3 Chronological overview
7.6 What constitute the groups’ hierarchy of enemies and target selection?
Whilst the three groups have expressed enmity towards largely the same parties, flanks and states, largely “the usual suspects” in Salafi-Jihadi discourse, their hierarchy of enemies arguably differ. The near enemy, as conceptualized as the Syrian regime and its supporters, is for obvious reasons a higher priority in the groups’ operational activities as well as the most recurrent object of vocal attacks in their publications. As for the “far enemy” JN and ISIS have to a greater extent than AS expressed enmity against “the West” and “the international society” for their perceived direct involvement in the conflict.
The three further differ in so forth as their pronounced enemies overlap (or not) with whom they consider to be legitimate targets for their operations. This is clearest when it comes to their sectarian framing of the conflict, where one can arguable distinguish between sectarianism (AS and JN) and violent sectarianism (ISIS). As such ISIS stands out from the rest regarding the degree of brutality they choose to expose in their online self-projection of themselves and promotion of their actions. Whereas other groups have been known to kill
367 Al-ʿAdnani, “al-Raʾid la yakdhibu ʾAhlahu”. 368 Ibid.
369 Al-ʿAdnani, “al-Raʾid la yakdhibu ʾAhlahu” and “al-Silmiyya Dīn Man?”. 370
“Ghazwat al- Thaʾir li-Haraʾir al-Sham” (Battle of Revenge for the Free [Women] of al-Sham), Muʾassasat
al-Manara al-Bayaʾ li-ʾIntaj al-ʿIlam, 26 February 2012, 45:27, http://jihadology.net/2012/02/27/al-manarah-al-
bay%E1%B8%8Da-foundation-for-media-production-presents-a-new-video-message-from-jabhat-al- nu%E1%B9%A3rah-battle-of-revenge-for-the-free-of-ash-sham-syria/
79 alleged criminals without a trial or assassinated pro-regime militia members or Alawites, as far as I’m have registered, none have chosen to record and spread video-clips of this online to the extent that ISIS has.
It can further be argued that the groups’ perception of enemy compliments their self- perception. Much like legitimacy and value is bestowed upon their envisioned Islamic state by counterpoising it with, in their view, dysfunctional or even perverted political principles and ruling structured, the self-perception of the group gains significance through the framing of their enemies. Or put differently, how they define their enemy, gives us insight as to how they perceive themselves and their role in the conflict. Whilst AS, and to a lesser extent JN, have limited their battle, their enemies and proclaimed targets to the ones they confront in Syria, ISIS fronts a perception of a de-territorialized conflict and de-territorialized enemy further enforcing their self-perception as an eternal force.
80
8 The geographical scope of their
operations and aims
We have said from the start that we aspire to return the governance of God to His land then revive the umma to implement his sharʿia and spread his methodology.372
Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani of Jabhat al-Nusra, April 2013
[W]e announced that we wish to establish an Islamic state in Syria, and this state will replace the current regime. As for our aspirations we yearn for the day when these states come together and unite as is the case with the [states in the] European Union which removed the borders between themselves. 373
Hassan ʿAbbud of Ahrar al-Sham, June 2013 We will not forget to renew the pledge to the Umma that we won’t enjoy life until we liberate the Muslims everywhere, and until were regain Al-Quds, return Al-Andalus, and conquer Rome, God willing. 374
Abu Muhammad al-ʿAdnani of ISIS, July 2013
The aim of (re-)creating a unity of the Muslim nation (umma) transcending geographical borders, racial divides, and state-citizenship is considered a key trait of Salafism. As
illustrated by the quotes above, it is also an aim shared by JN, AS and ISIS. The spectrum of other groups, movements and ideologues – from Jamal al-Din al-Afghani to al-Qaʿida, who have endorsed the same “mission” – further illustrates that the aim in itself does not dictate the measures, nor the short-term geographical scope of one’s agenda. Rather, the
manifestation of this aim into plans and actions, and in particular the geographical limitations of these plans may vary greatly. In short, some have confined their struggle to the national state and explicitly “postponed” any larger regional or global “revolution” to the far-future. Others have argued that the establishment of a regional caliphate is imminent and thus operates with a geographical scope transcending existing borders – rhetorically as well as operationally. Others again might harbor regional or global ambitions, but are (for the time being) more locally focused due to economic and/or operational hindrances. Finally, there are numerous instances of groups shifting their geographical priorities over the course of their lifespan, al-Qaʿida itself arguably constituting a well know example. This notwithstanding, a group’s geographic priorities and ambitions, and whether or not its “national”, “regional” or
372 Al-Jawlani, [Untitled audio recording]. 373
Hassan ʿAbbud, interviewed by Taysir ʿAlluni (11 June 2013).
81 “global” (or alternatively “state-oriented”, “nation-oriented”, “umma-oriented”375
or “transnational salafiyya”376
) constitute a common key distinguisher in comparative analyses of salafi/salafi-jihadi movements.
In the following I will move beyond the idealized vision of a united, transnational
umma, state or caliphate shared by the three, and look into the way they have explicitly
expressed their geographical ambitions and self-imposed territorial limitations.
I will first review in brief where the groups did in fact operate during the timespan of this study (January 2012 and May 2014). Secondly, I will approach the overarching question of whether they are primarily nationally, regionally or globally by posing three sub questions; 1) To what extent have the group identified themselves as Syrian?
2) To what extent have they expressed regional aims? 3) To what extent have they expressed global aims?