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ABYZANTINE INSTRUCTIONALM A N U A L ON SIEGE DEFENSE:
THE DE OBSIDIONE TOLERANDA1.
INTRODUCTION, ENGLISHTRANSLATION2ANDANNOTATIONS
Denis F. Sullivan
with a reprint of the Greek text edited by Hilda van den Berg
DATE ANDAUTHOR
The Byzantine military treatise known under the Latin title De obsidione t o l e r a n d a provides an instructional handbook, using a precept and his-torical precedent approach, for a general officer in command of a city under siege. It was first edited by Melchisédech Thévenot (with Ph. de La Hire) in 16933from inferior manuscripts4; his edition was translated into French by E. Caillemer5. The text was next fully edited only more than 250 years after Thévenot from the best manuscript witnesses by Hilda van den Berg6. Her text is reproduced here with an annotated English translation.
A terminus ante quem for the composition of the treatise, as van den B e rg noted in her introduction, is provided by its inclusion in two manu-scripts, Vaticanus graecus 1164 and Barberinianus 276, the former dated to the early 11th century or possibly late tenth, the latter to the early 11 t h c e n t u r y. Internal references in the treatise place the terminus post quem as the early 10th century. The anonymous author refers (64:8)7 to the x e i r o s ¤ f v n o n, a device mentioned by Leo VI (886-912) as a recent Byzantine invention8; he also employs the term l a › s a (50:6, 57:3, 74:18) for a siege shed (t e s t u d o), a usage which Eric McGeer has shown to be 10th-century9. Anonymous mentions (78:9-10) an Arab siege of
1 For many years the highlight of the summer in Washington, D.C. was the presence of Nikos Oikonomides at Dumbarton Oaks. It is with a profound sense of sadness that I find this piece published in a memorial volume to him and not in a birthday Festschrift.
2 I am most grateful to Professor Elizabeth Fisher who has read the Introduction and sec-tions of the translation and offered a number of valuable suggessec-tions.
3 Veterum Mathematicorum Athenaei, Bitonis, Apollodori, Heronis, Philonis et aliorum Opera (Paris: 1693) 317-30.
4 van den Berg 34: “e codicibus deterioribus”; Rochas d’Aiglun (1872) 200 comments: “Le texte tel que l’ont publié Thévenot et Lahire est extrêmement incorrect”.
5 Caillemer (1872) 199-253.
6 Anonymus de obsidione toleranda (Leiden: 1947).
7 References are to van den Berg’s page and line numbers.
8 Leo VI, Taktika XIX:57.
9 E. McGeer (1991) 129-40.
Thessalonike, almost certainly that of 904 and, given the author’s lack of any further comment on it, presumably still memorable and close to the date of composition. Following Martin1 0, van den Berg also plausibly dates the reference to the capture of Kitros by the “most cruel Bulgarians” (52:8-11) during the period 913-924 when they frequently invaded Byzantine territory; the author’s characterization of the Bulgarians suggests recent and perhaps personal experience. Thus a date of composition in the first half of the tenth century is probable.
The situation is, however, complicated by the fact that the anonymous 10th-century author is presumably drawing on a lost source, called by A . Dain the A n t i p o l i o rc e t i c u m11. Dain edited1 2, in an article apparently unknown to van den Berg, a short untitled text found in Ambrosianus B-119-Sup. (Gr. 139), which he called Mémorandum inédit sur la défense des places and whose compilation he dated to the second half of the tenth c e n t u r y. It consists of brief extracts which closely parallel in sequence and content the De obsidione toleranda, but with differences which led Dain to conclude that the two texts derive independently from a lost source. I provide an English translation of the M é m o r a n d u m as an appen-dix to this Introduction; items 11, 12, 13, 16, 23, and 26 contain the mate-rial not found in the De obsidione toleranda. Based on the two extant texts Dain suggested that this lost source consisted of two main sections, a discussion of various means of defending against a siege, and a series of historical accounts of famous sieges. He dated1 3this A n t i p o l i o rc e t i c u m in a wide range between Theodosius II (408-450) or his immediate successors and Constantine VII (913959). One might add that the De obsid -ione toleranda contains a reference (50:16-21) to the Persian siege of Caesarea in 611. If this notice was in the A n t i p o l i o rc e t i c u m, which, given the date 611 and the unique information on the siege the notice provides (i.e. that the Persians entered the city through a tunnel under the walls), seems likely though not certain, it would bring the lower limit for that text to the early seventh century.
