The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review was the third such review (fourth if one counts the 1993 Bottom-Up Review294) since the Berlin Wall was torn down by joyous Germans. The consistent defense-plan-ning problem outlined in all previous post-Cold War strategic reviews was dealing with two nearly-simultaneous cross-border invasions in widely separated geographic theaters. However, since a key aim of the 2006 QDR was to “operationalize” the new National Defense Strategy, the 2006 QDR was guided by an entirely different strategy framework.
Accordingly, it identified four new strategic challenges that were to guide the Services and joint commands as they worked to adapt their force postures over the next two decades:
• Defending the homeland in depth;
• Fighting the Long War against radical extremists and defeating terrorist networks;
• Preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction; and
• Shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads.295
Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, applauded the new direction of the 2006 QDR, calling it “the most important and far-reaching review of our military
294 The Bottom-Up Review conducted by the first Clinton Administration in 1992–1993, was ostensibly the first “clean-sheet” post-Cold War strategic/
posture review. See Report on the Bottom-Up Review.
295 See 2006 QDR Report, especially pp. 19–34.
posture since the early days of the Cold War” and gave the report “high marks” for its articulated emerging challenges.296
Once these four emerging challenges were identified, QDR, OSD, Joint Staff, and Service planners began to analyze the joint force capa-bilities needed to confront them. As will be discussed in this chapter, it soon became clear that the existing joint aerospace capabilities portfolio would need to be revised and strengthened, especially in the areas of range, persistence, stealth, and battle networking.
D
EFENDING THEH
OMElAND IND
EpTHThe implacable hostility and global reach of international terrorist net-works, the proliferation of ballistic missiles, and rapid advances in Chi-nese military capabilities, including unconventional means of attack, demand that the Pentagon place increased emphasis on homeland defense. As the 2006 QDR Report put it:
The advent of long-range bombers and missiles, nuclear weapons, and more recently of terrorist groups with global reach, fundamentally changed the relationship between US geography and security. Geographic insu-larity no longer confers security for the country.297
Defending the homeland in depth implies a need for sustained global surveillance, both to identify potential threats before they fully form and to provide forewarning of imminent attacks. It also demands that the US develop capabilities to mount rapid preemptive strikes, if necessary. This helps to explain the 2006 QDR’s emphasis on improving:
• Air and maritime domain awareness capabilities to provide increased situational awareness and shared information on potential threats through rapid collection, fusion, and analysis;
and
296 Andrew F. Krepinevich, “The Quadrennial Defense Review,” testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, March 14, 2006, accessed online at http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/T.20060314.
QDRTestimony/T.20060314.QDRTestimony.pdf on March 20, 2006.
297 2006 QDR Report, p. 24.
• Tailored deterrence, including prompt global-strike capabili-ties to defend and respond in an overwhelming manner against WMD attacks, and air and missile defenses, as well as other defensive measures, to deter attacks by demonstrating the abil-ity to deny an adversary’s objectives.298
Achieving air and maritime domain awareness is a critical require-ment for securing the air and maritime approaches to the United States.
However, given that both aerospace and maritime attacks on the coun-try can be made over intercontinental ranges, air and maritime domain awareness is a global endeavor, demanding the assembly of a 24/7 (24 hours a day, seven days a week) surveillance network over large areas of the globe. Aerial ISR systems with long range and endurance, and with an ability to dwell over an area of interest for extended periods of time, will be critical nodes in this network and could give US decision-makers the ability to quickly focus in on any particular region or ocean of the world where intelligence suggests there is a rising threat.
