Understanding Terrorism Knowledge Formation

2.3.1 The Archaeology of “Terrorism”

This study into the perceptions of terrorism is concerned with a more complex aspect of human knowledge than basic mathematics, but the analogy above is useful in highlighting some important considerations. Looking past the a priori / a posteriori

differences for a moment, the concept of 1+1=2 has an archaeology to it, as does terrorism; it has a function that lies behind man's conscious thought and the depth of this function may never come to light because it has become so embedded in the fabric of

human knowledge (Foucault 2002:155).

In addition to a hidden (perhaps non-existent?) archetype, the word is also covered by layers of history. The seemingly random memories of man have affected its function and meaning, to a point where what is declared as knowledge is merely a mix of past representations and current interpretations (things that suit the landscape in which the term is used). History, or rather the complex network of representations that form the narrative of mankind's existence, contributes to current representations and perceptions of terrorism because “it either picks out an entity and allows it to survive or ignores it and allows it to disappear” (please note that Foucault was discussing his ideas through the example of natural selection, but it is applicable to other words or concepts, Foucault 2002:155). There may be lived experiences that lead to the formation of these memories, but the “dispersion of time” (Foucault 2002:338) and the nature of human recall, as something both random and “at the mercy of representations” (Foucault 2002:309), means that any event or object under discussion has become subject to mankind's ever-changing perceptions and representations: something that will become apparent during my discussion about the archaeology of terrorism knowledge (see Chapter 3).

Conversely, if there were no memories to recall, if the representation did not possess the “obscure power of making a past impression present once more, then no impression would ever appear as either similar to or dissimilar from a previous one” (Foucault 2002:69). Therefore, the memories or ideas that are recalled by the word “terrorism” are essential for allowing the perceptions of the term to be described and explained. Without these associations, the term would be meaningless or indescribable. That is not

to say that the memory recollections discussed by the participants completely painted a picture of their perceptions; they did not discuss all their thoughts openly and there were also some ideas that remained hidden by layers of subconscious, but which nevertheless affected the discussion. Any memories that were recalled and discussed were also subjected to the randomness of recollection. As Foucault questioned: “is everything [that is recalled] significant and, if not, what is and for whom and in accordance with what rules?” (Foucault 2002:36).

2.3.2 Comprehending the Word “Terrorism”

As the analogy of 1+1=2 demonstrated, to fully understand the complexities of a concept, it is not only important to question the meaning of it in its entirety, but also the individual notations (such as “1”) that represent aspects of the whole, and yet are also things in their own right. Although the notations represented in terrorism are harder to articulate than those in 1+1=2, its etymology and associated words, such as terror, terrorise, terrorist and so on, can be used to explain some of the known levels of meaning, representation and reinterpretations, but not all. Any unknown levels of meaning will remain hidden and thus have to be ignored, unless they are made visible through reflection; but even then, the very act of reflecting will add layers to the perceived knowledge, thus making some subconscious thoughts even more hidden.

It is not just the word terrorism that has individual notions that can be explored, but the representations of terrorism can similarly be broken down into distinct components (such as symbols, images or tactics etc.) and discussed in more detail. These representation of terrorism could be uncovered by exploring how the word was used in context, because this allowed for certain representations to become visible: in practical

terms, examining the participant's language could shed light on known representations and other influential discourses, as well contribute to our overall understanding of the pupils' perceptions of terrorism (Foucault 2002:59).

The context in which the word was used, its “network of comprehension” (Foucault 2002:330), also affected how the perceptions of it could be understood. Therefore, throughout the research process, I tried to remain aware that every aspect of the language under analysis had its own archaeology: from the grammar used to the sentence construction and the words chosen to describe ideas. Each aspect had particular representations associated with it, but when used in conjunction with other words, as a means of explaining the participant's thoughts on terrorism, it held a particular meaning, specific to that context. The layers of representation were thickened further because I not only explored the language used by each participant, but also the language used between participants. The way in which the participants responded to each other highlighted additional ideas and concepts, that contributed to the analysis.

2.3.3 Moral Judgements about Terrorism

The term terrorism is generally considered to have negative connotations and its use implies immoral people or activities. However, in the Order of Things (2002), Foucault began to theorise and question the origins and nature of this moral knowledge. The negativity associated with terrorism could simply be an example of how we perceive it, rather than something intrinsic to the term. There is no ultimate “Good” or “Bad”, but if we perceive something to be so, that judgement is based upon the representations and ideas associated with it (Foucault 2002:336). Foucault stated that “for modern thought, no morality is possible” (Foucault 2002:328), therefore morality is perceived, it is not

something in its own right. My reflections on this hypothesis made me realise that the focus for this project was not on the immorality of terrorism, but rather on the question of why terrorism is perceived as something immoral? What associations or representations have made it so? To explore these ideas in greater depth, I examined Foucault's later text, Discipline and Punish (1991).