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EFENSE IND
EpTHAt least two potential homeland defense missions would benefit from the extended range and persistence offered by N-UCAS. These are defend-ing the continental United States from long-range cruise missile attacks, and providing global defense in depth against ballistic missile attacks.
The N-UCAS’s ability to fly persistent surveillance-strike orbits at extended ranges could be quite valuable if the United States confronted a state or non-state actor armed with land-attack cruise missiles. Due to the difficulty in tracking and intercepting high-speed or stealthy cruise missiles, a future homeland defense scenario involving cruise missiles would focus on killing the “archers” not the “arrows”—just as the Navy planned to do during the Cold War Outer Air Battle. In cases where the missiles might be employed from ships, long-loitering N-UCASs armed with air-to-surface guided munitions would provide a more effective outer-ring defense than manned aircraft, which would be limited to mission lengths no more than ten hours long. Against airborne threats, or against cruise missiles, N-UCASs carrying air-to-air missiles, and operating under the control of manned airborne warning and control platforms like the E-2D Hawkeye or Air Force Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), could form the outer edge of an extended continental integrated air defense network at ranges beyond the effec-tive range of any air-launched land-attack missile. Of course, the N-UCASs could also operate from land bases. In either case, because of their long endurance, N-UCASs would be a far better choice for this mission than manned fighter-interceptors. As for submarine-launched cruise missiles, the N-UCAS could also be configured for wide-area anti- submarine warfare operations, serving as a remote monitor of sonobuoy sensor networks, as a long-range ASW aircraft able to prosecute attacks
against a distant submarine target, or as an air defender against cruise missiles launched from submarines.327
As suggested in the previous chapter, forward boost-phase ballis-tic missile defense (BMD) is another homeland defense mission that is uniquely suited to the N-UCAS’s capabilities. The only US boost-phase defensive system of record is the Airborne Laser (ABL)—a specially-modified Boeing 747 jetliner equipped with special optics and a chemi-cal oxygen iodine laser (COIL). The employment concept for the ABL is for the plane to fly figure-eight patterns over friendly territory or in uncontested airspace, scanning the horizon for missile “plumes.” Once a ballistic missile launch is detected, the aircraft would first illuminate the missile with a tracking laser, which would allow the ABL’s adaptive optics to account for atmospheric turbulence, and then fire the COIL in a three- to five-second burst, weakening the missile’s skin and caus-ing a catastrophic failure. Of the several potential problems with this concept, two stand out. The first is the effective range of the COIL. The American Physical Society calculated that, under the best of conditions, the maximum effective range of the laser against liquid-fueled rockets would be approximately 320 nm, while the maximum effective range against solid-fueled rockets would be only half that. Against any capable enemy with a modern integrated air defense system, operating a large, ungainly B-747 within 160 nm of a ballistic missile launch area would be very risky. And, second, because the ABL’s primary weapon is a chemical laser, the ABL fleet would need to operate from a large, fixed, forward theater base, with storage facilities for large amounts of toxic, volatile chemicals. This base would be a natural target for enemy attacks. 328
A better, more survivable boost-phase BMD system might be an N-UCAS specially modified to carry and employ the new Network-Centric Airborne Defense Element, or NCADE. NCADE is an AIM-120 AMRAAM equipped with a new second-stage liquid-fueled rocket motor and the advanced infrared seeker of the AIM-9X Sidewinder. The former gives the NCADE the added speed necessary to catch a ballistic missile in its boost or early ascent phase; the latter allows it to home in on the ballistic missile’s high-infrared signature. Although the NCADE
327 The Navy is working on a suitcase-size control console that could be operated from either E-2Ds or P-8 patrol craft. See Fulghum, Chavanne, and Butler, “Stealth at Sea,” p. 34.
328 See “Airborne Laser,” at http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/
abl.htm; and “Boeing YAL-1,” at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_YAL-1.
Both websites were accessed online on September 10, 2007.
is heavier than a standard AMRAAM, it has roughly the same dimen-sions, likely allowing for its internal carriage inside an N-UCAS. As the missile is specifically designed to operate as part of a broader ballistic missile defense network, it would be cued by external sensors.329 The first actual test of the NCADE concept occurred in December 2007, when an F-16 multi-role fighter engaged and destroyed a sounding rocket in its boost phase. Expectations are that an operational NCADE would have an operational engagement range of approximately 100 nm.330
The N-UCAS/NCADE combination could help make the US air-craft carrier force both a formidable theater ballistic missile defender as well as the leading edge of a national BMD system. Even when more than 3,000 nm away, a carrier equipped with a single 12-aircraft N-UCAS squadron could establish up to five 24-hour-a-day, persistent BMD CAPs inside a hostile power’s air defense network and above its missile launch sites within ten hours. It could establish more CAPS as the carrier closed the range.331 Two aircraft carriers would double the number of orbits. Armed with guided air-to-ground weapons, orbiting N-UCASs could launch preemptive precision attacks on missile launch sites should final launch preparations be observed. Alternatively, when equipped with NCADEs, the N-UCAS would conduct boost-phase inter-cepts of any missiles that were launched.
Indeed, a Carrier Strike Force equipped with N-UCAS could potentially establish and maintain a stifling BMD network over almost any rogue regional nuclear power, providing an important additional capability to the land-based missile defenses stationed in Alaska.332
329 See “NCADE — An ABM AMRAAM?” Defense Industry Daily, December 6, 2007, accessed online at http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/ncade-an-abm-amraam-03305 on September 10, 2007.
330 “US Jet Intercepts Ballistic Missile for the First Time,” accessed online at http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=071204233530.iix59uhf&show_
artic on December 6, 2007.
331 It is worth noting that the number of persistent missile defense CAPs that the US military can currently generate is zero.
332 For example, Raytheon executive Mike Booen states that the entire North Korean missile launch complex in eastern North Korea could be covered by NCADE-equipped aircraft operating in international airspace. N-UCASs could perform such ballistic missile defense (BMD) picket orbits much more effectively than manned platforms. Moreover, due to their stealthy configuration, they could be operated much closer to the launch complexes.
David A. Fulghum, “Space-RAAM: Veteran AIM-120 dogfight missile is recast as a ballistic missile interceptor,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, May 21, 2007, p. 31.
When operating in conjunction with surface combatants armed with anti-ballistic missiles capable of mid-course intercepts, the N-UCAS’s prospective ability to provide reliable boost-phase intercepts could give the nation a compelling defense in depth against all types of ballistic missiles, and a visible capability that the President could deploy for effect in order to diffuse a crisis or to deter a potential nuclear adversary.