6. The context of return
6.3. The case of Huaquechula
Participants described the local economy in Huaquechula as stagnant. Three main explanations given for this were the scarcity of (natural) resources (access to water was highlighted as the most significant), lack of adequate conditions for business development, and lack of access to employment. Specifically, the decrease of access to irrigation water for agriculture has deeply affected certain actors and locations within the region, and was identified by participants as a key factor contributing to local inequalities. Due to their geographical location, at the south of the municipality and far from the main rivers, Huaquechula and Bonilla95 are considered some of the most badly affected towns (Cordero Díaz 2004:119). Among the most disadvantaged groups are small farmers whose economy relies on small-scale agriculture. This is the case of Paco (H, 37) and his family who depend on their agricultural production to be able to sell in the local markets, trade with other producers, as well as use it for their small family food business, and for their household consumption. For this family, the dry season means not just losing their production which is their main means of livelihood, but also losing the financial investment that they made during the sowing.
With regard to business development, contrary to the case of remittances which are often used for household consumption and construction, return migrants’ savings seem to represent a good capital injection into the locality due to its investment in the development of businesses. As will be revealed in more detail in the next chapter, these businesses rarely grow as planned and are extremely vulnerable to any contextual shock or personal eventuality. For example, David (H, 31) upon his return invested his savings in the purchase of a van to work in the local public transportation system, and after just one year of work, it was stolen. Despite filing a police report, David did not receive a response from the police with regard to the resolution of the investigation. About this, he said “By losing my van I not only lost my main means with which to provide for my family, I also felt that someone had
95 While the supply of water apparently is the same, the development of the population has
increased its demand resulting in a decline in the agricultural production since the 1970s which has triggered an increase in migration to the USA.
stolen my years of hard work in the USA [...] I did not follow up with it [police report]. I don’t think I would get any response from them [authorities], it would be a total waste of time”. At the time of the interview, David was trying to recover from his financial loss by starting a new business; a hamburger stall on the porch of his house. David’s experience highlights that systemic failures at a macro level, such as delinquency and lack of an effective judicial system, contribute to the perception that there are inadequate conditions for business development in Huaquechula. These aspects, beyond reducing migrants’ opportunities to have a sustainable return, also reduce their trust in institutions.
As mentioned earlier, the lack of employment opportunities was considered by several participants as a consequence of the stagnant economy in Huaquechula. Andres (H, 39), mentioned – quite frustrated – that the (few) developments happening in the town were because of the investments migrants had made, and highlighted that the government had taken very few steps towards the creation and support of initiatives that could generate employment for Huaquechula’s residents. While some initiatives were mentioned (e.g. pig farm, tea factory and to make the town a Pueblo Mágico96) these had not developed into
anything concrete. As for small-scale businesses developed by the majority of returnees, these were primarily run by families, leaving very few employment options for other people. A more detailed description of the economic activities of returnees in Huaquechula will be given in the next chapter; the only feature to highlight at this point is that, interestingly, one of the very few sources of formal employment available for returnees was within the local government.
In relation to how the PEM is implemented locally, significant governmental authorities at a state and municipal level identified as the main problem the absence of budget allocation for the creation of programming and services. Additionally, political rivalries within the three levels of government, and political patronage, were two other obstacles identified for the implementation of these policies. In this regard, a key informant elaborated,
About this issue [how PEM is being implemented at the local level], it is very important to talk about how politics work these days. Despite that there are policies that have been approved at the federal level, when we apply for the funds to implement the programmes over here, they [federal government] tell us that there is no money available. It just happened to me: the President presented the
96 ‘Magic towns’ is an initiative led by Mexico's Ministry of Tourism (SECTUR), in conjunction with
other federal and state agencies, to attract tourists to other areas that are not the well-known resorts. To obtain the pueblo mágico certification, the local government has to apply for it and present the locality’s uniqueness and historical relevance as well as confirm that has the infrastructure to receive tourists.
programme México seguro contra desastres97 (Mexico safe against disasters), so I requested some funds for a contingency plan in case the volcano erupts, and they told me that there is no money for it. It is always like that, they make a big deal about the new policies but when the time comes to implement, they say there is no money. Especially if you are not from PRI98, they first ‘look after’ their people [localities ruled by PRI] and then it is us [localities ruled by other parties]. It happens the same for the case of migration, I have a person here in charge of the Oficina
de atención al migrante (Office for migrants’ affairs), but there is no money to pay
for his salary or to implement any programming. Same thing with the person in charge of the Municipal Women’s Institute. We do get some funds and training from the state [ruled by the same political party – PAN99] but not from the Federal government [ruled by the opposition – PRI].
Regarding programmes and institutions created specifically for migrants, approximately half of the returnees living in Huaquechula had knowledge of at least one, but very few had access to them and even fewer received services related during their (re)integration process. In terms of these programmes, the majority of participants mentioned the (well known) Programa Paisano100 and the less well-known PRIM. Regarding Programa Paisano, Tere (H, 48) who struggled to enter the country without being robbed by border authorities (her experience was mentioned in the last chapter), described it as “good in intention, but not very effective in practice.” Two main obstacles identified for its effective delivery are the culture of corruption and impunity engrained in the governmental institutions, and the lack of interest and trust of migrants to report any incident. PRIM was described as helpful for some participants who were deported, as they received assistance after their arrival on Mexican soil. For example, Tony (H, 37) was referred to a shelter so he could spend his first couple of nights in Mexico safely. As for institutions, the one mentioned was the local Oficina
de Atención al Migrante (Office for migrants’ affairs) which had provided some support for
people in need of repatriating the bodies of relatives who were deceased while in the USA and for people in need of obtaining Mexican documentation for their US-born children to be
97 In 2013 the President announced a new programme México seguro ante desastres (Mexico safe
against natural disasters) whose aim is to prevent natural disasters but also to respond and especially protect the population in case of emergencies.
