What is the centrality of (armed) jihad in their discourse?

Whilst the three groups have supplemented their (armed) jihad with other non-combat activities, such as daʿwa, aid-work and rebel governance, they have explicitly (and repeatedly) stated that it is

207 _{“The Establishment of the Islamic State Part 1”, Muʾassasat al-Iʿtisam li-l-ʾIntaj al-ʾIʿlam, 10 December}

2013, 03:19, http://jihadology.net/2013/12/10/al-iti%E1%B9%A3am-media-presents-a-new-video-message- from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-series-of-the-life-from-the-words-of-the-ulama-on-the-project-of- the-islamic-stat/, “The Establishment of the Islamic State Part 6”, Muʾassasat al-Iʿtisam li-l-ʾIntaj al-ʾIʿlam, 11 March 2014, 04:15 http://jihadology.net/2014/03/11/al-iti%E1%B9%A3am-media-presents-a-new-video- message-from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-series-of-the-life-from-the-words-of-the-ulama-on-the- project-of-th-5/

208 _{“The Establishment of the Islamic State Part 2”, Muʾassasat al-Iʿtisam li-l-ʾIntaj al-ʾIʿlam, 25 December}

2013, 05:48, http://jihadology.net/2013/12/25/al-iti%E1%B9%A3am-media-presents-a-new-video-message- from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-series-of-the-life-from-the-words-of-the-ulama-on-the-project-of-th/

209 _{“The Establishment of the Islamic State Part 3”, Muʾassasat al-Iʿtisam li-l-ʾIntaj al-ʾIʿlam, 4 January 2014,}

05:02, http://jihadology.net/2014/01/04/al-iti%E1%B9%A3am-media-presents-a-new-video-message-from-the- islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-series-of-the-life-from-the-words-of-the-ulama-on-the-project-of-th-2/

210 _{“The Establishment of the Islamic State Part 4”, Muʾassasat al-Iʿtisam li-l-ʾIntaj al-ʾIʿlam, 8 February 2014,}

07:16, http://jihadology.net/2014/02/08/al-iti%E1%B9%A3am-media-presents-a-new-video-message-from-the- islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-series-of-the-life-from-the-words-of-the-ulama-on-the-project-of-th-3/

211 _{“The Establishment of the Islamic State Part 5”, Muʾassasat al-Iʿtisam li-l-ʾIntaj al-ʾIʿlam, 25 February 2014,}

05:51, http://jihadology.net/2014/02/25/al-iti%E1%B9%A3am-media-presents-a-new-video-message-from-the- islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-series-of-the-life-from-the-words-of-the-ulama-on-the-project-of-th-4/

212 _{“The Establishment of the Islamic State Part 7”, Muʾassasat al-Iʿtisam li-l-ʾIntaj al-ʾIʿlam, 21 March 2014,}

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52 (armed) jihad (“and the will of God”) which will cause the fall of the Assad regime, and clear the path for the subsequent establishment of an Islamic state. However whilst AS consider armed jihad to be the only possible way to remove the regime, JN and ISIS have on the other hand described it has the only legitimate way. And, whilst statements from AS indicates that it armed jihad is amongst their top two priorities for now (alongside daʿwa) their actions could be limited to the latter in the future. Thus whilst AS legitimation for the armed jihad at the current predicament and in the current crisis is contextualized with the Syrian crisis, and the fight against the Assad-regime, it is a de- territorialized and de-contextualized legitimation of jihad found in the discourse of JN, and more so, ISIS. In sum, it could be argued that ISIS and JN evokes jihad as part of their raison d’être to a larger extent than AS.

53

6 Visions and manifestations of an Islamic

State

What concerns us is that the sharʿia be implemented and justice prevailed and lifting the injustice over the people and the righteous Islamic government established on the methodology of the prophet hood that’s seek to liberate the Muslim lands, and implements the sharʿia of God Almighty, and threats the people fairly and lifts the injustice over the people, this is our quest.”213

Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani of Jabhat al-Nusra, January 2014 We want to put an end to this period of injustice, tyranny and coercion and replace it with a state which confines with the aspirations of the people in so forth that it is a state governed by the true sharʿia (al-sharīʿa al-ḥanīf).214

Hassan ʿAbbud of Ahrar al-Sham, June 2013

As for our political project, it is the project of the umma. Our goal is to establish an Islamic State on the methodology (manhaj) of the prophet, which doesn’t recognize borders nor differentiate between an Arabs and non-Arab, Easterner or Westerner, except with piety. Its loyalty is to God alone (…).215

Abu Muhammad al-ʿAdnani of ISIS, July 2013

The opposition’s raison d’etre can be boiled down to the dual mission of firstly removing the Assad-regime and secondly replacing it with “something better”. For Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham, this “something better” has since the start of the conflict been conceptualized as some version or another of an Islamic state. The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), for their part, considers itself to be that very Islamic State manifested, as indicated by its chosen name. The three groups thus share the key objective of establishing a politico-religious entity with Islam at the fundament. In the following I will explore how and where their

visions and ambitions regarding an Islamic state differ, primarily seen through the lens of their discourse but complimenting with examples from their actions in rebel governance.