As they have since the very beginning of the Cold War, prompt global-strike capabilities—the foundation for both deterrence and pre-emptive action—rely on aerospace platforms with great range, which enable the US to mount rapid global strikes from bases located in the United States or outside a targeted theater. Increasingly, these global-strike capabilities will rely as much, or more, on endurance, stealth, and persistence as sheer speed. In combination, range and stealth greatly increase the chances for successful unwarned preemptive strikes. And endurance and stealth, two closely related characteristics when oper-ating inside denied airspace, allow a platform to loiter and search for targets that are either hiding or fleeting. In other words, what is most important for future global-strike capabilities is “not raw speed but
‘loiter time,’ the ability to stay in enemy airspace long enough to hunt down elusive targets and then hit them within minutes before they fade away.”299 When combined with an ability to coordinate their actions with other platforms, platforms with range, endurance and persistence, and stealth will be able to swarm and disperse as part of a persistent surveillance-strike network capable of rapid global strikes.
Air platforms with a combination of greater range, endurance and persistence, stealth, and networking will also be especially valuable for
298 Ibid., p. 27.
299 Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “The Air Force’s Next Bomber,” National Journal, August 2007.
forward missile defense. A ballistic missile is most vulnerable immedi-ately after launch, during its boost phase, when the missile is struggling against gravity to reach its maximum velocity, when its rocket engines are emitting a massive infrared signature, and before it has had time to deploy its individual reentry vehicles (RVs) and decoys. For this reason, boost phase attack weapons are among the most sought-after defen-sive weapons in any layered ballistic missile defense system (BMDS).
Long-range, high-endurance, persistent, and stealthy aerial systems that are able to loiter for long times even inside contested airspace, and are armed with both air-to-ground and air-to-air weapons, would be in the very best position to make either boost-phase attacks on missiles climbing up and out of the atmosphere or even preemptive strikes while the missile is being prepared for launch.
F
IGHTING THEl
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ERRORISTN
ETWORkSBy 2006, the Global War on Terror had been renamed the Long War, signifying that the struggle against radical Islamist extremists and ter-rorists with global reach would likely be an enduring one. Dr. Andrew Krepinevich explained the nature of the primary enemy in this way:
“Radical Islamists constitute a transnational, theologically based insurgent movement seeking to overthrow regimes in the Islamic world that are friendly toward the United States, and to evict US pres-ence from parts of the world viewed as vital to America’s interests.”300 These extremists thrive on chaos and are instinctively drawn to regions with weak or no functioning governments—areas in which they can freely train and plan and prepare attacks against the US and its inter-ests. Finding them is difficult because these radical terrorists seek to blend into the surrounding civil or tribal societies in both friendly and unfriendly countries. Defeating them will require, among other things, improvements to US capabilities along a broad spectrum of irregular warfare tasks, from extensive counterinsurgency to individual man-hunting operations.
Four of the joint force capabilities cited in the 2006 QDR as being necessary to defeat extremists and their terrorist networks are:
300 Krepinevich, “The Quadrennial Defense Review.”
• Prompt global strike to attack fleeting enemy targets rapidly;
• Persistent surveillance to find and precisely target enemy capa-bilities in denied areas;
• Capabilities to locate, tag, and track terrorists in all domains, including cyberspace; and
• Capabilities and organizations to help fuse intelligence and oper-ations to speed action based on time-sensitive intelligence.301
Once again, these capabilities suggest that joint forces need to be able to create distributed and persistent (24/7) surveillance-strike networks over known enemy operating areas. These networks must be capable of searching for terrorist targets, and attacking them as soon as they reveal themselves, and before they can disappear. Aerial plat-forms with the ability to both hunt and kill, like the Reaper hunter-killer UASs, will be especially valuable because they are able to precisely identify potential targets. Additionally, when operating as part of a sur-veillance-strike network based on rapid decision protocols, they can minimize the inherent time delay between identifying a fleeting threat and attacking it.
These persistent irregular warfare surveillance-strike networks will often need to be maintained over long ranges, in many cases due to the sheer geographical distances. For example, Africa and Central Asia are home to broad stretches of ungoverned areas attractive to the enemy. Moreover, an ability to assemble and operate persistent networks from long range will have the additional benefit of greatly reducing the number of foreign bases needed to conduct broad area surveillance, independent search and strike missions, and persistent surveillance-strike support of special operations forces operating against a located enemy. In some cases, such as operations against state sponsors of ter-ror that harbor extremists planning attacks out of area, these networks will need to be stealthy. Another benefit of stealthy ISR-strike platforms is that they can help provide friendly governments with plausible deni-ability of US forces or counter-terrorism forces operating inside their national borders from exterior or interior bases.
