The second case study examines three interconnected security networks, which have been set up to prepare and implement the shift towards community-driven policing in Western Mindanao and Tawi-Tawi.
The data used to substantiate this study are retrieved from internal documents of Conciliation Resources, discussions and collaboration with C-R’s project coordinator on the publication of a learning, open sources from other organisations and press articles, the peace agreements, baseline studies conducted by fellow researchers, my own former research and experience as analyst for the Initiatives for International Dialogue, through which I also visited Layog in November 2015.
For readability purposes, my sources are not quoted in the text, except for direct citations. An exhaustive list of my materials can be found in the bibliography.
4.2.1 Introduction and context
The peace agreements signed between the MILF and the government in 2012 and 2014 foresee the withdrawal of government military forces from Western Mindanao. They shall be replaced by a civilian Bangsamoro Regional Police (BRP) composed of former BIAF combatants and PNP officers. The Independent Commission on Policing (ICP), an organ created by the
Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, recommends in a report published in 2015 that the future BRP “places an utmost importance on community policing and public safety function.” The BRP must also have “special consideration and understanding for human rights and Shari’ah (Islamic) law” (Uesugi 2014). Following the ICP report, the British Council in the Philippines16 launched a 2-year project destined to prepare local security stakeholders to the shift towards community-policing. The project seeks to increase the awareness of “diverse stakeholders in the region, with particular focus on marginalised groups, and the policing authorities and organisations”, and gather their “inputs, perceptions and expectations on community policing”, in order to develop a strategy for community-policing in Mindanao (British Council in the Philippines 2015). Meanwhile, the national and international NGOs Security Reform Initiative (SRI) and Conciliation Resources (C-R) organised community- policing projects in pilot areas. The present study focuses on the work of C-R.
4.2.1.1 Environment
C-R, together with three local partners, initiated the transition towards community-policing in the barangays17 of Layog (Pagalungan, Maguindanao), Pandan (South Upi, Maguindanao) and Sanga-Sanga (Bongao, Tawi Tawi.)
Layog is a post-conflict area, where the frequency of conflict-related incidents has remained relatively low after Pagalungan declared itself a “sanctuary for peace”during the wars in 2000 and 2003. Pagalugan hosts the MILF’s camp “Rajah Muda” within which the MILF shariah courts have jurisdiction over security issues such as rido. This does not extend to Layog. The most important security issues in Pagalungan are election-related violence, and flows of internally displaced persons, as it hosts evacuation centres. In December 2015, conflicts between local politicians, the BIFF and the MILF near Pagalungan displaced some thousands of people. It did not, once again, directly concern Layog. Layog otherwise has a relatively functioning barangay government, and local communities had already been involved in community development work conducted by local and international partners.
Pandan is regularly affected by horizontal violence such as rido and conflicts between indigenous peoples and Moro communities, whose relations are spoiled by unresolved land-
16 The UK's international organisation for cultural relations and educational opportunities.
17 A barangay is the smallest unit of local governance. The first name between brackets refers to the city, and the second to the province, in which the barangay is located.
related disputes. Legal and illegal armed groups (MILF, Philippines marines, BIFF and lost commands) are present in high numbers in this area.
The third barangay, Sanga-Sanga hosts members of the government armed forces and both Moro revolutionary groups (MILF and MNLF.) The place is also home to the Badjao, a tribe of indigenous nomads. Its case is not examined here as it is located outside the region of Western Mindanao.
Map of Mindanao, with the localisation of Layog and Pandan.
Retrieved from Google Maps.
4.2.1.2 Actors and objectives
The community-policing project is implemented through three security networks comprising C-R, three local civil society organisations (CSOs), representatives from the communities, local government units (LGUs), the PNP, and the army in some cases. The networks were formally created in 2015, with the financial support of the EU and the technical support of the British Council and other international partners, such as the UK-based NGO Saferworld. They primarily aim to promote active collaboration between the communities, the LGUs and the PNP on safety and security issues. This objective is explicitly linked to other peacebuilding goals,
Pandan, South Upi
Layog, Pagalungan
such as re-establishing contacts between the communities and state services, and “strengthen local capacities for peace” (Conciliation Resources 2017).
