MACRO-LEVEL DETERMINANTS OF REFUGEE RETURN
3.2 Phases of Refugee Displacement
3.2.1 Forced Displacement
There are four phases of involuntary migration: initial flight, resettlement in asy-lum, repatriation home, and reintegration after return (Bascom 2002).3 The aca-demic literature mostly focuses on initial flight and resettlement in asylum. Stud-ies on forced displacement utilize theorStud-ies of economic migration that take a ra-tional actor approach in the decision to emigrate. They assume individuals have agency, which involves the capacity to reflect on their current position, devise strategies, and take action to achieve their desires (Bakewell 2010). While theories of economic migration assume an individual has time to come to a decision, in regards to forced displacement, people often need to make a quick decision to flee in hopes the destination is safer than if they stayed (Schon 2019).
Factors influencing the decision to flee are well covered in the literature. Peo-ple leave their homes and become displaced when they feel they are in physical danger (Davenport, Moore, and Poe 2003). Schmeidl (1997) finds that civil wars with foreign military intervention are more likely to produce large and prolonged refugee migrations and that ethnic rebellions cause smaller flows rather than mass
3While these phases are helpful in conceptualizing stages of involuntary migration, it should be noted that not every displaced person goes through all steps.
exoduses. Moore and Shellman(2006) uncover that refugee flows are greater than the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) when there is state-sponsored genocide/politicide than during other forms of armed violence. Other factors influencing whether people are internally or externally displaced depend on the geographic distance of another country (Moore and Shellman 2007) and existence and size of transnational ethnic kin in another state (Cederman, Girardin, and Gleditsch 2009; R ¨uegger and Bohnet 2018), which both speak to the relative ease of deciding to stay versus flee.
3.2.2 Repatriation and Return Migration
As compared to studies of initial displacement, there are fewer systematic as-sessments considering when refugees return to their country of origin. Instead, academics and policymakers who discuss repatriation typically evaluate how the return of refugees is an imperfect process that requires more attention from host states and the UNHCR (Chimni 2004; Loizides and Antoniades 2009; Bradley 2013). During the Cold War, resettlement in a third country was more common and accepted because the environment of bipolarity made it a political slight to return refugees back to communist countries, the volume of refugee flows was smaller, and refugees tended to be more skilled and educated (Loescher 2001;
Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Martin et al. 2005; Toft 2007). Since the end of the 1980s, refugee flows are growing in size and predominantly come from less de-veloped countries, which leads many in host states to believe that refugees are
less likely to contribute to the host society, ultimately deterring many countries from devoting effort and resources toward accommodating the displaced (Bradley 2013). The few who are granted permanent resettlement tend to be more skilled and educated than their counterparts (McSpadden 2004).
As a result, repatriation is encouraged as the preferred solution for refugee problems. In fact, the UNHCR declared the 1990s to be the “decade of repa-triation” (Hammerstad 2000). This shift away from third-country resettlement and host integration is heavily criticized, with claims that repatriation is eroding rights of asylum, preventing refugees from accessing safety in wealthy democra-cies, and states’ self-interests are motivating a seemingly unhumanitarian policy (Barnett 2001a; Chimni 2004; Hathaway 2007;Adelman and Barkan 2011). Yet, as discussed in the previous paragraph, hosting states do not find it in their self-interest to host refugees (Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004). This leads to the expec-tation, that, in general, host states will prefer to return refugees.
International law dictates four preconditions for refugee return processes: (1) there is a fundamental change of circumstances in the home country, (2) the deci-sion to return is voluntary in nature, (3) a tripartite agreement is signed between the origin state, host country, and the UNHCR, and (4) that the return process happens in safety and dignity. However, repatriation in dignity and safety is rarely what transpires in reality. As host states are demanding refugees leave as soon as possible, the UNHCR is pressured to act (Barnett 2001b). Given wealth-ier and more developed states are the major donors to the UNHCR (Zeager and Bascom 1996), the organization is beholden to their demands and are unable to
force these countries into accepting more refugees. While a “safe” return is less likely, there are ethical challenges of refusing to help refugees return simply be-cause they are returning to less than ideal conditions or to assist them regardless because some help is better than none (Gerver 2016).4
While the budget and operations of the UNHCR have expanded since the 1990s to accommodate the shift in policy towards repatriation (Hammerstad 2000), the UNHCR is still under-resourced to provide adequately for refugees.
This leads to varying degrees of a “voluntary” return. A truly voluntary return is when a refugee has full control of the decision to return or to stay permanently in the host country. A less voluntary decision of return occurs when there are finan-cial incentives, typically paid by the host country or an organization, that funds their return or staying in the host country and risking forcible return at some point in the future. Israel provided South Sudanese and Cote d’Ivorian refugees with an ultimatum to return “voluntarily” with a stipend or face detention or deportation without a stipend (Gerver 2014). Even though the South Sudanese refugees were concerned about poverty, crime, and violence, they returned be-cause of the threat of detention. The least voluntary type of return happens when refugees are pushed to return by everything but the use of force, to the point that they really have no choice in the matter (Black and Gent 2006), which some argue is a form of refoulement (Chimni 1993; Hathaway and Neve 1997).5
4Activities of agencies can include facilitation, such as coordinating transportation and as-sisting in documentation for return, or to directly promote return by encouraging refugees to consider return as the viable solution to displacement, funding “go see” visits, and initiating local reintegration programs (Bradley 2013). Yet, some agencies refuse to provide these services if they believe conditions in the country of origin are not safe for their return (Gerver 2016).
5Refoulement is defined as the expulsion or return of a refugee to a place where her life or
Collectively, the literature suggests that in practice, refugees are not returning in accordance with international law and promoting repatriation as the solution for refugee situations put refugees in danger. Additionally, the literature ascribes normative assumptions that return must happen with safety and dignity. This neglects whether refugees have agency and the necessity to return under condi-tions prescribed by international law. In the next section, I develop expectacondi-tions on when refugee return is more likely using a push and pull framework of host and origin states. Based on these factors, refugees, host states, and international organizations are more likely to promote return when conditions in the origin state are improving and deteriorating in the host state.