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TWO MILITARY ORATIONS OF CONSTANTINE VII Eric McGeer
“Un empereur doit faire la guerre, comme Basile Ier, ou écrire sur la guerre, comme Léon VI” — so wrote Paul Lemerle in his essay on the military encyclopedias produced during the reign of Constantine VII.
True to the example of his father, Constantine saw it as his duty to pro-mote the revival of military science by collecting and copying treatises on warfare in its various aspects, yet he also aspired to lead his armies on campaign in person, in the pattern of his grandfather and founder of his dynasty. Although Constantine was never to realise his ambition to accompany his soldiers in the field, his place in the history of Byzantine military literature is assured, and his reign as sole emperor (945-59) stands out as the pivotal stage in the wars against the Arabs during the tenth century. After ousting his Lekapenid co-rulers with the support of military aristocrats whose fortunes were intertwined with his own, prin-cipally the members of the Phokas family, Constantine rewarded his allies by elevating them to the high command and placing the resources of the empire at their disposal. The regulation of the soldiers’ properties, the changes in the military administration, the improvements in training, tactics and equipment, and the increased recruitment of foreign merce-naries combine with the renewed interest in military theory to demon-strate the intensification of the Byzantine military effort during the reign of Constantine VII. At the time of the emperor’s death in November 959, the Byzantines stood poised to achieve a series of landmark victories — the recovery of Crete, the conquest of Cilicia, and the capture of Antioch
— which would establish them as the dominant power in the eastern Mediterranean for the next century.
Byzantine supremacy along the eastern frontiers did not come about easily or automatically, however. In fact, through much of Constantine’s reign the Byzantines lurched from one defeat to another, none more glar-ing than the failure of the expedition sent to take Crete in 949.1The sting of this disaster, painful to an emperor who had staked the prestige and divine sanction of his dynasty on the success of this venture, was com-pounded by the humiliations visited upon the Byzantines by a new adver-sary whose rise to power coincided almost exactly with Constantine’s
1 The lists recording the mobilisation and rates of pay for this expedition have now been edited by Haldon (2000) 201-352.
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assumption of sole authority. This was Sayf al-Dawla, Hamdanid emir of Aleppo from 944 until his death in 967, reviled in the Greek chronicles as the ‘foul’ or ‘impious Hamdan,’ who in the spirit of the djihad led yearly raids into Byzantine territory, seizing booty and prisoners and scoring some notable successes against the foremost Byzantine com-manders of the time.2 Much more significant than the material gains and losses resulting from these campaigns were the reputation and propagan-da value which the Muslim emir acquired from his exploits against the infidel, and the corresponding damage to Constantine’s image as the divinely appointed defender of the Christian realm.3 The Byzantine response to the challenge posed by Sayf al-Dawla was therefore not con-fined to the battlefield; it also involved staging triumphs and ceremonies to promote the aura of imperial victory,4and bolstering the morale of the
‘host beloved by Christ’ sent forth to fight against a foe singled out as the archenemy of the Christian faith.
Two harangues attributed to Constantine VII record the appeals and the incentives, spiritual and worldly, by which the emperor sought to rouse the martial ardour of his men. Both were composed as circulars to be read out to the soldiers of the eastern armies, and both refer directly to Sayf al-Dawla as the enemy they must confront. The first, published by Hélène Ahrweiler, comes from the early stages of the Byzantine-Hamdanid conflict when Sayf’s reputation was on the rise.5The second, published by Rudolf Vári, was composed at the moment when the tide had turned decisively in favour of the Byzantines.6 What follows is a translation and discussion of the two harangues which will set them in their historical context and explore them as sources for the study of mil-itary policy and ideology during the reign of Constantine VII.
The two speeches are preserved in a single codex, the Ambrosianus B 119 sup., one of the major collections of military works assembled dur-ing the tenth and early eleventh centuries.7The Ambrosianus has been studied in detail by C.M. Mazzucchi whose analysis clarified a number of points relating to the origin of the manuscript and the chronology of Constantine’s speeches.8 From the dedication extolling the military
2 The course of these wars is traced by Canard (1951) 715-863; Vasiliev (1935-1968) II.1 311-80. The élan and skill of Sayf’s leadership were at their best in the 956 campaign: Howard-Johnston (1983).
3 The poems of Mutanabbi memorably convey the drama and spirit of Sayf’s campaigns:
see Canard (1973).