301 2006 QDR Report, pp. 23–24.
O
pERATING IN Ap
ROlIFERATEDW
ORlD The third major 21st century strategic challenge facing the United States—operating in a world that sees increasing proliferation of weap-ons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapweap-ons—is a problem that concerns an increasing number of strategic thinkers.302 The 2006 QDR Report mentions a number of different proliferation threats in the com-ing decades, such as hostile nations developcom-ing WMD capabilities and the loss of a state’s control over its nuclear inventory. These threats, as well as others that stem from the general spread of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons technology, open the door to a future where the use of weapons of mass destruction is an increasing likelihood.For example, the end of the Cold War saw a number of nations pursue nuclear weapons programs as a way of bolstering their inter-national status and as a deterrent against either local enemies or the United States, or both. In 1998, India and Pakistan both unambigu-ously joined the “club” of nuclear-armed states. In 2006, North Korea exploded a nuclear weapon, and Iran is widely suspected of seeking the capacity to manufacture them. These events may trigger even wider proliferation. Indeed, the potential exists for a nuclear “domino effect”
to spread throughout the Middle East as predominantly Sunni nations like Saudi Arabia or Egypt move to develop their own nuclear weapons if Iran successfully explodes a “Shia bomb.” Even Japan may be forced to consider a national nuclear deterrent force in light of the North Korean nuclear test and PRC military expansion. Should such a nuclear break-out occur, the probability that nuclear arms may be used either to coerce neighbors or to gain a wartime advantage seems certain to increase.
Setting aside the problem of more nuclear-armed states, the US military must also be prepared to prevent the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons by non-state actors. Leaders of al Qaeda have made their desire to get their hands on nuclear weapons quite clear, as well as their willingness to use them to further their aims. Preventing this is one of the “greatest dangers” facing the US armed forces.303
302 For excellent examples of people thinking about the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation, see Fred Charles Iklé’, “The Second Coming of the Nuclear Age,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 1996: 119–128; Paul Bracken,
“The Second Nuclear Age,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2000: 146–157;
and Steven Peter Rosen, “After Proliferation: What To Do If More States Go Nuclear,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2006: 9-14.
303 2006 QDR Report, p. 32.
This explains why the 2006 QDR directs all of the Services to organize, train, and equip their forces for WMD elimination opera-tions.304 These operations will be made possible by improvements in the following:
• Capabilities to locate, tag, and track WMD, their delivery sys-tems, and related materials, including the means to move such items.
• Capabilities to detect fissile materials such as nuclear devices at stand-off ranges.
• Interdiction capabilities to stop air, maritime, and ground ship-ments of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials.
• Persistent surveillance over wide areas to locate WMD capabili-ties or hostile forces.
• Non-lethal weapons to secure WMD sites so that materials can-not be removed.
• The capability to shield critical and vulnerable systems and technologies from the catastrophic effects of electromagnetic pulse (EMP).305
This list of capabilities needed to support future WMD elimina-tion operaelimina-tions suggests the need for joint aerial platforms with greater range, endurance and persistence, stealth, and hardened networking (e.g., ability for communication links and electronics to withstand EMP). These platforms would allow for the assembly of special coun-ter-WMD surveillance-strike networks capable of persistent observa-tion of a naobserva-tion’s WMD infrastructure; assured tracking of WMD strike systems or weapons as they are moved, shipped, or deployed to opera-tional launch sites; or pre-emptive or preventive raids to seize WMD sites or weapons systems. Such a persistent network would need to have multi-phenomenology sensors to overcome an enemy’s extensive use of decoys, as well as new WMD detection capabilities and both lethal and non-lethal weapons. Both would likely be facilitated by long-dwell, persistent surveillance. As suggested in the list above, platforms in such a counter-WMD network might need to be EMP-hardened to continue
304 Ibid., p. 34.
305 Ibid.
operating even after the use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, given the stakes associated with a future WMD elimination operation, the net-work would also need assured, rapid man-in-the-loop decision proto-cols. Finally, since any country with the resources and technical skills to pursue weapons of mass destruction will likely protect them from aerospace attack with integrated air defense systems, many of these operations will most likely demand all-aspect stealth.