During a first phase, network participants gathered to discuss the necessity and feasibility of adopting a community-policing approach. Workshops were also organised to train them on specific issues such as women or Islamic security, enhance team-building dynamics, and conduct local security assessments (UNYPAD n.d.; Conciliation Resources 2017). The CSWGs then initiated joint actions on issues such as “traffic control to curb over-speeding in the area, humanitarian response to the internally displaced families due to flooding and advocacy programs against drugs and gambling” (Conciliation Resources 2017).
The CSWGs have overlapping memberships, though individual members vary depending on the localisation. LGU representatives from Layog for instance participate in the CSWG for Layog, whereas LGU representatives from Pandan participate in the CSWG for Pandan. Some members nonetheless participate in all CSWGs, such as C-R’s project coordinator. The network directly involves the following organisations, which are considered members thereof:
Conciliation resources is an independent international organisation working with people in conflict, to promote peaceful societies. C-R is otherwise involved in the GPH- MILF peace process as a member of the International Contact Group, and through programs aiming at supporting community empowerment, especially of women. The Teduray Lambangian Women's Organization (TLWOI) is “a federation of 35
community-based women’s organisations of indigenous peoples in the province of Maguindanao” (« Southeast Asia Partners » 2015.)
Nisa Ul Haqq fi Bangsamoro (NISA) is a “Bangsamoro women’s group that uses Islamic teaching as a framework for women’s and men’s empowerment” (ibid.) United Youth for Peace and Development, Inc. (UNYPAD) is a “youth organisation,
which aims to produce competent, effective and efficient young leaders who meaningfully give spiritual, political and socio-economic services to the society” (ibid.) The PNP is the civilian security organ of the Philippines. PNP agents in Mindanao are handicapped by inadequate resources, especially regarding guns and vehicles, and a lack of capacities to deal with the specific security issues that plague Mindanao, such as rido. The army has been compensating for their deficiency until now.
The local government unit in this case refers to the barangay and the municipality services. These levels of local governance serve “as a general purpose government for
the coordination and delivery of basic, regular and direct services and effective governance of the inhabitants within (their) territorial jurisdiction” (RA 7160 Local Government Code 1991, sec. 440).
The term communities refer to the people living in the sectors covered by the community-policing project, and who should be the primary beneficiaries of security services. The communities should not be regarded as a homogeneous bloc, as they form different groups (e.g. women, indigenous peoples (IPs), Moros, Christians, youth….) with, sometimes, contradictory interests.
The local CSOs and C-R are bound to withdraw their participation.
The network indirectly collaborates with international and national organisations such as the British Council, the government services, other NGOs, donors, etc. which are not members of the network, but have a significant influence over it. The British Council, as leading coordinator on community-policing activities in Mindanao, and the EU, as main donor, are the most influential non-member actors.
4.2.2 Description of the network’s properties
The following paragraphs describe on the properties of the two CSWGs located in Western Mindanao.
4.2.2.1 Structure and governance
The CSWGs tend towards an all-channel design and a shared kind of governance, as decisions on network orientations and activities must be collectively decided. This choice seeks to foster active collaboration and is, from a peacebuilding perspective, necessary to ensure inclusivity. C-R and the local CSOs however de facto endorse a leadership role, which introduces forms of brokered governance alongside participatory decision-making processes. Local CSOs, especially, serve as “emissaries” (Conciliation Resources 2017) to facilitate communication among the communities, between the communities and the state services, and between local participants and C-R. They also organise and facilitate the activities and trainings which are conducted during the meetings. Their leadership was made possible thanks to their high degree of “betweenness centrality”, i.e. the level of influence they have over other actors due to their position in the network (Wasserman and Faust 1994, quoted in Whelan 2016, 27). This position results from their track-record as service providers to the communities, and their familiarity with both LGUs and security sector representatives with whom they engage regularly in projects or for advocacy purposes.