4 McCormick (1986) 159-78.
5 Ahrweiler (1967) 393-404 (Greek text on pp. 397-9).
6 Vári (1908) 75-85 (Greek text on pp. 78-84).
7 Dain (1967).
8 Mazzucchi (1978) 276-92, 310-16.
achievements of Basil the parakoimomenos and from the presence of several works on naval warfare, Mazzucchi concluded that the manu-script was commissioned by the eunuch and courtier Basil Lekapenos sometime between his return from his successful eastern campaign in the autumn of 958 and June of 960, when the large force under Nikephoros Phokas set sail for Crete, an expedition which the ambitious Basil had apparently hoped to lead.9 An inventory of the manuscript’s contents shows that the parakoimomenos had reserved a section for works of mil-itary oratory. The first is a sixth-century manual known as the Rhetorica militaris10, which is followed by a collection of military speeches (Conciones militares) drawn from the ancients (Xenophon, Flavius Josephus, Herodian), and the two harangues of Constantine VII.11
The attachment of the imperial harangues to this small anthology of military rhetoric has some bearing on the study of the two speeches, par-ticularly the second. It is evident that they were included as contempo-rary models of the protreptikoi logoi, or exhortations, outlined in the Rhetorica militaris, and therefore underwent slight revisions to give them the faceless character proper to literary exemplars. In three places in the second speech, the copyist replaced the name of a Byzantine com-mander with the elliptic ı de›na (‘so and so’) or a generic plural,12 put-ting us at one remove (at least) from the oration as composed by Constantine or drafted for him by an official.13
The art of inciting men to battle is as old as the Iliad, and the power of oratory to inspire soldiers could be used to great effect by ancient commanders, as shown by an Alexander or a Caesar.14 The ability to rouse the courage of their soldiers with the spoken word ranked high among the desirable attributes of Byzantine generals, who could pad their repertoires with the pithy sayings and beaux gestes of illustrious 113
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9 Mazzucchi (1978) 292-5, 302-3; Basil’s interest in the documents pertaining to the 949 expedition is noted by Haldon (2000) 236-8. On Basil’s life and career, see Brokkaar (1972);
Bouras (1989).
10 Ed. Köchly (1856); see also Dain (1967) 343-4, and Hunger (1978) II 327-8. Only a por-tion of the text is preserved in the Ambrosianus; the full text is found in the Laurentianus LV, 4, the great military manuscript copied during the reign of Constantine VII. Once thought to be anonymous, the Rhetorica militaris in fact forms part of a larger work attributed to Syrianus Magister: see Zuckerman (1990) 209-24 (in which a forthcoming edition of Syrianus’s text is announced).
11 Dain (1967) 364.
12 Cf. Mazzucchi (1978) 303-4, esp. note 110.
13 It is possible that Theodore Daphnopates had a hand in the composition of the second speech, as the parallels between this work and the final portion of Theophanes continuatus, which Daphnopates is thought to have written, suggest; see below, note 79.
14 Alexander the Great’s use of oratory, with its dramatic effects of timing, variation of tone and emotion, and performance, is discussed by Keegan (1987) 54-9.
commanders recorded in the military handbooks.15 On a more formal level, as with other branches of rhetoric, the technique of composing and delivering military orations was well established, following the design and examples laid out in the aforementioned Rhetorica militaris. The for-mulaic nature of these set pieces, however, should not obscure the valu-able function ascribed to them by Byzantine tacticians. The Strategikon of Maurice (ca. 600) records brief instructions on the ‘useful role’ of the cantatores, heralds ‘who before the clash of arms should say a few words of encouragement [tina ... protreptika] reminding the soldiers of previous victories.’16The author of the De velitatione (ca. 970) instructs the com-mander to deliver a speech ‘sweet as honey’ to his men to stir their courage before they close with the enemy,17and in his second harangue Constantine himself praises a commander who made effective use of
‘inspiring speeches’ (logois protreptikois) as he led his forces on a suc-cessful raid into the regions of Tarsos.18In a broader sense, the orations read out to the army also formed, along with acclamations, official salu-tations, and daily religious rituals, an integral part of the imperial propa-ganda which affirmed the army’s special status, its loyalty to the emper-or, and the ideals for which it fought.19
A reading of Constantine’s speeches reveals the influence of the Rhetorica militaris, a work he certainly knew,20and of his father Leo VI’s Taktika (extensively reworked during Constantine’s reign), in which the contents suitable to an address to soldiers are summarised as follows:
XII. 70. We think that the role of the so-called cantatores is appropri-ate at the time of battle. These are the men who incite the army with speeches, offering advice, repeating their message, and summoning it to battle. Such a task should be performed, if possible, by men from among the soldiers themselves or their officers. The officers select those men who are eloquent and capable of addressing the army, for
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15 E.g. Leonis Tactica II.12; Sylloge tacticorum, sections 76-102.