Of course, the surveillance-strike networks erected to counter state-sponsored WMD programs would be equally valuable when work-ing to deny radical extremists and terrorists access to and the use of nuclear weapons. Similarly, the persistent surveillance-strike networks needed to hunt for “loose nukes” would be similar to those needed to prosecute the Long War, except that their sought-after “high-value tar-gets” might be a single nuclear warhead rather than a single terrorist.
In all cases, the ability to assemble persistent and stealthy coun-ter-WMD surveillance-strike networks over long ranges may prove to be vitally important. Any operation against a WMD-armed adversary might find forward basing access denied. Countries within striking range of an enemy’s WMD forces may be unwilling to risk an attack on their territory by granting US forces operational access. If this hap-pens, the United States must be ready to assemble and operate its WMD surveillance-strike networks from bases located at sea or outside the theater of operations.
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The fourth strategic challenge identified in the 2006 QDR was “shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads,” a euphemism for the problem of dealing with the rise or decline of great powers. In this regard, the report mentioned three potential great powers that would likely attract the most US attention—China, Russia, and India. However, of these, the report singled out China as having “the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive
military technologies that could over time offset traditional US military advantages absent US counter strategies.”306
The report did not suggest that a hostile military competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China was pre-ordained. Moreover, even if a wider global military competition with China should occur, it would most likely develop over a long period of time due to the current state of the PRC armed forces. However, a clash with China over Taiwan could take place much sooner, primar-ily because of the clearly stated positions of both the Chinese and US governments. For its part, the Chinese government has explicitly declared that it would tolerate no overt Taiwanese move toward inde-pendence, and that it would use force, if necessary, to block such a move.
The United States has made it equally clear that it would likely come to the defense of Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. Given these circumstances, Chinese political and military leaders are clearly hedg-ing against the possibility that they may have to fight a war against the United States. Such a conflict would be characterized by highly accurate and deadly firepower and “near total battlefield awareness, nonlinear battlefields, and multidimensional combat.”307
As will be discussed at length later in this report, PRC military strategies and plans for such a future high-tech fight are based on anti-access/area-denial operations and tactics designed to disrupt or pre-vent US forces from mounting effective operations in support of Taiwan long enough to permit the Chinese to achieve their military and politi-cal aims. For the purposes of this discussion, PRC “anti-access opera-tions” are defined as actions taken to deny US forces from deploying to a position in theater from which they can conduct effective opera-tions against Chinese forces. They include PRC political action to coerce regional countries into denying US forces access to operational bases, and operational attacks against existing US regional bases or forward-deployed naval forces. PRC “area-denial operations” are actions taken
306 India was called “a key strategic partner” and Russia was listed as “unlikely to pose a military threat to the United States or its allies.” 2006 QDR Report, pp. 28–29.
307 Ka Po Ng, Interpreting China’s Military Power, Doctrine Makes Readiness (Routledge, 2004), p. 21, accessed online at http://books.google.com/book s?id=pe1tJb2e9JIC&printsec=frontcover&dq=%22local+war+under+high+
technology+conditions%22#PPP1,M1 on March 28, 2007; and Roger Cliff, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase, Derek Eaton, and Kevin L. Pollpeter, Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Anti-access Strategies and Their Implications for the United States (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007), p. 21.
within the Pacific theater of operations to deny successfully deployed US forces an ability to conduct effective operations in the vicinity of Taiwan
within the Pacific theater of operations to deny successfully deployed US forces an ability to conduct effective operations in the vicinity of Taiwan