The Rationale for High Speed Rail

High speed rail in the United Kingdom is not a new phenomenon; the rail industry has had the capacity to build high speed rail lines for several decades. However, our railway infrastructure has been unable to support safe running at such high speeds and, until the 1970s, the speed limit on British railways remained at one hundred miles per hour. In the 1970s, British Rail began to explore new technologies that would enable the use of high speed rail services in the UK. They did this by attempting to develop a train that would be capable of running on existing rail infrastructure whereas countries such as Japan and France decided to build new tracks for their high-speed rail systems. This is most likely because ‘at the time the UK did not suffer from lack of capacity on the conventional network’ (Sanchez- Mateos and Givoni, 2012:105). In 1973, the world experienced a global oil crisis which affected how decision-makers thought about motive power. During this time world oil prices quadrupled (Ikenberry, 1986). This was the end of cheap energy for most and this prompted the rail industry to rethink their choice in this power and British Rail later chose traditional electric overhead lines (Duffy, 2003). During the same period (1970s) British Rail developed and invested in the Intercity 125, which was also known as the High Speed Train (HST) (Owen and Phillips, 1987). This was considered the first high-speed rail service in the United Kingdom. It was thought of as a success because it was popular amongst users and passenger ridership had increased each year which they believed was good for the economy. This success led to British Rail exploring further options for new high speed rail lines.

The Channel Tunnel Rail Link, which is now referred to as High Speed One (HS1) was the first new mainline railway to be built in the United Kingdom for a hundred years. It was built to carry passenger traffic between the UK and Europe but is also capable of carrying freight trains. The project of building a tunnel between the two countries was considered as far back as the 1960s and it was agreed then that ‘serious modern consideration of the construction of

108 the Channel Tunnel commenced in 1957 when an Anglo-French Channel Tunnel Study Group was established’ (Anguera, 2006:292). A White Paper was published by the

Department of the Environment (DoE, 1973) and it was expected that a Hybrid Bill would pass through Parliament by 1975. However, a change in Government (Labour) led to the project being reassessed and later abandoned. It was then in 1979 that the project re-emerged under the new Conservative government and in 1986 the Prime Minister of the UK and the President of France ‘issued a joint statement announcing the decision of the two

Governments to facilitate the construction of a fixed link across the Channel’ (Anguera, 2006:293). It took twenty years of studies and consultations in the 25 years leading to the construction of the Tunnel. Construction began in 1998 and was completed in 2003 and phase two was opened in 2007. There are conflicting opinions about whether or not HS1 can be considered a success. Those in favour of high speed rail claimed that it was a successful project that finished on time and under budget whilst reducing the need to travel to Europe by air (Major Projects Association, 2008). However, those opposed to the development of a new high speed line argued that a cost benefit appraisal of the Tunnel reveals that ‘overall the British economy would have been better off if the Tunnel had never been constructed, as the total resource cost has been greater than the benefits generated’ (Anguera, 2006:314).

HS1 provides an example of a mega-project in which actors have interpreted the outcome of the project in a different way. It depends on what factors are taken into consideration as to whether or not they interpret the project as a success. For example, Anguerra (2006) argued that some of the forecasts for HS1 such as passenger ridership and economic benefits were overly optimistic but the tunnel did bring large benefits in the form of increased competition and reduced prices for freight and passengers. The Tunnel also meant that passengers could travel to Europe without travelling by air or sea which created some environmental benefits which might be considered more important to some actors than economic benefits. Returning

109 to the rationale for a new high speed line, another reason that they were explored rather than developing trains to run on existing lines was the outcome of the modernisation programme of the West Coast Main Line (WCML) in 2004. The aim of this programme was to upgrade the existing infrastructure to ‘allow improved services delivered by new trains running at 140 miles per hour’ (National Audit Office, 2006:4).

Upgrades to the WCML took four years and was completed over three phases with the

intention of improving punctuality, reducing journey times and increasing capacity. However, the project ‘proved overly ambitious and the programme quickly ran into difficulty’ (HoC Committee of Public Accounts, 2007:3). Modernisation of the WCML was estimated to cost around £3 billion but the final figure now stands nearer £9 billion (HoC Committee of Public Accounts, 2007). The line is still prone to overcrowding and it is likely to require further investment in the future. It has also been suggested that further modernisation of the line will cause severe disruption to services for passengers (Network Rail, 2011). This influenced the decision to pursue further research into a separate line. There have been a number of studies that have shaped the debate and a review of the main high speed rail documents in the UK is provided below.