This situation, then, leaves the date of many statements in the D e obsidione toleranda uncertain. Dain commented that the 10th-century author did not simply paraphrase an older model, but inserted personal r e m a r k s ;1 4some of these are clear, as noted above; others may be less so.
The traditional nature of such texts and the continuity of both off e n s i v e and defensive siege techniques further complicates identification of
140 DENIS F.SULLIVAN
10 Martin (1854) 327-28; van den Berg 3.
11 Dain (1967) 349-50 and 366-67.
12 Dain (1940)124-27.
13 Dain (1967) 350.
14 Dain (1967) 359.
specifically 10th-century practice and innovation. Thus in the absence of a verifiable tenth-century date for specific material, the reader should keep an open mind.
We know virtually nothing of the 10th-century author or of the author of the A n t i p o l i o rc e t i c u m. The De obsidione toleranda refers (61:9-10) to another treatise which the author claims to have written “On Torch [Signals]”
(Per‹ fan«n), but which author, if either, is responsible is not clear.15 CONDITION OF THE TEXT
van den Berg edited the text from three manuscripts, Vaticanus graecus 1164 (V), Barberinianus 276 (P) and Escorialensis Y- I I I - 11 (E). She noted in her introduction scholarly consensus on these three as the source of all other copies and considered V and P independent witnesses, but E as copied from V, and thus used E only in the final sections where V h a s lost folios (from 92:1). The manuscripts are plagued by numerous lacu-nae and van den Berg often suppleted the text from parallel sources or logically from the context. Her suppletions have been translated here in angle brackets with indication of the source. With two exceptions (noted with “DS”) all suppletions and emendations are taken from her appara-tus or appendix. Through the kindness of Fr. George Dennis I have been able to examine mss. V and P in microfilm and I consider the printed edi-tion carefully done. van den Berg also provided an extensive register of Byzantine and classical f o n t e s and parallel passages; I have in general noted f o n t e s only when not included in her exhaustive list. Where the text is virtually a verbatim quotation from an earlier source, the translation is italicized. I have benefited here from P. A. Brunt’s translation of A r r i a n1 6, H. St. J. T h a c k e r a y ’s translation of Josephus1 7, and W. R. Paton’s trans-lation of Polybius1 8, although I have generally attempted a more literal rendering as well as adjusting to differences in the text of the De obsid -ione toleranda.
ORGANIZATION
The treatise is written to a “general” (s t r a t h g Ò w), who is directly addressed in the vocative (“o general”) on two occasions (45:14, 98:14);
the Greek title has “How a general . . . must withstand the siege . . . .”
Two other instances indicate specifically that “the general” must take 141
INSTRUCTIONAL MANUAL ON SIEGE DEFENSE
15 So Dain (1967) 350.
16 Arrian, with an English translation (Cambridge, MA: 1976-1983).
17 Josephus, The Jewish War with an English translation (Cambridge, MA: 1927-28).
18 Polybius, Histories (Cambridge, MA: 1922-27).
certain actions (54:10, 55:6), a usage found in ten instances in the M é m o r a n d u m, indicating that this approach was in the A n t i p o l i o rc e t i c u m. The text is not focused on a single city, but considers various alternatives: the presence or absence of islands to provide food, specific needs of cities on the sea, the presence or absence of terrain use-ful for ambushing the enemy, cities with and without tunnels under the walls, etc. There are two references to the Bulgarians, their capture of Kitros mentioned above and one on enemy ambush techniques (“The Bulgarians customarily do this” 62:17) suggesting the 10th-century A n o n . ’s particular concern with the Balkans.