Overview of the CSWGs’ environment:
Drawn with draw.io
Governance within the networks is moreover affected by external influences. The communities in Pandan hold extra-network dialogues to discuss their activities as part of the network. The EU, as main donor, also exerts a strong and asymmetric influence, as its financial support conditions the survival of the network in its present form, i.e. with the participation of C-R and with as many trainings and assistance.
4.2.2.2 (Sub-)culture(s)
Network participants entered the CSWGs with their own cultures, manifested through a distinct vocabulary and reference to specific political or legal agendas. Women organisations for instance typically refer to the Women Peace and Security framework18, police officers to their code of conduct, etc. Some participants also have common cultural references: NISA, UNYPAD and other Muslim members share the Islamic faith. These cultures are not dismissed, but contrariwise promoted and disseminated among network participants, to facilitate inter- organisational and inter-community understanding. This is done through workshops and seminars, as well as during dialogues, where safe spaces for questions and discussions are provided.
The preservation of organisational and individual cultures does not hinder the development of other levels of identification. In Pandan, the communities felt the need to “iron out internal disagreements” and select common representatives to offer a strengthened position when engaging the security sector (Conciliation Resources 2017). They identify themselves as members of a same group, when they were before divided into multiple and conflicting affiliations (IPs versus Moros.)
At the network-level, and in the three CSWGs, the participants adopt a human rights narrative as guiding framework for their activities. This narrative comes with a set of values (human rights), and a specific vocabulary which serves as common language and helps define each other’s roles within the network (“duty bearers” and “rights holders”.) It can therefore be considered as a form of network-level culture, though it is not specific to the CSWGs. The development of a shared culture was not intended, but emerged over time through the systematic reference, by the lead organisations, to international, national and local human rights conventions during workshops and consultations.
4.2.2.3 Policies
The PNP adopted the community-policing approach as “its dominant managerial and operational style” in 1996, which it defines and regulates in a comprehensive “COPS” manual (NAPOLCOM 1996). The baseline study conducted by the British Council and the consultations held before the creation of the CSWGs however establish that, “for the security sector, while there was an acknowledgement of the term community policing as a strategy (as prescribed in the community policing manual), in reality this has not been applied” (Conciliation Resources 2017). The
CSWGs are in fact subject, not to the PNP policies, but to the provisions of the peace agreements, and the semi-contractual relationship which bounds the implementing partners (C- R, local CSOs) to the project’s main donor (EU.)
The networks in reality retain a large margin of manoeuvre concerning their orientations and activities, and mostly use informal accountability mechanisms. Community representatives for instance pressure their LGU counterparts to deliver on their promises by paying them regular visits. The EU also exercises a soft control over the CSWGs, through monitoring and evaluation processes, which however holds accountable only the direct beneficiaries of international funding (C-R, local CSOs.)
4.2.2.4 Technologies
The CSWGs are established in far-away locations, to which virtual and physical access is difficult, as there is no internet access, poor mobile signal and sometimes no road. Geographical isolation limits communication and impedes the organisation of network activities. Basic technologies such as SMS loops, motorbikes, etc. are in that regard fundamental network enablers, as they allow for transports and communication between network participants from and outside the area of the CSWGs.
4.2.2.5 Relationships
Relationships among some participants pre-dated the creation of the CSWGs. Members of the local CSOs were linked to the project coordinator of C-R in Mindanao, with whom they had already worked on other projects, or due to interactions during peacebuilding events. The communities, especially in Layog, were also familiar with some of the CSOs, though maybe not at the individual level, as they had benefitted from their activities and services in the past. The CSOs and the state services, finally, had built relationships through training, advocacy engagement, and collaboration on community projects. Levels of trust between the participants who already had relationships range from neutral (communities and barangay) to positive (communities which benefitted from CSOs services) and high (between C-R and the CSOs.) In the latter case, trust is anchored in both inter-organisational and inter-personal grounds, which explains its strength.
Conversely, relationships were weak between the LGUs and the communities, though the degree of contact varies depending on the location. The Barangay government of Layog for instance functions relatively well, while relationships in Pandan were broken at all levels. The participants in all areas also reported a deep divide and extremely low trust between the
communities and the security sector, and, in Pandan, between indigenous and Moro communities.
