Chapter Summary

In this chapter I have presented an overview of the implementation literature to emphasise the view that implementation is dependant on networks of actors operating within a complex social context of policy, operator discretion, and administrative direction. My purpose in reviewing this literature was to reinforce the perspective that implementation is both social and complex, and in a burgeoning literature is acknowledged as requiring “multiple linked social actors, often multiple organizational actors, to achieve collective purposes” (O’Toole and Meier 2004, 681). Notwithstanding, I note that most research remains focussed on issues of network management, performance measurement, and the development of empirical theory (O’Toole and Meier 2004).

Policy implementation, regardless of how many actors are involved, has consequences beyond the defined boundaries of the implementation network. These include distributional consequences that arise from conflict or competition within the implementing network, and from institutionalising the exclusion of some social actors. It is unlikely that insight into the distributional consequences of implementation will arise as an incidental or collateral benefit to research otherwise focussed on implementation success or administrative efficiency. The managerial focus is currently predominant in the literature. But this focus tends to

institutionalise aspects of implementation, rather than viewing them as constructs to be analysed. Institutionalising the view that administrative agencies are representative of the public interest limits opportunities to explore the possible exclusion of legitimate private interests which may, in fact, better represent a public good. One case in point is the

recognition of indigenous and archaeological private interests in the public interest arguments for archaeological regulatory policy.

This focus on the management of networks fails to account for the complex social and political environment in which implementation takes place. For this reason I follow O’Toole and Meier’s (2004) suggestion that earlier insights of Schattschneider (1960) potentially provides one way of moving beyond a focus on management to consider how implementation networks form and operate, their social content, and distributional consequences.

Schattschneider’s theory of politics provides several insights into policy as politics, including: 1) the role of bias in the formation of interests; 2) that strategic management of the scope of conflict is critical to success; 3) that scope is a function of inclusion and exclusion; 4) that the outcome of any political contest is at best temporary stability, and; 5) new contests may arise which absorb and redefine earlier contest outcomes. However, this theory is limited in its

original exposition to overt conflict between large, identified actors seeking a political resolution.

I take the position that this theory can be applied to policy implementation, and describe how it may be used to account for the social conditions underlying implementation networks and the local negotiations required when interrelated actors are engaged. I expand on the types of contests that may arise in implementation to include not only overt conflict between interests, but also cooptation, actor discretion when shielded from observation, and strategic action aimed at excluding certain interests or institutionalising dominant interest perspectives. In extending Schattschneider’s theory to account for the social dynamics inherent in

implementation, I draw on insights from actor-network theory (Callon 1986; Latour 2005). The social constructivist nature of actor-network theory allows any actor, organisation, individual, or policy instrument to be decomposed to expose the complex interactions from which it was formed. This perspective encourages the exploration of organisational action by considering the actors within the organisation both in terms of their defined roles and their associations with other, overlapping networks. In addition to decomposing normative actors into constituent parts, actor-network theory also provides a more dynamic account of how networks form, dissolve, or disappear (intact) as they are absorbed into larger actor-network formations.

The challenge in implementation research is not finding a forum within which deliberative democracy can be practiced, but in analysing and exposing the nature of the actors involved in implementation. Structural actors – organisations and institutions – that are given distinct status on normative grounds that there must be some form of administration are granted the authority to steer implementation towards specific outcomes. Unanalysed, the private interests of these actors are conflated with the public interest. But actions by some

organisational actors may be based in operator discretion (cf. Lipsky 1980), while others may be designed to satisfy administrative objectives (Wilson 2000).

There are other actors as well. Groups that were excluded intentionally or otherwise in the original struggle over policy remain as actors with interests relative to the distributional consequences of policy outcomes. Thus, addressing democratic shortcomings to policy or its implementation also requires the identification of these invisible actors, who are excluded from implementation networks and often overlooked as being ‘otherwise represented’ by more dominant actors. Although these groups may seek or be sought out by collaborative managers or discursive democrats, their participation may not arise until the implementation network is in place; then they are consulted as outsiders to a process in which most of the

benefits have been earmarked. For these actors, the greatest hope for meaningful inclusion comes from an exposition of the dominant actors as a means of challenging hegemony and changing the scope of policy and implementation. Among the actors to be analysed are those defined in the most radical sense: the policy documents, legal agreements, and administrative rules that guide or constrain the action of others.

In the next two chapters I explore the complex network relations that arise in policy and its implementation. For archaeological policy this raises a number of questions, such as: who are the network actors, how these actors are enrolled in the network, what is their relationship to the policy objectives or the central agency overseeing implementation, and what is their interest relative to the stated policy objectives. Questions also arise of whether the network relies on the exclusion of actors or interests, and what normative assumptions exist, but are operationally invisible to the actors engaged.

In chapter 3, I review the nature of regulatory policy, and the regulatory archaeological policies of several jurisdictions with similar political and colonial histories. In this review, I discuss the form of archaeological policy and how it shapes practice. In addition, I develop the argument that cross-jurisdictional borrowing by policy makers, similar to the exchange of ideas on the jurisprudence associated with indigenous treaty law, has institutionalised the exclusion of indigenous interests in this policy. In Chapter 4, I draw my focus to Ontario, Canada, and discuss how both the regulatory policy on archaeology and broader government initiatives around horizontal management create complex implementation networks, separate the central regulatory agency from local negotiations, and cause a number of intermediary documents to gain prominence as actors in implementation. In Chapter 5, I attempt to map out the implementation networks that have developed under these conditions in Ontario, by way of three case study examples. In the case studies my focus is on the manner in which policy objectives are altered through negotiation when network actors are faced with conflicting or vague policy objectives, multiple principals, or more directly in the face of formal cooptation or are shielded from direct observation by the central agency responsible for implementation. In this chapter, my concern is to identify which actors are engaged in negotiating the actions required by policy, and how these negotiations alter or otherwise affect policy outcomes.