Dain described the organization of the treatise as “malheureusement v a g u e ”1 9. This is perhaps overly pessimistic; while not tightly compart-mentalized, there are some basic categories. The author begins with generic encouragement not to capitulate when a siege threatens, since the enemy is only human and susceptible to various problems. He then deals with the issue of providing immediate necessities, first if food supplies are abundant, then in cases of scarcity, and continuing with possible evacuation of noncombatants, organization of craftsmen, and the impor-tance of inventiveness2 0, again citing conditions of abundance and rec-ommending provision of various commodities and raw materials, and concern for the water supplies. He then considers fortification issues:
repair and raising of walls, securing tunnels, adding loopholes to walls, digging ditches, securing them with palisades and filling them with water; securing the “b r a c h i o l i o n” (a kind of defensive jetty) if on the coast, constructing bridges over the ditches, and positioning chevaux de f r i s e, caltrops and warning bells. He then examines “personnel” issues:
oversight of the watch, capital punishment for deserters, training in weapons use, organization of army units and their leaders, training for enemy attacks by simulation. He then considers action in the face of the imminent arrival and subsequent presence of the enemy: securing flocks and herds or if necessary slaughtering them for the meat, destroying non-essential animals which would deplete supplies, reaping the fields and bringing in livestock and people, ambushing the enemy if they are pro-ceeding in disarray, poisoning rivers, lakes and wine containers, coordi-nating ambushes with friendly forces inside as well as outside the city and carefully estimating the time of such an ambush, using clear signals to allow friendly forces back in while excluding the enemy, setting fire to enemy siege machines, waging pitched battles and attacking the e n e m y ’s homeland, attacking enemy foragers, fighting in relays when the enemy does so, providing defenses against battering rams and siege
142 DENIS F.SULLIVAN
19 See Dain (1967) 359.
sheds, and using mats, new walls and ditches to defend breached portions of walls. Two final sections are dominated by use of lengthy historical examples. The first advocates the use of counter stratagems against overt enemy operations, with emphasis on inventiveness, as exemplified by Archimedes, to create them and adds encouraging comments on the weakness of contemporary enemies who could not do what A l e x a n d e r did at Tyre and Gaza or Titus at Jerusalem. The second deals with covert enemy operations, citing A l e x a n d e r’s capture of the rocks of Sogdiana and Chorienes, the text ending abruptly in the midst of that example.
HISTORICALEXAMPLES
The precepts in the treatise are generally presented in the form “it is nec-essary” (de› o r x r Æ) followed by an infinitive or simply by an infinitive withd e › or x r Æ in ellipsis2 1. In some instances this is accompanied by an explanation introduced by “in order that” (· n a) or “for” (g ã r ). A n o t h e r major feature of the treatise is citation of historical examples to support the recommendations. In the first half these are usually brief and serve to reinforce a suggestion either positively or negatively. For example, the proposal (50:11-13) to raise the height of the walls even while under enemy fire is given credence by citing Josephus, who did the same at Jotapata. The proposal to secure any tunnels in the walls (50:14) is fol-lowed by three examples of the negative consequences of failing to so. In at least one case examples are used to show the weakness of a tentative recommendation. At 65:3, after suggesting an attack on the enemy’s home territory to force them to lift a siege, the text continues: “But then this has often ruined many.” The example of the failure of Hannibal’s attack on Rome in an attempt to lift the siege of Capua is cited with addi-tional historical parallels. In two instances a raaddi-tionale for the examples is specifically stated. At 84:10-17 the author notes as encouragement that no contemporary enemy forces could mount the kind of sieges brought by Alexander at Tyre and Gaza and Titus at Jerusalem, followed by lengthy citations of those sieges. At 98:4ff he indicates that he uses the examples to show that even the most clever enemies can be resisted by those under siege and that contemporary enemies are weaker than those of the past. Then, advocating the necessity of carefully guarding against 143
