The case study: High Speed Two

In the previous chapter the case study was presented in more detail; this section provides a summary of the case and the reasons behind its selection. The chosen case study was a new high speed rail network that is being designed and built in the UK. It has been named ‘High Speed Two’ after the Channel tunnel rail link was referred to as High Speed 1. High speed rail arrived in the UK with the opening in 2003 of the first part of High Speed 1 (then known as the 67-mile Channel Tunnel Rail Link) between London and the Channel Tunnel and it was completed in 2007. This was actually relatively late in terms of development as other

142 countries in Europe such as France, Spain and Germany had already developed large high speed rail networks. In 2004 an extensive study was published on high speed rail networks and it raised questions as to why the UK did not already have a network. It concluded that at the time there was not a big capacity issue on the classic rail network (Commission for Integrated Transport, 2004). Then in 2005 and 2006 reports were published that had conflicting views over whether or not high speed rail was needed in the UK based on increasing capacity issues. A report by Atkins entitled ‘High Speed Line Study: Summary Report’ (2005) suggested that ‘a new high speed line is effective in relieving rail crowding problems and performs better in respect of relieving rail crowding than alternative

investments such as upgrades of the existing networks, new lower-speed lines or highway upgrade programmes’ (2005:ii). In contrast to this, the Eddington Transport Study (HM Treasury, 2006:49) argued that:

‘New high-speed rail networks in the UK would not significantly change the level of economic connectivity between most parts of the UK, given existing aviation and rail links. Even if a transformation in connectivity could be achieved, the evidence is very quiet on the scale of resulting economic benefit, and in France business use of the high speed train network is low’

Regardless of this report, since at least 2007 there has been a growing consensus amongst politicians in the UK that construction of a high speed rail network is needed because of a growing problem with capacity on the current rail network. The development of a second high-speed line was proposed in 2008 by the Labour government to address capacity constraints on the West Coast Main Line railway, which is forecast to be at full capacity in 2025. A report published by the Department for Transport in January 2009 described an increase of 50% in rail passenger traffic and a 40% increase in freight in the preceding 10

143 years in the UK and detailed a number of infrastructural problems (Department of Transport, 2009). The report proposed that new high-speed lines should be constructed to address these issues and after assessing various options concluded that the most appropriate initial route for a new line was from London to the West Midlands. After formally deciding to advance with a new high speed rail line the government began its consultation process with the public on its high speed rail plans.

Much of the studies to this point have focused on a cost-benefit analysis of a high speed rail network, very much following the methodology reported in De Rus (2008). The focus of the reports is usually on the investment required on the one hand and the economic benefits, mainly in terms of travel time savings, on the other. The analysis is mainly restricted to the line in question without due consideration of areas beyond (but close to) the line or areas bypassed by it. In 2009, the Labour government established High Speed Two Limited (HS2 Ltd) which was chaired by Sir David Rowlands to examine the case for a new high speed line. It is an executive non-departmental public body that is funded by grant-in-aid from the Government. The most recent study, published at the end of October, 2013 entitled ‘The Strategic Case for HS2’ has changed the focus back to the benefits of delivering additional capacity and has used upgraded forecasting and evaluation techniques. As a result the benefit- cost ratio (including wider economic benefits) is estimated at 1.7 for phase one and 2.3 for the full network. This represents a decline from values of 1.9 and 2.5 reported previously (HS2 Ltd, 2013).

The logic underlying the selection of HS2 is that a live case was essential in order to

understand the complexities and messiness of the policy process. This would not be possible if the case was analysed retrospectively. Also, the aim of the research was to look at a policy issue that encompassed a wide range of decisions, different types of evidence and was multi-

144 actor. In terms of practicalities, Birmingham is part of phase one of the proposed route and many of the stakeholders are based between London and Birmingham. Therefore, several interview participants were identified within a 100 mile radius. From living in Birmingham there was an awareness of community meetings about the proposed rail project and gaining access was not difficult. The community meeting in Castle Vale was attended by a number of key stakeholders which provided a good networking environment for future interview

participants. The researcher established a relationship with Birmingham City Council that enabled them to participate in and contribute to the scrutiny review of HS2 thus enabling access to a setting that most researchers are unable to observe. The placement provided an opportunity in which to obtain large amounts of empirical data that could be used to answer the research questions. Also, attending meetings meant the researcher could observe how different policy actors negotiated different types of evidence with one another. Hence HS2 was chosen because it presented a suitable and meaningful empirical context in which the research questions might be answered.