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Augustine‘s answer to the problem of evil as we have seen revolves around the concept of free will. Consequently, his solution and the solutions of those scholars who followed his footsteps are often referred to as free will theodicy.

Now, the concept of privation in free will theodicy claims that evil is the absence of a good or a quality that normally would be present in a thing. Nonetheless, some leading scholars reject the theory on the basis that it is a denial of the reality of evil or an attempt to circumvent the problem of evil.⁴⁷

Stanley G. Kane, in his analysis of the theory, affirms that the rejection of the concept of privation arises from misunderstanding.⁴⁸ The basis of this confusion, Kane asserts, is the failure to see the function of the theory in the free will theodicy. The concept is not intended to explain away evil or alleviate pain or deny the assertion that evil is caused by some active agent. A superficial reading of the statements on the theory is the cause of the misunderstanding. On the contrary, the idea of privation advocates a vivid sense of sin. No doubt, he declares, it does not portray any intention of explaining away evil. As defined by Augustine and Aquinas, Kane concedes, the theory recognizes evil as negative but not as non-existent. It is negative in a sense that its existence depends on the nature of another thing. The theory only describes the nature of evil. ⁴⁹

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On the other hand, Kane affirms, that even with a correct understanding, the theory of privation has a deficient elucidation of the problem of evil. He claims the concept fails to answer the problem of evil, for not all evils are privation. Some evils are positive in nature and others are real but are privative. First, its account for pain is not plausible. A paralyzed leg can be considered a privation, but a leg aching with pain as suffering cannot be privation of good health. It is an experience different from a paralyzed leg. It is not a lack of feeling or function.⁵⁰ Secondly, the concept does not recognize the distinction between a sin of omission and a sin of commission.

According to him, ―On the privation theory we would have to say that both sorts of sin are equally evil, and that as evil there is really nothing in the hateful or murderous acts beyond the lack or privation of love and right action. This . . . is a reduction ad absurdum of the theory.‖ Privation does not explain all the gradations of evil in the world.⁵¹

Bill Angling and Stewart Goetz, in their article ―Evil is Privation,‖ argue that Kane‘s rebuttal does not negate the efficiency of the privation theory. They assert that pain is a privation in the sense that it entails some absence in a normal state of consciousness and an indicator of an absence of physical well-being. In the same manner, privation handles a sin of commission adequately. A Sin of commission embraces the lack of executing some duties, just like a sin of omission. However, a sin of commission is a greater evil than a sin of omission inasmuch as it involves greater privation, ―…a greater deviation of the will from the dictates of conscience and thus a greater lack of psychic harmony.‖⁵²

According to John Hick, from the point of view of the modern logical theory,⁵³ ―there is no basis for the hypostatization of non-being. The situation is simply that we have the generally useful habit of presuming an entity of some kind corresponding to a noun; but sometimes the language generates words that have no denotation—and non- being is a case in point.‖⁵⁴ Thus Hick condemns the use of privation of good in Augustine‘s theodicy. The crucial issue with the problem of evil, Kane and Hopers argue, is not whether evil is positive or negative, but if there is enough reason for God to allow the occurrence of evil in the world. According to them, evil as a positive

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reality is not incompatible with God‘s omnipotence; if God, according to free will theodicy, uses evil to accomplish His purpose, then the positive or the negative reality of evil does not matter; for God has control over evil. Rendering evil as negative does not give sufficient moral reason for the permission of evil in our world.⁵⁵

P. M. Farrell argues that the idea of privation is like ―the passing of colour from the decaying rose,‖ hence, in free will agents privation becomes a necessary by-product,

―a very nature of a contingent being.‖⁵⁶ Wallace I. Matson also suggests that the theory of privation points to metaphysical evil. ―Evil . . . considered in itself, is mere non-being, the deprivation of reality, whereas being and perfection are synonymous.

Insofar as anything is real, it is perfect and good. But everything, except God, is and must be finite, hence everything, except God must be evil to some extent.‖⁵⁷ Quoting from Augusinus Magister, Hick explains that the principle of privation does not only make evil metaphysical but also makes grace a metaphysical force.⁵⁸

By this definition of evil as non-being St.

Augustine threw into the process of theological reflection a principle which was to lead to a particular conception of grace, salvation, the Christian life, and the Church. In effect, if sin is a privation, the sinner is deficient. Consequently the grace which saves him will fill up this deficiency, and will be an irresistible grace [un don de force]. The instrument of this infusion of supernatural life will be the sacrament. The Church will have the treasury of these sanctifying graces at its disposal and will distribute it by means of its priests.⁵⁹

Kane proposes that the idea of relating the inevitability of some physical evil to the concept of privation is not accurate; it is rather the principle of plenitude that makes evil a necessary consequence of contingency. The privation theory of the nature of evil, he contends, is not true experientially and does not safeguard any of the beliefs of theism. There are no ―extra-theistic‖ or ―intra-theistic‖ grounds for accepting the theory.⁶⁰

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