlements and state-building, Sukanya Podder, for example, acknowledges the role of “socialization aimed at normative or contextual change in NSAG behaviour.”76 David Capie has raised the possibilities of norm socialisation with reference to encouraging the compliance of armed groups with humanitarian norms. Drawing on the work of Johnston,
Checkel and others, he suggests the application of the processes of
72 Ibid., 809.
73 Johnston, "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments," 498-99; Checkel,
"International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework," 813.
74 Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework," 809-11.
75 Johnston, "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments," 500-02.
76 Podder, "Non-State Armed Groups and Stability: Reconsidering Legitimacy and Inclusion," 17.
34
“persuasion” and “social influence”77 to assessment of the acceptance of humanitarian norms by NSAGs. Furthermore, Capie points to the need for those “who will be influential and seen as authoritative” to be involved in the engagement processes to achieve persuasion of NSAG leadership.
This could involve “former or even current combatants who have some shared worldview or common sense of purpose with the target group.”78 This echoes the importance of persuaders being seen as authoritative or from an in-group as highlighted by Johnston and Checkel, but moving the frame of reference from international institutions to NSAGs and those actors engaging with them to improve compliance with humanitarian norms.
This approach is significant both in terms of practical application, and for theorising about the potential factors and processes that may influence NSAGs, especially the leadership who drive policy and those who may have influence on the leadership such as associated civil society or religious leaders. It takes into account both the potential for actors to internalise and be persuaded by the norm, or to give it greater prominence in their calculations if they already hold it as a valid belief. It also
recognises the pressure to conform, or to be seen to adhere to the norm, regardless of personal belief. This is relevant for NSAG leadership in terms of concerns about local or international legitimacy.79 It is also significant in the role and influence of actors who have internalised or been persuaded by such norms, and who are involved with welfare or civil society activities associated with, or accepted by, NSAGs. One significant difference, however, is that non-states usually have less incentive,
opportunity, or capacity, to comply with international norms. This is the case regardless of whether they have internalised it, or merely see advantage in compliance with it, for instrumental reasons.
77 David Capie, "Influencing Armed Groups: Are there Lessons to Be Drawn from Socialization Literature?," in Exploring Criteria and Conditions for Engaging Armed Non-State Actors to Respect Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: Conference Report, June 4-5 2007 (Geneva, Switzerland: PSIO, UNDIR, Geneva Call, 2007), 87-89.
78 Ibid., 93.
79 Legitimacy concerns of NSAGs are explored further in the sociology-based literature on NSAGs in chapter five.
35
Armed groups are more likely to maintain their influence or de facto sovereignty with the people they claim to represent if they not only wield armed force, but also present themselves as legitimate or credible
representatives. This can engender support from constituent populations and increase their legitimacy locally and/or internationally.80 This concern with legitimacy by NSAGs has been outlined in the work of writers
considering the role of NSAG governance.81 That some NSAGs have a social component beyond just the use of military force demonstrates the value of social constructivism in analysis of them. An NSAG’s image, identity, support base, and legitimacy with those it claims to represent, or wishes to influence, fit within the constructivist framework of ideas,
interests and identity. Equally, actors wishing to influence NSAGs towards greater respect for humanitarian norms are likely to appeal to ideational aspects of the groups and their constituencies, such as identity and legitimacy.
Regarding the work of constructivist scholars, however, Jeffrey Checkel asks why it is that international norms meet with more acceptance in some countries than in others. He further notes that "it would also be useful to consider cases when the ‘dog doesn't bark,’ that is, where state
identity/interests, in the presence of a norm, do not change."82 This is also relevant to analysis of NSAGs that do not modify actions that contravene humanitarian norms, despite favourable circumstances or engagement efforts by external actors to that end. Variation in the policies, actions, or the extent of acceptance of engagement on humanitarian issues, is a central point of the present research. The cases of NSAGs in Burma present examples where one humanitarian norm has received more attention, acceptance, or action, than another, and where certain groups
80 However, some authors argue that where NSAGs have access to economic endowments that do not require them to seek support and legitimacy from the local population they will be more abusive or predatory behaviour towards that population.
See, for example, Weinstein, Inside Rebellion:The Politics of Insurgent Rebellion. See, further, the section on political economy of armed conflict in the literature review chapter.
81 See, for example, Mampilly, Rebel Rulers; Sukanya Podder, "Mainstreaming the non-state in bottom-up non-statebuilding: linkages between rebel governance and post-conflict legitimacy," Conflict, Security & Development 14, no. 2 (2014).
82 Jeffrey T. Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," World Politics 50, no. 2 (1998): 338.
36
have been more amenable overall to engagement on these matters than have others.
Summary
This chapter has introduced the type of organised ethnic political armed groups in Burma that are the focus of this study. Two contrasting
theoretical perspectives applied to NSAGs and their behaviour as it relates to civilian protection and humanitarian norms were then outlined. These were the political economy of armed conflict, and social constructivism.
Both theories are structural, but for the actors in the constructivist understanding applied to state behaviour and extrapolated to NSAGs in this study, “the structures within which they operate are defined by social norms and ideas rather than by objective or material conditions.”83 The political economy analysis of civil wars, most explicitly, takes into
consideration the material and coercive structures within which NSAGs and affected populations are embedded and their actions enabled or constrained. This approach considers the sources of resources and
funding for armed groups and how these influence the types of groups that develop, their motivations, and behaviour.
This study takes the political economy approach further in considering how economic factors impact on NSAG-civilian relations and, consequently, on the extent of NSAG adherence (or not) to humanitarian norms. Economic factors have often been seen in the political economy literature as
potentially negative influences on NSAG behaviour towards civilians.
However, they may also contribute to ceasefires between warring parties, and potentially to improved conditions and even protection for civilians, depending on the NSAG’s motivations and use of resources.
The constructivist perspective in IR, originally derived from sociology, was introduced and explored for where it intersects with NSAGs and
humanitarian norms. The development and promotion of norms and the processes associated with socialisation were identified for their analysis of, and potential practical application to, NSAGs. This approach highlights
83 J. Samuel Barkin, "Realist Constructivism," International Studies Review 5(2003): 326.
37
mechanisms that influence actors towards compliance with norms, whether through instrumental interests and incentives, or through internalisation and genuine acceptance. This, in particular, has implications for the influence of social factors such as identity and legitimacy on NSAGs. Based on the social constructivist approach, this study contends that perceptions of legitimacy play a major role in NSAG interest in civilian protection and the extent of their adherence to
humanitarian norms. Perceived legitimacy of NSAGs from constituent populations will matter for the group’s continued material and social support. Equally, the leadership and members of NSAGs will value their perceived legitimacy. Thus, the socially constructed concept of legitimacy can be either instrumental for NSAGs to maintain local or international material support, and/or internalised in terms of self-image or identity with the populations they claim to represent.
Writing from humanitarian practitioners and academics on the practical and legal implications of NSAGs, and especially NSAG-civilian relations, is explored in the following chapter three. The focus is on humanitarian engagement with NSAGs, international humanitarian and human rights law applicable to NSAGs, and the processes by which NSAGs can demonstrate adherence to those laws. The factors believed to influence NSAG compliance with humanitarian norms are then drawn on from the work of humanitarian academics and practitioners. Following the two principal theoretical approaches outlined in this chapter, literature relevant to these influences is then disaggregated between the frameworks of political economy of armed conflict and sociology in chapter four.
39