Review of the Empirical Chapters

Beyond the broader contributions of this dissertation, the three empirical chap-ters make more directed contributions through novel arguments and corroborated with empirical tests. The following sections highlights these arguments and con-tributions from these chapters.

5.2.1 Chapter 2 - Hosting Refugees from a Rival State and Re-spect for Human Rights

In this chapter, I develop an argument suggesting refugees from a a strategic rival will motivate host states to promote inclusive good-will action toward the exiled population of their adversary. By doing so, host states are openly shaming their rival in an attempt to undermine their adversary’s legitimacy and discredit that government in the eyes of the international community. The self-promotion and cooperation with humanitarian organizations to host refugees will be associated with an increase in respect for human rights. On the other hand, the absence of a strategic rivalry between the host and origin state provides less of an incentive for host states to be willing to protect refugees, especially in the face of a xenophobic domestic public.This should lead to a decrease in respect human rights.

I test these arguments using data on the number of refugees a host states ac-cepts from rival and non-rival country and changes in respect for human rights in the host state. I find support for my arguments; hosting refugees from neigh-boring rival states is associated with the strongest improvement in human rights

whereas refugees from a contiguous and non-rival state are related to the steepest decrease in respect for human rights.

The findings of this study show that the arrival of refugees is not always met with repressive action by the state (Danneman and Ritter 2014). In fact, there seems to be a conditioning effect once interstate relations are taken into account.

At the same time, conditions for refugees in the host state are not necessarily rosy, especially since most refugees are not from strategic rivals. This leads to questions about how refugee populations interpret situations in the host state and whether there are other options besides staying in exile.

5.2.2 Chapter 3 - Macro-level Determinants of Refugee Return

Building upon Chapter 2, this essay explores one option refugees could take: re-turn to their country of origin. Existing scholarship on refugee rere-turn tends to critically evaluate the lack of voluntary decision-making or limit the scope to the post-conflict period. Yet, there is little systematic knowledge about conditions ad circumstances in host and origin countries that are, on average, more likely to lead to refugees returning.

To address this gap in the literature, I adopt a “push and pull” framework used in studies of voluntary and forced displacement as a conceptual foundation for when refugee return is expected. I contend refugees are pushed to return when political, economic, and physical security in the host state is weak and pulled to return when they are positive in the country of origin. However, I disagree with

prior studies that directly compare host and origin countries, as these states are not equivalent. I anticipate shifts in the origin and host nations can stimulate returns as a means to get around this selection issue.

I test my hypotheses on a cross-national dataset of origin and host states in the Post-Cold War period. The analyses suggest several factors to keep in mind when studying refugee return. First, explaining return must take into account political, economic, and physical security conditions in host and home states. Without taking these factors into account, there is an incomplete picture of the context refugees are operating in. Moreover, physical security tends to supersede the explanatory power of political and economic circumstances, serving as a strong push and pull factor for patterns of refugee return.

A puzzling finding from this analysis is that more refugees are expected to return during conflict, rather than the post-conflict period. This is intriguing given many studies on refugee return focus solely on the years after conflict official terminates in the origin state. This leads to questions about why refugees would return to their country of origin while conflict is ongoing and whether there are other factors in the origin state that might pull refugees to return.

5.2.3 Chapter 4 - The Effect of Leader Turnover on Refugee Re-turn

After the counter-intuitive finding that refugees tend to return in larger numbers during conflict than in the post-conflict period, Chapter 4 identifies a political

factor in the origin state that might motivate return: leader turnover. Transitions in leadership can provide observers, such as refugees, host governments, and hu-manitarian organizations, with updated information about safety considerations in the country of origin. I argue leader changes are a useful heuristic providing signals of: (1) leader’s commitment to maintaining their predecessor’s policies, (2) political turmoil in refugees’ origin state, and (3) legitimacy of the leader’s as-cension to power. Based upon this information, there is a re-evaluation of whether circumstances in the country of origin have changed enough to encourage refugee return.

Updated information is crucial in understanding why refugees are returning after specific types of leader change. As Chapters 2 and 3 point out, host states are over-burdened with the task of supporting refugee populations and will try to find windows of opportunity to alleviate that burden. Refugees in survey data consistently claim they want to return at some point, but it is unclear what conditions are “safe enough” to alter their decisions about staying in a host state.

International humanitarian organizations serving refugee populations advocate on behalf of refugees and are constantly monitoring the situation in the country of origin. Leader turnovers, and what they signal to observers, can change how these three actors assess the situation in the country of origin and whether they will promote return.

I generally find support for my arguments, with results demonstrating more refugees are returning to their country of origin after leader changes signifying forecasted policy change, happen according to established rules of the state, and

the new leader did not require foreign assistance to rise to power. These findings suggest that ongoing conflict dynamics in the country of origin are not the only factors used to motivate return. Rather, a political change conveys enough in-formation about conditions in the country of origin that promotes or suppresses return.