This part compares the cases to expose any contrasts, similarities and patterns regarding the influence of the context, as well as the networks’ effectiveness and peacebuilding effectiveness.
4.3.1 Influence of the context on the security network
The context is structuring in both cases. The peace process, specifically, affects the networks’ objectives, culture, practices, membership, and governance. The conflict, on the other hand, is less determining. It influences members’ relationships before the creation of the networks, and, to some extent, the choice of governance and technologies used by network participants.
4.3.1.1 Influence of the peace process
4.3.1.1.1 Peacebuilding as golden thread
Both networks explicitly aim at peacebuilding, in addition to their security objectives. This is unsurprising for the CMM as it is intrinsically bound to the peace process, and security for this network (implementation of the ceasefire agreements) equals peace. The case of the CSWGs is more peculiar. The CSWGs are an indirect creation of the peace process (ICP report.) They involve both peace and security stakeholders, and pursue security objectives which are in connection to the peace process (trust-building), as well as disconnected from it (traffic control, humanitarian response to the families displaced by floods, advocacy programs against drugs and gambling.) Furthermore, they will continue after the transition to peace, whereas the CMM will disappear once the peace process will be terminated.
As a consequence, the networks’ mandates and activities are designed to enhance peacebuilding on the ground. Principally, they seek to (re-)establish trust among participants with inexistent or broken relationships, in a perspective of reconciliation and normalisation. The networks use different strategies to that end. The local CSOs serve, in the case of the CSWGs, as mediators between the communities and the state services. The relationships between the AFP and the BIAF within the CMM are, on the other hand, forced by the peace agreements, and exist thanks to the parties’ commitment to their implementation. Mediation has resulted in quite formal relationships (visits, courtesy calls), while relationships within the CMM are mostly grounded
into informal ties. The CSWGs are nonetheless young networks, and formal relationships may develop into more informal ones over time.
Aside from trust-building, the networks adopt a comprehensive and conflict-sensitive approach to security, which requires regular conflict analyses, and to educate their members to peace issues.
This has consequences on the development of a network-level culture in the case of the CMM. Regular peace education seminars contribute to making emerge a culture of peace, as does the emphasis on peace as a common framework for understanding. The network’s culture of peace otherwise owes to the involvement of some of its participants in other aspects of the peace process (peace panels for the GPH and the MILF, community-based peacebuilding activities and peace advocacy for civilian members of the IMT-CPC.) This conversely explains why the police has been resisting it so far: it has not been involved in the peace process until 2015. The CSWGs adopt a network-level culture of human rights, which is similarly supportive of peace. Unlike the CMM, this culture has developed over time in an unintended manner, because the local facilitators impressed their vision and language on the other participants through pro- active and repeated engagement. The CSWGs’ culture has yet to pass the test of time. There has indeed been no turnover among the CSWGs’ membership until then; thus, it is unsure whether it would survive to the replacement of the PNP by former BIAF members, as foreseen by the ICP report.
4.3.1.1.2 Multi-level membership, shadow governance and alternative legal frameworks The peace process is otherwise structuring in the sense that it creates an environment where national sovereignty does not fully apply. Thus, the networks are more framed by the peace agreements than national laws, and non-state actors such as rebel groups, NGOs or international organisations can have as much or even a stronger influence than national agencies. The international community, especially, is involved in both cases, though to different extents. In the case of the CSWGs, international donors21 exert an influence from the background. This influence is strong and asymmetric, considering that it applies to all network members, whereas only a few of them have the possibility to engage with international donors. The international
21 The international community is otherwise directly involved through C-R, but the project coordinator is Filipino.
community is contrariwise a direct participant in the CMM network, through its representatives in the IMT. International participants are in this case subject to contradiction and accountability.