INSTRUCTIONAL MANUAL ON SIEGE DEFENSE
20 The treatise mentions “inventiveness” (§p¤ noia) again at 48:1, 78:3, 84:11 and perhaps at 98:19.
21 As these are addressed, as noted above, to a general officer, one might speculate that the author is also one himself or a compiler writing with the support of a general or emperor.
covert enemy operations, he cites at length A l e x a n d e r’s unexpected method of capturing the rocks of Sogdiana and Chorienes2 2.
RELATION TO OTHER MILITARY MANUALS
The treatise is in the tradition of didactic military manuals stretching back to Aineias Ta c t i c u s ’ (4th-century BC) How to Survive under Siege.
While that treatise, despite its traditional title, covers considerably more than siege defense, it does provide specific advice on protecting walls and gates, dealing with incendiary devices, detecting and thwarting sap-pers, etc. and does so with frequent use of historical examples to corrob-orate its recommendations2 3. The 3rd-century BC compendium (MhxanikØ sÊntajiw ) of Philo of Byzantium2 4includes a P o l i o r k h t i k ã with detailed instructions on constructing city defenses, and with recom-mendations on preparations for and defensive actions while under siege, including some similar to ones found in the De obsidione toleranda ( e . g . , lists of commodities, digging three defensive ditches, etc.). The late 6th-century S t r a t e g i k o n of Maurice2 5(Book X:3) provides brief but detailed instructions for siege defense which are largely repeated with some addi-tions in Leo V I ’s (early 10th-century) Ta k t i k a2 6 XVI:46-66. Some of these find parallels in the De obsidione toleranda, e.g., concern for sup-plies for the estimated time of the siege, evacuation of those useless for siege defense in cases of scarcity, use of heavy mats hung over the bat-tlements to defend against stones from enemy stone throwers, and mat-tresses and sacks filled with chaff or sand to defend against rams, etc.
The contemporary 10th-century anonymous Sylloge tacticoru m, Chapter 53 (“What the besieged general must do”), drawing in part on Leo’s Ta k t i k a, includes similar recommendations regarding provisions of sup-plies, evacuation of the noncombatants, dividing the army into units, fighting in relays, hanging heavy mats from the battlements, using sacks of chaff or sand against rams, using x e i r o s ¤ f v n a, digging counter exca-vations against sappers with subsequent use of fire and smoke in an
144 DENIS F.SULLIVAN
22 On the possible source of these siege descriptions, already present in the Antipoliorceticum, in an earlier compilation of historical extracts, see Dain (1967) 349, with an opposing view in van den Berg 21-22.
23 See Whitehead (1990). He estimates (38) that historical precedents constitute one-third of Aineias’ treatise.
24 For the text with French translation see Y. Garlan, Recherches de poliorcétique grecque (Paris: 1974) and for partial English translation, A. W. Lawrence, Greek Aims in Fortification (Oxford: 1979) 89-99.
25 For the text see Maurice Strategikon; for English translation see Dennis (1984).
26 For the complete text see PG 107. A new edition and translation is in preparation by Fr.
George Dennis.
earthen jar, etc. The De velitatione2 7(ca. 975), Chapter 21 (“The siege of a fortified town”), instructs a general to provide food supplies for four months or more, insure that there is water in the cisterns, employ coor-dinated night attacks, destroy anything outside which might be useful to the enemy, and to use diversions to get supplies into the besieged city, while indicating that the topic has been covered in greater detail by pre-vious writers on tactics and strategy. Yet at the same time each of these seven treatises contains seemingly unique items; in the De obsidione t o l e r a n d a these include use of human excrement against siege sheds and use of sacks filled with beans to absorb ram blows, etc. The precise rela-tionships of these common and unique elements awaits further scholarly i n q u i r y.
