The preceding chapters have demonstrated that the instabilities of political outcomes vary systematically according to two factors a) the complexity of issue domains and b) the centrality of decision-making processes. When issues are comparatively simple, or organizations base outcomes on a market structure then changes are smooth and gradual. As issues become more complex and decision-making is centralized, then changes come is a series of fits-and-starts, with predominately marginal adjustments punctuated by dramatic changes.
The implications of these findings are substantial. First, they offer valuable nuance to punctuated equilibrium theory. Previous scholarship uses the theory to explain an observation – that political outcomes show frequent punctuations – and while important, there was little work dedicated to explaining variance within that outcome. Why do some organizational outcomes show more or fewer punctuations than others? Why does instability vary across issue domains? Most seriously, this deficit in the literature left a basic prediction of the theory untested – can we observe instabilities varying with attention such that attention scarcities correlate with
punctuations? Ultimately, the test of a theory must lie in its ability to make successful predictions. My research has found that attention does seem to be a crucial factor that can explain political stability – both issue complexity and market-based decision mechanisms relate directly to the capacity of organizations to attend to new information. In summary, punctuated equilibrium theory passes the test; a basic prediction is met.
My research, however, also presents a cautionary tale to anyone expecting political instabilities to be pronounced and inevitable. I documented many cases where, with simple
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issues and market-based structures in place, political outcomes change only gradually with time. Further, these conditions are not particularly rare within government, and relatively common taking a broad view of human enterprise. These observations are not hostile to the General Punctuation Hypothesis; rather, because they occur where attention is least scarce, they can be seen as exceptions that prove the rule. Still, given the emphasis in the literature that government decision-making will always results in punctuated outcomes, it is important to note that large areas of policymaking – monetary policy for instance – are not particularly unstable.
My research also invites a second look at the idea that the shape of output distributions has a great deal to tell us about government efficiency. The underlying logic – that inputs
relevant to governing should be normally distributed so outputs that deviate from normal indicate sub-optimal policymaking – is sound. But a key finding from Chapter 2 was that many
punctuations appear to be in response to stochastic crises. If scientists at NOAA have trouble accurately predicting the occurrence, duration, and path of hurricanes, then we can hardly expect policymakers in Washington to do any better. In other words, the level of precision necessary for governments to be comprehensive information processors far exceeds anything that exists in the world’s most powerful supercomputer. From this perspective, I have argued that punctuations can be a seen as a good thing, in the sense that we cannot reasonably expect our governments to foresee ever crisis, but can expect that they will respond dramatically to those crises when they occur. Divorcing the study of political instability from evaluations of efficiency does nothing to diminish this field of study, instead it encourages practical assessments of the ways in which policymaking is or is not successful. Most important, it forces researchers to take a closer look at the inputs relevant to governing in order to determine how governments respond to problems across different issue domains.
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Areas for further research are plentiful. Punctuations in government outputs are well- documented, more recent scholarship shows similar patterns of change in media coverage (Boydstun 2013), and my research shows that changes in public opinion are likewise unstable. This raises the tantalizing possibility that punctuations could be traced through the political system. Do punctuations in spending originate as dramatic shifts in public opinion? Do spikes in media coverage precipitate spikes in spending and opinion? Can we establish the existence of a national agenda where the government, media, and public all attend to the same issues at the same time? This line of research has implications for understanding the causes of political instability and also the relationship between three major components of the political system.
Another area for additional research is to further investigate the link between various input series and agenda setting dynamics. We can expect that the process of agenda setting is an interaction between policymakers, public opinion, and the severity of problem indicators. For example, Democratic presidents may wish to focus on unemployment or income inequality – issue domains closely associated with the Democratic Party’s platform – but if indicators suggest that these problems are getting better, it would be very difficult for a president to make the case that these are issues worthy of attention. In all, the process by which issues land on the agenda is complex and the literature is far from a fully specified model of agenda setting. My research advances the discussion by showing that the stability of policy outcomes varies substantially according to the relevant inputs, but this only a first step for integrating inputs into agenda setting models. The next step would be to determine how policymakers respond to problem indicators and how this response is conditioned by the severity of underlying problems.
Finally, interview and field-work based research may be highly useful in assessing differences across issue domains in the range of indicators—quantitative and qualitative—that
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are actually used in government decision-making. As discussed, it is often difficult for
researchers to link indicators with particular budget categories, or policy outcomes. One obvious possibility to surmount this difficulty would be to survey policymakers and simply ask what indicators they pay attention to. This approach would be beneficial for practical reasons –
because it would help researchers determine what indicators to associate with what policies – but also theoretically – as it would be interesting to see if instabilities are more likely when there is widespread disagreement over the relevant indicators. A lack of field-work is a significant gap in the literature on the causes of punctuations, or in validating the conceptual model with
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