16 Strategikon II.19, VII A.4.
17 Dagron, Mihaescu (1986), chapter XXIII.20-31, with comments on 284-6.
18 The speeches put in the mouths of emperors or commanders lend dramatic effect to the narratives of campaigns and battles: see Theophanes (Mango and Scott) 436, 439 (recycled in Theophanes continuatus 478.7-18), 441, 442-3, 448; De Creta capta I.59-70, 73-100, II.140-166, IV.45-52,
54-56; Leo the Deacon 12.5-13.10, 21.12-23, 72.23-74.12, 130.19-131.12. Speeches of Arab leaders to their men, as recorded in Byzantine sources, make an interesting contrast: Karapli (1993).
19 Koutrakou (1993) 350-86. The salutation recited by the emperor to his soldiers, recorded in the third of the three campaign treatises prepared by Constantine, should be taken in con-nection with our two harangues: Haldon (1990) Text C.466-473, and commentary 284-6.
20 Constantine recommends that the text of Syrianus Magister, to which the Rhetorica mil-itaris belonged, be included in the imperial campaign baggage: Haldon (1990) Text C.196-204, and commentary 210-12.
the sharing of hardship and the toils of war make the listeners more receptive to fellow soldiers who accompany them.
XII.71 The cantatores should say such words of encouragement as these to the army facing battle: first, they should remind them of the reward of faith in God, of the emperor’s benefactions, and of previous successes; that the battle is for the sake of God and for the love of Him and for the whole nation; moreover, that it is for their brethren of the same faith and, as it may be, for their wives and children and their fatherland; that the memory of those who earn distinction in wars for the freedom of their brethren remains eternal; that this struggle is against the enemies of God, and that we have God as our ally, Who holds the power to decide the outcome, whereas the enemy, as unbe-lievers, have Him set against them; and thinking of anything else in a similar vein, [the cantatores] should stimulate morale. This sort of address, delivered at the right moment, can rouse spirits mightily, more than any amount of money can.
These themes all appear, in greater or lesser measure, in both of Constantine’s circulars, shaped to the circumstances of the moment. He was also the heir to the distinction his father had drawn half a century earlier between the Christian empire and the realm of Islam, now mani-fest in the struggle between the heroic defenders of Christian Byzantium and the forces of Sayf al-Dawla along the eastern frontiers.21Yet despite the derivative character of the two harangues, they are more than mere rhetorical exercises or a pastiche of clichés. They refer to contemporary events, they bear witness to the changes in Byzantine military policy dur-ing the 950s, and they shed light on the question of morale and motiva-tion in the armies of the time. Most importantly, they display the image which Constantine VII — an emperor ever mindful of the precariousness of imperial power and succession — sought to promote among his sol-diers, and how he hoped to translate military success into confirmation of the divinely sanctioned legitimacy of his dynasty.
We come now to the translations of the texts themselves.22 The first harangue can be divided into five main sections:
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21 On these and other passages of the Taktika, and Leo VI’s reaction to the Arabs, see Dagron (1983), esp. 224-32; Dagron, Mihaescu (1986) 161-2, 284-6.
22 I have taken into account the (minor) corrections made to Ahrweiler’s Greek text by Mazzucchi (1978) 296 note 83, and by Sevcenko (1992) 187 note 49 (who also lists correc-tions to Vári’s edition of the second harangue). I wish to thank Alice-Mary Talbot and Paul Magdalino for reviewing the translations and suggesting a number of improvements.
1) introduction praising the army’s recent victories which have won fame throughout the empire;
2) exhortation to the soldiers, emboldened by their victories and by their faith in Christ, to fight even more eagerly against the enemies of God;
3) dismissal of Sayf’s boasts and posturing as a bluff concealing his fear and weakness in the wake of his defeat;
4) expression of the emperor’s longing to be with his soldiers in per-son, among the truly virtuous and worthy;
5) administration of an oath to imperial officials to submit accurate reports of the army’s actions and to identify the soldiers and offi-cers deserving of rewards.