APPENDIX
Mémorandum inédit sur la défense des places, ed. A. Dain (1940) 124-27.
This brief text begins virtually each item with ˜ t i , presumably the abbre-viated version of ÉIst° on ˜ti (“Be aware that”) found frequently in the De administrando imperio2 8and the De cerimoniis2 9, often used in mar-ginal notes and as a formula of transition. The same formula is also found in the “table of contents” and a number of chapter headings in the S y l l o g e t a c t i c o ru m and in the so-called Strathgikå paragg° lmata3 0. A n g l e brackets indicate Dain’s additions to the text, square brackets my own additions for clarity.
1. [Be aware] <that it is necessary> especially in this situation to call upon the invincible power of God.
2. [Be aware] that it is necessary to suspend [regular] commerce in wheat and other foodstuffs in time of siege, and that the general order those who have them to sell all at a moderate price, keeping for them-selves only what they need for a specified time.
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INSTRUCTIONAL MANUAL ON SIEGE DEFENSE
27 See Dennis (1984) 223-27.
28 See J. B. Bury, “The treatise De administrando imperio”, BZ 15 (1906) 517-77, specifi-cally 538-39.
29 See J.B. Bury, “The Ceremonial Book of Constantine Porphyrogennetos”, English Historical Review, 209-27 and 417-439, specifically 223 with n. 41 and 428 and Haldon (1990) 42-43.
30 J.-A. Foucault, Strategmata (Paris: 1949) 110-120.
146 DENIS F.SULLIVAN
3. [Be aware] that it is necessary for the general in a timely manner to train the workmen who are useful to a besieged city, namely engi-neers, siege machine operators, builders, arms manufacturers, rope makers and the others <and> to gather and support them with promis-es of payment and make them quite eager.
4. [Be aware] that it is necessary to prepare c h e i ro m a g g a n a3 1and pro-jecting beams <able> to throw heavy stones from the battlements.
5. [Be aware] that it is necessary to provide many arrows and to cut notches in them and thus to shoot them at the enemy.
6. [Be aware] that when the enemy are present nothing prevents increasing the height of the wall during the night, and devising l a i s a i3 2 (l a Û s s ã w ) to intercept the missiles of the enemy.
7. [Be aware] that it is necessary to search out the tunnels and secure them; for through these many cities have been captured.
8. [Be aware] that it is necessary to put in place numerous bow-bal-listas and to ward off the enemy with them. Likewise it is also neces-sary to dig ditches and make them deep.
9. [Be aware] that <it is necessary> if the city is by the sea to bind together masts of large ships and large poles, and to attach these to the wall and by means of these to blockade ships approaching the wall.
10. [Be aware] that it is necessary to hang bells on the battlements so that should the guards be negligent [the bells will] give warning of the secret attack of the enemy.
11. [Be aware] that it is necessary at night for the watches to be close-ly arrayed and to rouse one another with trumpets.
12. [Be aware] that it is necessary to close the taverns lest through drunkenness the troops be enervated in time of battle.
31 On the term see footnote 34 of the text.
32 On the term see footnote 48 of the text.
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INSTRUCTIONAL MANUAL ON SIEGE DEFENSE
13. [Be aware] that it is necessary for the general to order that no one abandon his section of the wall in time of war, nor be fearful of sud-den rumors coming from another part of the city which some cowards or traitors are spreading.
14. [Be aware] that it is necessary that a deserter in this situation be punished by the general.
15. [Be aware] that it is necessary for the general to train the archers and the javeliners and the other engineers so that when necessity calls they are ready to perform their duties.
16. [Be aware] that it is necessary for there to be officers on each part of the wall and for elite troops to be distributed everywhere,
16. [Be aware] that it is necessary for there to be officers on each part of the wall and for elite troops to be distributed everywhere,