The Centrality of Language in the Formation of Knowledge

I initially considered the object of my study to be situated in language: namely, the word terrorism and its associated discourse(s). Beginning with an examination of the language used was crucial to the project because it was from this that I hoped to gain insights into the knowledge and perceptions divulged by participants. Furthermore, comprehending language was essential for the analysis into the power-knowledge

dynamics associated with this topic. Foucault's theories into the archaeology of discourse and philosophical insights into knowledge and language formation, as explored in The Order of Things (2002), provided the initial insights and framework by which the limitations of the divulged knowledge were explored.

According to Foucault, language, be it in written or spoken form, is a recognisable manifestation of representable aspects of human knowledge and the ordering of ideas (Foucault 2002:xx). It makes visible that which was hidden; once spoken, ideas can be known, formulated, ordered, explored and even altered. That does not necessarily make them “real” or “correct” expressions of an object or idea, because language expresses a world of resemblance, reflection and thought (Foucault 2002:35). Foucault argued that language is the articulated ordering of resemblances, but it is still important because it is the best means humanity has of expressing ideas (Foucault 2002:36).

Therefore, the study of language involves the study of representations of knowledge, rather than a study of knowledge in itself. Once these representations of knowledge have been studied, man “transmits these resemblances back into the world from which he receives them” (Foucault 2002:23). Therefore, there is a constant knowledge cycle between representation and interpretations of those representations. There may have been a first object of knowledge, but its very discovery lead to it becoming altered by personal and social interpretations (and reinterpretations). However, if there was no first object or event that sparked the knowledge, then what is it that has been perceived? Foucault states that there is the possibility that representation is nothing but myth (Foucault 2002:374) because man is “the locus of misunderstanding” (Foucault 2002:323).

On closer examination of the implications of Foucauldian thought, we can begin to understand how knowledge is subject to representations. Take for example the Classical division between the two main categories of knowledge – a priori and a posteriori: even though this is frequently perceived as a rigid categorisation, in Foucauldian thought, such a divide becomes hazy because it is subject to representation. A posteriori

knowledge is (by its very nature) linked to experiences, therefore it naturally has some form of interpretation linked to it – as seen in Foucault's example of wealth and money (Foucault 2002:177). A priori knowledge, on the other hand, appears exempt from interpretation because it is based on an unquestionable logic and contains a repeatable truth. However, Foucauldian thought makes one question whether this is indeed the case. A simple explanation can be expressed through a mathematical example: each letter or symbol used to explain a concept, such as 1+1=2, requires an understanding of other symbols, representations or signs to explain that knowledge. One must understand what each notation, e.g. “1”, represents before the overall concept can be understood – namely, the symbolic representation of an addition of two objects, as well as something symbolising a mathematical formulation in its own right (Foucault 2002:82). This sum will also have an external layer of meaning and representation that is dependant on the context in which it is used, be it to teach young people to add groceries and so on.

The ideas that have lead to mathematical sums becoming such an important aspect of human existence have an “archaeology”; a history that goes into the depths of human memory. The essential foundations or “truths” of knowledge are not within man's conscious thought, they function behind the scenes (Foucault 2002:330). Language itself has similar foundations and “unspoken habits of thought” (Foucault 2002:297)

that are necessary for comprehension and knowledge, but which simultaneously hinder how we form and express that knowledge. For example, the requirements of spelling and grammar, or the four segments of discourse (proposition, articulation, designation and derivation) limit our discourse – both in spoken and written form. Furthermore, the nuances of the English language means that the language used is not always articulated in a “typical” format; the participants (or myself) could use “spontaneous” and “badly constructed” language (Foucault 2002:158). For example, the language used to make an exclamation can be very different to the language of needs, habits or prejudices – not only in the words used but also in the way in which the words are structured together. This problem was noticeable in my project because, as a researcher, I had different vocabulary to the young people being interviewed, therefore I used words or terminology, such as those found in academic vernacular, that they may not have known or which they misunderstood (and vice versa). Furthermore, the context of these words was also restricted by our respective use of the English language and required some imaginative thought for understanding. According to Foucault, imagination is crucial for understanding representations, because it helps us to make links between words or ideas that may not be explicitly stated (Foucault 2002:69). Therefore, in my analysis of the data, I necessarily relied on my own knowledge, as well as on the informed and imaginative processes that influenced the concepts explored herein.

2.2.1 Using Language to Express Knowledge

Once the nuances of language have been understood, it becomes necessary to explore how this language expresses knowledge. According to Foucault, such expressions of knowledge can be explored by dividing them into discrete exploratory elements; in this case, the specific words and sentences used by the participants. These divisions form

part of the total impression and it is through this that we can better comprehend the nature of our knowledge (Foucault 2002:59). However, dividing such knowledge is not an easy feat. As Foucault questioned: “On what "table", according to what grid of identities, similitudes, analogies, have we become accustomed to sort out so many different and similar things? What is this coherence?... It is not a question of linking consequences, but of grouping and isolating, of analysing, of matching and pigeon- holing concrete contents; there is nothing more tentative, nothing more empirical (superficially, at least) than the process of establishing an order among things” (Foucault 2002: xxi).

Foucault suggests that any divisions of knowledge are relatively arbitrary: discourses overlap, influence each other and alter according to historical findings or current events. Furthermore, due to the nature of conducting research into an unknown field of knowledge (namely pupils' perceptions of terrorism), all avenues of research could not become apparent until the data collection events were completed, since the participants shed light on other ideas that were not considered beforehand. Foucault suggested that there are three central “problems” that require consideration when examining knowledge formation: change, causality and subject (Foucault 2002:xii-xv).

1. Change: Knowledge can change and be reorganised by the emergence of additional data. One example found was within the literature on terrorism before and after 11th September 2001 (9/11).

2. Causality: Although it is not easy to discover what events or ideas may have affected new discoveries or concepts, an awareness of the fact that information does change and

is affected by emerging ideas helps us to comprehend the fabric of our knowledge. For example, I have divided the thesis into “before-and-after” data collection, as I deem those events as the most noticeable causation for knowledge movement and change.

3.Subject: For Foucault, science and its history requires a reference to the scientist himself. This concept can be applied to other fields of knowledge: just as I have affected the data within this thesis, it is also important to recognise any writer's role in the development of terrorism knowledge.

Therefore, knowledge formation should be considered a process, that is based on past and current perceptions, which constantly evolves and thus affects any future perceptions. This process is not just shaped by experience but also by the language used to explain, formulate and describe such ideas. This language in itself also has histories of meaning and usage, which in turn influences and affects our perceptions. One example of this type of knowledge formation was uncovered through an examination of the word “terrorism” in itself: as I will now explain.