Ahrweiler proposed that the speech should be dated to the years 952-3, but Mazzucchi’s arguments for an earlier dating must be accepted.23 The recent (pr≈hn) triumphs over the Hamdanids which the emperor lauds in section 1 are without question those achieved by Leo Phokas, strategos of Cappadocia, during the spring and summer of that year. The first was his assault on the small fortress of Buqa when he succeeded in taking Nasir al-Dawla prisoner and inflicting heavy losses on the enemy; the second, and more spectacular feat of arms, came in October 950 when Phokas’s forces ambushed Sayf al-Dawla’s army as it returned laden with plunder from a raid into Byzantine territory.24These achievements were all the more praiseworthy since they offset the failure of the expedition to Crete the year before, but for our purposes it is significant to note that the Byzantines initially chose to exploit their success not with military action but with the prompt offer of a truce and exchange of prisoners.
This offer, however, was defiantly refused by Sayf, who vowed instead to avenge his defeat by resuming his raids into the realm of the infidel with even greater zeal.25 This truculent rejection of terms, raising the prospect of further defensive campaigns against Sayf, lies behind Constantine’s lengthy disparagement of the Hamdanid emir’s bluster and theatrics in section 3 (roughly a quarter of the speech), which follows the appeals to his soldiers in section 2 to return to the struggle against the enemy with the confidence derived from their victory and their hope in Christ. The correspondence between this sequence of events and the con-tents of the speech places its composition and delivery late in the year 950.
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23 Mazzucchi (1978) 296-8.
24 Canard (1951) 763-70; Vasiliev (1935-68) II.1 341-6; Dagron, Mihaescu (1986) 301-6.
25 Mutanabbi’s poems recounting the 950 disaster are replete with Sayf’s promises of revenge: Vasiliev (1935-68) II.2 308-14.
26 Theophanes continuatus 271.1-2, Skylitzes 137.55-6(Basil I); Leo the Deacon 53.19-54.4.
Commanders returning from campaign held reviews before disband-ing their armies to take stock of their manpower and equipment, to apportion plunder, and to confer promotion and rewards for valour. Basil I had conducted such ceremonies, and the historian Leo the Deacon records that at the end of the 964 campaign, Nikephoros Phokas brought his army back to Cappadocia and dismissed the soldiers with gifts and rewards, bidding them return in the spring with their weapons and hors-es in good condition.26We may assume that Constantine’s speech was read out in a similar scene, as the soldiers disbanded for the winter and received instructions on their mobilisation for the campaign the follow-ing sprfollow-ing.
[MILITARY ORATION OF THE EMPERORCONSTANTINE]27
1. As I receive word of the surpassing renown of your exploits, men, I do not know what words of praise from the emperor’s tongue I shall now fashion for you. What great things I have heard about you, and what great tidings have been brought back to me through the reports of my faithful servants, for they have given me accurate information, they have given me a true account of your valour, the amount of courage, the amount of zeal, the amount of spirit you have displayed against the enemy, and how you were embroiled in combat not as if against men but as if triumphing over feeble women, succeeding not as in battle or in war, but rather dealing with them as though it were child’s play, even though they were mounted on horses whose speed made them impossible to overtake,28even though they were protected by equipment unmatched in strength, equipment unmatched in crafts-manship, and lacked nothing at all of those things which bring secu-rity and cause astonishment. But since they were without the one paramount advantage, by which I mean hope in Christ, all of their advantages were reduced to nothing and were in vain. And so, saith the Lord, their carcasses were for an example on the face of the field, like grass after the mower, and there was none to gather them29. With confidence in this hope, and after entrusting your souls to it, you have set up such trophies as these against the enemy, you have striven for such victories as these, which have reached every corner of the world, and have made you famous not only in your native lands but also in 117
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27 The title and first letter are missing in the manuscript, for reasons explained by Mazzucchi (1978) 303-4.
28 The great speed of the horses ridden by the Bedouin was frequently remarked upon by Byzantine observers: cf. McGeer (1995) 238-42.
29 Jeremiah 9: 22
every city. Now your wondrous deeds are on every tongue, and every ear is roused to hear of them.
2. I still want you men, my peculiar people30, my strength and my
2. I still want you men, my peculiar people30, my strength and my