The networks consolidate pre-existing relationships, and connect the participants which had no link through the mediation of the local CSOs and self-designated liaison officers. Formal relationships are established between members of the participating organisations during the CSWGs’ consultations and dialogues, and strengthened through follow-up visits of communities’ representatives to the LGUs and vice-versa. Informal networking also happens outside of the CSWGs, such as Philippine Marines and PNP agents who liaise with community members within their sectors of deployment. Inter-organisational trust augments as inter- organisational and inter-personal contacts and communication between network participants increase.
4.2.3 Description of the networks’ outcomes
Relationships have significantly improved among the communities, and between the communities and the state services, since the establishment of the CSWGs. Such development translates on the ground into the resumption of basic services such as more regular health visits, counterpart in kind as support for community-built buildings, and better access to justice systems and dispute settlement mechanisms. LGUs official also display new attitudes towards the communities, which are more frequently consulted and involved in meetings and programs. Better access to the judiciary and the creation of spaces for dialogue moreover improve the communities’ ability to mitigate conflicts through peaceful means. Concretely, incidents of crimes have substantially declined in Layog over the past two years, and, in 2016, the town of Pagalungan received an award for its good local governance regarding peace and order, which the mayor attributes to the CSWG (Aiman 2017). In sum, the network effectively delivers on its goals and provides other forms of benefits. Its effectiveness is acknowledged by both members and non-members, as illustrated by the institutionalisation of the CSWGs which received accreditation from their respective LGUs, and the renewal of EU’s funding in 2017. Some factors increase the networks’ efficiency and effectiveness. Some were adopted at the outset of the project, while other emerged over time. Firstly, the training provided to the local CSOs in community-mobilisation and community-policing increase their ability to assist the other participants with the formulation of their needs and expectations, which facilitates more meaningful interventions during the meetings. Second, identifying the troublemakers and positive influencers at the outset of the project has helped the process of setting up the CSWGs,
as the firsts could be avoided or engaged, and the seconds were co-opted as champions to secure the other participants’ commitment to the project. Third, the human rights narrative provides a comprehensible framework through which participants can understand their role as either right- holders or duty-bearers, in a way that is neutral enough to be accepted by all. On the other hand, network activities suffer from the participant’s low ability to handle complex security issues, which intricate vertical and horizontal types of conflicts. Organisation and logistics are also made difficult due to geographical isolation.
4.2.4 Analysis
The following paragraphs analyse any correlations between the context and the networks’ properties, the networks’ properties and their effectiveness, based on the theories established by Provan, Kenis, and Whelan, and determine the networks’ capacity to contribute to peace.
4.2.4.1 Influence of the context on the development of the security network
The conflict structures the relationships between the networks’ participants. The disorganisation or replacement of some LGUs by a MILF-led administration disrupt the contacts between the communities and the state services. The security sector suffers from its reputation of army of occupation and because the communities bear in mind images of former combats. The CSOs are trusted because they provided humanitarian aid and/or peacebuilding activities to the communities in the past. Other factors, which are not related to the conflict, may nonetheless be cited as well. The police-community relations are affected by a deeply entrenched distrust, caused by the “illegitimate interference of the local politicians in policing” (Uesugi 2014) and, for Bangsamoro and indigenous women, the perception that the PNP cannot “appropriately address women’s issues” (Conciliation Resources 2015). The feudal system in Mindanao is also a source of mistrust between the communities and LGU officials.
The ongoing peace process seems a more structuring parameter than the conflict. Firstly, the CSWGs are typically designed to enhance peacebuilding, though it is not their chief objective. Trust-building is promoted as a distinct network’s objective, in a perspective of reconciliation, whereas it is in other contexts only a factor towards the achievements of network goals. Secondly, the peace process suspends common laws and procedures, which allows non-state actors such as local or international NGOs to exert a stronger influence than national agencies. A reform of the police in a stabilised context would need to be directed by the government, and