4.3.1.2 Influence of the conflict
The conflict, on the other hand, is less determining than the peace process. It influences the relationships among network participants at the beginning (inexistent or broken relationships, defiance), which has some impact on the choice of governance in the case of the CSWGs. The CSWGs indeed evolve towards a hybrid model of governance, in which the leadership of the local CSOs palliates the inefficiency of the original shared governance model, plagued by low- trust issues. The conflict nonetheless becomes less relevant once the network is in place, as relationships evolve over time as in any other network.
The choice to favour low technologies is finally indirectly due to the conflict, as it prevented the development of, or destructed existing transportation and communication infrastructures.
4.3.2 Testing the theories on security network effectiveness
Both cases verify Provan, Kenis, and Whelan’s correlations between a network’s properties and its effectiveness; with some nuance concerning the correlation between a network’s size, its type of governance and their effect on effectiveness in the case of the CSWGs.
4.3.2.1 Structure and governance
The CMM case verifies the statement that a hub design enhances the effectiveness of a large- size network. It also confirms that the NAO and shared types of governance are more effective when trust is widely shared among network participants, the network-level goal consensus is high, and a majority of members are committed to the network.
The case of the CSWGs invalidate the statement that an all-channel design enhances the effectiveness of a small-size network, but confirm that a network which adopts a lead- organisation model works better when trust is narrowly shared; and a hub design benefits from a strong and legitimate leadership.
Noteworthily, both cases adopt hybrid forms of governance, in which shared governance exists alongside brokered governance.
4.3.2.2 (Sub-)culture(s)
The development of one or several cultures at the network-level multiplies the network’s effectiveness in both cases. The cultures of peace, coordination and human rights adopted by the networks trigger a strong consensus on the networks’ peace and security objectives, and
redefine the relationships among members so they see themselves as partners, instead of adversaries or simply unrelated organisations.
4.3.2.3 Policies, flexibility and bureaucracy
In both cases, effectiveness owes as much to flexibility as to rigidity, and to the network’s ability to achieve a balance between both.
The CSWGs are self-organised, and barely framed by any policies. They evolve in an environment where national laws do not apply, and are only indirectly structured by the peace agreements. Such flexibility is a factor of effectiveness as it permits to adapt to local needs and realities (evolution of the type of governance, use of low technologies, shift to a human rights narrative instead of a peacebuilding narrative, etc.) This does not mean that the CSWGs are free of any obligations nor structure. They must achieve the benchmarks established by their donors, or will be sanctioned by the non-renewal of their funding. These requirements do not impair the networks’ effectiveness: contrariwise, they clarify their objectives. The facilitating role of the local CSOs furthermore shows that some centralisation is necessary to boost collaboration. The CMM, on the other hand, is strictly framed by the peace agreements, which clearly define its objectives, procedures, and membership. This structure enhances the consensus on the network’s goals, and facilitate coordination among members. It is thus a catalyser for effectiveness, as long as adaptation remains possible. The CMM can indeed fulfil its mandate only if it adapts to local realities, which it does by expanding its mandate to comprehensive peacebuilding activities.
4.3.2.4 Technologies
Low technologies are enablers in both cases, whereas high technologies would be disablers. This observation emphasises the need to adapt to local realities.
4.3.2.5 Relationships
Trust-building is cited as a main achievement as well as a key factor of effectiveness for both networks. Some trust also pre-existed their creation, though it was not distributed among all participants. In the CMM case, the peace agreements guarantee that a party would not use the coordinating mechanisms to take advantage over the other, which is a source of impersonal trust between members of the AFP and the BIAF. Considering the CSWGs, the facilitators are trusted by the communities and the state services, which makes their mediation possible. This minimal amount of trust is necessary for the network to function in both cases.
4.3.2.6 Designed for effectiveness?
The CSWGs are designed according to considerations of efficiency and effectiveness. This is because international funding requires goal-oriented programming, and ineffectiveness would be sanctioned by the non-renewal of aid or, in other words, the dissolution of the networks. The CMM, on the other hand, is rather the result of political negotiations. It will furthermore continue to exist even if it is not fully effective, as illustrated by its reactivation after the 2000 and 2003 wars.
