Local practices and global policy consequences

Reflecting on the application of Schattschneider’s theory of politics to this research, as expanded using insights from actor-network theory, the theory continues to provide a responsive and robust means for analysing political contests at the level of policy

implementation. The theory is not, strictly speaking, predictive, but it does have the capacity

Ultimately, in this social constructivist view, the limits to knowledge and reality in any field are set by these statements, inscriptions, or texts (Law 2004).

to lead researchers beyond the managerial thinking that marks some of the current literature on implementation.

Beyond this managerial thinking lies the understanding that complex implementation networks are comprised of multiple local contests. Drawing on the actor-network theory concept of translation, individual actors in the implementation contest are themselves networks, drawing together and coordinating a range of other, smaller actors, documents, assumptions and practices, that shape their participation in the contest. Thus each participant is a local implementation contest, and the way in which they work with, and inter-define other participants through the exchange of intermediaries such as texts, money or techniques, define other, equally local implementation contests.

Applied to policy implementation, this perspective recommends that participants seeking to understand their roles and opportunities within the network look beyond local contests. This is especially true for central agencies seeking to manage the implementation network to produce desired outcomes. Their local contest, as I suggest in the analysis of the cases presented, involves ‘head office’ and ‘big picture’ concerns. Meeting the challenges of

results-based planning when implementing policy that has vague objectives and unmeasurable outcomes draws their focus inward, toward measurable targets. Formulating new policy documents to intercede on their behalf with other implementation participants is similarly local, as the policies contained in these documents are tested against other statute, policy, or practice performed by actors local to them. In the municipal planning example, the Ministry of Culture’s policy interaction was primarily with Municipal Affairs and Housing, and focussed on the goodness of fit between archaeological resource protection direction and Planning Act obligations of municipal planners and developers. Analysis would benefit in these cases from considering the local effect of the new policy document, how it fits with internal compliance and monitoring processes, and how it will add complexity to a local contest that may already be replete with a diverse range of texts and techniques.

In application, the theoretical approach taken in this research suggests a number of key considerations in future application. Each of these matches a general management strategy for engaging productively in policy implementation networks. The first consideration arises from the acknowledgement of policy documents as actors in the network. The addition of new textual actors increases the complexity of the contest in much the same manner that adding human or organisational actors does. Further, the introduction of documents intended as intermediaries between actors also presents the document as a representative of the

into circulation, and as representatives they may be seen as authorised to negotiate

implementation requirements on behalf of the originating actor. Increasing the complexity of the implementation network by adding actors and displacing others creates the conditions for local negotiations that do not include central agency actors directly. The displacement of the central agency can, in these local negotiations, lead to goal displacement as local

considerations override policy intent (Bohte and Meier 2000; Merton 1940).

Monitoring local contests is perhaps the most effective way of determining what outcomes these contests are producing. Monitoring may also provide a means for helping the central agency to stay engaged in local contests without an excessive increase in monitoring costs (cf. Mitnick 1975). Effective monitoring requires that a communication loop is created which distributes policy direction from the central agency to local implementing actors, and then requires a response, to the same agency, that identifies how the direction was carried out. In the cases reviewed, costs of monitoring were perceived by local actors as simply adding to the burden of carrying out archaeological resource protection measures. Currently, monitoring is both direct, in the case of the reports required under the terms and conditions of

archaeological licensing, and indirect where it is overseen by an agency other than the Ministry of Culture, or assumed to be addressed in the archaeological report prepared for licensing purposes. As I have discussed, the review of the archaeological report focuses on specific administrative checkpoints that address results based management commitments, not archaeological protection. Further, the report review cannot serve as a monitoring tool for municipal or forest management planning decisions regarding archaeological potential and the initiation of archaeological assessment projects. The Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing review of complete applications packages has a similar checklist approach to monitoring implementation of O. Reg. 544/06, by simply noting whether a report on archaeological potential has been prepared as part of the application review, but does not engage in a detailed review of the methodology or thoroughness of this report. Monitoring, in this case consists primarily of closing loops.

Managing implementation networks necessitates finding the middle ground between setting the networks loose to find their own outcomes and reasserting central authority over the network (Rhodes 2000; O’Toole 1997a). As the representative of the public interest in archaeology, a concept which I discussed in Chapter 3, the state may have a prerogative to steer implementation networks towards producing outcomes that support state priorities. O’Toole (1997a) argues in favour of central agencies acting to alter the network membership in a way that the balance of support is tilted in favour of the state’s objectives. In

recommending that public administrators “shift network membership toward more supportive coalitions [and] locate key allies” (O’Toole 1997a, 48), he is recommending managing the scope of participation in implementation contests. While this ensures that the negotiation efforts of managers return the desired results, it is difficult to reconcile this approach, as a form of agenda control (cf. Majone 2006; Stewart 2007) with normative expectations of democracy in public administration. In addition, O’Toole suggests that managing participation will “act to limit uncertainty and complexity” (1997a, 48). This objective is worthwhile, as small networks comprised of participants with similar backgrounds and sharing professional norms will produce predictable results (Wilson 2000). However, in the forest management planning case discussed in Chapter 5, scope expansion resulting in an increased diversity of views destabilised the implementation network, allowing Ministry of Natural Resources to reframe archaeology policy in the context of cultural heritage protection, and provide benefit to forestry interests. Thus, while outright manipulation of participation may be effective, it is not the only means of managing networks to return desired results. One final observation concerns the nature of policy that should be circulated within

implementation networks. Each policy document, and in the case of archaeology policy the assessment reports produced and letter of approval from the central agency, are all actors within these complex, but highly local networks. Policy that is formulated in response to a perceived social need or public interest carries with it the policy narrative on which it is based, and in this the traces of the original contest that negotiated the final form of the policy. Where the underlying narrative is one that serves private interests, these interests are

promoted, invisibly, through the network. Where the policy addresses administrative concerns, rather than substantive issues related to the policy subject, these rules become the objective of policy in the practice of the network. The normative objective of policy making should be the construction of a few robust statements that guide local decisions, but the results of the research reported in this thesis suggests that these local decisions would continue to serve local interests. Within diffuse networks such as the ones described, more policy coupled to more actors destabilises implementation and diminishes central actors ability to control for outcomes. Thus, a wider policy formulation objective should also be less policy coupled with greater compliance in the context of an anticipated implementation network. In seeking this it is important that implementation includes monitoring compliance and

flexibility in responding to unsatisfactory outcomes, and success in this requires that the field of implementation is kept clear of an excess of contradictory actors, human and non-human, seeking to advance their private interests.