98 The Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI – Institutional Revolutionary Party) is the governing
party at a Federal level.
99 Partido de Acción Nacional – PAN (National Action Party).
100 Established in 1989 with the main objective of controlling and gradually eliminating common
abuses and crimes committed against Mexicans during their visit home, such as extortion, robbery and corruption through delivering information about migrants’ rights and obligations, protecting the security of migrants and their property, training and raising awareness among public servants and civil society about migrants’ rights and responding to complaints and allegations done by migrants (INM 2016a).
included in the education system. This office, while limited in its scope of services, was described as helpful. Interestingly, according to state-level officials, other types of (re)integration assistance such as USA labour certification, job-seeking and jobseekers’ allowance were available to support returnees’ economic (re)integration, but no one mentioned them or had received them among the interviewees from Huaquechula. Access to programmes and institutions in vital areas for (re)integration such as education, health care, and welfare, was also described as positive, especially the health and education services to which the vast majority had access (either themselves or an immediate family member). Despite their access, what remains a challenge is the inadequacy of the services, particularly when compared to those they had access to while in the USA. As an example, while the majority of participants were enrolled in Seguro
Popular101, many opted for private services. Long administrative procedures and waiting periods, lack of basic material resources (e.g. medicines) and adequate installations, as well as negative attitudes from service providers were some of the reasons why interviewees decide to pay for private care instead of making use of this service. With regard to education, contrary to Hamann and Zúñiga’s findings in the state of Zacatecas (2011), in Huaquechula access to basic education was not identified as an obstacle by participants. This was confirmed by key informants from local schools, “we received instructions from the upper management [education authorities from the state capital], they asked us to ensure the access to all students [to basic education] regardless of their available documentation.” Knowing of experiences like this, where for certain institutions the principle pro persona [the person first] is more relevant than the bureaucratic requirements, gives some hope that the local implementation of the recent changes in the education policy (mentioned earlier in this chapter) may not be as problematic as expected by some key informants.
Experiences of accessing welfare services contrasted markedly with health and education services, where enrolment to Prospera102 was identified as problematic. While the obstacles remain unclear, two of the most common understandings shared by participants were that when they were compared to the non-migrant population they were no longer
101 Since 2004, Seguro Popular is a public health insurance that covers a wide range of services
without payment for its affiliates. It was established by the Federal Government in an effort to expand health care to those without health insurance and to reduce health inequities.
102 Launched in 1997, Prospera (previously Oportunidades) is a conditional cash transfer
programme targeting poor and extremely poor households which integrates three basic social rights – health, education and nutrition.
considered as poor or extremely poor, therefore they did not qualify as recipients of this social programme. Very often, participants would make reference to the fact that their new housing situation would serve to raise their status within the community, therefore they would not be considered as ‘in need’ giving them limited access to resources. The other understanding was that access to this programme was not fair and transparent. In other words, David (H, 31), who is the father of four children, was self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage and had no access to Prospera, identified access to this programme as something more related to connections (who you know within the government) than with their entitlement or need.
When life became challenging during his post-return experience, David found comfort and support in the Evangelical church, including financial support “when we [him and his family] had nothing to eat.” Similar to David and his family, some other returnees identified civil society (mainly religious organisations) as a significant source of functional support, such as participation in saving schemes and receiving advice regarding business development and career paths. Furthermore, they were able to find psychosocial support; after all, as Ramiro (H, 55) mentioned, “when we arrive, we are unstable, we need support that non-migrants do not require.” Although very few had access to these non-governmental services, participants reported that these were important spaces where they felt listened to, were provided with valuable information and were able to re-connect with other migrants103. In relation to the social environment affecting migrants’ (re)integration in Huaquechula, while some participants expressed (particularly during the focus groups) their concerns regarding returnees’ involvement in gang violence and criminality, overall it prevailed the impression that this is an inaccurate perception and that Huaquechula is a tranquil and traditional community. For some participants, these aspects had a positive connotation and for others (the minority) a negative one. On the one hand, as mentioned in the last chapter, due to the fact that the majority of interviewees had an undocumented status and were based in New York while in the USA, there was an expectation of returning to a calm, quiet and traditional environment where people could feel safe, free and relaxed. On the other, some people, such as Paco (H, 37) missed what a big city like New York had to offer “[…] being able to enjoy myself, go to the zoo, a baseball game, the concerts, the bailes […] and to find well paid jobs.” Furthermore, the conflictual coexistence of sympathy and rejection of
103 Particularly a couple of men who were not coping well with their return and who were drinking
the ‘different’ or the ‘other’ (described earlier in this chapter), had led to the development of categories such as ‘desirable’ and ‘undesirable’ returnees (mentioned in Chapter 5). The desirable returnees would be those sin vicios (with no vices – healthy), who have fulfilled their family/community responsibilities (wealthy), and who respect traditions and behave accordingly. The undesirable returnees would be those not fulfilling these expectations. Particularly those identified as being deported would easily be labelled as “bad hombres” [bad men] and be blamed for gangs and violent activities. Another relevant aspect related to the social environment was that the strong sense of community and cohesion longed for by participants contrasted with the reality of political divisions, as well as issues of mistrust between migrants, non-migrants and authorities.