A description of circular justification cannot be meaningfully separated from that of its opposite in the geometrical framework, linearity, since the presence of one implies the absence of the other. An epistemological demonstration could be said to be circular
“in so far as the truth of the system of philosophy is supposed to be a function of the truth of its starting point; which, in turn, is supposed to be demonstrated by the very system in question.”6 Understood as such, circularity could be reasonably opposed to its
epistemological opposite, linearity, the view that a philosophical argument “presupposes explicit beginning or ending points of a chain or arguments or reflection, points which are taken as absolute in some sense or another.”7
5Daniel Breazeale, “Certainty, Universality, and Conviction: The Methodological Primacy of Practical Reason within the Jena Wissenschaftslehre,” in New Perspectives on Fichte, ed. Daniel Breazeale and Tom Rockmore, 1996), 36.
6Daniel Breazeale, “Circles and Grounds in the Jena Wissenschaftslehre,” in Fichte: Historical
Contexts/Contemporary Controversies, ed. Daniel Breazeale and Tom Rockmore (Atlantic Highlands, NJ:
Humanities Books, 1994), 44.
7Kevin Stoehr, “The Virtues of Circular Reasoning,” in Epistemology (The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy), vol. 5, ed. Richard Cobb-Stevens (Bowling Green, OH: Philosophy Documentation Center, Bowling Green State University, 2000), 163–4.
Rockmore indicates that linearity and circularity have their origin in geometry but remarks that they could be used for functions that are otherwise than geometrical, for example, they could be utilized to justify claims to knowledge. According to Rockmore, circular and linear demonstrations both have a decent representation in the history of philosophy that goes back to the pre-Socratics.8 Although both epistemological models are represented in the Western philosophical tradition, there is good reason to believe that linearity remains the preferred justification in philosophy and continues to dominate the intellectual debate even today. For Seigfried, the fact that theories of philosophers such as Nietzsche, Charles Sanders Pierce, and William James have been unable to completely escape fundationalist metaphors succinctly demonstrates this fact.9 Part of the appeal of linear argument may not be unconnected with the fact that it is the intellectual model that has been passed down in the Western philosophical tradition from generation to
generation over the years. At least since Plato, the philosophical tradition has tended to construe genuine knowledge as reason’s ability to intuit reality in its objective
existence.10
But our fascination with linear reasoning might be driven by a host of
considerations that are not wholly philosophical. Somehow, we tend to be more favorably disposed toward systems that make it possible for us to verify that projects embarked upon are capable of yielding measurable outcomes. Conversely, we tend to view with
8Tom Rockmore, Hegel’s Circular Epistemology (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986), 2.
9Charlene Siegfried, “Like Bridges Without Piers: Beyond the Foundationalist Metaphor,” in
Antifoundationalism Old and New, ed. Tom Rockmore and Beth Singer (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 143–44.
10Robert Crease, “Science as Foundational?” in Questioning Foundations, ed. Hugh Silverman (New York:
Routledge, 1993), 44.
disdain or suspicion any process that is perceived to be inconclusive. With its clearly identifiable starting and ending points, it is not surprising, therefore, that we find linear proof more appealing than its circular counterpart that many still associate with vicious circularity or error in the reasoning process.
Stoehr rightly observes that humans tend, for the most part, to seek closure to situations, and are disappointed when things remain unresolved, especially when such lack of closure borders on painful experience. For example, a family whose loved one has gone missing in combat will achieve closure only when the issue of that loved one’s status is successfully determined. According to Stoehr, it is the desire for closure in our lives that that often propels us toward the divine or the absolute.11 Following from this argument is the inference that we are more likely to be suspicious of a strategy that appears to be open-ended than the one that facilitates us in the resolution of our issues.
Another reason for our favorable disposition toward linearity may pertain to the influence of the theologies of the major world religious traditions, for example,
Christianity and Islam. Both Christianity and Islam tend to interpret our presence on earth in teleological terms, and successfully convinced their adherents it is a worthwhile
venture subordinating the here and now to the yet to come. A variant of this theology could be found in Augustine who claims that the human person, who is created for relationships with God, continually yearns for union with the creator: “For you have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you.”12 For the adherents of these religious traditions, while the here and now may be good, since it is not the ultimate
11Stoehr, “The Virtues of Circular Reasoning,” 165.
12Augustine, The Confessions of Saint Augustine, trans. John Ryan (New York: Doubleday/Image, 1960), 43.
it is nothing in comparison to the eternal bliss that is reserved by God for those who distinguished themselves while on Earth.
For better or for worse, these factors make us seem to privilege linearity over circularity. Without any shadow of doubt, linearity’s gains constitute circularity’s losses.
For instance, there has been a quick rush to dismiss circular justification as a mere geometrical pictorial metaphor undeserving of any serious intellectual consideration.
Some people also tend to associate circular reasoning with attempts to escape the responsibility of having to demonstrate one’s cognitive claims.
Stoehr speaks for me when he argues that circularity definitely has something to contribute to the epistemological debate and is, therefore, deserving of every serious attention. Rockmore agrees: “In his claim that theory is necessarily circular and
inevitably circular Fichte rehabilitates a form of argument that had been much neglected since early Greek thought.”13 By his rehabilitation of circularity, Fichte has shown that, contrary to popular perception, circular reasoning does not render impossible the search for reliable knowledge or certainty; instead, it specifies the nature of the certainty or reliable knowledge philosophy is capable of yielding, namely, that truths are products of their conceptual frameworks. In my view, if not for anything else, circularity is worth our consideration for its pedagogical value. What is more, if anything is good in and of itself, philosophy is that something irrespective of whether or not it yields any concrete
outcome.
13Tom Rockmore, Before and After Hegel: A Historical Introduction to Hegel’s Thought, (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1992), 107.