Programming, in the case of the CSWGs, is based on a theory of change which does not consider much (in fact, at all) the network’s properties. The CSWGs nonetheless spontaneously develop effective network properties, such as a network-level culture, and a lead-organisation model of governance. They are also more effective than if they had followed the prescriptions of Provan and Kenis regarding their type of governance. This observation questions the need to conscientiously design a network’s properties in order to boost its effectiveness.
4.3.3 Peacebuilding effectiveness
Both networks carry out activities which respect the principles of effective peacebuilding, even when they are not explicitly peacebuilding activities. Their outcomes also seem to support peace, though a clear link of causality is hard to establish. The CMM implements locally informed, locally owned, conflict- and gender-sensitive activities aiming at the cessation of violence, both related and unrelated to the conflict, the protection of civilians, the furtherment of the peace process, as well as peace education. In terms of outcomes, it contributes to the respect of the ceasefire agreements,though other factors can explain the reduction of ceasefire violations. The development of strong relationships between the BIAF and AFP also facilitates the demobilisation and normalisation processes. The CSWGs are not primarily peace-oriented networks, but conduct activities which are locally informed, locally owned, conflict- and gender-sensitive, and indirectly contribute to peacebuilding as it re-establishes working relationships between the communities and the state services, which lead to the resumption of basic services, including dispute settlement mechanisms.
The network form of organisation partly explains the networks’ peacebuilding effectiveness. The network organisation is non-hierarchical, which facilitates partnerships between former foes or where trust is low, as they do not feel obliged to each other. It also promotes true local ownership in the CMM case, by giving local members an equal voice as their international counterparts. The same does not hold true for the CSWGs, however, as the international
community exerts a shadow influence from outside the network, to which local actors cannot respond. The networks finally act as incubators for the development of an interorganisational culture of peace and human rights. External factors such as the pre-existing peacebuilding culture of some participants furthermore consolidate the networks’ peacebuilding effectiveness.
4.3.4 Conclusions
The comparison concludes to more similarities than contrasts regarding the three objects of my analysis. It shows in both cases that the context is structuring, most of Provan, Kenis and Whelan’s statements on network effectiveness are confirmed, and the networks are peacebuilding effective because of their non-hierarchical form of organisation, the culture of peace that develops at the interorganisational level, and the pre-existing peacebuilding culture of some participants. Other patterns can also be observed across the cases:
- The same kind of actors can be found in both networks, namely: representatives of the security sector, NGOs, political organs, grassroots, and members of the international community.
- The participation of local actors is a factor of effectiveness in both cases, because they facilitate adaptation to local needs, provide important intelligence about local dynamics, and can leverage kinship ties to increase trust among network participants.
- Network participants which are related through a membership in one or several other networks are linked by stronger ties and higher levels of trust.
- The peace process is more structuring than the conflict. It even is a pervading factor of the networks’ properties and development: their goals, cultures, members, the way they evolve, etc. are all related to the peace process, even when the networks are not chiefly oriented towards peacebuilding.
- The participation of an organisation in multiple peace networks and mechanisms increases its sensitivity to peace.
- Flexibility always goes in the sense of an adaptation to local needs and realities. - Both networks adopt a hybrid form of governance which mixes brokered governance
with shared governance.
- Both networks involve participants with broken relationships and aim at re-establishing a link between them.
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A minimal amount of trust is necessary to establish the network. Trust can be personal or impersonal. It does not need to be widely shared.5
Chapter 5: Conclusions and recommendations
I studied and compared two security networks in the post-conflict transitional context of Western Mindanao, to determine which factors make them succeed or fail, and whether they contribute to the ongoing peace process between the GPH and the MILF. To that end, I used the concept of security network effectiveness, as theorised by Provan and Kenis (2007) and Whelan (2016, 2015). I also introduced the concept of peacebuilding effectiveness, which I measure based on whether the network supports or impedes projects which respect the principles of effective peacebuilding, and its outcomes support or contradict peacebuilding objectives.